The Appellate Defenders, Inc., Appellate Practice Manual is designed to assist appointed attorneys representing criminal, juvenile delinquency and dependency, and other indigent parties on appeal in California. It addresses common matters often encountered in appellate practice and gives attorneys a guide through each phase of the entire process.

The manual discusses a great variety of topics in law and procedure, practice, ethics, and policy. Some of the material is basic, but much is advanced, based on extensive research. The manual is divided into nine chapters:

Chapter 1 – basic information for appointed counsel
Chapter 2 – what can be appealed and how to get an appeal started
Chapter 3 – record completion, extensions, release on appeal
Chapter 4 – issue spotting and selection
Chapter 5 – briefing
Chapter 6 – oral argument
Chapter 7 – decisions by reviewing courts and processes after decision
Chapter 8 – California writs
Chapter 9 – federal habeas corpus

The manual is the product of many years of effort. Using various sources – articles from the 1993 ADI manual, drafts written for the manual, briefs, and much original research – Executive Director Elaine Alexander and Senior Staff Attorney Howard Cohen did the primary writing (and multiple rewrites) and editing. Each chapter was reviewed by one or more ADI staff attorneys in detail. Other staff attorneys reviewed the entire manual for correctness of substance and consistency. Law clerks and attorneys checked all citations repeatedly. Since then Elaine Alexander and Howard Cohen have done updates at least once or more each year.

In 2016 the Second Edition was published. An expansion of scope, the second edition newly covered dependency, as well as criminal and delinquency appeals.

The manual is on the ADI website. The most up to date version will always be the one online, given the practicalities of hard copy printing.

We believe the ADI Appellate Practice Manual is a product of great quality and usability. We hope it will be consulted regularly and routinely by new and experienced appellate practitioners alike, and that it will be a truly valuable resource to them.

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I. INTRODUCTION [§ 1.0]

The California system of appointed appellate counsel is unique in using nonprofit corporations (projects) to oversee members of the private bar (panels) in the handling of indigent appeals. Each district of the Court of Appeal, contracts with a project, as authorized by California Rules of Court, rule 8.300(e), to discharge the court’s constitutional or statutory duty to provide effective assistance of counsel to those entitled to appointed counsel. The project manages the district’s panel and assists the court in the administration of the system. The system delivers high-quality representation to as many as 10,000 or more clients a year in a remarkably flexible and cost-effective way. Started in 1983 by Appellate Defenders, Inc., which serves the Fourth Appellate District, the system quickly moved to all six Court of Appeal districts and the California Supreme Court.

This chapter outlines in broad terms the role of counsel appointed to represent indigent clients under the project-panel system. It addresses the relationship between the panel attorney and the project, the duties of counsel during the course of a typical appeal, client relations, the use of associate counsel, classification of counsel and cases and the matching of counsel to specific cases, and compensation for appointed representation.

This manual is purely descriptive and does not create rights or obligations of any kind. The project or the judiciary may revise, delete, or supplement any policy, practice, or procedure at any time in their sole discretion, with or without notice.

1The projects are the First District Appellate Project, the California Appellate Project/ Los Angeles (Second District), the Central California Appellate Program (Third and Fifth Districts), Appellate Defenders, Inc. (Fourth District), and the Sixth District Appellate Program. The California Appellate Project/San Francisco serves the California Supreme Court in death penalty cases.
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PANEL AND PROJECT  [§ 1.1]

A. Project-Panel System  [§ 1.1A]

As previously mentioned, each Court of Appeal district has a contract with a project (a non-profit corporation created for the purpose of serving indigents on appeal) to administer the system of appointed counsel. Each project is run by an executive director and has a staff of experienced appellate attorneys, ranging in number from, roughly, five to 25, depending on the caseload of the district. It also employs case processors, claims processors, and other support staff to assist with the office’s workload.

The project in turn runs a panel of, typically, several hundred private attorneys. Attorneys must apply to the panel and be accepted by the project. Besides admission decisions, the project classifies panel attorneys by their qualifications. These attorneys are selected by the project on a case-by-case basis to receive appointment offers. Each case is evaluated for likely complexity, and the project matches it with an attorney with the appropriate background and record of performance. The court formally appoints the recommended attorney. Project staff attorneys evaluate all work, periodically review and revise panel attorneys’ levels, and remove certain attorneys from the panel. They assist attorneys in their handling of individual cases and provide such resource help as manuals, brief and/or issue banks, seminars, educational programs, newsletters, e-mail notices, websites, and hotlines.

Under the supervision of the judiciary, the project recommends compensation for the panel attorney in each case, using judicially established guidelines. Payment is made by the Judicial Council of California from a fund appropriated by the Legislature. The judiciary performs quarterly audits of the projects’ recommendations through the Appellate Indigent Defense Oversight Advisory Committee, which consists of justices from each district, several project representatives, a panel attorney, and a civil appellate attorney.

In addition to administering the panel, the project assists the court, the Judicial Council of California judicial services, the Appellate Indigent Defense Oversight Advisory Committee, and other parts of the judiciary; provides advice about appellate issues to trial counsel; and helps defendants with problems in filing notices of appeal. Its staff attorneys also directly represent a number of clients.

Formerly Administrative Office of the Courts.

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Panel attorneys are responsible for becoming and remaining familiar with project policies and requirements. These are frequently promulgated by email, websites, manuals (such as this), written materials, and other readily accessible means.

B. Panel Membership  [§ 1.2]

The appointed counsel panel provides quality representation to indigent clients by using attorneys in private practice working with the assistance, administrative support, and oversight of a project such as ADI. Panel membership is not intended to, and does not, create any contractual rights or any employment relationship with the project, the Court of Appeal, or any other part of the judiciary. It does not guarantee a member any particular number of cases, or any cases at all, or continuing panel membership. The project and the judiciary have full authority and sole discretion to determine the number and kind of cases, if any, offered individual attorneys and to remove attorneys from the panel at any time, with or without cause and with or without notice.

The Appellate Indigent Defense Oversight Advisory Committee has decreed that the projects may not admit or keep attorneys who reside out of state, unless they are independent.

1. Conflicts interfering with panel membership  [§ 1.2A]

The projects’ policies on conflicts are similar, though not necessarily identical. In general, because a panel attorney is in private practice and is not an employee of the project, the attorney may engage in other kinds of practice, provided the work does not create a conflict of interest. ADI treats as a conflict any work of any kind with a prosecuting agency or law enforcement (or civil equivalent such as county counsel) or a court. It does not matter what cases the work might entail, whether the attorney is paid, or what the geographical area is.

A panel attorney may, for example, do criminal defense or dependency defense or civil trial work and retained appeals. He or she may do motion work for a criminal defense attorney or a dependency attorney representing parents or children or a civil attorney. ADI would regard as a conflict, however, the same work for a district attorney, police, or county counsel office (even one out of state); serving in the judiciary in any capacity or jurisdiction; employment as a regular instructor for a court or a law enforcement agency.\(^3\) Although this bright-line policy goes beyond the ethical

\(^3\)This list is illustrative and is not intended to be exhaustive.

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requirements of the State Bar, ADI uses it to protect its cases from even being challenged for the appearance of possible conflicting loyalties.

ADI also uses a strong presumption that an attorney who handled trial proceedings in a given case should not be appointed on the appeal. (See People v. Bailey (1992) 9 Cal. App.4th 1252, 1254-1255; see 2011 ADI ethics article, Arguing One’s Own Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.)

2. Differences with staff attorney; ultimate responsibility for case

As is true for most districts, the appointed attorney is the sole counsel of record in ADI cases and has full, final, and personal responsibility for handling them. The attorney continues to bear this responsibility when delegating work to associate counsel or law clerks (see §§ 1.79-1.82, post, on responsible use of such assistance) or when consulting with a project staff attorney.

The project provides assistance and advice from experienced and highly trained appellate attorneys. Appointed counsel should follow the project attorney’s guidance unless counsel has a strong reason, based on the best interests of the client, to reject it.

If a difference of opinion arises between appointed counsel and a project staff attorney on the best way to handle a case, appointed counsel should listen to and give considerable weight to the staff attorney’s opinion but need not yield if not persuaded. It is often helpful to step back and try to state the other person’s position in the strongest possible light, then try to close the gap on the points of disagreement. If the differences persist, the appointed attorney can ask the staff attorney to get a second opinion from another staff attorney or to refer the question to the project executive director. Ultimately the appointed attorney, as counsel of record, must follow his or her own professional judgment.


5The Sixth District has a different system, in which the Sixth District Appellate Program is counsel of record and associates the panel attorney for the appeal. Because the accompanying text describes the ADI system, counsel should check with SDAP for differences in handling a Sixth District case.
3. **Steps to take when attorney is unable to handle responsibilities of case** [§ 1.2C]

Panel attorneys, as counsel of record, must ensure their cases are covered when they are unable to handle them. If the attorney will be unable, for a variety of reasons, to handle the basic responsibilities of the case in the long term, the attorney must notify the project about being relieved. The project is happy to work with attorneys in such a situation to find substitute counsel. This is a responsible approach that protects the client and the attorney’s own reputation with the project and the court.

For temporary coverage, such as vacations and short illnesses, continuances are often the best solution. If that is not feasible, it is advisable to have standing arrangements with another attorney of equivalent experience to cover workload during absences. Panel attorneys should not count on the assigned staff attorney to cover for them.

ADI panel attorneys should consult and comply with the ADI newsletter articles on this subject.⁶

4. **Duty to keep informed and in contact, to maintain active State Bar membership** [§ 1.2D]

Panel attorneys are responsible for all information the project makes available to them via e-mail, the website, mailings, telephone, or any other methods of communication. They must maintain a valid e-mail address. In the Fourth District, this is the way ADI makes case offers and sends news alerts to the panel.

Attorneys are responsible for keeping the project, the Judicial Council services, all courts in which they have active cases, and all current clients informed of any changes in contact information, tax identification, and other key administrative matters affecting them. (Attorneys must notify the project and Judicial Council services with the official change of address form.⁷ For changes in tax identification information, the change of address form itself does not constitute adequate notice: it must be accompanied by an IRS Form W-9.⁸)

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⁷http://www.courts.ca.gov/4201.htm

Appointed counsel must maintain active California State Bar membership throughout the life of any court-appointed appeal. They must notify the project if their active status changes, including temporary suspensions for failure to pay dues or certify MCLE compliance.

5. Professional liability insurance  [§ 1.2E]

Each project provides professional liability coverage for panel attorneys’ work on that project’s cases. A copy of the relevant provision of that policy is available on request. Renewal of such coverage and payment of any deductible are within the project’s sole discretion.

To safeguard coverage, it is essential that appointed counsel notify the project of any suit, threat of suit, or facts that might lead to suit. The project must report this information to the carrier immediately. A delay in communicating may result in refusal of coverage by the underwriter.

C. Assisted Cases  [§ 1.3]

If a case is designated as assisted, the record will be sent to the project. In dependency fast-track cases, the panel attorney and the project staff attorney each get a copy of the record, so that they can be working simultaneously. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.416(c)(2)(B).) The assisting staff attorney may review key parts of the transcripts, then send appointed counsel the record (if the panel attorney did not initially get a copy) and documents from the project’s file and any other information that may be helpful – for example, a list of potential issues, cautionary advice on matters that might be troublesome, sample briefing if available, and suggestions on how to approach the case.

After input from the project, the appointed counsel will read the record and draft an opening brief, perhaps consulting with the project staff attorney at various times. Counsel will submit the draft to the staff attorney, who will offer suggestions on adding, deleting, or modifying arguments. Suggestions may be made concerning style, form, grammar, or citations, but the project attorney should not be expected to edit or rewrite the brief; the draft should therefore represent a finished product as much as possible. Drafts must be typed or computer-printed and must be double-spaced. In some cases the staff attorney will want to see one or more revised drafts before the final brief is filed.

After the opening brief is filed, appointed counsel and the project attorney will consult on such matters as the respondent’s brief, a reply brief, oral argument, and a petition for rehearing and review. The staff attorney evaluates appointed counsel’s work and recommends compensation. An ADI panel attorney can obtain a copy of the
evaluation by emailing the staff attorney a form for requesting an evaluation when the opening brief is filed.⁹

The Appellant Indigent Defense Oversight Advisory Committee has adopted a policy that severely restricts the use of associate counsel in assisted cases. Only in rare instances will the project director waive these restrictions. (See § 1.79 et seq., post, on appropriate use of associate counsel.)

D. Independent Cases [§ 1.4]

If the case is independent, appointed counsel should receive documents from the project’s file either when counsel is appointed or when the record is forwarded. With some exceptions, such as some guilty pleas,¹⁰ the record will be sent to counsel without a staff attorney’s prior review. Appointed counsel is encouraged to consult with the assigned project attorney about issues arising in the case. As with assisted cases, the staff attorney evaluates the work and recommends compensation. A copy of the written evaluation can be obtained by attaching a request¹¹ to the opening brief.

E. “Modified” Assisted or Independent Cases [§ 1.4A]

Some assisted cases are denominated “modified assisted.” While the project staff attorney will still review drafts of the opening brief, the staff attorney may elect not to review the record before mailing or may review only limited portions, as the circumstances of the case dictate. The case remains formally “assisted” and is paid at that rate.

Some independent cases are denominated “modified independent.” They are formally “independent” and are paid at that rate, but some staff attorney involvement is contemplated, such as review of a draft of the opening brief or parts of the record. This classification is used for training attorneys for complex and serious cases, getting to know an experienced attorney new to the panel, ensuring quality control when needed, etc.


¹⁰Judiciary policy encourages the projects to retain a substantial number of Wende (no arguable issues) cases as project staff cases. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; see also Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)

III. TYPICAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF APPOINTED COUNSEL  [§ 1.5]

Counsel typically will have the responsibilities described in the following sections when handling an appointed appeal.

A. Appropriate Administration of Office and Files  [§ 1.6]

Counsel of course must keep track of all cases to which he or she is appointed. Efficient internal office organization is essential. Counsel must keep orderly files where the relevant materials such as filings and correspondence can reliably be found, where counsel’s thoughts about the case and work product are maintained, and where accurate time records (to the nearest 0.1 hour) are kept.

Effective calendaring is imperative. Some redundancy, such as a computerized calendar and a paper one, can be an invaluable safety net. Counsel should also monitor filings, due dates, and court actions through the court website.\(^{12}\) Automatic e-mail notification of major developments – filing of record and briefs, calendar notice, disposition, and remittitur – is available on request; each page has a footer entitled “Click here to request automatic e-mail notifications about this case.” Counsel should register for automatic email notification in all of their cases and also visit the site periodically to track case activity for which no e-mail notification is available.\(^{13}\) Indeed, the strong ADI policy and expectation is that the panel attorney will register; the attorney must be prepared to justify failure to do so. This resource is, of course, a backup – not a substitute for accurate records personally kept by the attorney.

B. Initial Contact with Client and Trial Counsel  [§ 1.7]

Communication with the client is covered extensively in § 1.39 et seq., post, on client relations. Generally, counsel must contact the client upon getting the case and must promptly answer letters. Soliciting the client’s suggestions on the appeal is not just good public relations: it is an integral part of the competent investigation of an appeal. The

\(^{12}\) [http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov](http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov). Some cases may not be posted for reasons of confidentiality.

\(^{13}\) Caveat: If a concurrent writ petition is filed and the Court of Appeal assigns that proceeding a new number, counsel must register for e-mail notification under that number, as well as the appeal number. The same is true for dependency cases where the parent has a previous appeal pending.
client may be aware of matters outside the record and often can shed valuable light on issues.

Trial counsel likewise can offer valuable insights into potential issues. Trial counsel can provide impressions of the case (e.g., the victim’s demeanor on the stand, the judge’s attitude) and can alert the appellate attorney to matters outside the record (e.g., motions made that have not been transcribed, jurors’ statements about the case, and potential adverse consequences from appealing).

C. Record Review and Completion; Correction of Notice of Appeal Problems
   [§ 1.8]

   1. Transcripts   [§ 1.9]

   Counsel must review the transcripts meticulously. (The process of record review is covered extensively in § 4.11 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection.”) In doing so it is helpful to make careful notes as to relevant facts and possible issues. The record may be tabbed with removable stickers for reference, but counsel should not mark or underline it. It belongs to the client and normally will be sent to him or her when the appeal is over. (This subject is covered more fully in § 1.60 et seq., post, on client records.) In addition, it conceivably could be lodged or introduced as an exhibit in a future collateral proceeding.

   Counsel also is responsible for ensuring an adequate appellate record, for the purpose of identifying and documenting all potential issues. (See People v. Barton (1979) 21 Cal.3d 513, 519-520; People v. Valenzuela (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 381, 393-394.) The topic of record correction and completion is covered extensively in § 3.12 et seq. of chapter 3, “Pre-Briefing Responsibilities: Record Completion, Extensions of Time, Release on Appeal”; see also § 4.12 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection.”

   14 It is essential to solicit trial counsel’s explanation if the appellate attorney thinks ineffective assistance of counsel might be an issue. ADI policy also requires appointed counsel to consult with the ADI attorney before raising or investigating ineffective assistance of counsel, regardless whether the issue is being considered for the direct appeal or for a habeas corpus investigation. Consultation with ADI helps prevent abuse of the issue and facilitates proper handling of the critical first contact with trial counsel. The requirement does not apply for a “fallback” IAC argument (“No objection was required, and if it was, counsel was ineffective for not raising it”).

   15
Some courts specify additions to the normal record through local rules or miscellaneous orders. These rules and orders are generally available on the court website.  

2. Superior court file and exhibits  [§ 1.10]

Record review may require inspection of the superior court file and exhibits. Such a step might be important if the record is hard to understand, if counsel has trouble discovering issues, or if either the client or trial counsel has referred to events not in the transcripts. The superior court file may contain documents not in the transcripts, such as pretrial motions, notes from the jury, letters of recommendation submitted at sentencing, communications about or from the client, and orders made after judgment. A number of counties now make superior court files available online. Confidential records, such as juvenile cases, are not publicly available. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 827.)

If necessary, appointed counsel should review exhibits, such as diagrams, maps, photographs, documents proving prior convictions, and physical evidence. Counsel should make copies of relevant documents and arrange for transmission to the Court of Appeal of any exhibits the court should inspect. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.224, 8.320(e), 8.407(f).) If reviewing an audio or video recording, counsel should take appropriate equipment. Exhibits are part of the record, and so briefs may cite to exhibits as well as a transcript. (Rules 8.320(e), 8.407(f).)

Court-specific processes of reviewing superior court records in the Fourth Appellate District are described on the ADI website pages on Fourth District practice.

15 http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm. For the Fourth Appellate District, court-specific orders for additions to the normal record and the processes of record completion are described at http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/fourth_dist.asp.

16 It is helpful to call the exhibit room at the superior court to make advance arrangements for such review. Some courts require an appointment. If counsel wishes to see confidential juvenile court records, counsel should bring a copy of the Court of Appeal’s appointment order, and should draw the court’s attention to Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(E), giving counsel authority to view the confidential records.

17 Some courts provide forms for requesting transmission of exhibits.

18 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/fourth_dist.asp
Anna Jauregui-Law’s article on *Demystifying the Exhibit Review Process*\(^{19}\) likewise gives comprehensive guidance for Fourth Appellate District cases.

Long-distance travel by an appointed attorney to the superior court may be unnecessary. Counsel should contact trial counsel first, to see whether he or she can provide copies of missing documents or provide other information. Also, files for cases tried at a branch court can usually be sent to the county’s main courthouse for review, if arrangements are made in advance. Exhibits may not be transferable, however: check with the court. Another possibility might be to transfer the superior court file to the Court of Appeal.

If counsel’s office is far from the county where the case was tried, a project staff attorney or other staff member might be able to review the file and exhibits on behalf of counsel, but not all projects offer this service. The assigned staff attorney is the best source of information on local practice.

3. Notice of appeal problems [§ 1.11]

Normally the project handles notice of appeal problems, such as untimeliness or inadequacy in form or content, before appointment of counsel. Occasionally the problem surfaces later, however, and appointed counsel may face the responsibility of correcting it. Counsel should consult the assigned staff attorney. (See § 2.90 et seq., “Procedural Steps for Getting Appeal Started,” in chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and What It Takes To Get an Appeal Started.”)

If counsel determines there are multiple notices of appeal from the same proceedings, counsel should discuss with the project whether the appointment orders cover all necessary aspects of the case and whether consolidation might be appropriate.\(^{20}\)

D. Remedies in Trial Court [§ 1.11A]

On occasion, counsel should or must seek a remedy in the trial court, as a precondition to, or alternative to, raising an issue in the appellate court. These uses of trial court remedies are exceptions to the general rule that the filing of a valid notice of appeal


\(^{20}\)In a dependency case, for example, a parent may appeal from the termination hearing and separately from the denial of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 motion ordered on a different day from the termination hearing.
vests jurisdiction in the appellate court and divests the trial court of jurisdiction until issuance of the remittitur. (*People v. Perez* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 554; *Gallenkamp v. Superior Court* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1, 8-10.) Allowing the trial court to correct its own errors instead of invoking the whole appellate process (with its need for transcripts, briefing, oral argument, written decision, etc.) promotes judicial economy. It is often more expeditious – an important consideration in time-sensitive cases (see § 1.30, post).

The principle that the trial court loses jurisdiction pending appeal does not apply to juvenile cases, because the juvenile court retains ongoing jurisdiction during the appeal. (*In re Nicholas H.* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 259-261; *In re Omar R.* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439; *In re Natasha A.* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28; *In re Katherine R.* (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 354, 356-357; see Code Civ. Proc., § 917.7.) For this reason, appellate counsel should be in contact with trial counsel throughout the progress of the appeal to determine whether proceedings in the trial court have changed the posture of the appeal significantly.21 Theoretically, under California Rules of Court, rule 8.410(b)(2), the juvenile court clerk should notify the Court of Appeal and parties when this occurs, but in practice they seldom remember. (See also rule 8.340(a).)

As to criminal cases, an example of statutorily required initial resort to the trial court is Penal Code section 1237.1, which requires a motion in the trial court to correct clerical errors in custody or conduct credits before raising that issue as the only one on appeal, and section 1237.2, applying the same requirement to fines, fees, and similar monetary assessments. (See § 2.13 of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started.”)


__________________________

21This is especially true in dependency appeals from jurisdictional findings.
The preferred approach is generally to ask trial counsel to make the motion in the trial court. If that approach is not appropriate or feasible, however, appellate counsel should consult the project about handling the matter himself or herself.

E. Selection of Issues  [§ 1.12]

Issue selection begins with a comprehensive, non-selective list of potential issues and proceeds through a gradual winnowing process to the final selection. Often the choice of issues will depend on further record review, research, consultation with other attorneys, and consideration of such matters as the relative strength and scope of the issues, strategic factors, the client’s expressed concerns, and potential adverse consequences. (See chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection” for an extensive discussion of the issue selection process; see also ADI’s article on To Brief or Not To Brief: Marginal Issues.\(^{22}\))

Appellate counsel has no constitutional duty to raise every non-frivolous issue requested by the client.  (Davila v. Davis (2017) ___ U.S. ___ [137 S.Ct. 2058, 2067, 198 L.Ed.2d 603]; Jones v. Barnes (1983) 463 U.S. 745.) If the client insists on raising issues that, in counsel’s professional judgment, would have no reasonable chance of success or would detract from stronger issues, counsel should consult with the assigned staff attorney. In the end, counsel’s responsibility is to handle the case according to counsel’s best professional judgment, and issue selection is one of the most critical decisions appellate counsel makes.

Procedures for situations in which counsel can find no arguable issues are discussed in § 1.24 et seq., post, and more extensively in § 4.73 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection.”

F. Preparation of the Opening Brief  [§ 1.13]

This topic is covered extensively in chapter 5, “Effective Written Advocacy: Briefing.” Very summarily, brief preparation requires a number of steps: drafting the statement of case and statement of facts,\(^{23}\) researching, drafting the arguments, submitting


\(^{23}\)Some attorneys prefer to draft the statements of case and facts as a first step, to put the case in a concrete contextual focus, while others find it beneficial to wait until the arguments are drafted, to ensure the statements do not contain material irrelevant to helping the court understand the issues.
the draft brief to the project staff attorney in an assisted case, revising the draft, and filing the final version as required by the California Rules of Court.

A copy of the brief must be sent to the client, unless the client has specifically requested otherwise. It is important at that time to explain the omission of any issues in which the client has expressed an interest or which were intensively litigated at trial. This kind of communication is vital to foster good relations and helps forestall ineffective assistance of appellate counsel or malpractice claims. Depending on circumstances, appointed counsel may or may not provide explanations for rejecting other issues.

Special care must be exercised in juvenile and other confidential cases to follow rules for the title of the case, names used in the brief, names and addresses on the proof of service, returning the record at the end of the case, etc. The anonymity of the parties must be maintained. (See Seiser & Kumli on California Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2018) §2.190(12).) The ADI web page on confidential records has guidance for the multiple protections counsel must observe in handling these cases.

If there are multiple appellants in a case, coordination among counsel with clients taking compatible positions is encouraged, for the sake of economy and quality. Joinders may be filed in such instances. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).) However, joinder must be done thoughtfully. Many issues require individualized argument applying the law to the particular case. Counsel must identify which specific points or arguments are joined. Do not use generic, boilerplate language, such as “counsel joins other parties’ points to the extent they may benefit my client.” (People v. Bryant (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335; October 2014 ADI News Alert.)

The method of filing depends on the court. Courts of Appeal are gradually shifting to electronic filing, but the process is slow and uneven. Counsel should consult the court clerk’s office or website for current information or ask the appellate project.

24 Some types of cases, such as child molest, may endanger the client’s personal security, especially within an institutional setting. Counsel should be sensitive to such possibilities and discuss them with the client before sending documents revealing facts about the case or client into an environment where they might not be secure.


27 http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm
Service on other counsel is another fast-changing area. It may be electronic or hard copy, depending on the area. Counsel should check with the applicable project about the current situation in that district. In Fourth Appellate District criminal cases, service on and from the Attorney General is by email. In dependency cases, service on opposing counsel may be by hard copy or email, depending on the arrangements ADI has made with county counsel in the county where the case originated. Service on ADI and between panel attorneys is by email. As for others to be served, such as the trial court, the district attorney (criminal and delinquency cases), and trial counsel, some have entered into an e-service arrangement with ADI, but others have not. The most recent information on ADI’s e-service program may be obtained on the e-service page of ADI’s website or from the assigned project attorney. ADI website home page has a link to its quick-reference guide, or “Cheat Sheet.”

G. Later Filings [§ 1.14]

After the opening brief is filed, the next major responsibilities are to review the respondent’s brief when it is filed and decide how to reply – normally in the form of a reply brief. Counsel representing a non-appealing minor submits a filing on behalf of the child after the respondent’s brief.

1. Respondent’s brief [§ 1.15]

Appointed counsel receives a copy of the respondent’s brief; the project also receives a copy. In areas such as the Fourth Appellate District, the copies will be electronic in criminal cases where the Attorney General is opposing counsel. In dependency cases, it will be either electronic or paper, depending on the county from which the case arose. The client’s copy will normally be paper but may be electronic if the client has access to a computer. The respondent’s brief may be sent immediately with an explanatory cover letter, but it normally is more advisable to send it along with the reply brief, so that the client sees counsel’s response right away. In either case, counsel should reassure the client that the respondent’s brief is simply an argument, not a decision, and that counsel is answering it. It is often advisable to send the client the respondent’s brief and reply brief at the same time.


2. **Reply brief**  [§ 1.16]

ADI for the most part takes the position that *in most cases counsel should file a reply brief*. It will usually be the last document filed by the parties and, unlike oral argument, will be considered before the opinion is drafted. It is a chance to answer the opposing party’s contentions and authorities, deal with procedural obstacles such as waiver, cite new legal developments, bolster the arguments, communicate confidence, and avoid the appearance of conceding. (See § 5.58 et seq. of chapter 5, “Effective Written Advocacy: Briefing.”) In assisted cases, appointed counsel should discuss the reply brief with the project attorney. In those rare cases in which a reply brief is not filed, appointed counsel should explain the reasons to the client and to the assigned staff attorney.

3. **Non-appealing minor’s filing**  [§ 1.16A]

If appellate counsel has been appointed for a non-appealing dependency minor, the child’s brief or letter brief is due 10 days after the respondent’s brief is filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.412(b)(4).) The filing states the minor’s position.

As the appellate project with the most extensive experience with minor’s counsel, ADI has developed guidelines for determining a position, preparing a filing, and handling other responsibilities. (See chapter 5, “Effective Written Advocacy: Briefing,” § 5.63 et seq.)

H. **Oral Argument**  [§ 1.17]

Oral argument is covered extensively in chapter 6, “Effective Use of the Spoken Word on Appeal: Oral Argument.” If appointed counsel has never argued before the Court of Appeal, or has argued before but has questions about how to approach a particular case, it is advisable to consult with the project staff attorney. He or she might offer pointers, reassurance, and war stories that may help put things in perspective. In occasional cases, especially for those in the Supreme Court, a moot court practice session might be available.

The “unofficial rules” of oral argument are a matter of common sense. Dress and conduct oneself professionally, be prepared, be on time, be polite and respectful but

assertive, keep it short, don’t repeat the facts or just rehash the briefs, answer questions immediately when asked (don’t say “Wait, I’ll be getting to that later”!), don’t read the argument, admit when you don’t know the answer (never bluff), if appropriate ask permission to file a supplemental letter brief, and don’t “save” the best arguments or case citations for oral argument (they belong in the briefs).

I. The Court’s Decision; Advice to the Client  [§ 1.18]

The court’s decision is covered extensively in § 7.4 et seq. and § 7.29 et seq. of chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision.” Counsel should review the opinion carefully in light of the briefs and consult with the project attorney if necessary.

Prompt communication with the client is essential. If the client has lost, it is important to explain whether counsel plans further action. If the decision is not to pursue the case further, the client must be told of the right to petition for review in pro per and be given the applicable rules and deadlines. Petition for review information forms for clients are on the ADI website. If the client has won, counsel should explain what it means and what to expect next. The client’s first questions will usually be “When am I going back to court, what will happen, and will you still be my attorney?” When there are ongoing trial court proceedings – as with juvenile cases – counsel should explain how the appeal affects those proceedings.

If the outcome is mixed – a victory in part and a loss in part – counsel should evaluate whether a petition for review on the losing issue(s) is called for and advise the client accordingly, but should leave it up to the client to decide whether to proceed, since doing so could risk losing the partial victory already in hand.

It is helpful to send a copy of the opinion to trial counsel, especially if the case is to be remanded or if the case is reversed because of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See __________)

31 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples.asp. Basic information is on the court website at http://www.courts.ca.gov/2962.htm. Caution: Some of the information (e.g., on filing fees) does not apply to criminal or juvenile cases.

32 Even if opposing counsel does not file a petition for review, rule 8.504(c) of the California Rules of Court allows him or her to file an answer to the client’s petition, raising additional issues to be considered in the event review is granted. If review is denied, however, the additional issues will not be considered; a petition for review is necessary if counsel wishes the court to review the client’s own issues regardless of whether the opponent’s petition is granted.
Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6068, subd. (o)(7) [duty of attorney to self-report to State Bar of reversal of judgment based on the attorney’s “grossly incompetent” representation], 6086.7 [duty of court to report reversal or modification based on misconduct or incompetence of counsel].

J. Post-Decision Responsibilities  [§ 1.19]

Petitions for rehearing, review, and certiorari are covered in § 7.33 et seq., § 7.46 et seq., and § 7.100 et seq. of chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision.”

1. Rehearing  [§ 1.20]

If the decision is adverse to the client, appointed counsel has only 15 days after the opinion is filed to petition for rehearing, asking the Court of Appeal to reconsider. A rehearing petition should be used to call the court’s attention to material problems, errors, or omissions in its decision and not merely to reargue positions with which the court disagrees. A rehearing petition is required by Supreme Court policy if the party intends to seek Supreme Court review on the ground of a material factual or legal error or omission in the Court of Appeal opinion. (Rule 8.500(c)(2).) If the attorney does not intend to file a petition for review but the client wants to continue in pro per, the attorney should preserve it for the client by seeking to cure the error or omission; such a correction is a legitimate ground for rehearing, and as a practical matter, few clients would be able to prepare a petition for rehearing within jurisdictional time limits.

A petition for rehearing may be used to correct factual errors in the opinion. It is important the opinion accurately reflect the facts and issues. (See, e.g., People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448 [appellate opinion in prior case considered as evidence of

33 The presiding justice may grant relief from failure to file a timely petition for rehearing until the 30th day after the filing of the opinion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.268(b)(4).) The court also may grant rehearing on its own motion during this period. (Rule 8.268(a).) A late petition with a persuasive explanation might be considered, but counsel should not count on that possibility.

34 Some courts take the position that clients represented by counsel have no standing to file in pro per and refuse to accept a petition for rehearing submitted by the client. A procedural way around that problem, if the client wants to file in pro per, would be for counsel to ask to be relieved right after the decision not to proceed further is made.
underlying fact stated in opinion].) This occurs frequently in dependency cases, because they tend to be heavily fact-intensive.

Petitions for rehearing are covered more comprehensively in § 7.33 et seq. of chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Court and Processes After Decision.”

2. Review [§ 1.21]

A petition for review asking the California Supreme Court to take jurisdiction of the case should be considered when the case involves an area of broad importance or an area where lower courts are in conflict. (See discussion of petitions for review in § 7.46 et seq. of chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision.”) It is not appropriate simply because counsel disagrees with the Court of Appeal decision, although in a rare case the interests of justice may require correcting a glaring error. A petition or review is necessary if future federal review is a serious possibility. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.508, on petitions filed solely to exhaust state remedies.) In an assisted case, the possibility of petitioning for review should be discussed with the assisting project staff attorney.

If counsel decides not to petition for review, the client should be informed of this decision and told how to do so in pro per.35 (See discussion in § 1.76, post.)

3. Certiorari  [§ 1.22]

Petitioning for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States is relatively uncommon. It requires a substantial issue of federal law, properly preserved and presented to the state courts, including the California Supreme Court. Considerations are, first, the chances of getting certiorari granted and, second, the chances of prevailing on the merits if it is granted. (In the end, the objective is to better the client’s position, not just get into the United States Supreme Court. If the end result of a decision on the merits is very likely to be negative, the certiorari petition will not serve the client’s interests and may end up making “bad law” for the whole country in the process.)

35 Petition for review information forms for clients are on the ADI website:
http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples.asp

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In any case, assisted or independent, counsel considering a possible certiorari petition should discuss it with the assigned project staff attorney. At ADI, the attorney must get the executive director’s preapproval before doing any work on a certiorari petition for which compensation is expected.

K. Investigation of Collateral Matters and Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus [§ 1.23]

The appeal itself is bound by the four corners of the record, and appellate counsel has no duty to search actively for every off-record claim that might conceivably be developed. (*In re Clark* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 783-784, fn. 20.) However, appointed counsel should be alert to the possibility of issues not reflected in the record.

When counsel has reason to believe that significant facts in support of such issues exist outside the record, counsel should discuss them with the assigned project attorney before proceeding further to any appreciable extent. In some districts counsel must get court preapproval for an expansion of the appointment to cover writ investigation and preparation. (For a comprehensive discussion of writs, see chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies.”) Preapproval for unusual expenses such as investigators or experts must be given by the project, the project director, or the court, depending on the district, the project, and the amount. Funding for these costs is provided in the form of reimbursement to appointed counsel.

The most common off-record claim is ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and as noted in § 1.7, ante, it is important for appointed counsel to discuss such a claim with the project attorney. (ADI requires advance consultation with the project attorney.) If the claim has no arguable merit, appellate counsel will not want to tarnish the trial attorney’s reputation – and counsel’s own – by raising it. If the claim does have merit, appellate counsel will have to exercise caution at every step to preserve and document the claim for the benefit of the client.

L. Representation When There Are No Arguable Issues (*Wende-Anders-Sade C. Filings*) [§ 1.24]

An “arguable issue” is one that, in counsel’s professional opinion, has a reasonable potential for success and that, if resolved favorably to the client, will result in a reversal
or modification of the judgment. (*People v. Johnson* (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 106.) This matter is explored in an ADI memo on arguability, *To Brief or Not To Brief: Marginal Issues*. 36 Appointed counsel who has found no arguable issues after a diligent search must follow a specific procedure – called *Wende-Anders*37 in criminal and delinquency38 cases or *Sade C.* in dependency cases – whether the appointment is designated as assisted or independent. Depending on whether the case is criminal or civil, the court may have certain responsibilities, as well. These procedures are described in more detail in § 4.73 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection.” A brief summary follows here.

1. Preliminary steps  [§ 1.25]

The *Wende-Sade C.* procedure requires counsel to ensure the record is complete and to review the complete record thoroughly. Before any no-issues brief or letter brief is filed, and before any case is abandoned or dismissed for lack of issues, all counsel (assisted or independent) must discuss the case with the assigned project attorney, usually provide the record, and get the project attorney’s “second opinion” and approval to proceed on a no-issues track. The panel attorney should provide to the staff attorney, along with the record, a draft *Wende-Sade C.* brief or letter brief, a memo on issues considered and rejected and why, plus any contacts with the client, trial counsel, or others that might shed light on potential issues.

If the project attorney agrees that the case is appropriate for no-issues treatment, appointed counsel must write to the client about the assessment and procedures, including advice about applicable timelines and any right to file a pro per brief or letter or to request that counsel be relieved.


38 *In re Kevin S.* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97 held *Wende-Anders* applies to delinquency appeals. Most appellate courts have assumed that without discussion.
If an extension of time is needed for the project to perform its record review, counsel should not mention the *Wende-Anders-Sade C.* review in the extension request, because such a comment tends to disparage any merits issues later raised.

If counsel believes an arguable issue exists but pursuing it would not be in the client’s best interests, counsel cannot properly file a *Wende-Sade C.* brief or letter brief. (*In re Josiah Z.* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 677.) A client-authorized motion to dismiss, client waiver of the issue, or other remedy is required.

In fast-track cases, the time frames require counsel to notify the client very quickly—usually, before the project review—of a potential *Sade C.* situation, so that the client can prepare a pro per filing, if desired, for submission at the time of the brief or letter brief. Counsel should be aware the court is highly likely to reject the filing.

2. **No-issues brief or letter brief** [§ 1.26]

Unless the client chooses to abandon the case, counsel will need to file a *Wende-Anders* brief in a criminal or delinquency case or a *Sade C.* brief or letter brief in a dependency case. This filing has several purposes:

- It summarizes the proceedings and facts fully, with citations to the transcripts.

- In districts that prefer or at least permit inclusion of unbriefed issues, the filing may describe issues raised at trial and others suggested by the record, as well as related authorities the court should consider. Counsel are advised to consult the

39 The letter brief format is required for dependency cases in all three divisions of the Fourth Appellate District. It must be filed electronically. Other districts may have different expectations, and so counsel should consult the project for guidance. Regardless of format, the contents of the dependency no-issues filing must conform to the requirements of *In re Phoenix H.* (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 843.


Legal issues and authorities need not be included if counsel concludes the client’s interests would best be served by omitting them. (See *Smith v. Robbins* (2000) 528 U.S. 259.)

28
district project for guidance. An unbriefed issue should not specifically urge that issue as a ground for reversal but also should not argue against the issue; a neutral description is the objective. (See § 4.77 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection,” for detailed guidance.)

- In criminal and delinquency cases, the filing reminds the court of its constitutional duty to read the record; in dependency, conservatorship, and similar cases, it must acknowledge this review is not legally required but then should suggest the court review the record in the exercise of its discretion.

No-issue brief and letter brief templates are available on the ADI website, forms and samples page and dependency forms and samples page. Other projects also offer samples tailored to their court.

Because the client has no right to file a pro per brief in a dependency case (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835) and the court almost always denies any extension for such a filing, practicality suggests such a brief be submitted along with the Sade C. filing. The court need not accept it (and usually does not), but at least it gives the client a shot at showing “good cause . . . that an arguable issue does, in fact, exist.” (Id. at p. 844.)

3. Sending record to client [§ 1.27]

Counsel normally should send the record to the client before or upon filing the no-issue brief or letter brief, so that the client can file a pro per brief or letter, if one is permitted and desired. In dependency cases, counsel must check the confidentiality provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 before sending the record. Some clients, such as relative and de facto parents, are entitled to only a very limited record or no record. Alternatively, if counsel believes there is a reasonable possibility the court will order supplemental briefing by counsel and the client has expressed no interest in filing a pro per brief, counsel may retain the record and tell the client it is available on request.

41 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples.asp


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Counsel may make a copy of some or all of the record for future reference. (See also In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835.)

4. **Court’s responsibilities [§ 1.28]**

   a. **First criminal or delinquency appeal as of right [§ 1.28A]**

      When a *Wende-Anders* brief is filed in a first criminal or delinquency appeal as of right, the Court of Appeal must conduct its own review of the entire record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (*People v. Wende* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.) It also must offer the appellant an opportunity to file a pro per brief. (See *People v. Feggans* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444, 447-448.)

      If the court discovers an arguable issue, it must order counsel to brief the issue. (*Penson v. Ohio* (1988) 488 U.S. 75, 81, 83-84.) It may appoint new counsel for that purpose, but almost never does since original counsel does not routinely seek to withdraw on making a no-issues filing. If the court finds no arguable issues, it will affirm the judgment or dismiss the appeal.

      The court must issue a written, reasoned opinion if the defendant files a pro per brief. (*People v. Kelly* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106.)

   b. **Other appointed appeals [§ 1.28B]**


      In dependency cases, the court does not have to provide an opportunity to file a proper brief in a dependency appeal, because those cases are so time-sensitive. (*In re*  

43 A modest amount of copying for counsel’s use in the event the court orders supplemental briefing is compensable. Any substantial copying, however, requires specific justification and should be cleared with the project.
Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835.) It must do so, however, in civil commitment cases (e.g., In re Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529 [LPS]; see also People v. Taylor (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 304 [mentally disordered offender appeal]) and arguably other non-criminal, non-dependency appointed appeals.

If the defendant files a pro per brief in a non-criminal case, the court arguably has a duty to file a written decision under People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106. That duty is based on article VI, section 14, of the California Constitution, providing a decision determining a “cause” must be in writing with reasons stated – a requirement that applies to civil as well as criminal cases. (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232.)

M. Representation When the Client Might Suffer Adverse Consequences from Appealing [§ 1.29]

On occasion a client may face the prospect of receiving an increased sentence or other adverse result from pursuing an appeal. For example, the lower court may have imposed an unauthorized sentence in the defendant’s favor, or the remedy for an error might be withdrawal of an advantageous plea bargain. Counsel must be alert to the possibility of such adverse consequences in every case. This topic is discussed in § 4.91 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection.”

In dependency cases, the court may have offered the client reunification services where they were not warranted, or erroneously found a father to be presumed. Dependency clients may also have been involved in criminal proceedings, and the two cases may interact in negative ways. Or certain actions in the dependency case may trigger retaliatory conduct by agencies, foster parents, etc. Close contact with trial counsel and the client will aid counsel in identifying and dealing with such situations appropriately.

Decisions about abandoning or pursuing an appeal belong ultimately to the client. It is important for appointed counsel to consult with a project attorney before advising the client about filing an abandonment or motion to dismiss because of possible adverse consequences. Counsel should have the client sign and return a written acknowledgment

that the client has been advised of the potential benefits and risks of the various options and that the decision whether to pursue the appeal is the client’s own.

N. Protecting the Client in Time-Sensitive Cases  [§ 1.30]

One important responsibility of appointed counsel is to safeguard the possibility of meaningful relief for the client in time-sensitive cases and avoid the possibility the client might end up serving “dead” time – custody in excess of the lawful sentence – in the event of a favorable result on appeal. Counsel must always keep in mind that, if the client fails to benefit from any remedy ultimately awarded on appeal, the whole effort might prove meaningless.\(^{45}\) As a preliminary step during the initial review of the case following appointment, especially when the sentence is relatively short, appellate counsel should determine the client’s expected release date and calculate how that might be affected by a favorable ruling on appeal.

All dependency cases by nature are time sensitive. The case will be continuing at the trial level. Extensions of time are disfavored and should be requested only when genuinely necessary. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.412(e).) A heavy workload is generally not a sufficient reason.

1. Release pending appeal  [§ 1.31]

Appellate counsel can seek release pending appeal, on bail or other terms, or assist the client or trial counsel in doing so. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12; Pen. Code, §§ 1272 & 1272.1; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.312.) This topic is treated in depth in § 3.37 et seq. of chapter 3, “Pre-Briefing Responsibilities: Record Completion, Extensions of Time,

\(^{45}\)If the defendant ends up serving “dead” time, the period of parole should be reduced by the excess time of imprisonment. (E.g., People v. London (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 896, 911, fn. 8; In re Ballard (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 647, 650; cf. In re Lira (2013) 58 Cal.4th 573 [no credit against parole for custody between Governor’s erroneous reversal of earlier grant of parole and eventual release on parole]; People v. Espinoza (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 635 [no credit toward post-release community supervision after grant of Prop. 36 resentencing under Pen. Code, § 1170.126].) Counsel should ask the Court of Appeal to note this fact in its disposition. (E.g., In re Phelon (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1221-1222, overruled on other grounds in People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 801, fn. 2; In re Pope (2010) 50 Cal.4th 777, 785, fn. 3.)
Release on Appeal.” The possibility of release pending decision is also available on habeas corpus. (Pen. Code, § 1476.)

2. **Motion to expedite appeal** [§ 1.32]

A motion to expedite the appeal and a motion for calendar preference can be filed if the circumstances warrant it. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.54, 8.240.) In such cases it is important to avoid asking for extensions of time and to oppose extensions of time by other parties.

3. **Motion for summary reversal or stipulated reversal** [§ 1.33]

If the need to reverse is indisputable, the court may reverse without going through the usual briefing processes. One procedure is a motion for summary reversal. (*People v. Geitner* (1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 252 [court erroneously assured defendant he could appeal issue of voluntariness of statement under Fifth Amendment after guilty plea]; *People v. Browning* (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 320, 322-324 [*Allen* instruction given jury had been found reversible per se by the California Supreme Court].) The opportunity for oral argument must be provided. (*Browning*, at p. 322; see also Pen. Code, § 1253; *People v. Brigham* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 283, 289.)

Similarly, if opposing counsel concedes that reversible error occurred, it may be possible for the parties to stipulate to a reversal. (*Neary v. Regents of University of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273, as limited by Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8).)

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46 *Allen v. United States* (1896) 164 U.S. 492 (instruction to deadlocked jury, urging minority jurors to give weight to majority’s views, found prejudicial per se error and ordered not to be given in California in *People v. Gainer* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 852).

47 Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8) provides:

An appellate court shall not reverse or vacate a duly entered judgment upon an agreement or stipulation of the parties unless the court finds both of the following:

(A) There is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal.

(B) The reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.
People v. Barraza (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 114 expressed doubt that section applies to criminal cases. In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376 applied it to a dependency case. If a given client in either a criminal or juvenile proceeding could benefit from the procedure, ADI would support submitting a stipulation to the court, making the showings specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 128, after appropriate consultation with the project.

Counsel should be cautious about these remedies. Summary or stipulated reversal on a particular issue might waive, for purposes of retrial and a subsequent appeal, issues that might have been resolved on the first appeal. If retrial and another appeal are likely or the defendant has substantial issues other than the one requiring reversal, counsel should consider alternatives to summary or stipulated reversal.

4. Writ petition on the merits  [§ 1.34]

If appropriate, a writ petition can be filed in addition to or in lieu of a brief. The petition would state a prompt disposition is required in the interests of justice and an adequate remedy cannot be provided by way of the appeal. (In re Quackenbush (1996) 41

48 At the risk of advancing an ad hominem point: The author of Barraza, Justice Anthony Kline, vociferously opposed Neary and once (in dissent) refused to follow it, arguing his ethical principles required departure from the duty to honor the rulings of a higher court: “I cannot as a matter of conscience apply the rule announced in Neary.” (Morrow v. Hood Communications, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 924, 927, dis. opn. of Kline, J.) He was brought before the Commission on Judicial Performance, but charges were dismissed on the ground the commission could not conclude that “the argument for a narrow exception to the stare decisis principle . . . was so far-fetched as to be untenable.” (Decision and Order of Dismissal, p. 4, http://www.cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/Dismissals/Kline_8-19-99.pdf.)

Counsel may take from this background the understanding that Barraza should not be an obstacle if a stipulated reversal is to the client’s advantage.

49 In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189 declined to apply section 128, subdivision (a)(8) under the facts of the case, but stated: “There is nothing in the statutory scheme or the California Rules of Court preventing the appellate courts from using the stipulated reversal procedure and nothing in this opinion should be read to foreclose the appellate court from accepting stipulated reversals.” (Id. at p. 198, fn. 8.)
5. Immediate finality of writ opinion or issuance of the remittitur

In a writ case, after receiving a favorable opinion in the Court of Appeal, counsel might ask the court to order early finality as to the Court of Appeal to prevent mootness, frustration of relief, etc. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.387(b)(3)(A), 8.490(b)(3); e.g., M.V. v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 166, 184; In re Phelon (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1222, overruled on other grounds in People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 801, fn. 2; In re Pope (2010) 50 Cal.4th 777, 785, fn. 3.)

The Supreme Court may order early finality of one of its decisions. (Rule 8.532(b)(1)(A).)

Counsel may also seek immediate issuance of the remittitur via stipulation of the parties under California Rules of Court, rule 8.272(c)(1). The Supreme Court may order immediate issuance on stipulation or for good cause. (Rule 8.540(c)(1).)

6. Follow-through with custodial officials

Counsel should always make certain, especially in time-sensitive cases, that custodial officials know about any relief granted (such as a favorable decision on appeal, the grant of a writ, or the issuance of an order for release) and that they take action on it. Occasionally a case falls through the cracks – as when paperwork gets lost, a court omits to inform the prison, or the prison itself delays taking action.

O. Requests To Be Relieved

Sometimes an attorney is unable to handle a case to which the attorney has been appointed. A new job with incompatible responsibilities, a conflict of interest not discovered when the appointment began, personal or family illness, breakup of a law partnership or marriage, and many other factors may interfere with representation. In such

50Finality as to the Court of Appeal does not end an appeal: the Supreme Court still has rule time to grant review. (See Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29; rule 8.512(b), (c).)
a situation, it is important that counsel take appropriate action as soon as possible. A request to be relieved is usually the best resolution for both the client and the attorney. ADI does not count such a request as a negative factor in the attorney’s record, but on the contrary sees it as a responsible and professional way of dealing with a difficult situation. Attorneys should call the project for guidance on how to do this.

Occasionally, appointed attorneys have been told that the client or the client’s family has retained an attorney and that a substitution of counsel needs to be filed. When this happens, it is important that the appointed attorney contact the ADI staff attorney or executive director at once, before signing any substitution agreement, sending the records to the other attorney, or assuming that the new attorney will take care of such needed steps as an augmentation or extension request. The court wants ADI to verify the arrangement before acting on it. This topic is discussed further in the July 2003 and November 2011 ADI alerts, and is listed on the FAQ page under question 5, “When is it mandatory (or strongly advisable) for a panel attorney to consult ADI?”

P. Handling Situations in Which Appeal Is Subject to Potential Termination Because of Jurisdictional Defects, Non-Appealability, Mootness, Death or Escape of Client, Etc. [§ 1.38]

An appeal is subject to dismissal – i.e., termination before a decision on the merits – if basic requirements are lacking, such as jurisdiction, standing, or appealability, or if it can no longer materially affect the client’s interests, as when, for example, it has become moot because of developments in the lower court or changes in the underlying situation, or the client has died or escaped. To ensure the attorney responds appropriately and does not end up doing non-compensable work, it is vital to notify the project immediately upon learning of the situation and to cease doing anything but urgent work on the case (such as an extension request to avoid default).

The project will help assess what if any action would be appropriate. The steps to be taken will depend greatly on the situation. They might include notifying the court

53 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/panel/faq.asp
and/or proceeding until the court orders otherwise, abandoning, moving for abatement or dismissal, or seeking permission to continue the litigation despite the situation.

These topics are covered in more detail in § 2.5 et seq. of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started,” and § 4.34 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection.”

IV. CLIENT RELATIONS [§ 1.39]

An essential component of appellate advocacy is client relations. It starts with counsel’s first communication with the client. The approach taken by counsel at the outset and throughout the appeal may make a world of difference in the success of the appeal or, at the very minimum, the rapport counsel enjoys with the client. This section serves as a guide for establishing and maintaining good client relations and for handling the various circumstances that may arise during the appeal.

A. Communications [§ 1.40]

Throughout the appeal, the attorney must keep the client reasonably informed of significant developments and promptly respond to inquiries and requests from the client. Samples of initial and follow-up letters are in § 1.144 et seq., appendix B, post. (Adapted from letters provided courtesy of panel attorney David Y. Stanley.)

54 The death of the client during the pendency of the appeal permanently abates the proceedings. The appellate court normally should remand to the lower court with instructions to enter an order to that effect. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 893 [juvenile delinquency appeal]; People v. Anzalone (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1074 [MDO appeal]; In re Jackson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 464, 480 [parole review]; People v. Dail (1943) 22 Cal.2d 642, 659; People v. De St. Maurice (1913) 166 Cal. 201, 202; People v. McCoy (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587; People v. Alexander (1929) 101 Cal.App. 394, 396.)

On occasion, however, a motion for dismissal may be preferred. (E.g., In re A.Z. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1177 [dismissal provides final resolution for the child to proceed to adoption].)

55 The court might elect to proceed with a moot or quasi-moot case, if the issues are important and an opinion would provide guidance in similar cases; public interest can be considered. (In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23-25.)
1. **Governing principles** [§ 1.41]

The ethical principles governing client communications are set out in Business and Professions Code section 6068 and rule 1.4(a)(3) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct. Section 6068 provides, in relevant part:

It is the duty of an attorney . . . :

(m) To respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of clients and to keep clients reasonably informed of significant developments in matters with regard to which the attorney has agreed to provide legal services.

(n) To provide copies to the client of certain documents under time limits and as prescribed in a rule of professional conduct . . .

Rule 1.4(a)(3) states a lawyer must:

keep the client reasonably informed about significant developments relating to the representation, including promptly complying with reasonable requests for information and copies of significant documents when necessary to keep the client so informed . . .

2. **Initial communication** [§ 1.42]

Client communications should begin promptly when the attorney is first appointed to the case. As part of the goal to maintain good client relations over the course of the appeal, the initial contact letter should anticipate and deflect problems. Early in the appointment process ADI sends clients a paper entitled *Understanding Your Appeal*. (See § 1.143, post, appendix A.) It explains what an appeal is, who will represent the defendant, what happens during an appeal, and how the defendant can find out more about the appeal. The attorney’s initial letter should reinforce this information. Making early contact is especially important in dependency cases, which often are fast-track.

In addition to informing the client of the appointment, the letter should explain counsel’s role, the appellate process, the likelihood of substantial delay between filings, and the differences between a trial and an appeal. It should inform the client of what is and is not permitted in appeals: for example, the client needs to understand that the brief cannot cite matters outside the record and that the facts must be stated in the light most favorable to the judgment. Counsel most likely will not be traveling for a prison visit because the nature of appeals makes in-person contact unnecessary and because such travel is not compensable except under unusual circumstances. Counsel will need to keep possession of the transcripts during the course of the appeal. The letter should also
explain the importance of keeping attorney-client communications confidential and of refraining from discussion of the case with fellow inmates, prison staff, or others.

The project will provide counsel with copies of correspondence generated in the case before the appointment. Counsel should communicate awareness of the prior letters so that the client does not feel shuttled from attorney to attorney.

For some courts, minor’s counsel may be expected to visit the minor at least once. Counsel should seek preapproval for long-distance travel.

3. Later communications [§ 1.43]

a. Significant developments [§ 1.44]

The client is entitled to be informed of all significant developments. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (m); Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.4(a).)

What is a “significant” development is situation-specific and generally depends on the surrounding facts and circumstances, as well as the client’s expectations. (Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.4(a), Comment [1].) Certainly the requirement includes providing copies of all briefs and petitions, significant motions, the opinion, and other court rulings on significant matters. The client of course must know of potential adverse consequences from the appeal and any other matters requiring the client’s participation or decision. The attorney must respond to reasonable requests for information.

The duty to communicate about other occurrences during an appeal depends on the nature of the case, the issues raised, the client’s level of involvement, the time-sensitiveness of the proceedings, what the client has asked for, what counsel has told the client he or she would do, and numerous other factors.

If the client is very demanding or hostile, it is advisable to err on the side of self-protective communication. This includes advising the client of decisions not to do something, such as file a reply brief, request oral argument, or seek rehearing. A good

56 An exception would be when the client expressly asks not to get such documents because, for example, his or her security might be jeopardized if fellow inmates learned the facts of the offense. Counsel should at least advise the client of the fact of filing and the general content, to the extent possible within the constraints of the client’s situation.
precaution is to give notice an adequate time before taking the action, so that the client has an opportunity for input. (That does not mean the client has power to dictate the decision; only that he or she has a chance to express an opinion.\textsuperscript{57})

\begin{quote}
Note: For any client, a decision not to petition for review should generally be communicated, because the client may want to file in pro per. (See ADI instructions for pro per petitions for review.\textsuperscript{58})
\end{quote}

b. Frequency [§ 1.45]

The frequency of communication is a function of the significant developments of the case and the need to respond to client inquiries. In addition to communications necessitated by significant developments, updates at reasonable intervals may be advisable during long periods of delay. If the client communicates excessively, the attorney is expected to exercise control over the client and limit the number and mode of communications. The attorney can explain to the client the need for counsel to focus primary attention on handling the case itself and other clients’ cases, rather than responding to repeated queries and complaints.

4. Method of communication [§ 1.46]

Appointed counsel need to consider both efficiency and effectiveness in choosing a method of communication. Most of the time this means written communication, but telephone calls and in-person visits are also possible.

a. Written correspondence [§ 1.47]

Because most criminal clients are incarcerated and other kinds of communication are difficult, written correspondence is by far the most common. This method has the advantages of efficiency and creation of a permanent record of communication.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{57}“Counsel ‘is in charge of the case’ and the defendant ‘surrenders all but a handful of ‘fundamental’ personal rights to counsel’s complete control of defense strategies and tactics.’” (In re Barnett (2003) 31 Cal.4th 466, 472, citing People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1162.) See § 1.56 et seq., post, on decision-making authority as between the client and the attorney.
\item \textsuperscript{58}http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples.asp, under Petition for Review Information Forms.
\end{itemize}
Counsel should inform the client of the likelihood that communication will be by letter and advise him or her, that to ensure confidentiality, letters and envelopes should be labeled “Attorney-Client Confidential Communication.” (It is also good practice for the client to include the title “Attorney at Law” in addressing the envelope.)

It is a good idea to check the client’s current address before sending any correspondence, especially if it concerns time-sensitive or other important matters. Addresses tend to change with some frequency for a number of clients. The ADI website includes links to common locating resources.59

The client should be reminded that California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation regulations require the following for the processing of outgoing confidential correspondence: (1) the letter and the envelope must be addressed to the attorney by name; (2) the inmate’s name and the address of the facility must be included in the return address appearing on the outside of the envelope; and (3) the word “confidential” must appear on the face of the envelope. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3141, subd. (c), 3142; see also Pen. Code, § 2601, subd. (b) [prisoner’s civil rights include confidential correspondence with attorney].)

Counsel should additionally be aware of the requirements for incoming confidential mail: counsel’s letter must bear counsel’s name or title, return address, and office name. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3143.) Incoming correspondence bearing only a department, agency, or law firm return address, without any reference to the name or title of the individual attorney, will be processed as non-confidential correspondence. (Ibid.) Although a notice or request for confidentiality is not required on the envelope (ibid.), the better practice is to identify the envelope as “Attorney-Client Confidential Communication.”

Both the attorney and the client must ensure confidential legal mail is not used for transmission of information and materials unrelated to the case. Failure to observe this restriction is considered an abuse of the right and could result in discipline. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3141, subd. (b).)

Communication with out of custody clients may be more difficult, because many clients are homeless, living in shelters, living temporarily with friends and relatives, or are in drug treatment; many frequently move. Diligence in attempting to reach the client

can entail using contact information from such sources as the appellate record, relatives, the trial attorney, and social media. Email or texting increasingly may be useful.\(^{60}\)

b. **Telephone calls** [§ 1.48]

Counsel should inform the client that collect calls are allowed; however, telephone calls should be limited to what is reasonably necessary. Confidential matters should not be discussed in recorded, non-confidential telephone calls. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3282, subds. (e) & (i).)

The regulations do permit counsel to make special arrangements for a confidential call:

If staff designated by the institution head determine that an incoming call concerns an emergency or confidential matter, the caller's name and telephone number shall be obtained and the inmate promptly notified of the situation. The inmate shall be permitted to place an emergency or confidential call either collect or by providing for the toll to be deducted from the inmate's trust account. A confidential call shall not be made on an inmate telephone and shall not be monitored or recorded.

(\text{Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3282 (g).}) The designee of the institution may be the litigation coordinator of the particular prison facility where the client is located. Sometimes the client’s counselor is cooperative in arranging and facilitating such calls.

In prearranging for a confidential call, counsel may use California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation form CDCR 106-A.\(^{61}\) Counsel should make clear it is to be “confidential, unmonitored, and not recorded.” The request must be in writing on letterhead. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3282, subd. (g)(1).) Generally, “[t]he date, time, duration, and place where the inmate will make or receive the call, and manner of the call

\(^{60}\)It is important to take reasonable precautions to protect confidentiality when communicating with clients through electronic means. (Cf. Cal. Evid. Code, § 917, subd. (b).) Before sending e-mails with confidential information, counsel should confirm the client is the only person with access to the account. Emails should include a disclaimer. The client should also be cautioned about using public wi-fi and computers. It is advisable to seek a return receipt or a response from the client, to ensure the client has actually received and opened the e-mail.

\(^{61}\)\text{http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples/Confidential_Phone_Call_Request_CDCR_106-A.pdf}
are within the discretion of the institution head . . . .” (Ibid.) The request should explain why the matter cannot be dealt with by mail or personal visit. (Cf. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3282, subd. (g)(2).)

As long as the attorney-client communication privilege is not violated, a confidential call may be denied where the institution head, or his/her designee, determines that normal legal mail or attorney visits were appropriate means of communication and were not reasonably utilized by the inmate or attorney.

(Ibid.) Some institutions may impose a fee to defray the cost of having a staff member visually monitor the client during the call.

Out of custody clients may frequently change phone numbers and may not have regular access to a telephone. Counsel may want to obtain a stable emergency contact number from the client.

c. Visits [§ 1.49]

Non-local client visits are usually not necessary in the context of appeals and are not compensable. Exceptions may arise in special circumstances, as when a personal interview is a necessary part of a habeas corpus investigation or when telephonic and written contacts have not been successful in achieving the required level of communication. As a general rule, to be compensable, client visits (except local ones) must be preapproved by the project or the court.

Dependency minor’s counsel may be expected to visit the minor at least once in some courts. Counsel should seek preapproval for long-distance travel, however.

5. Literacy and language [§ 1.50]

Many indigent clients have limited education. The attorney should write simply and clearly and avoid using legal terms unless they are necessary and their meaning is explained. If there is a language difference, a translator should be used to translate letters of reasonable length. Briefs cannot be translated verbatim; instead, a summary of the principal points raised in the briefs can be translated.

62 Check with the project about low-level routine expenses. Moderate translator expenses (i.e., $200 or less) do not require ADI preapproval.

43
6. **Family communications** [§ 1.51]

If the client’s family communicates with counsel, counsel should respond promptly. The content of communication with family and others must be limited to matters of public knowledge (such as due dates, procedures, etc.), not strategy or potentially confidential information, unless the client gives specific written permission. Before obtaining such permission, counsel should advise the client about potential waiver of confidentiality.

In juvenile and other cases with confidential records, counsel should ascertain the family member is entitled to see the records. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 827.) The client may not be the holder of the privilege of confidentiality and so may not be in a position to waive it.

Only a de minimis amount of family contact (e.g., about an hour) is compensable if it is merely for purposes of reassurance, or “hand-holding.” More time is compensable if it is reasonably necessary for the handling of the case, such as to investigate a habeas corpus petition, to facilitate communication with the client, or to translate. Counsel should inform the family about these limitations and also about the confidentiality of attorney-client communications.

B. **Difficult Clients** [§ 1.52]

Most attorneys at one point or another have to deal with a challenging client. Usually the underlying cause is the client’s lack of understanding and mistrust of the legal system. One of the most important tools for managing this type of client is communication. The attorney needs to keep the client informed, to show respect, to explain the issues and decisions, and to respond to the client on a timely basis.

It helps in initial contacts with the client to explain the appellate process and counsel’s role. Early in the appointment process ADI sends clients a memo entitled *Understanding Your Appeal*. (See § 1.143, appendix A, *post.*) It explains what an appeal is, who will represent the defendant, what happens during an appeal, and how the defendant can find out more about the appeal. This document can be referenced, sent a second time, or paraphrased in counsel’s attempts to help the client’s understanding.

Counsel needs to tailor the approach to the specific type of difficult client. There are, for example, clients who have language or literacy barriers. (This topic is treated in
§ 1.50, ante.) Some are mentally ill or developmentally disabled. (§ 1.53, post.) There are prolific writers and “legal scholars” who provide counsel with long lists of issues and authorities and want to control the proceedings. (§ 1.54, post.) There are occasional threatening clients. (§ 1.55, post.)

1. Mentally ill or developmentally disabled clients  [§ 1.53]

   For clients who are mentally ill or developmentally disabled, clear, simple, and patient communication may suffice to ensure the client adequately understands and participates in the proceedings. If the case requires the client to make significant decisions, such as whether to abandon or proceed with the appeal, counsel should evaluate the client’s capacity for such decisions, perhaps by contacting family members, trial counsel, doctors, or others who have known the client or by making a personal visit. If counsel is unsure the client is able to make a knowing and intelligent choice, the project should be contacted about such possibilities as a formal evaluation or guardian ad litem.

2. Demanding clients  [§ 1.54]

   A demanding client, such as a prolific or obsessive communicator, requires patience and invariable respect for the client’s concerns – but also firmness. More letters or phone calls than normal are to be expected, and to some extent counsel must make allowances for the client’s need for reassurance and a sense of control. However, counsel cannot let the client take over the case, much less counsel’s entire practice, and eventually may need to set limits, such as one letter or one phone call a month. The limit-setting should be balanced by faithful communication at the times promised.

   When the client demands various non-arguable issues be raised, making a special effort to show the attorney’s interest in and respect for the client’s concerns could prevent an irremediable rupture in the relationship. Counsel can provide a legal analysis with citations to support the rejection of the issues. If the client is exceedingly distrustful, photocopying rather than paraphrasing the relevant authority can reassure the client the attorney is accurately representing the law. If the client rejects the analysis and threatens to file a motion insisting the attorney be relieved, a complaint with the bar, a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, or a malpractice suit, the project must be informed.\textsuperscript{63} It will evaluate the situation and may offer to intervene as a mediator.

\textsuperscript{63}As noted in § 1.2E, ante, ADI provides professional liability coverage for panel attorneys’ work on ADI cases. To safeguard coverage, it is essential that any suit, threat

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3. Threats against physical safety  [§ 1.55]

If a client makes a threat against the physical safety of appointed counsel and/or others, the attorney should contact the project. Together, the project and counsel can sort out the facts (e.g., the seriousness of the threat and the ability to carry it out) and review ethical considerations.

Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) imposes a duty on the attorney to “maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client,” with the exception that it allows but does not require disclosure when the attorney reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent a criminal act that threatens serious physical harm to a person. (See also Evid. Code, § 956.5 [same exception for lawyer-client testimonial privilege]; People v. Dang (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1299; Elijah W. v. Superior Court (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 140, 151-160 [minor entitled to appointment of a defense-team psychologist who would respect defense counsel’s duty of confidentiality, despite Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act and rule of Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 on duty to report patient’s serious threat of violence to another]; see also Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 314 [duty of confidentiality under Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (e) is modified by various exceptions to attorney-client privilege in the Evid. Code (citing In the Matter of Lilly (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 473, 478); see General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164, 1189-1192.]

In addition to researching these applicable principles, counsel can consult the State Bar’s and county bar associations’ ethics opinions and hotlines. ADI’s website pages on ethics have links to a number of resources.

C. Decision-Making Authority  [§ 1.56]

1. Attorney’s authority  [§ 1.57]

Appellate counsel is the decision-maker on issue selection and strategy. “When a defendant chooses to be represented by professional counsel, that counsel is ‘captain of

of suit, or facts that might lead to suit be reported to the carrier via ADI immediately.

64 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/research/ethics.asp

46  Go to Table of Contents
the ship’ and can make all but a few fundamental decisions for the defendant.” (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 376; see also Jones v. Barnes (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 751-754 [no federal constitutional duty for appellate counsel to raise every available non-frivolous issue, even if client wants them to be raised]; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728-729 [defendant does not have right to present defense of own choosing but merely right to adequate and competent defense]; In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 95 [defense counsel has complete control of defense strategies and tactics].)

Although appointed counsel has both the authority and the responsibility to make these decisions, maintaining good client relations requires counsel accord the client’s opinions respect.

2. Client’s authority  [§ 1.58]

The client defines the basic goals of the appeal. Rule 1.2(a) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct provides that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation.” The client decides such fundamental matters as whether to pursue or abandon the appeal (for example, because there are no arguable issues or appealing involves risks of adverse consequences). (See Jones v. Barnes (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 751 [“the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal”]; In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 680-681; see also Garza v. Idaho (2019) ___ U.S. ___ [139 S.Ct. 738] [counsel must file notice of appeal on request even if defendant waived right to appeal as part of plea bargain]; People v. Harris (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 709, 715 [client, not counsel, responsible for deciding to abandon appeal]; In re Martin (1962) 58 Cal.2d 133 [counsel not permitted to abandon appeal without client’s consent by letting it be dismissed under former rule 17, now rule 8.360(c)(5) of Cal. Rules of Court]; In re Alma B. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1037 [counsel not permitted to appeal without client’s consent]; Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 1.2 [lawyer must follow client’s direction as to objectives of appeal].)

The client also decides what issues should be waived because of their potential detriment to the client. For example, the client might want to forego issues that could highlight an error in his or her favor or that might require another appearance in court

\[65\] Rule 8.360(c)(5)(A)(ii) now provides that if appellate counsel for an appealing defendant is court-appointed, substitution of counsel, rather than dismissal of the appeal, is the appropriate remedy.

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because leaving prison could result in the loss of a beneficial prison placement or job. If there is an issue regarding the legality of a guilty plea, the client determines whether to attack the plea and thereby potentially lose its benefits as well as its burdens. (See §§ 2.16 and 2.39 of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and What It Takes To Get an Appeal Started,” and § 4.91 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection.”)

3. **Pro per briefs by represented clients**  [§ 1.59]

If the client wants to file a pro per brief, counsel should explain that a party in a criminal case does not have the right to act as co-counsel, to file a brief while represented by appellate counsel, or to represent himself or herself. (Martinez v. Court of Appeal (2000) 528 U.S. 152, 163-164 [no constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal]; People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1163 [no right to act as co-counsel if represented by counsel].)

If the client submits a pro per brief, a Court of Appeal usually will decline to accept it and will forward the brief to appointed counsel for a decision on whether to raise the client’s issue. The attorney should not simply “adopt” the pro per brief. If counsel decides to submit the issue to the court, counsel should properly argue the issue and present it in a supplemental brief. If the issue does not have merit, counsel should return the brief to the client, explaining the reasons for the rejection by the court and for counsel’s conclusion the issue does not have merit. Counsel may also write to the court and state, “I have reviewed the brief and will not be filing supplemental briefing. I have returned the brief to the client with an explanation of the court’s policy.”

In such a situation the project may be able to help “mediate” by giving counsel a second opinion and explaining to the client why the issue is not arguable. If that is unsuccessful, counsel can advise the client about requesting a new attorney on appeal or on filing a pro per habeas corpus petition. At the same time counsel must admonish the client about such dangers as the successive petitions rule, possible waiver of attorney-client confidentiality (by alleging ineffective assistance of counsel), disclosure of

66 An exception is the right to file a pro per supplemental brief after appointed counsel files a no-issue brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 440. This right does not apply to dependency appeals. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835.)

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damaging information in a motion or petition, undercutting counsel’s efforts by attacking
counsel or the arguments in the brief, and other pitfalls of self-representation.

D. Client Records [§ 1.60]

Counsel have ethical duties with respect to client records, both the appellate
transcripts and materials in the case file. It is important to understand these duties and
handle them carefully.

1. Transcripts [§ 1.61]

Although ADI has found no explicit authority stating that appellate court
transcripts are the client’s property and part of the attorney’s file, ADI has always taken
the “safe” position that they are and that the client is entitled to them on request at the end
of the case. If the attorney does not give them to the client after the case ends, the attorney
must retain them for the life of the client in criminal cases and for a substantial period
after the subject child (or youngest child, if there are several) attains majority in a dependency case.67 (See Cal. State Bar Formal Opn. 2001-157 [duty
to retain file in criminal case for life of client unless provided to client or client consents
to other disposition].)

a. Possession during appeal [§ 1.62]

During the course of the appeal, it is possible a client might request a copy of the
transcripts. The attorney should explain that there is only one copy and the client is not
entitled to them while represented by counsel because counsel needs them. If the client is
insistent, however, and the record is small, making a copy may be reasonable. If the
record is large, counsel can offer to send a summary of the transcripts or relevant
excerpts. If that is not satisfactory, counsel can suggest that the client or the client’s
family or friends provide payment for the photocopying costs. But counsel should not
relinquish possession of the record while the case is still being actively litigated, unless
counsel has access to another copy (e.g., a scanned version).

67Superior court document retention policies may be a guide to counsel in
determining how long is a reasonable period after the child attains majority. Written
policies for at least some counties may be viewed on the court website.
http://www.courts.ca.gov/find-my-court.htm

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An exception arises when counsel files a no-issue brief under *People v. Wende* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 440, or *In re Sade C.* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952. Counsel normally should send the record to the client upon filing such a brief, in case the client wishes to take advantage of the opportunity to file a pro per brief. Such an opportunity is required in non-dependency cases. (See § 1.27, ante.)

b. **Disposition after appeal** [§ 1.63]

Early in the case counsel should make written arrangements with the client for the disposition of the record when the appeal is over. The transcripts normally should either be (a) retained by the attorney, (b) sent to the client or his or her designee, or (c) otherwise disposed of in accordance with the client’s instructions.

It is usually not feasible for attorneys to retain hard copies of transcripts, because a seasoned appellate attorney will have hundreds of cases over the years. Sending them to the client and asking for client instructions on some other disposition, such as destruction or transmission to a third party, are alternatives. If the attorney has obtained the reporter’s transcript in computer-readable form, storage is not a concern, and retaining the record, with notice to the client it is available at any time on request, is probably the most practical way of complying with ethical obligations. Attorneys who received records in computer-readable form will be reimbursed for sending the client a paper copy only when the client has expressly requested it in that form.

In cases with confidential records, counsel should use care to dispose of them in a way that does not compromise their confidentiality. See ADI’s *web page on confidential records.* (See also following § 1.64 on sensitive and confidential materials.)

The usual options may not be feasible when the client is an infant or young minor in a dependency appeal. In such a case, counsel cannot send the record to the client when the child’s caretaker is not entitled to access to it, because doing so violates confidentiality. It may be possible to send the record to the child’s guardian ad litem, often trial counsel. Or, if counsel is able to verify that the documents and reporter’s transcripts will be obtainable from court archives during the minority of the child, counsel may destroy them, while informing the client or the client’s caretaker the attorney will

68 See California Rules of Court, rule 8.130(f)(4) (requesting reporter’s transcript in computer-readable form).


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pay for any costs of retrieval. Because such costs rarely occur and are not large, that approach is far less costly than storing increasing quantities of documents over the years.

When sending them to the client, counsel should always make it clear this is the client’s only copy, and the client has the responsibility of safeguarding it. If it is lost, the client must pay the state for a replacement.\(^{70}\)

c. Sensitive and confidential materials \([\$ 1.64]\)

There may be circumstances (e.g., many child molestation cases) when the client does not want the record coming into an institutional setting, where privacy is limited.\(^{71}\) In such a situation, counsel should ask for written directions on whether to send it to a third party or destroy it. Counsel who fail to send the record to the client or make arrangements for its disposal may have an ethical obligation to keep it.

Sometimes material that is not supposed to be in the record is inadvertently included. For example, by law the transcripts must not include the names, addresses, or telephone numbers of sworn jurors; jurors must be referred to by an identifying number.\(^{72}\) (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.332(b).) Other examples might be confidential juvenile records (see, generally, Welf. & Inst. Code, § 827; rule 8.401(b)) and confidential transcripts (rule 8.47). Examples in dependency appeals might be the contact information for confidential foster parents or a parent or the psychological

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\(^{70}\) The court can assist in obtaining copies of records. See “Records Retrieval” on each district’s Practices and Procedures page. 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm

\(^{71}\) In such cases, counsel should be careful about all communications during the appeal, including contents of letters, briefs, etc. The client may ask that nothing revealing the nature of the crime be sent to prison. Other methods of communication may then have to be arranged.

\(^{72}\) The information for unsworn jurors (such as those excused) must not be sealed unless the court finds compelling reason to do so (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.332(c)), but by policy unsworn jurors should be identified only by first name and initial.

If access to juror identification information is required to handle the case, counsel may apply to the trial court under Code of Civil Procedure section 237, subdivisions (b)-(d). (See People v. Johnson (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 486.)
evaluation of the other parent. Upon discovering material that counsel is not supposed to see, counsel should stop reading that part of the transcript immediately and notify the Court of Appeal and the project. The court may order return of the records, redaction, or other corrective action. Under no circumstances should counsel send such material to clients or other persons without specific authorization from the court or project.

If the material is appropriate for counsel to review, but not the client, counsel may personally redact the transcript, if practical, in order to send it to the client, completely covering the confidential information and ensuring it is not readable by any methods. If the changes are more extensive, counsel may ask the court to order the court clerk to prepare a proper copy. If the record is in electronic form, having the clerk do the corrections may be the only alternative.

2. Office file  [§ 1.65]

If the client wants counsel’s office file, he or she is entitled to it. California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.16(e)(1) provides:

subject to any applicable protective order, non-disclosure agreement, statute or regulation, the lawyer promptly shall release to the client, at the request of the client, all client materials and property. "Client materials and property" includes correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts, experts’ reports and other writings,* exhibits, and physical evidence, whether in tangible, electronic or other form, and other items reasonably necessary to the client’s representation, whether the client has paid for them or not . . . .

a. Contents of file  [§ 1.66]

The file to be turned over to the client on request includes all correspondence and filings. The attorney’s work product materials – written notes, impressions, thoughts, etc. – may also belong to the client and if so must be delivered to the client or a successor attorney on request. (See Eddy v. Fields (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1543, 1548, and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 242, 246-248 [describing conflicting lines of authority]; Kallen v. Delug (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 940, 950; Code Civ. Proc., § 2018; Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.4, Comment [4].)

73 Counsel can make a copy of the file, at his or her expense, and retain those copies. (See Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.16, Comment [6].) This is highly advisable in most cases, for the attorney’s own protection.
Copies of cases, statutes, etc., are not work product because they are in the public domain. Claims materials are not produced for the client’s benefit; they are extrinsic to the attorney-client relationship and so need not be turned over.

As indicated in § 1.61 et seq., ante, ADI has always taken the “safe” position that appellate court transcripts are part of the attorney’s file, that they belong to the client, and that the client is entitled to them on request.

b. Sending file to client  [§ 1.67]

If the client requests the file during the appeal, counsel can send it right away, or if the original is needed to represent the client, can offer to send a copy immediately and provide the original at the end of the case.

At the conclusion of the case, if the file is sent to the client, counsel should warn the client that it is the original, that the client has the responsibility to preserve it, and that if they lose the material they may be responsible for the costs of additional copies. Counsel does not have to send the client copies of documents already sent. Nevertheless, it is often good for client relations to do so, provided the extra copying is modest in scope and is not repeatedly requested.

c. Storing file if not sent to client  [§ 1.68]

If the original file is not sent to the client or the client has not given written instructions on its disposition, in criminal cases it is the attorney’s responsibility to store it for the life of the client. (State Bar Standing Com. on Prof. Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Opn. No. 2001-157 [“client files in criminal matters should not be destroyed without the former client’s express consent while the former client is alive”].) It may prove useful in the event there is a post-appeal claims audit or post-appeal habeas corpus proceedings. The file may be stored in counsel’s office or in an off-site storage facility.

In dependency cases, counsel should keep the files at least for a substantial period after the subject child (or youngest child, if there are several) has reached majority.

74http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=PFc4o8VEEnCg%3d&tabid=838.

75Superior court document retention policies may be a guide to counsel in determining how long is a reasonable period after the child attains majority. Written

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Counsel should ensure these confidential files are in a secure location, where unauthorized persons cannot get access.

E. Client Custody Issues [§ 1.69]

Counsel occasionally must face issues of whether the client should seek to be released, where the client is incarcerated, and other custody matters.

1. Release pending appeal/avoiding excess time in custody [§ 1.70]

Occasionally, the attorney may face the matter of seeking the client’s release pending appeal. The client may request the attorney do so, or counsel may conclude release pending appeal is necessary to safeguard the possibility of meaningful relief for the client and avoid the possibility the client might end up serving “dead” time – custody in excess of the lawful sentence – in the event of a favorable result on appeal. These matters are discussed in detail in § 3.37 et seq. of chapter 3, “Pre-Briefing Responsibilities: Record Completion, Extensions of Time, Release on Appeal.” The possibility of release pending decision is also available on habeas corpus. (Pen. Code, § 1476.)

2. Compassionate release [§ 1.71]

If the client is terminally ill, counsel should consider pursuing a compassionate release. Seeking early release under this program is sensible only if there is a place for the client to go, such as family or an alternative care facility.

The procedure for compassionate release is governed by Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (e)(1)-(6) and the title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, starting at section 3076. It does not apply to a defendant who is sentenced to death or a term of life without the possibility of parole. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (e)(2)(B).)

Policies for at least some counties may be viewed on the court website.

http://www.courts.ca.gov/find-my-court.htm

76If the defendant ends up serving “dead” time, the period of parole should be reduced by the excess time of imprisonment. (E.g., People v. London (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 896, 911, fn. 8; In re Ballard (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 647, 650.)

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Upon the recommendation of the Director of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and/or the Board of Parole Hearings, a court may recall the prisoner’s sentence if (1) the prisoner has an incurable condition likely to produce death within six months and (2) release or treatment would not pose a threat to public safety. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (e)(1) & (2)(A) & (B).) The prisoner, his or her family, or a designee may make the request for consideration of recall and resentencing by contacting the chief medical officer at the prison or the Director of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (e)(4).)

The defendant may appeal the denial of compassionate resentencing as an order after judgment affecting his or her substantial rights. (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155 [rejecting previous line of decisions implying the fact the defendant has no right to make a motion deprives the defendant of standing to appeal its denial]; see chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started,” § 2.62 et seq.)

3. Prison placement and other matters not directly related to the appeal [§ 1.72]

Sometimes the client asks for assistance dealing with matters other than the appeal, such as prison conditions, prison placement, or a particular medical problem. These communications promote the attorney-client relationship but, because they are unnecessary to the handling of the appeal, are compensable only to a de minimis extent. For example, the attorney may refer the client to prisoner resources.77

Counsel can also provide information on the general governing principles. For example, a client may want to be housed in a prison nearer home. Counsel can refer the client to Penal Code section 5068, which recognizes that maintaining family and community relationships reduces recidivism and provides that placement should be nearest the prisoner’s home, unless other classification factors make such placement unreasonable. The client can inform the reception center, the counselor, and classification committee of his or her desire and can provide them with information verifying family ties, such as the probation report and letters from family. Hardship, such as an elderly or ill parent who is unable to travel far, can be a basis upon which to seek placement. The client should be told that although custodial authorities may consider these factors, they will still give priority to custody and safety-based concerns.

F. Post-Decision Responsibilities  [§ 1.73]

As discussed in § 1.19, ante, when the opinion is received counsel must analyze it, decide what if anything counsel will do next, and then explain the situation to the client.

1. Rehearing and review  [§ 1.74]

If the opinion is unfavorable, counsel should inform the client about the petition for rehearing and review process. It is important to write promptly because of the tight time requirements: 15-day limit for petitions for rehearing (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.268(b)(1)) and the requirement that petitions for review be filed within 10 days after finality as to the Court of Appeal (rule 8.500(e)(1)).

a. Rehearing  [§ 1.75]

Pro per petitions for rehearing are usually not feasible, given the short deadlines and typical slowness of prison mail. In addition, the court may refuse to file a pro per petition filed by a client currently represented by counsel in that court. Thus counsel should give the benefit of the doubt to filing the petition if the client may want or need to do so. Petitions for rehearing are covered more comprehensively in § 7.33 et seq. of chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision.” (See also § 1.20, ante.)

b. Review  [§ 1.76]

Counsel should petition for review if in counsel’s judgment there are grounds under California Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b), and the client is reasonably likely to benefit from it. Counsel should also petition if there is a reasonably viable and properly preserved federal issue the client wants to pursue. (See rule 8.508 [abbreviated petition for review solely to exhaust state remedies].) If counsel decides not to file a petition for

78The presiding justice may grant relief from failure to file a timely petition for rehearing until the 30th day after the filing of the opinion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.268(b)(4).) The court also may grant rehearing on its own motion during this period. (Rule 8.268(a).) Although a belated petition accompanied by a good explanation of why it is late may possibly be considered, no one should rely on this if a timely petition is feasible.
review, counsel should provide the client with information on how to proceed in pro per. This may include a sample petition, the due dates, the addresses for the courts and parties to be served, and the number of copies required. Petition for review information forms for clients are on the ADI website.79

Petitions for review are covered more comprehensively in § 7.46 et seq. of chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision”; see also § 1.21, ante.)

2. Federal filings [§ 1.77]

An appointment in the California Court of Appeal may include a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court in appropriate cases. Certiorari is compensable but is considered an exceptional step and at ADI requires the executive director’s preapproval.

Federal habeas corpus is not compensable under the state appointment, although counsel may choose to “ghost-write” a pro per federal petition for writ of habeas corpus to be filed by the client or seek an appointment from the federal court.

The client should be informed about seeking relief in federal courts if the client has a substantial federal issue or has expressed interest in pursuing one. The client needs to know the grounds for certiorari and/or habeas corpus, the deadlines for filing, state exhaustion requirements, the restriction against successive petitions, etc. Counsel can provide forms, addresses, and other information.

Certiorari is discussed more comprehensively in § 7.100 et seq. of chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Court and Processes After Decision.” Federal habeas corpus is the topic of chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”

3. Post-appeal contacts with clients [§ 1.78]

Sometimes after an appeal a client may ask for help relating to the appeal or other areas. Counsel should give the client the respect of a timely reply. The authority to act

79 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples.asp
under the appellate appointment is usually over, but counsel can inform the client about such resources as legal books maintained by the prison law library, prisoner rights organizations, and innocence projects. The ADI website maintains a partial list of prisoner assistance resources.\footnote{http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/pract_resources.asp#prisoner} Counsel can also provide habeas corpus forms and instructions on filing them.

V. RESPONSIBLE USE OF ASSOCIATE COUNSEL AND LAW CLERKS
[§ 1.79]

At its December 2015 meeting, the Appellate Indigent Defense Advisory Oversight Committee (AIDOAC) promulgated a statewide policy regarding the use of associate counsel. It was largely based on the policies previously spelled out in this Manual and represented no substantive change for ADI panel attorneys. In the interests of maximum uniformity among districts, the Manual is revised to adopt the AIDOAC formulation. Any special ADI interpretations or Fourth District rules on the subject are marked clearly.

\begin{center}
\textbf{AIDOAC POLICY ON USE OF ASSOCIATE COUNSEL}
\end{center}

\begin{quote}
(section numbers added to conform to ADI Appellate Practice Manual system)

The AIDOAC guidelines are based on principles articulated by the California Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal and reflect the appellate projects’ standards for assessing the performance of appointed counsel. They are based, as well, on the broad ethical responsibilities of attorneys, recognizing that the failure adequately to supervise the work of subordinate attorney or non-attorney employees or agents is a failure to act competently on behalf of a client. (See Rules Prof. Conduct, \textit{rule 1.1 and related annotations}.\footnote{http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/rules/Rule_1.1-Exec_Summary-Redline.pdf})

Special considerations:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Court- or project-specific requirements:} Individual courts or projects may have additional or more specific requirements. Counsel must consult with the applicable project for such requirements.
\end{itemize}
\end{quote}

\footnote{http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/pract_resources.asp#prisoner}
\footnote{http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/rules/Rule_1.1-Exec_Summary-Redline.pdf}
Limitation for assisted cases: AIDOAC has determined that attorneys in assisted cases may not use associate counsel, except with prior approval of the project executive director upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances.

A. Basic Principle of Personal Responsibility  [§ 1.80]

The attorney of record at all times has complete, final, and personal responsibility for the case. It is acceptable for the attorney in an independent case to employ others to assist in any of the attorney’s functions. The attorney personally, however, is fully accountable for what has or has not been done on the case. The projects use a detailed, comprehensive method of evaluating attorneys’ performance and selecting them for particular cases. The projects’ quality controls would be undercut if attorneys were to allow others, not subject to this system, to take over important aspects of a case. The projects examine every category for which associate counsel or law clerk time is claimed, to determine whether appointed counsel has been sufficiently engaged to fulfill expectations.

The projects expect the quality of an attorney’s work at all stages to reflect his or her own experience and other personal qualifications. This policy of personal accountability applies, not only to final filed documents, but also to preliminary drafts, if any, submitted to the projects and discussion of cases with a project staff attorney. Appointed counsel must be prepared to communicate personally with the project on all substantive, legal, strategic, ethical, and other important matters related to the case. Drafts and communications must conform to what is reasonably expected of attorneys at the experience level of appointed counsel.

Over-delegation may negatively affect the project’s evaluation of appointed counsel’s performance. Any substandard work produced by associates will damage the standing of the panel attorney personally.

B. Specific Responsibilities of Appointed Counsel  [§ 1.81]

The appointed counsel is responsible for the following tasks, among any others the handling of a case may require: reviewing the entire record, completing it, and selecting issues; filing appropriate briefs, motions, applications, and other pleadings; reviewing all filings; making any personal appearances that adequate representation might require, including oral argument; and ensuring prompt, proper, and thorough communication with the client, the project, counsel for all parties, trial counsel as necessary, and the court. In performing these tasks, counsel must also ensure all applicable deadlines are met. To expand on some of these areas:
1. **Reviewing the entire record, completing it, and selecting issues**  [§ 1.81A]

Review of the entire record for issue selection and mastery of essential facts is an especially critical aspect of representation. Counsel must ensure the record is adequate for performing this task and complete it if necessary. While associate counsel may assist in record completion and review by performing such functions as taking notes on the transcript or writing a summary of the case and facts, ultimate delegation of this supremely important responsibility to another is unacceptable. The time appointed counsel spends personally reviewing the record must be adequate to assure all potential issues in the record have been spotted and considered. Counsel must also be familiar with the details of the record to understand nuances of fact that might affect the assessment and drafting of arguments.

2. **Filing appropriate briefs and other pleadings**  [§ 1.81B]

The opening brief is usually the pivotal document in an appeal, and counsel must put substantial personal effort into filing a product of appropriate quality. It is the attorney's own responsibility to confirm that the facts are stated appropriately, in accordance with appellate standards, and are supported by accurate citations to the record; to ensure all appropriate authorities have been considered and all citations are accurate and up to date; and to see that the document is proper and complete in both form and substance, complies with all requirements of the Rules of Court, accurately states all facts and law, and is argued intelligibly, coherently, grammatically, and persuasively. Similar responsibilities apply to reply briefs, petitions for rehearing or review, motions and applications, and any other filing.

3. **Reviewing all filings by others**  [§ 1.81C]

Other aspects of representation also require close personal attention. Decisions about reply briefs, oral argument, rehearing and review, etc., cannot be made properly unless appointed counsel reviews such filings as the respondent's brief and the opinion, plus any co-appellant's briefing, court orders, and any other filing that may affect counsel's exercise of judgment.

4. **Making personal appearances**  [§ 1.81D]

Personal appearances (such as oral arguments) require special care, because supervising another's work in a courtroom is essentially impossible. Unless advance arrangements have been made, the projects and the courts expect appointed counsel to make all appearances personally. The panel attorney must consult with the project before using associate counsel at oral argument. The court may have to pre-approve the appearance of associate counsel, as well.
certain circumstances, the court or project may also require the client’s consent. Requirements may vary from one court and project to another.

5. **Engaging in proper communication with the client, court, project, and others** [§ 1.81E]

Counsel is personally responsible for ensuring prompt, proper, and thorough communication with the client, the court, the project, counsel for all parties, trial counsel as necessary, and any other person or entity the needs of the case may require. Counsel must fully comply with the ethical requirements of adequate client communication, including providing copies of significant documents and keeping the client informed of significant developments in the case. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subds. (m) & (n); rule 1.4(a)(3), Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct.)

C. **Compensation** [§ 1.82]

Appointed counsel must report on all compensation claims any usage of associate counsel and indicate how much of that counsel’s time is included in the hours claimed. These principles apply:

*Meaning of “associate counsel”:* Associate counsel must have been an active member of the California State Bar at the time the services were performed for that individual’s time to be billable as “counsel” time. If that was not the case, the time is billable only as law clerk or paralegal time – an expense not to exceed $25 per hour.

*Compensable costs of associate counsel:* A claim with associate counsel time will be judged under the same guidelines and standards of reasonableness as those applicable to single-attorney claims. The use of associate counsel does not increase the time payable for any service performed.

*Claiming associate counsel’s time:* Associate counsel time is reported as a part of appointed counsel’s time for any specific task. Associate counsel time included in the claim is then itemized in the associate counsel attachment, which must state the name and California State Bar number of the associate counsel. These special rules apply:

- Counsel must first claim all of his or her own billable time and only then add any associate counsel time deemed billable on top of that: It is essential for the project to know how much time appointed counsel personally spent on the case, in order to

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assess counsel’s compliance with these associate counsel policies. Counsel must not cut his or her own time in order to claim associate counsel time: doing so will understate appointed counsel’s own involvement and cause the project, AIDOAC, or court to question whether counsel exercised appropriate control over the case.

• In the attachment for itemizing associate counsel’s time, the hours shown must be only those actually claimed (as opposed to those spent): In determining how much time appointed counsel personally spent on each function, the projects take the total hours reported for each function and subtract the itemized hours for associate counsel. That calculation requires that the itemized hours be only those actually included in the hours claimed. If counsel wishes to state unclaimed associate counsel time to show the extent of work performed on the case or give the attorney due credit, the comments are the appropriate place, not the itemization chart.

— END OF AIDOAC POLICY STATEMENT —

VI. CLASSIFICATION AND MATCHING OF CASES AND ATTORNEYS
[§ 1.83]

A. Case Screening and Classification [§ 1.84]

Under a statewide system approved by the judiciary, defendants’ appeals in criminal and juvenile delinquency cases are classified as follows:

A: Sentence of less than 5 years for trials, less than 10 years for pleas.

B: Sentence of at least 5 but less than 10 years for trials, at least 10 but less than 20 years for pleas.

C: Sentence of at least 10 but less than 20 years for trials, at least 20 but less than 30 years for pleas.

D: Sentence of 20 years or more for trials, 30 years or more for pleas, or any with life maximum.

E: Life without possibility of parole.
Special classifications for other types of appeals in criminal cases or quasi-criminal cases include People’s appeals, habeas corpus, and Sexually Violent Predator. Juvenile dependency, family law, conservatorship, paternity, sterilization, and other civil cases requiring court-appointed counsel are classified by the type of proceeding.

B. Attorney Screening and Classification [§ 1.85]

The attorneys on the panel are separated into two speciality groups – criminal and juvenile dependency. They are then divided by the location of their office into geographic groups. Within each specialty/geographical area, the attorneys are divided into groups based on their qualifications, using the statewide level 1 through 5 classifications.

1. Attorney ranks [§ 1.86]

The general framework within which attorneys are classified and appointment decisions are made is shown in the following chart.
CRITERIA FOR ATTORNEY CLASSIFICATIONS

**Level 1.** Attorneys who are fairly new to the panel and need substantial assistance.

*Expected work product:* Must demonstrate promising writing, research, and analytical skills and make steady progress toward skills required of higher classifications.

*Typical ADI cases:* Class A or B cases on an assisted basis.

**Level 2.** Attorneys with some relevant experience who need some but reduced assistance in cases and whose work indicates the ability to handle cases somewhat more difficult than the simplest.

*Expected work product:* Must produce work of at least standard quality, requiring little assistance to perform basic duties. As a general policy, attorneys at this level must demonstrate reasonable progress toward handling independent cases.

*Typical ADI cases:* Class A or B cases on a modified assisted basis.

**Level 3.** Attorneys with a moderate amount of relevant experience, whose work indicates ability to handle cases of intermediate complexity on an independent basis.

*Expected work product:* Must consistently produce work of at least good to very good quality, requiring assistance only to perform more complex duties.

*Typical ADI cases:* Classes A through C on an independent basis.

**Level 4.** Attorneys of superior qualifications and considerable relevant experience, whose work indicates ability to handle complex cases on an independent basis.

*Expected work product:* Must consistently produce work of at least very good quality, requiring assistance only to perform very difficult and complex duties.

*Typical ADI cases:* Classes A through D on an independent basis.

**Level 5.** Attorneys with the highest qualifications and extensive relevant experience, whose work indicates ability to handle the most complex cases on an independent basis.

*Expected work product:* Must produce work of consistently very good to excellent quality, requiring assistance only at highly sophisticated levels.

*Typical ADI cases:* Cases of all classes on an independent basis.

These are general principles, not rigid rules, and are constantly evolving. They vary from project to project and over time.

2. **Determination of rank**  [§ 1.87]

When an attorney’s application to the panel is accepted, the initial classification depends not only on experience (which is of course an important factor), but also on more qualitative measures such as training and education, class rank and academic honors, writing ability, and commitment to indigent appeals.
After admission, the project evaluates the attorney’s work on each individual cases. The project uses an evaluation form assessing overall performance and itemizing specific factors that go into the overall assessment. The evaluations form a cumulative record of performance. The statewide evaluation process system is described in § 1.94 et seq., post.

Each attorney’s ranking is reviewed on an ongoing basis as the record of evaluations and other factors change. The project may move the attorney’s rank up or down, increase or decrease or suspend offers, remove the attorney from the panel, put him or her on probation, or take other steps as circumstances require.

C. Selection of an Attorney for a Particular Case  [§ 1.88]

The matching process – selection of an attorney for a case – begins after the case is screened and classified as described in § 1.84, ante (A, B, C, D, or E, or one of the special classifications). The following discussion generally describes the matching process at ADI; other projects may use different procedures.

1. Assisted vs. independent decision  [§ 1.89]

One fundamental decision is whether the case is to be “assisted” or “independent.” Sometimes a hybrid category is used, such as “modified-assisted” (for an assisted case requiring less assistance than usual) or “modified independent” for an independent case requiring more assistance than usual). This decision is affected by such factors as caseload, staff attorney resources, training needs, costs, and the availability of qualified attorneys. Assisted cases are usually assigned to attorneys with less experience on the panel. Independent cases are generally assigned to the three highest rankings according to the level of complexity, giving the more complicated cases to the more highly qualified attorneys. (ADI tries not to use the highest ranked attorneys for the simplest cases, in order to assure they remain available for the most difficult cases.)

2. Choice of attorney rotation  [§ 1.90]

Another step is to choose the appropriate rotation from which to select the attorney. The combination of the case classification and the type of representation (assisted or independent) indicate which attorney qualifications levels – level 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 – are eligible under the standards described in § 1.86, ante. Geographic locale is often one consideration, although often it is not, as well.

Within each rotation, the attorneys are listed roughly in order of last offer, so that those whose last offer was longest ago tend to be near the front. Other factors, however,
may affect the attorney’s place in the rotation, including quality of recent work, time
difficulties, request not to get an offer for a certain time for one reason or another, request
for new appointment, and so on.

3. **Choice of individual attorney within rotation**  [§ 1.91]

The appointment is offered to the first individual in the rotation who is considered
to be highly suitable for the particular case. The judgment of suitability takes account of
the attorney’s preferences, number of unbriefed cases outstanding, timeliness, general
quality of work, probable availability, special areas of strength or weakness, recent
performance, client preferences, and numerous other factors.

4. **Special request for appointment outside the normal rotation**  [§ 1.92]

ADI recognizes that attorneys may wish to let ADI know that they have come to a
point where they can do no more work on their pending cases for some time (for example,
while awaiting the preparation of a lengthy augmentation of the record). They may use the
form requesting appointment outside the normal rotation on the ADI website. Counsel
must use only this form, not phone calls or letters, to inform ADI of a request. ADI
cannot guarantee to honor such requests, since the suitability of the attorney for a
particular case remains the most important factor, and ADI has to consider fairness to all
attorneys in offering cases. Thus, special requests for appointment outside the normal
rotation should be the exception. A request containing inaccurate information will be
discarded.

5. **Offer of case**  [§ 1.93]

The attorney selected for an appointment offer is contacted. If the attorney declines
or cannot be reached reasonably promptly, ADI repeats the selection process. When an
attorney has accepted, ADI sends a recommendation for the appointment to the court.
Because of the many factors considered in making the selection, ADI can make no
representations how many appointment offers an attorney may receive, or whether an
attorney will continue to receive any appointments at all.

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D. Evaluations of Attorney Performance  [§ 1.94]

The assigned project staff attorney evaluates every case handled by a panel attorney. The following categories, approved by the judiciary for statewide use, are considered:

1. Issues – selection and definition  [§ 1.95]
   a. Identifies standard issues  [§ 1.96]
      Identifies standard issues which would be apparent to an attorney having knowledge of the record and a reasonable awareness of existing procedural and substantive law.
   b. Identifies subtle issues  [§ 1.97]
      Shows depth of insight and analytical skill in identifying and developing issues. Identifies issues that are not obvious and perceives their implications.
   c. Identifies current issues  [§ 1.98]
      Identifies current issues which would be apparent to an attorney having knowledge of the record and familiarity with recent trends and the cases then pending in the appellate courts of California and the United States.
   d. Evaluates issues properly  [§ 1.99]
      Exercises sound judgment in determining the merit of each issue and treating each issue according to its merits. Gives each issue its share of the brief, but no more. Arranges issues in the brief in an appropriate order. Eliminates issues that are only marginally arguable if they detract from the remaining issues or the tone of the brief as a whole.
   e. Defines issues clearly  [§ 1.100]
      Demonstrates competency in framing each issue. Defines the scope of the issue. Clearly understands and phrases the exact
question to be decided by the court. Uses effective argument headings.

2. **Research**  [§ 1.101]
   
   a. **Performs thorough research**  [§ 1.102]
      
      Thoroughly researches all relevant aspects of each potential issue, becoming familiar with the law on related issues or “sub-issues” when necessary. Finds the most recent cases. Shows resourcefulness and knowledge of available materials.
   
   b. **Selects appropriate authority**  [§ 1.103]
      
      Cites adequate authority for the principles relied upon, neither string-citing unnecessarily nor making statements without support. Whenever possible uses cases which are factually on point as well as legally relevant. Takes account of adverse authority.
   
   c. **Cites authority accurately**  [§ 1.104]
      
      Cites and quotes legal authorities accurately; does not intentionally or negligently misrepresent the facts or law contained in authorities.
   
   d. **Checks current validity of authority**  [§ 1.105]
      
      Researches later history of cases. Cites no cases which have been overruled, depublished, or granted review in the California Supreme Court.

3. **Argumentation**  [§ 1.106]
   
   a. **Organizes argument**  [§ 1.107]
      
      Presents position in a coherent manner. States facts, sets forth legal principles and authorities, argues, and summarizes in a logical, orderly progression. Keeps objective of argument in mind; does not ramble or dwell on marginal matters.
b. **Covers all points essential to position**  [§ 1.108]

Is aware of and addresses all points logically or legally necessary to the argument. Applies law to facts. Argues prejudice. Anticipates and discusses failure-to-object and waiver or forfeiture issues.

c. **Handles authority skillfully**  [§ 1.109]

Analyzes authorities accurately and perceives their implications. Argues from analogy and distinguishes or challenges adverse authority skillfully.

d. **Demonstrates proficiency in advocacy skills**  [§ 1.110]


e. **Is consistently professional in manner**  [§ 1.111]

Maintains decorum without being pompous or overly formal. Is respectful to the court and opposing counsel. Concentrates on merits and refrains from personal attacks.

4. **Style and form**  [§ 1.112]

a. **Writes fluently**  [§ 1.113]

Shows mastery of written language. Presents ideas clearly and concisely. Avoids legalisms.

b. **Uses correct grammar, diction, spelling, capitalization, and punctuation**  [§ 1.114]

Demonstrates command of the structure and formal elements of the English language. Does not detract from professional image by displays of carelessness and illiteracy. Proofreads carefully.

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c. Presents statement of the case properly  [§ 1.115]

Summarizes only those procedural facts relevant to the appeal itself or the specific issues to be decided. Cites to record.

d. Presents statement of facts properly  [§ 1.116]

Summarizes in the statement of facts only those facts supported by the record. Adequately cites to the record. Is scrupulous in presenting the facts accurately and in the light most favorable to the respondent. Clearly separates and labels the defense evidence. Writes the pertinent facts in narrative form, not a witness-by-witness account.

e. Uses correct citation form  [§ 1.117]

Uses correct citation form for both legal authorities and the appellate record.

f. Follows rules and good practice on form and technical aspects of pleadings  [§ 1.118]

Follows prescribed format and formal requirements as to typing, binding, copying, and distributing of briefs and other pleadings. Gives briefs neat, orderly, professional appearance.

5. Responsibility  [§ 1.119]

a. Makes sure record is adequate  [§ 1.120]

Whenever necessary reviews the trial exhibits and the superior court file. Augments the record as needed.

b. Makes use of opportunities for reply briefs and/or oral argument  [§ 1.121]

Orally argues or files a reply brief whenever necessary. Bases the decision to request or waive oral argument upon the appropriateness of argument, not upon convenience.
c. **Is reliable and cooperative in working with project**  

   Promptly answers letters and returns phone calls. Keeps appointments. Meets informal interim deadlines within a reasonable time. Accepts reasonable recommendations and suggestions unless in conflict with the attorney’s duty to the client or the attorney’s professional judgment.

d. **Observes deadlines**  

   Files all motions, briefs, and petitions on or before the date due, requesting extensions of time if, but only if, necessary.

6. **Relationship with client**  

   a. **Communicates reliably**  

   Writes the client soon after appointment, answers correspondence, and provides the client with copies of all filings. When the court’s opinion is issued, promptly advises the client; explains how to file his or her own petitions if the attorney sees no merit in proceeding further.

   b. **Faithfully pursues client’s interests**  

   Selects issues to maximize effectiveness of appeal for client. Acts zealously and conscientiously in fulfilling obligation to client, regardless of perceived reward or detriment to attorney.

E. **Feedback to Attorneys**  

   An accurate and realistic understanding of one’s own strengths and weakness is critical to development of the necessary skills. Accordingly, attorneys always may obtain information on how they are doing at ADI. They do need, however, to be proactive in seeking this information. ADI cannot possibly advise attorneys *sua sponte* of the hundreds, indeed thousands, of individual decisions we make each year regarding the cases they receive.

   Panel attorneys may, and when in doubt should, ask the assigned staff attorney for informal feedback on their performance in specific cases. A phone call or e-mail will do.
Staff attorneys in turn are encouraged to provide such feedback, even when not asked, whenever they think it would benefit the panel attorney.

At ADI, formal written feedback in any given case is also available, in the form of a verbatim copy of the staff attorney’s narrative evaluation and overall assessment. It will be provided on request in any case whenever the appropriate form\(^\text{84}\) is submitted at the same time the copy of the opening brief is served on ADI.

In addition to case-specific feedback, attorneys may ask for an overall assessment and panel status report at any time. Although at ADI only the executive director is authorized to provide this information, attorneys may make their request in any way comfortable to them – directly to the executive director or through a staff attorney or the ADI panel liaison (“ombudsman”\(^\text{85}\)).

We strongly encourage attorneys to take advantage of these opportunities to improve their performance, track their panel status, and head off any problems before they become big.

VII. COMPENSATION OF APPOINTED COUNSEL \([§ 1.128]\)

A. Standards for Assessing Claims \([§ 1.129]\)

1. Services \([§ 1.130]\)

The judiciary has promulgated guidelines\(^\text{86}\) to assure the reasonableness of compensation. The guidelines offer a prima facie measure of reasonableness for the time to be spent on various functions in the “ordinary” case (not significantly more or less complex than most). The ultimate standard is always reasonableness, which may or may not correspond to the guidelines in a given situation.

ADI has produced a compensation claim manual\(^\text{87}\). It “codifies” the ways the Appellate Indigent Defense Oversight Advisory Committee, the Judicial Council of


\(^{85}\) [http://www.adi-sandiego.com/panel/ombudsman.asp](http://www.adi-sandiego.com/panel/ombudsman.asp)


California services (formerly Administrative Office of the Courts), the projects, and ADI in particular have interpreted the guidelines over the years in particular situations.

Counsel are required to keep time records to the nearest one-tenth of an hour and may be required to produce them on request. Only actual time may be claimed. The claim must never be premised solely on the guidelines (for example, by simply dividing the record length by the guidelines’ pages per hour) or an estimate (“I know I spent at least X hours on this”).

While claims in excess of the guidelines are not necessarily unreasonable, appointed counsel has the burden of showing why the time was needed in the particular case. These claims should be supported by written justification, preferably submitted with the claim to avoid delays. Indeed, whenever the necessity for any time claimed is not evident from the face of the filings (for example, research that did not yield any cases), counsel would be well advised to include an explanation with the claim.

Payment may be different from the guidelines. A lower payment is often recommended, for example, when the case was relatively simple and straightforward as compared with the “typical” case that is the model for the guidelines, or when the quality of work was substandard. It may also be higher than guidelines if the case was exceptionally challenging or counsel produced work of unusually high quality that was of notable benefit to the client, the court, or the law. The ultimate test is “reasonableness” – what an experienced appellate attorney would find reasonably necessary for handling the case appropriately. This is an individualized judgment for each case.

2. Expenses  [§ 1.131]

Like services, all expenses are reviewed under guidelines and ultimately are subject to a general test of reasonableness. The guidelines are the “actual cost” for postage and telephone expenses, if the postage and telephone expenses are reasonable under the circumstances. Ordinary use of computerized legal research (Lexis, Westlaw, 88Extraordinary delivery expenses are reimbursable only when the unavoidable needs of the case – not counsel – require their use. For example, if the court ordered a supplemental brief and allowed only four days for filing, the use of express mail or even personal messenger delivery might be reasonable under the circumstances. By contrast, when counsel has delayed working on the brief until a few days before the due date and uses express mail to avoid default, the express service is for counsel’s own needs and is not reimbursable. Consult the project for special situations, such as “fast-track” dependency cases.

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etc.) is considered overhead and is not compensable, but special circumstances, such as the need to search sources not within commonly available subscription plans, may warrant payment; consultation with the project before such use is advised. All extraordinary expenses will be considered on a case by case basis and should be explained. Some, such as experts, require project director or court preapproval in order to assure compensability.

B. Submitting Claims [§ 1.132]

1. Timing [§ 1.133]

Counsel may file a compensation claim at two times for most cases: an interim claim after the opening brief is filed and a final claim after the opinion is filed or whenever services are concluded. Supplemental claims may be allowed in cases with records over 7,500 pages or, on the approval of the project executive director and Judicial Council services, in cases with unusually long delays causing hardship for the panel attorney.

Counsel are encouraged to submit claims as soon as they are permitted. Filing a final claim waives payment for reasonably foreseeable services performed after submission of the claim, such as reading the opinion or communicating with the client. If the court orders supplemental briefing, an additional claim may be filed.

Interim claims in *Wende/Anders* and *Sade C.* no-issue cases are not permitted; final claims may be filed after the time the court sets for filing a pro per brief has expired.

A final claim needs to be filed within six months of the opinion. Appointed counsel should file a final claim even if it is for a relatively small amount of money. Judicial statistics are in large part based on final claims. Failure to file claims in cases with low hourly totals distorts those statistics and may hurt efforts to improve compensation for appointed attorneys. In addition, the Judicial Council requires the projects to submit “administrative” final claims for those considerably past due, in order to clear the books and pay the 5% holdback from the interim; these include no time past the interim and so may result in waiver of payment for such services.

89 Moderate translator expenses do not require preapproval.

90 *People v. Wende* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and *In re Sade C.* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952. (See § 1.24 et seq., ante, for further discussion of this topic.)
ADI sends counsel who have not already submitted a final claim a reminder approximately 60 days after the remittitur issues. About four weeks after that, the file will be closed and sent to storage. A claim filed after the case has been sent to storage cannot be processed until ADI receives payment for any costs of retrieving, transporting, and refiling the closed file. Counsel should call the project about the current applicable fee; claims submitted without this payment will not be processed.

2. Form and content of claim  [§ 1.134]

ADI claims must be submitted through the panel portal. Counsel’s State Bar number and vendor site identification number must be included on the claim. Check with other projects about the proper procedures in their cases.

If counsel wants the income reported under a law firm’s identification number, counsel must submit an attorney information change form, an IRS form W-9, and a certification, on firm letterhead and signed under penalty of perjury by a partner or officer, to the Accounting Unit of the Judicial Council Services, 455 Golden Gate Ave., San Francisco, CA 94102.

Special explanations must be provided where applicable. Counsel should describe unbriefed issues, for example, with sufficient detail for the project reviewer to assess reasonableness. Counsel must also complete when applicable the step for stating the significant use of brief-banked or otherwise recycled material, both factual (as with reused statements of case and facts in petitions for review or in habeas corpus petitions) and legal (as in substantially reused arguments).

91 https://cms.airsis.com/

92 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/pdf_forms/AOC_and_Appellate_Project_Information_Sheet_Final.pdf


95 Short boilerplate passages on general principles of law, such as standards of review or prejudice, tests for cruel and unusual punishment, standard Wende-Sade C. boilerplate, and elements of crimes, need not be declared as “recycled”; the project reviewer will assume it. More substantial and less obvious passages, however, must be declared.
As discussed in §§ 1.79-1.82, ante, the use of others to assist in the appeal must not reflect over-delegation and, to the extent it is compensated is expected not to increase the costs of the case. On the form, associate counsel’s time is to be combined with appointed counsel’s on the appropriate line, and paralegal or law clerk time is to be reported as an expense.\footnote{To be compensable as attorney time, work must be done by a person then an active member of the California State Bar. If the assistant does not qualify in this regard, the time may be claimed only as law clerk time, an expense. Thus work by persons who are, at the time of the work, members of another state’s bar but not California’s or persons who have passed the California bar exam but not yet been admitted may be claimed only as law clerk time.} The time must be itemized in the appropriate step, and associate counsel’s State Bar number must be provided. In making recommendations for these services, the project evaluates their cost in combination with the appointed attorney’s time to ensure the total is reasonable.

Counsel are well advised to add their own explanations whenever the need for and reasonableness of the services or expenses is not self-evident.

Counsel should review the \textit{Statewide Compensation Claims Manual}\footnote{https://www.capcentral.org/claims/claims_manual.asp} on specific topics for more detailed information on these matters.

C. Procedures for Reviewing Claims \[§ 1.135\]

1. Project’s recommendation \[§ 1.136\]

Attorneys should check with the applicable project about the procedures in that office. ADI policy and goal is to process claims expeditiously upon receipt – within 10 working days if there are no unusual problems or complexities. Claims are initially checked by a claims processor at ADI, then reviewed by a staff attorney.

The staff attorney will evaluate the number and complexity of the issues, both briefed and unbriefed. Using the guidelines and other measures of reasonableness applicable to the particular case, the staff attorney will calculate a recommendation for payment.

The recommendation takes into consideration the overall quality of the work. Even if the claim is within the usual guidelines and would otherwise be reasonable, a reduction
may be recommended if the work is evaluated as substandard. Conversely, higher payment may be recommended if the extra time was required by the nature of the case or resulted in exceptionally high quality work.

The staff attorney should automatically notify an attorney if ADI is proposing a cut of more than 5.0 hours from a claim of 50.0 hours or less, or 10% from a claim of more than 50.0 hours, from either: (a) the AOB on an interim claim (the holdback does not count as a cut), or (b) the total of a final claim. The panel attorney is given an opportunity to discuss the proposed cuts with the staff attorney.

The staff attorney’s recommendation is reviewed by at least one other staff attorney at the interim and another at the final stage. This review is done to ensure fairness and objectivity, compliance with policies, and uniformity and consistency in ADI recommendations.

2. Transmission to Judicial Council services  [§ 1.137]

The project’s recommendation is sent to the Judicial Council services for review and approval. The office reviews every claim over $7500 and a small sample of lower claims. (See Statewide Compensation Claims Manual, 98 Appendix on JCS and AIDOAC Reviews.) Once authorized by the office, claims are sent to the state Controller for issuance of the check. This process is becoming increasingly expeditious as the steps are automated.

3. Holdback at interim stage  [§ 1.138]

Interim claims are paid at 95% of the recommended hours and 100% of the recommended expenses. The final payment is for all approved hours and expenses not compensated at the interim stage.

4. Payment for cases not completed  [§ 1.139]

Sometimes an attorney is relieved before completion of the case. Compensation in that situation depends in part on whether the reason was beyond counsel’s control (such as serious illness or the client’s retaining counsel) or within counsel’s control (such as accepting conflicting employment). Also relevant is whether the relieved attorney filed any briefs or motions or produced a work product, such as a draft statement of facts or research notes on the issues, which were helpful to successor counsel. Recommendations


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may vary from no compensation at all (e.g., no draft of anything yet written or counsel relieved because of excessive delay) to full compensation (e.g., complete and usable work product or unavoidable need for new counsel).

5. **AIDOAC audits** [§ 1.140]

The compensation process is overseen by the Judicial Council’s Appellate Indigent Counsel Oversight Advisory Committee. Every quarter, as part of its functions, the committee audits a number of final claims from the preceding quarter. They are chosen at random. If AIDOAC determines the project claim recommendation was too high or low, it will order an adjustment. Thus, counsel should always keep in mind that payment for a particular case is not necessarily final until the audit period for the following quarter is closed. (See Statewide Compensation Claims Manual, Appendix on JCS and AIDOAC Reviews.)

6. **More information** [§ 1.141]

The projects have developed a Statewide Compensation Claims Manual, which is indexed and easily searchable. Counsel should check with the assigned staff attorney for any recent modifications.

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UNDERSTANDING YOUR APPEAL:
Information for Defendants

This information letter will help explain what an appeal is all about. It answers some of the questions most often asked by our clients. Your individual attorney will help you understand your own case.

“What is an appeal?”

An appeal is not a new trial. The purpose of an appeal is to check over the proceedings in the trial court to see if they followed the law.

An appeal can deal only with matters shown in the transcripts. The transcripts include: (1) the papers in the trial court files; and (2) a court reporter’s word-for-word record of what happened in the courtroom. The Court of Appeal cannot consider facts outside of the transcripts. It hears no witnesses and takes no new evidence.

The Court of Appeal has no power to decide questions of fact, such as whether you are guilty or innocent, or whether a certain witness was lying, or what a particular piece of evidence proves. It has no power to say what sentence you should get, among those allowed by law. Decisions like those are only for the jury or trial judge, and the Court of Appeal cannot change them.

The Court of Appeal deals with legal questions. It decides whether the trial court proceedings followed the law. For example, it might decide whether certain evidence was correctly admitted, or whether the jury was properly instructed, or whether the trial

judge gave adequate reasons for choosing a particular sentence, and other questions of those types.

If the Court of Appeal finds that the proceedings were conducted correctly, the judgment is “affirmed,” and your conviction and sentence will not change.

If the Court of Appeal finds some important mistake was made in the trial court, your case will probably be “reversed” (in part or in full) and sent back to the trial court for a new trial, a new sentencing, or some other proceeding to correct the mistake. Some mistakes can be corrected by the Court of Appeal itself, without sending the case back.

“WHO WILL REPRESENT ME ON APPEAL?”

Appellate Defenders, Inc., is a firm of criminal defense attorneys. All are very experienced in criminal appeals. The firm helps to manage criminal cases in the Fourth District Court of Appeal.

In every case requiring appointment of an attorney on appeal, Appellate Defenders either handles the case itself or finds a private attorney to handle the case.

Your case has been given to an attorney with appropriate qualifications after having been checked for length, difficulty, and seriousness of penalty.

If a private attorney has been selected, an Appellate Defenders staff attorney will be available to assist the private attorney at every stage of the appeal.

“WHAT CAN I EXPECT TO HAPPEN DURING THE APPEAL?”

The usual steps in an appeal include:

(1) Preparation of the Transcripts. The trial court clerk and reporter began preparing the transcripts in your case after the notice of appeal was filed. It is hard to guess how long it will take them. Sometimes the transcripts are done in less than a month, and sometimes they take six months or more, especially if the trial was long.

(2) The Appellant’s Opening Brief. After the transcripts are filed, your attorney will study them and decide what issues should be presented to the Court of Appeal. These issues will be set out in the appellant’s opening brief.
The brief will normally have several parts. First, it will describe the trial court procedures in a section called “Statement of the Case.” Then it will describe the prosecution’s evidence in a section called “Statement of Facts.” (The brief may, of course, describe the defense evidence, too. But by strict rule, the prosecution’s evidence must be presented as the “facts.”)

The next part of the brief will be the “argument.” In this part your lawyer will show how the trial court proceedings did not follow the law, and will argue why you should be given a new trial, another sentence, or some other relief.

The opening brief is due 40 days after the transcripts are filed. In most cases, however, one or more 30-day extensions of time are needed.

(3) The Respondent’s Brief. About two to three months after the appellant’s opening brief is filed, the Attorney General will file the prosecution’s answer, called the “respondent’s brief.” In it, the Attorney General will usually argue something like: no mistakes were made in the trial court; or any mistakes were unimportant and did not hurt you; or a particular issue cannot be raised on appeal; or something else in answer to your arguments. This is just the prosecution’s argument and is not the Court of Appeal’s decision.

(4) The Appellant’s Reply Brief. In this brief, your lawyer will have a chance to answer the arguments made in the Attorney General’s brief. It is due 20 days after the Attorney General’s brief is filed. The appellant’s reply brief is optional and will be filed only if your lawyer thinks it will help.

(5) Oral Argument. Usually within a month or two after all the briefs are filed, the Court of Appeal will give both sides a chance to ask for oral argument. In oral argument, the lawyers for both sides go to court and argue in person. It usually takes only a few minutes. You will not be there.

Oral argument is not held in every case. Your lawyer will ask for it only if he or she believes something needs to be said that was not already said in the briefs.

(6) The Opinion. The Court of Appeal will give its decision in a written “opinion.” The opinion explains why the court decided each issue as it did.

The opinion will be filed sometime after oral argument is held or waived. It may be only a few days later, or as much as three months later.
Three judges of the Court of Appeal will decide your case. They will read the briefs, look at the transcripts, and hear oral argument (if it has been requested). Then they will vote. It takes at least two judges voting the same way to reach a decision. One of the judges writes the opinion. One or both of the other judges may write separate opinions if they disagree with something the first judge said.

(7) Petition for Rehearing. If the decision is against you in some way, your lawyer may decide to file a petition for rehearing asking the Court of Appeal to reconsider. The Attorney General may also file a petition for rehearing if the decision is against the prosecution. The petitions are due 15 days after the opinion is filed. Very few are granted.

(8) Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court. Another possible step to take, if you lose in the Court of Appeal, is to file a petition for review. In it, your lawyer would ask the California Supreme Court to reach its own decision on one or more of the issues raised in the Court of Appeal. Your lawyer will file the petition if he or she believes there is a reasonable chance of having it granted. The Attorney General may also petition for review if the prosecution has lost in the Court of Appeal.

The petition must be filed no earlier than 30 days, and no later than 40 days, after the Court of Appeal’s opinion is filed. If the petition is denied, the decision of the Court of Appeal is left standing and becomes “final.” Very few petitions are actually granted.

(9) Other Matters

Many other motions and papers can be filed in an appeal. Your lawyer will file them in your case if they are necessary. You will get copies of all the briefs, the opinion, any petitions filed, and all other important papers.

In a few cases known as “People’s appeals,” the prosecution will be appealing, asking the Court of Appeal to change some ruling of the trial court. In People’s appeals, the prosecution will be the “appellant” and file the appellant’s opening and reply briefs. The defendant will be the “respondent” and will file the respondent’s brief.

As you might be able to tell, most appeals take about a year from the time the notice of appeal is filed until the time the decision of the Court of Appeal becomes final. Of course, your case may be shorter or longer, depending on how long the transcripts are, how many issues are raised, and many other things.
“HOW CAN I FIND OUT MORE ABOUT MY APPEAL?”

This letter is intended only to give you a general idea what to expect in your appeal. Your own case may be different from the “usual” case in some way or another. Your attorney will explain what is happening in your case and will try to answer any questions you may have.

While your attorney should regularly keep you informed of what is going on, please keep in mind there are restrictions on the attorney’s time. The attorney needs to spend most of his or her time preparing briefs and otherwise representing you. The Court of Appeal has adopted guidelines for the time to be allowed for client communication. Your attorney will get most of the information pertaining to your case from the transcripts. Please be patient and let your attorney put the time spent on your case to the best use on your behalf.

—— APPELLATE DEFENDERS, INC.
SAMPLE CLIENT LETTERS

(Most adapted from letters provided courtesy of panel attorney David Y. Stanley)

INITIAL CONTACT LETTER [§ 1.145]
LETTER TO ACCOMPANY APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF [§ 1.146]
LETTER TO ACCOMPANY RESPONDENT’S BRIEF AND APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

[§ 1.147]

LETTER RE SETTING OF ORAL ARGUMENT [§ 1.148]
POST-ORAL ARGUMENT LETTER [§ 1.149]

LETTER TO ACCOMPANY OPINION [§ 1.150]
(if counsel has decided not to take further action)

LETTER TO ACCOMPANY OPINION [§ 1.151]
(if counsel intends to file petition for review)

LETTER TO ACCOMPANY PETITION FOR REVIEW [§ 1.152]
LETTER AFTER DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REVIEW [§ 1.153]

• All letters should be prominently marked “Confidential Attorney-Client Communication” on both the envelope and the letter.
• Adaptations to the individual case will of course always be required.
I am the attorney who will be handling your case under appointment by the Court of Appeal. Because the transcripts on appeal have not yet been prepared, I know very little about your case at this time. I will give you my assessment of the case as soon as I have read the transcripts.

You may have received from Appellate Defenders, Inc., some general information about how cases are handled in the Court of Appeal. Please let me know at any time if you have any questions about the process.

An appeal is very different from a trial court proceeding. It is not a new trial but a review of the trial court proceedings to ensure they were conducted according to law. For that reason, the appeals court does not decide guilt or innocence or other factual questions from scratch. The court’s authority in an appeal is limited to matters in the “record,” which includes a clerk’s transcript of documents from the [superior/ juvenile] court’s file and a reporter’s transcript of testimony and other oral proceedings in the [superior/ juvenile] court. We are not permitted to introduce new evidence or witnesses. However, if you believe something important may not be in the transcripts, please let me know about that; sometimes information outside the record can be the basis for relief other than by appeal.

[Additional proceedings may be held in juvenile court over the duration of the appeal. However, I am only appointed to represent you on appeal and I will not be able to advise you about your juvenile court case. Please keep me informed of any decisions the court makes as they may influence how I approach the arguments in your appeal.]

Appeals take a considerable amount of time to complete, and the major events in the case often are separated by periods of months. The most important step will be the filing of an opening brief, in which I will set forth all the issues to be raised on your behalf, as well as the procedural history and the facts of the case. The [Attorney General/County Counsel] will then file a respondent’s brief, and I will file a reply brief if that will help your case. [Mention other briefs if there are additional parties.] After the briefing is complete, the court will begin to work on the case. I will have an opportunity to go to court for an oral argument if I think it is important, although often I find the best approach is to let the case be decided on the briefs alone, without oral argument. Your case will be decided by a panel of three Court of Appeal justices, and the decision will be in the form of a written opinion.
I will keep you advised of all major events in the case and send you copies of the briefs and the court’s decision. Some of my clients prefer not to receive such materials because of privacy or other concerns. If that is the case with you, let me know; I will not send them and will discuss the case with you only in general terms. If you would like for me to send the briefs and the court’s opinion to someone else, please send me the name and address of that person.

When the appeal is completed, I will send you the transcripts unless you have told me to send them to someone else or destroy them. Only one set of transcripts is made for the defense, and of course I will need to keep them during the appeal to handle your case properly. Once the appeal is over, the transcripts will become your property permanently.

You and I have an attorney-client relationship that makes our communications privileged, or confidential, under California law. However, what you say to other people may well be used in later proceedings, and so I urge you not to discuss your case with anyone other than me, including those closest to you. You may call me collect if there is something too urgent to deal with in writing. Under the standard practice in these cases, I will not be visiting you for an in-person interview, unless your case presents very unusual circumstances.

I invite you to write to me whenever you have questions or comments about your case, and I will respond promptly. Also, please keep me advised if your address or other contact information changes, so that we can be in touch on short notice if necessary. I look forward to working on your behalf and hope to be able to help you.

102 Note to attorney: For incarcerated clients, add: To ensure confidentiality, be sure to write “legal mail” on the outside of envelopes you send to me, along with using “lawyer” or “attorney” as part of my address.

103 Note to attorney: For incarcerated clients, add: Unless special advance arrangements are made, however, calls from jails and prisons are monitored and we therefore cannot discuss confidential matters on the telephone.
Enclosed is your copy of our opening brief, which is now being filed with the Court of Appeal. When you read it, please keep in mind that the rules on appeal require that we present the statement of facts as the jury found the facts to be; we are not allowed to present the facts from your point of view.

[Explain issues raised.]

The next step will be a respondent’s brief filed by the [Attorney General for the prosecution/county counsel for the social services agency]. Their brief will be due in 30 days, but they may receive one or two 30-day extensions. I will keep you posted on the due date. After I have read the respondent’s brief, I will decide whether to file a reply brief on your behalf. I will send you a copy of the respondent’s brief and our reply brief if I file one.

That will conclude the briefing stage of the case. The court will then study the briefs and process the case in the normal manner, which generally takes several months before the case is either set for oral argument or submitted for decision on the briefs.

In the meantime, please let me know if you have any questions.

104Note to attorney: In fast-track or other urgent cases, this number may be modified as applicable.
Enclosed you will find a copy of our reply brief, which is being mailed today for filing with the Court of Appeal, as well as a copy of the respondent’s brief filed by the [Attorney General for the prosecution/ county counsel for the social services agency].

[Describe any particularly important points in these briefs.]

This is the end of the briefing phase of your case. The court will now study the briefs and process the case in the normal manner, which can take several months before the case is either set for oral argument or submitted for decision on the briefs. I will keep you posted as the case progresses and will let you know about any oral argument that might take place.

The next major filing will be the court’s decision, which will be in the form of a written opinion. I will send you a copy of it.

Please let me know if you have any questions.
I have just been notified by the court that oral argument in your case is scheduled for the [date] calendar.

Oral argument is a court hearing in which the lawyers for the opposing sides present their positions to a panel of three judges. During argument the judges often ask questions of the lawyers to clarify the issues in the case.

[For incarcerated clients: You will not be brought to court for oral argument.] If [you or] your friends or family members might want to attend, please let me know so that I can provide a preview, because an appellate oral argument can seem very strange to persons who have never seen one or had the procedure explained to them. I can provide directions, as well.

The judges do not announce their decision at the argument. The decision may not come until several weeks, up to three months, after the argument. The decision will be in the form of a written opinion, and of course I will send you a copy as soon as I receive it from the court.
The oral argument in your case occurred on schedule yesterday. [Describe if significant developments occurred at argument.]

When the court announces its decision, it will be in the form of a written opinion. Whether we will take any further action will depend on the decision and my judgment as to the likely benefits to you of such action. I will give you my assessment of the situation in a letter accompanying your copy of the opinion.

In the meantime, all we can do is wait a little longer. It likely will be at least several days, and possibly several weeks, before we get the opinion. Best wishes.

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Optional. This letter should be sent if any significant developments occurred, or if the client has shown special interest in oral argument, or if counsel has promised a report.
I am sorry to have to tell you that the Court of Appeal has rejected our arguments and affirmed [your conviction/the juvenile court’s findings] by an opinion filed [date]. A copy is enclosed.

[Summarize court’s rulings on issues.]

After thoroughly studying the court’s opinion and reviewing your case once again, I have decided not to pursue your case further, by way of a petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeal[1] and/or a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. While I regret the result, I believe the Court of Appeal has decided the case in such a manner that any further appellate efforts would not be useful. This decision was made after a careful evaluation of all possibilities.

Even though in my professional opinion your case does not present issues that the Court of Appeal will reconsider or the California Supreme Court will review, you have the option of pursuing your case further on your own by filing a petition for review in the

[1] Note to attorney: Usually a pro per petition for rehearing is not a realistic option because of the short time frame and the typical delays in prison mail. If such a petition is needed under California Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2) – because the Court of Appeal opinion misstated or omitted an issue or matter of law or fact, and the client likely wants to petition for review on the issue – counsel should file the petition for rehearing, even if counsel does not intend to petition for review. If the client is to file a pro per petition for rehearing, this letter should be modified accordingly and include a due date. The Court of Appeal may require counsel to withdraw before it allows a pro per petition for rehearing.
California Supreme Court. Instructions on what to file are enclosed.[2] The petition is due [date].

[If a federal issue was raised in the Court of Appeal and the client might want to take it to federal court, add this:] We raised federal issue(s) in your appeal. [Describe issue(s)]. After the state appeal is over, you may want the United States Supreme Court [or a federal district court] to review these issue(s). BUT: You must first file a petition for review including the issue(s) in the California Supreme Court. If you do not ask the California Supreme Court to review the issue(s) first, the federal courts will refuse to hear your case. Once your petition for review to the California Supreme Court is denied, then you can go to federal court. You can petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,[3] or file a habeas corpus petition in federal district court,[4] or both. Please let me know if you decide to take either action. I will give you sample forms and let you know about such important matters as calculating deadlines, putting all known issues into one single petition.

I am sending the transcripts to you separately. They are now yours to keep. Please remember that they are your only copy. If they are lost, you will not be able to get replacements, except at your own cost, from the state. [Modify this language if alternative arrangements have been made.]

________________________

[2] Note to attorney: A petition for review information sheet is on the ADI website. http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples.asp. It is also useful to enclose a short sample petition. Counsel may modify the information sheet to apply instead to an exhaustion petition for review under rule 8.508, California Rules of Court, if that is the only reason for the petition. Note that counsel should file an exhaustion petition if there is a substantial, well-preserved federal issue; this is an independent justification, aside from the likelihood of success on review. See chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision,”§ 7.46.) http://www.adi-sandiego.com/panel/manual/Chapter_7_Decisions_and_later.pdf


I am pleased to have had the opportunity to represent you and am sorry my efforts to help you were unsuccessful. I offer you my very best wishes.
I am sorry to have to tell you that the Court of Appeal has rejected our arguments and affirmed your conviction by an opinion dated [date]. A copy is enclosed.

[Summarize court’s rulings on issues. If petition for rehearing was filed, state grounds and result.]

I believe it is worthwhile to file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, asking the court to take over your case and consider [name issue(s)]. I will be filing a petition no later than [date]. I will send you a copy of the petition and let you know the Supreme Court’s decision, which likely will be several weeks from the time the petition is filed.

Again, I am sorry that the Court of Appeal disagreed with our arguments. We must hope for the best in the Supreme Court. Best wishes.
Enclosed is your copy of our petition for review, which is being filed with the California Supreme Court.

[Describe issue(s) raised. If an exhaustion petition under California Rules of Court, rule 8.508 is being filed, describe its purpose.]

Because its resources are so limited, usually the Supreme Court will grant review only if an issue in the case significantly affects the public or applies to many other cases, or if the Courts of Appeal have divided on the issue. I think your case meets that standard, but it is important to understand that in the large majority of cases review is denied. [This paragraph is unnecessary if an exhaustion petition under California Rules of Court, rule 8.508 is being filed.]

I will let you know when the Supreme Court makes a decision. That will likely take one or two months or so. Best wishes.
I am sorry to have to tell you that the California Supreme Court has denied our petition for review in your case. Enclosed is a copy of that order, which was filed [date]. This is very disappointing. I thought the issue(s) in your case were strong and might interest the Supreme Court. But as I explained earlier, in the large majority of cases, even those with important issues, review is denied because the court does not have enough resources to take all deserving cases. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court is the highest court in California, and that means your California appeal is done. [Modify this paragraph if an exhaustion petition for review under California Rules of Court, rule 8.508 was filed.]

[If a federal issue was raised in the Court of Appeal and the client might want to take it to federal court, add this:] We raised federal issue(s) in the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. [Describe issue(s)]. Now that your state appeal is over, it is possible to ask the federal courts to review these issues. This can be done by petitioning for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court,[1] or by filing a habeas corpus petition in federal district court,[2] or both. Please let me know if you decide to take either action. I will give you sample forms and let you know about such important matters as calculating deadlines, including all known issues in one petition, and giving the California state courts a chance to decide the issues first.

I am pleased to have had the opportunity to represent you and am sorry my efforts to help you were unsuccessful. I offer you my very best wishes.

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1Note to attorney: Certiorari is discussed in § 7.100 et seq. of chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision.” The United States Supreme Court has a guide for pro per petitioners: http://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/guideforIFPcases2014.pdf. (See also Spanish version: http://www.adi-sandiego.com/pdf_forms/Spanish_Feb_2015.pdf.)

FILING AND SERVICE REQUIREMENTS
for briefs and other documents
in non-capital criminal and juvenile appeals and writs

Full treatment on ADI website:

CHARTS OF FILING AND SERVICE REQUIREMENTS

3http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/filing_service_chart.asp
- Chapter Two -

First Things First:

What Can Be Appealed

And

What It Takes To Get An Appeal Started
— CHAPTER 2 —

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PART ONE: GENERAL

I. INTRODUCTION  [§ 2.0]

This chapter examines the scope of appellate review in criminal and juvenile cases – what judgments and orders are appealable, who can appeal, and what issues can be raised in various kinds of appeals. It will also review the nuts and bolts of getting an appeal started – what has to be filed, where, and when, and what can be done if the process goes astray.

This section, PART ONE: GENERAL, addresses issues common to all cases – the source of the right to appeal, limitations on appealing, and the advisability of appealing.

PART TWO of this chapter addresses scope of appeals in criminal and delinquency cases by both defendants and the People and the peculiarities of notice of appeal requirements.

PART THREE addresses appeals in dependency cases.

A. Basic Authority Governing the Right to Appeal and Appellate Jurisdiction  [§ 2.1]

The right to appeal is governed primarily by state law. In California, various statutes provide authority for appeals. Certain limits on appeals are imposed by both statute and common law. The California Rules of Court govern the timing and process of appealing.

1. Constitutions  [§ 2.2]

There is no constitutional right of appeal. The federal Constitution does not require a state to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all. (Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12, 18.) The same is true of the California Constitution; the state right of appeal is statutory. (Leone v. Medical Board (2000) 22 Cal.4th 660, 668; see Powers v.
Article VI of section 11 of the California Constitution defines appellate jurisdiction:

(a) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction when judgment of death has been pronounced. With that exception courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction when superior courts have original jurisdiction in causes of a type within the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeal on June 30, 1995,[1] and in other causes prescribed by statute.

(b) Except as provided in subdivision (a), the appellate division of the superior court has appellate jurisdiction in causes prescribed by statute.

As a practical matter, that means cases that are charged solely as misdemeanors are appealed to the appellate division of the superior court, whereas those that are charged as felonies are appealed to the Court of Appeal, even if the conviction is only for a misdemeanor.2 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(a)(2) [definition of “felony” for purposes of appellate jurisdiction]; see also statutory provisions (§ 2.3A, post.)

2. Statutes [§ 2.3]

a. Criminal cases [§ 2.3A]

Penal Code section 1237, subdivision (a) governs a criminal defendant’s right to appeal after a trial or other contested proceeding. (See § 2.17, post.)

Appeals by a defendant from an order after judgment affecting the defendant’s substantial rights are governed by Penal Code section 1237, subdivision (b). (See § 2.60 et seq., post.)

Penal Code section 1237.1 addresses appeals based solely on presentence custody credits issues, requiring the issues to be presented first to the trial court. (See § 2.13.

1That date marked the unification of the superior court and municipal courts.

2When at a preliminary examination, all felony charges in the felony complaint are either not bound over or are reduced, leaving only misdemeanors, the resulting case is a misdemeanor case, and appellate jurisdiction will be in the appellate division of the superior court. (People v. Nickerson, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 33.)

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Section 1237.2 similarly requires recourse to the trial court first for appeals involving only fines, fees, and related issues.

Penal Code section 1237.5 deals with guilty plea appeals and requires a certificate of probable cause to challenge the validity of the plea. (See § 2.18 et seq., post.) Sentencing issues are not included in this requirement, unless the sentence is inherent in the plea agreement. (*People v. Ward* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 574-576; cf. *People v. Panizzon* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 74-75; see § 2.22 et seq., post.) Also excepted from the certificate of probable cause requirement are Fourth Amendment search or seizure issues in a guilty plea, which are expressly permitted by Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m). (See § 2.31 et seq., post.)

Grounds for appeal by the People are enumerated in Penal Code section 1238 for criminal cases. (See § 2.84 et seq., post.)


b. Juvenile delinquency cases [§ 2.3B]

Welfare and Institutions Code section 800, subdivision (a) provides the basic authority for appeal by a minor from a delinquency dispositional order initiated under Welfare and Institutions Code section 601 or 602 and any subsequent order. (See § 2.77 et seq., post.)

A parent’s right to appeal from orders directly affecting the parent’s interests, such as a restitution order making the parent liable, is recognized by case law as based on Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1). (See § 2.77, post, and footnote on anomalous case of *In re Almalik S.* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 851.)

When at a preliminary examination, all felony charges in the felony complaint are either not bound over or are reduced, leaving only misdemeanors, the resulting case is a misdemeanor case, and appellate jurisdiction will be in the appellate division of the superior court. (*People v. Nickerson, supra*, 128 Cal.App.4th 33.)

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3When at a preliminary examination, all felony charges in the felony complaint are either not bound over or are reduced, leaving only misdemeanors, the resulting case is a misdemeanor case, and appellate jurisdiction will be in the appellate division of the superior court. (*People v. Nickerson, supra*, 128 Cal.App.4th 33.)
Appeals by the People in delinquency cases are governed by Welfare and Institutions Code section 800, subdivision (b). (See § 2.84 et seq., post.)

c. **Juvenile dependency cases**  [§ 2.3C]

In juvenile dependency cases, Welfare and Institutions Code section 395 grants the right to appeal a disposition in proceedings under section 300 et seq. and subsequent orders. Exceptions include an order setting a permanent plan hearing under section 366.26 or a post-termination of parental rights order changing a child’s placement under section 366.28, both of which require a writ petition instead of an appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450 et seq.) Family Code section 7800 appeals are governed by sections 7894 and 7895. Dependency appeals are discussed in **PART THREE**, § 2.124 et seq., post.

d. **Other appointed cases**  [§ 2.3D]

Miscellaneous provisions of the Penal Code, Welfare and Institutions Code, Code of Civil Procedure, and others are applicable to other appointed appeals. These include civil commitments such as LPS conservatorship, sexually violent predator, mentally disordered offender, not guilty by reason of insanity, extended detention of youthful offender, paternity, special proceedings (e.g., Pen. Code, § 1368), some writs, certain civil proceedings, sterilization, emancipation, etc. In some areas the right to appeal is inferred by case law, rather than stated explicitly by statute or rule.

3. **Rules**  [§ 2.4]

The primary provisions governing criminal appeals in the Court of Appeal are found in rule 8.300 et seq. of the California Rules of Court. Rules 8.304, 8.308, 8.312, and 8.316 concern taking and abandoning an appeal. Rules 8.320, 8.324, 8.328, 8.332, 8.336, 8.340, 8.344, and 8.346 deal with the record on appeal. Rule 8.360 addresses briefing; it incorporates specified provisions of rules 8.60, 8.200, 8.204, and 8.216. By cross-reference in rule 8.366, rules 8.248 through 8.276 govern hearing and decision in the Court of Appeal.

Juvenile appeals are under California Rules of Court, rules 8.405 and 8.406 (filing the appeal), 8.407-8.409 and 8.416(b)-(c) (record), 8.410 and 8.416(d) (augmenting / correcting the record), 8.411 (abandoning), 8.412 and 8.416(e)-(g) (briefing), 8.470 and 8.416(h) (hearing and decision in the Court of Appeal), and 8.472 (hearing and decision
in the Supreme Court). (See also rule 5.585 et seq.) Parts of these rules incorporate by reference certain other rules on the processes in reviewing courts.

Proceedings in the California Supreme Court are governed by rule 8.500 et seq. of the California Rules of Court. Petitions for review are under rules 8.500 through 8.512. Proceedings after a grant of review are subject to rules 8.516 to 8.544. Rule 8.552 governs transfers before decision to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeal.

B. Priority on Appeal  [§ 2.4A]

The appellate courts are statutorily required to give preference to certain appeals in processing and deciding their caseload “preference” or “priority.” And rule 8.240 of the California Rules of Court allows courts to give individual cases “calendar preference” (expedited appeal) on a showing of good cause. These terms refer to the order in which the cases are considered and decided by the court, as well as the probable availability of extensions of time, the speed of setting oral argument, etc.

Most of the cases that the projects and the appointed counsel system deal with have statutory priority:

- **Criminal:** As a case “in which the people of the state are parties,” a criminal appeal has priority over other categories of cases. (Code Civ. Proc., § 44.)

- **Delinquency:** Welfare and Institutions Code section 800, subdivision (a), provides a juvenile delinquency appeal has “precedence over all other cases in the court to which the appeal is taken.”

- **Dependency:** Welfare and Institutions Code section 395(a)(1) gives precedence over all other appeals to juvenile dependency appeals; Code of Civil Procedure

4The rules permit the making of individualized decisions as to priority, but they do not and may not reorder the statutory priorities in any fundamental way. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6(d) [rules must be consistent with statute].)

5See memo on the meaning of statutory priorities, analyzing a 2013 proposal, considered by the Appellate Court Committee of the San Diego County Bar Association, to eliminate priority for criminal appeals except for those in which custody is at stake. http://www.adi-sandiego.com/pdf_forms/Priority_on_appeal.pdf

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section 45 does the same for appeals from orders freeing a minor from parental custody or control.

The fact criminal and juvenile cases have “priority” does not mean courts may hear only those cases. Statutory priorities are general principles for ordering a court’s business, not rigid, absolute rules for assigning an exact numerical “score” to each case. There is room for individualized judicial judgment (e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.240). In People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that priority for criminal cases requires converting every civil and specialized courtroom into one dedicated to hearing criminal causes. The judiciary has the inherent power to “control the disposition of the causes on its docket.” This is a constitutionally based authority; under principles of separation of powers, statute may not so completely infringe on this authority as to supplant altogether a court’s discretion effectively to handle its fundamental responsibilities. (Id. at pp. 1148-1149.)

C. Limitations on Right To Appeal   [§ 2.5]

The right to appeal is not unlimited. Guilty plea appeals, for example, have strict limitations; these are discussed in detail in § 2.18 et seq., post.) This section discusses appeals in general.

1. Jurisdiction   [§ 2.6]

The appellate court may lack jurisdiction. For example, a valid notice of appeal may never have been filed; appeal prerequisites such as a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(1)) or a writ petition (rule 8.450 et seq.) may not have been met; or the judgment or order appealed from may not be appealable as a matter of law.

2. Mootness and ripeness   [§ 2.7]

Usually the court will decline to exercise its discretionary reviewing power if a case is moot or is not yet ripe for decision. A case is moot if its resolution will not be binding on or otherwise affect the parties to the litigation. It is not ripe unless “‘the controversy . . . is [is] definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests . . . [and] admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170-171.) If a controversy is moot or unripe, a decision
would be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which ordinarily is outside both the proper functions and jurisdiction of an appellate court. (Id. at p. 170; see also People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084; Lynch v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 910, 912.)

A California court may exercise discretion to decide a moot case if it involves issues of serious public concern that would otherwise elude resolution. (California State Personnel v. California State Employees Association (2006) 36 Cal.4th 758, 763, fn. 1; People v. Hurtado (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1179, 1186; In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23-25 [detention of juvenile before jurisdictional hearing]; In re Newbern (1961) 55 Cal.2d 500, 505 [contact with bondsman]; In re Fluery (1967) 67 Cal.2d 600, 601 [credits for time in jail].) Similarly, the ripeness doctrine does not prevent courts from “resolving concrete disputes if the consequence of a deferred decision will be lingering uncertainty in the law, especially when there is widespread public interest in the answer to a particular legal question.” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170.)

3. **Review by writ instead** [§ 2.8]

   a. **Criminal cases** [§ 2.8A]

   Certain pretrial issues or those affecting whether the trial should proceed at all may require a writ petition. For example, in criminal cases, the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary hearing to support the information is reviewable only by pretrial writ. (Pen. Code, §§ 995, 999a.) Examples of other criminal statutory writs include Penal Code sections 279.6, 871.6, 1238, subdivision (d), 1511, 1512, and 4011.8. (See § 8.83 of chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies,” for further discussion of statutory writs.)

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6A case is not necessarily moot because the course of current litigation will not be affected. If the defendant may suffer collateral consequences, including stigma, future legal disabilities, etc., the case is not moot. (People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338, 345.) (See chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus,” § 9.3, on mootness under federal law.)

7In the federal system, in contrast, because of the “case or controversy” requirement of article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution, mootness as to the individual litigants defeats jurisdiction. (See § 9.3 of chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”)
Some issues in criminal cases are reviewable by either pretrial writ or appeal from a final judgment, but under different standards. While error may be sufficient to justify issuance of certain pretrial writs, appeals require a showing that the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Defects at the preliminary hearing, for example, cannot be reviewed after judgment unless the defendant demonstrates how they affected the trial. (*People v. Pompa-Ortiz* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529.) Denial of a speedy trial is similarly reviewable after judgment only on a showing of prejudice to the outcome of the case.\(^8\) (*People v. Martinez* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 766-769 [state constitutional right to speedy trial and statutory right to speedy trial under Pen. Code, § 1382].) The same rule applies to denial of a defendant’s motion for a physical lineup under *Evans v. Superior Court* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617. (*People v. Mena* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 146, 169-171.)

b. **Dependency cases**  [§ 2.8B]

The most prominent requirement for a writ rather than appeal in dependency cases is Welfare and Institutions Code sections 366.26 and 366.28, which mandate that an order setting a permanency plan hearing or post-termination placement of a child, respectively, is not appealable unless a writ petition under California Rules of Court, rule 8.450-8.452 or 8.454-8.456 has been timely filed and the issues to be reviewed were not decided on the merits. (See also rule 8.403(b).) This requirement is explored more fully in PART THREE, § 2.124 et seq., post.

4. **Standing**  [§ 2.9]

Lack of standing may preclude the court from considering an argument. For example, in a search or seizure situation, or an issue involving self-incrimination, the appellant lacks standing to raise an issue regarding the violation of someone else’s rights. (*In re Lance W.* (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 881-882.)

5. **Waiver of right to appeal**  [§ 2.9A]

As a term of a plea bargain, defendants occasionally agree they will not appeal the resulting judgment or a particular issue. Such a waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, with demonstrable knowledge of the relevant facts. (*People v. Panizzon* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80; *People v. Vargas* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1652, 1662.)

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\(^8\)In contrast to the standard on appeal, a Penal Code section 1382 violation entitles the defendant to pretrial dismissal regardless of prejudice. (*People v. Anderson* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 604-605; *People v. Martinez* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 769.)

In dependency cases, a parent may waive the right to appeal by, for example, unambiguously stipulating to a dispositional order. (In re Jennifer V. (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1206; see also In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159; cf. In re Tommy E. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1234 [ father did not waive right to contest jurisdictional findings on appeal, by submitting jurisdictional determination on information in social services report].) A parent waives the right to appeal if he or she submits on the recommendations of the Health and Human Services Agency, but not if he or she merely submits on the reports. (In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580, 589)

6. Forfeiture for failure to raise issue properly below  [§ 2.10]

Probably the most common reason for the Court of Appeal to decline to decide a particular issue is forfeiture (informally often called waiver), failure to raise it in the lower court. Usually, if the lower court has not had a chance to consider the issue or the opposing party has not had a fair chance to introduce evidence on the subject, the issue will not be considered on appeal.

Counsel may consider ways around forfeiture obstacles, such as arguing: the issue was obvious to all parties and the trial court, even without a formal objection; the issue was raised indirectly or substantially, even if not exactly as formulated on appeal; raising it would have been futile in light of other rulings by the trial court; the issue implicates fundamental due process; trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to raise it; or the law has since changed. (See more detailed description and authorities in § 5.27 of chapter 5, “Effective Written Advocacy: Briefing.”)

7. Motions requiring renewal at later stage  [§ 2.11]

Certain motions have to be renewed at a specified point to be preserved for appeal. Pretrial motions in limine, for example, may have to be renewed at trial. (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 189-190, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1.) Search and seizure motions made at the
preliminary hearing must be renewed in the trial court under Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m). (See further discussion of this requirement in § 2.35 et seq., post.)

8. Invited error [§ 2.12]

Invited error is another reason for a court to reject an argument other than on the merits. In such a situation the appellant by his explicit words or actions has solicited some type of action that is legally incorrect. To constitute invited error the action must have resulted from an intentional tactical decision. (People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 931; In re G.P. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1180.)

9. Credits and fees or fines issues – Penal Code sections 1237.1 and 1237.2 [§ 2.13]

Another limitation is imposed by Penal Code sections 1237.1 and 1237.2, which require appellate issues based on the calculation of credits and monetary assessments (such fees or fines), respectively, to be raised in the trial court first, if they are the only issues to be raised on appeal.

Section 1237.1, as modified effective 2016, provides:

No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction on the ground of an error in the calculation of presentence custody credits, unless the defendant first presents the claim in the trial court at the time of sentencing, or if the error is not discovered until after sentencing, the defendant first makes a motion for correction of the record in the trial court, which may be made informally in writing. The trial court retains jurisdiction after a notice of appeal has been filed to correct any error in the calculation of presentence custody credits upon the defendant’s request for correction.

Section 1237.2 provides:

An appeal may not be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction on the ground of an error in the imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs unless the defendant first presents the claim in the trial court at the time of sentencing, or if the error is not discovered until after sentencing, the defendant first makes a motion for correction in the trial court, which may be made informally in writing. The trial court retains jurisdiction after a notice of appeal has been filed to correct any error in the imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs upon the defendant’s request for correction. This section only applies in cases where the erroneous imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs are the sole issue on appeal.
Although Penal Code section 1237.1 refers to presentence custody credits, courts have also applied it to presentence conduct credits, as well. (See, e.g., People v. Clavel (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 516, 518; People v. Acosta (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 411, 415.)

With respect to credits, the requirement of prior presentation to the trial court applies only to minor ministerial corrections, such as mathematical or clerical error or oversight, not legal error; a legal issue such as which version of a statute applies, especially when the decision has constitutional implications, may be raised as a single issue without first seeking correction in the superior court. (People v. Delgado (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 761; see People v. Verba (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 991.)

With respect to fines and fees, there is no similar exception to the statutory requirement. (People v. Alexander (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 798.)


A request that the superior court modify custody and conduct credits or a fine or fee assessment may be made informally, rather than by a formal motion. (Pen. Code, §§ 1237.1, 1237.2, abrogating People v. Clavel (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 516, 518-519.) A more detailed analysis by FDAP executive director Jonathan Soglin of the changes wrought by A.B. 249, enacted in the 2015-2016 Legislative session, is on the FDAP website.

10. Fugitive dismissal doctrine  [§ 2.14]

Another limitation, derived from common law, applies when the defendant absconds while an appeal is pending. An appeal by a fugitive is subject to discretionary dismissal. One theory underlying this doctrine is that the court no longer has control over the person to make its judgment effective. (People v. Fuhr (1926) 198 Cal. 593, 594; People v. Redinger (1880) 55 Cal. 290, 298; People v. Buffalo (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 838, 839 [giving defendant 30 days to surrender]; cf. People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 399 [defendant fled during appeal, but was recaptured the same day; dismissal rule held inapplicable]; People v. Puluc-Sique (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 894 [deported defendant not fugitive].) Another theory is “disentitlement” – the defendant, having effectively
renounced the authority of the court by leaving its jurisdiction, may not try to take advantage of its processes. *(In re Kamelia S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1224.)*

The court has discretion to reinstate the appeal. *(See People v. Clark (1927) 201 Cal. 474, 477-478 [refusing to reinstate appeal a year after it was dismissed; power to reinstate “should only be exercised in those cases where it is plainly made to appear that a denial of its exercise would work a palpable injustice or wrong upon the appellant”]; People v. Kang (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 43, 47 [defendant escaped before sentencing; appeal filed in absentia was dismissed, then reinstated after his recapture two years later].)*

Federal due process and equal protection do not require a state to give the defendant a particular time to surrender, to reinstate the appeal after he is recaptured, or to treat defendants who escape before appealing the same as those who escape after appealing. *(Estelle v. Dorrough (1975) 420 U.S. 534, 537-539; Allen v. Georgia (1897) 166 U.S. 138, 142; see also Molinaro v. New Jersey (1970) 396 U.S. 365, 366, and Bohanan v. Nebraska (1887) 125 U.S. 692 [dismissals by Supreme Court during certiorari proceedings after state judgments]; cf. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States (1993) 507 U.S. 234, 249 [striking down Eleventh Circuit rule mandating automatic dismissal of appeals filed after defendant recaptured; there must be some reasonable nexus between defendant’s conduct and appellate process].)*


11. Previous resolution of matter  [§ 2.15]

The appellate court will not usually consider an issue on its merits if it has already been resolved in a binding form, under such doctrines as res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case. Under law of the case, for example, the appellate court’s decision on a question of law governs in all subsequent proceedings in that case – even if on a second appeal the Court of Appeal believes it should have decided differently the first time; some exceptions apply, as when there is a contrary supervening decision by the California

Before dismissing, the court in *Clark* decided the case on its merits, because it had been fully briefed before the escape.
D. Advisability of Appealing [2.16]

Counsel must evaluate, not only the availability of appeal, but also the advisability of pursuing appellate remedies. While usually appealing can only benefit the client, sometimes it carries serious downside risks. For instance, if the client entered into a beneficial plea bargain in the trial court, it may be highly inadvisable to challenge the validity of the plea on appeal, because withdrawing the plea means loss of the negotiated benefits. If a sentence lower than that authorized by law was imposed, the appeal increases the chance the error will be detected and remedied to the client’s detriment. (E.g., People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1044-1045; People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 763-764, dictum on unrelated point disapproved in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 583, fn. 1; In re Birdwell (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 926, 930.) New charges possibly may be added on retrial, and there may be non-penal consequences more onerous than the original punishment.

In dependency cases, some results favorable to the client (such as an offer of reunification services or visitation, or a judgment of presumed fatherhood) may have been unauthorized and would be subject to correction on appeal. Some matters brought up in the dependency appeal may be used against the client in any concurrent criminal proceeding. A non-legal consequence could be alienating the social worker or foster parents, resulting in decreased visitation or even its denial altogether.

10 An opening brief must include a statement of appealability, indicating the judgment or order appealed from and the basic authority for the appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(2)(B), 8.360(a).) See § 5.8 et seq. of chapter 5, “Effective Written Advocacy: Briefing,” for a more extensive discussion of this requirement.

11 Although counsel normally should ask the Court of Appeal to remand the case for an opportunity to withdraw the plea, instead of voiding the plea directly (e.g., People v. Franklin (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358), before seeking such an opportunity appellate counsel should explore with the client and trial counsel the ramifications of withdrawing the plea. It would not be appropriate to ask for a remand if under no circumstances would the defendant want to withdraw the plea. Further, pulling the client out of prison to go to a hearing that will change nothing might be detrimental to the client’s prison status (job, placement, etc.).
Appellate counsel should always be vigilant, therefore, to spot potential downsides and to advise the client about them. Counsel should help the client assess (a) the magnitude and likelihood of potential benefits from appealing, (b) the magnitude and likelihood of potential risks, and (c) the likelihood the adverse result might occur even in the absence of appeal.\(^\text{12}\)

The topic of adverse consequences on appeal is explored in detail in § 4.91 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection.” (See also § 2.39, post.)

PART TWO: CRIMINAL AND DELINQUENCY APPEALS\(^\text{13}\)

II. APPEAL BY A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT AFTER TRIAL  \([§ \text{2.17}]\)

Criminal defendants have a broad right to appeal from a final judgment after trial. Penal Code section 1237, subdivision (a) is the basic statutory authority conferring on criminal defendants the right to appeal from a final judgment after trial. It provides that an appeal may be taken by a defendant “[from a final judgment of conviction except as provided in Sections 1237.1, 1237.2, and 1237.5.” The statute defines a final judgment:

A sentence, an order granting probation, or the commitment of a defendant for insanity, the indeterminate commitment of a defendant as a mentally disordered sex offender, or the commitment of a defendant for controlled substance addiction shall be deemed to be a final judgment within the meaning of this section.

The judgment is construed as the sentence, broadly defined in Penal Code section 1237, subdivision (a), quoted above.

As pointed out in § 2.8A, ante, some issues in criminal cases are reviewable by either pretrial writ or appeal from a final judgment, but under different standards. While

\(^{12}\)An unauthorized sentence, for example, may be corrected at any time. \((\text{People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 764, dictum on unrelated point disapproved in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 583, fn. 1; People v. Massengale (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 689, 693.})\) The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the prosecutor, or the trial court conceivably could find the error even in the absence of an appeal.

\(^{13}\)PART ONE covers the general law of appealability. PART THREE covers juvenile dependency appeals.
error may be sufficient to justify issuance of certain pretrial writs, appeals require a showing that the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Examples listed in § 2.8A include defects at the preliminary hearing, denial of a speedy trial, and denial of a defendant’s motion for a physical lineup.

In criminal cases, orders made before and during trial are not separately appealable, but may be reviewed on an appeal from the judgment. Relief by writ may be available to challenge an interlocutory ruling on a proper showing that appeal would not be an adequate remedy. An order denying a motion for a new trial is not a final judgment and is not separately appealable; however, the order is reviewable on appeal from the judgment. (See People v. Jenkins (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 529, 531, fn. 1.) Orders suspending criminal proceedings because of present incompetence to stand trial (Pen. Code, § 1368) are independently appealable as special proceedings within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1). (People v. Fields (1965) 62 Cal.2d 538, 540.) Orders finding the defendant competent and declining to suspend criminal proceedings are nonappealable, interlocutory rulings and may be reviewed on appeal only from a final judgment in the underlying criminal proceeding. (People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 180-181.)

The defendant must timely appeal from an order granting probation or a commitment in lieu of sentence as listed in section 1237 to obtain review of the proceedings occurring before the order. These matters are not reviewable after subsequent orders affecting the probation or commitment or after a judgment imposed at a later time. Likewise, the defendant must appeal at the time probation is granted to obtain review of the sentence itself, if judgment was imposed but execution suspended. (See § 2.61 et seq., post.)

A vast array of issues can be raised on such an appeal if they are shown on the record and were timely preserved by proper objection or other procedural prerequisite. Just a few examples include jurisdiction, double jeopardy, statute of limitations, jury selection, denial of counsel or the right to self-representation, admission or exclusion of evidence, jury instructions, prosecutorial misconduct, and sentencing.

The scope of issues reviewable after trial may be preserved by entering a “slow plea,” a court trial submitted by stipulation on the preliminary hearing transcript or other

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{14}} \text{An exception to the rule against interlocutory appeals is the recusal of the district attorney. (Pen. Code, § 1238, subd. (a)(11), 1424, subd. (a)(1); e.g., People v. Vasquez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 47.)} \]
matters of record, upon agreement between the prosecution and defense as to the charges and/or sentence. (See § 2.20, ante.)

III. APPEAL BY A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT AFTER GUILTY PLEA [§ 2.18]

Guilty plea appeals are a different breed from appeals after trial. The scope of issues is limited both substantively and procedurally.

A. General: Waiver of Most Issues and Procedural Limitations [§ 2.19]

The right to appeal after a guilty plea is considerably restricted. Most issues are deemed waived by the plea, since the defendant has admitted guilt and agreed to submit to judgment without trial and all of its procedural requirements. (See § 2.122, appendix, for examples of issues waived by the plea.) Thus all issues going to guilt or innocence including affirmative defenses, most pretrial evidentiary rulings, and most procedural defects before the plea are considered waived. (*People v. Kanawha* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 9; *People v. Benweed* (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 828, 832; see *People v. Maultsby* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 296 [issues going to determination of guilt or innocence are not cognizable on appeal, regardless of application of Pen. Code, 1237.5].)

In addition to substantive limitations, an appeal challenging the validity of a guilty plea is procedurally restricted under Penal Code section 1237.5, which requires a certificate of probable cause (a) to initiate the appeal if the validity of the plea is the only issue or (b) to raise an issue concerning the validity of the plea if the appeal is initiated on grounds that do not require a certificate. (*People v. Mendez* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1104.) This topic is covered more thoroughly in § 2.105 et seq., post.)

B. Exception to General Limitations: “Slow Plea” [§ 2.20]

These limitations do not apply if the defendant entered a “slow plea” instead of a guilty plea. This procedure involves a court trial submitted by stipulation on the preliminary hearing transcript or other matters of record, upon agreement between the prosecution and defense as to the charges and/or sentence. Since a trial on the merits formally takes place, the judgment is reviewable as one after trial, not after a plea. (See

15 This section applies to pleas of nolo contendere, admitted probation violations, and admissions to enhancements, as well as pleas of guilty. (See Pen. Code, § 1237.5; *People v. Perry* (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1147, 1151.)
A slow plea preserves usual appellate issues for review. (*People v. Martin* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 687, 693-694 [insufficiency of evidence preserved]; see also *Bunnell v. Superior Court* (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 603-604 [fact that case was submitted “in no way alters or circumscribes [the right to appeal the judgment] or affects the scope of available appellate review”].) A certificate of probable cause is not required. (*People v. Tran* (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 680, 685, fn. 7.)

C. Exception to Waiver: Matters Arising After Entry of the Plea  [§ 2.21]

1. Attacks on sentence  [§ 2.22]
   a. Sentence not incorporated into plea agreement  [§ 2.23]

   In *People v. Ward* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 574-576, the California Supreme Court concluded the Legislature did not intend in enacting Penal Code section 1237.5 to abrogate the long-standing policy that a guilty plea does not automatically acquiesce in decisions made after its entry, as opposed to matters explicitly incorporated in or necessarily implied by the plea agreement. Thus a challenge to a sentence left open by the plea agreement is not intrinsically inconsistent with the plea and can be raised without attacking the plea itself. (See also *People v. Lloyd* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 658, 663-664; see § 2.24, post, on stipulated sentences and related exceptions.)

   If the sentence is not part of the bargain and any required objection has been made, a broad range of sentencing errors can be raised. These might include, to give only a few examples, improper probation conditions, abuse of discretion in choosing a base term or imposing consecutive sentences, failure to stay a term as required by Penal Code section 654, a contested determination of the degree of an offense (*People v. Ward* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 574), or a challenge to mandatory sex offender registration on an equal protection violation ground (*People v. Ruffin* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 669). On the other hand, a legislative change in a statutory consequence of the conviction such as a registration requirement, noted in the plea agreement but not made an explicit term thereof can be applied to the defendant without violating the agreement. (*Doe v. Harris* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64.)
b. **Negotiated sentence limitations**  [§ 2.24]

The rationale behind the general proposition that sentences and other post-plea matters can be reviewed on appeal after a guilty plea assumes the defendant by pleading has not automatically accepted the sentence and the prosecution has not relied on a particular sentence as part of the consideration for the plea bargain. However, if a specific sentence has been negotiated and is stipulated in the plea agreement or necessarily implied by it, this rationale is inapplicable.

*People v. Hester* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290 held a defendant waives the right to attack an unauthorized sentence by accepting it as part of a plea bargain. This situation creates an exception to the general proposition that an unauthorized sentence is deemed an act in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction and can be raised at any time:

Where the defendants have pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence, appellate courts will not find error even though the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in reaching that figure, so long as the trial court did not lack fundamental jurisdiction. The rationale behind this policy is that defendants who have received the benefit of their bargain should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to better the bargain through the appellate process.

*(Id. at p. 295, emphasis original; see also People v. Cuevas* (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374 [when plea negotiation results in dismissal or reduction of charges and defendant agrees maximum possible sentence for remaining charges is a specified time, certificate of probable cause required to contest sentence under Pen. Code, § 654]; *People v. Shelton* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 766-767 [attack on trial court’s authority to impose maximum sentence specified in bargain is attack on plea, requiring certificate of probable cause]; *People v. Panizzon* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 78 [certificate of probable cause required when attacking stipulated sentence as cruel and unusual punishment]; *People v. Rushing* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 354 [certificate of probable cause necessary where maximum sentence under Three Strikes was a possibility of the plea bargain and was imposed]; *People v. Ramirez* (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1428 [defendant estopped from challenging increase of previously imposed but unexecuted sentence when part of bargain to reinstate probation]; *In re Lino B.* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1474 [minor estopped from challenging probation term longer than statutory maximum when term was part of negotiated disposition]; *People v. Flood* (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 504, 508; *People v. Nguyen* (1993)
When a plea bargain sets a maximum sentence, the defendant does not automatically accept that sentence or any lesser one as appropriate and reserves the right to challenge the terms actually imposed and the reasons for them. This challenge is not an attack on the plea bargain itself. (*People v. Buttram* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 777, disapproving *People v. Stewart* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1209, and approving *People v. Cole* (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850 [abuse of discretion in not dismissing strike reviewable because possibility of such dismissal was anticipated in plea bargain provision that trial court would consider dismissal].)

However, an attack on the trial court’s *authority* to impose the lid is an attack on the plea. (*People v. Shelton* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 766 [defendant claimed imposing negotiated lid would violate Pen. Code, § 654].) Likewise, in asserting that Penal Code section 654 requires the trial court to stay certain counts, “defendant is not challenging the court’s exercise of sentencing discretion, but attacking its authority to impose consecutive terms for these counts.” (*People v. Cuevas* (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374; see also *People v. Jones* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 735, 743-746 [Pen. Code, § 654 inapplicable to any sentence, specified or within a “lid,” agreed upon as part of a plea bargain].)

In *People v. Young* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 827, 829, cited with approval in *People v. Shelton* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 771, the bargain provided a maximum of 25 years to life and an opportunity to request dismissal of priors. On appeal the court held the defendant’s challenge on appeal to his 25 years to life sentence as cruel and unusual punishment was an attack on the plea itself within the meaning of *People v. Panizzon* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68.


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16The *Cole* court did not reach the merits of issues concerning cruel and unusual punishment and withdrawal of the plea because of the lack of a certificate of probable cause. (*People v. Cole*, *supra*, at pp. 867-869.)
c. **Credits issue and fines or fees issue limitation** [§ 2.25]

As mentioned above in § 2.13, ante, if the calculation of presentence custody credits is the sole issue on appeal, Penal Code section 1237.1 requires the issue first have been presented to the trial court for correction. Section 1237.2 imposes the same requirement for issues concerning fines, fees, and similar monetary assessments.

2. **Procedural defects in hearing motion to withdraw plea** [§ 2.26]

The failure to provide the defendant a proper hearing on a motion to withdraw a plea or to use proper standards in evaluating the motion, regardless of whether the motion relates to pre- or post-plea issues, is reviewable after a guilty plea. (See Pen. Code, § 1018; *People v. Johnson* (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668.) Raising such an issue requires a certificate of probable cause. (*Id.* at pp. 681-683; see also *People v. Emery* (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 560, 565.) Issues concerning the underlying merits of a motion to withdraw also are reviewable and also require a certificate of probable cause. (§ 2.38 et seq., post.)

3. **Non-compliance with terms of bargain by People or court** [§ 2.27]

Issues arising when the prosecutor or court fails to comply with the terms of the plea agreement are not waived by a guilty plea, since by definition they were not contemplated when the agreement was made.

a. **Remedies** [§ 2.28]

Normally there are two possible remedies for breach of the bargain – withdrawal of the plea or specific enforcement of the bargain. (*People v. Mancheno* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 860-861; *People v. Kanawha* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 15.)

Withdrawal of the plea is the appropriate remedy when specific performance would limit the judge’s sentencing discretion in light of new information or changed circumstances. (*People v. Mancheno* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 861; see *People v. Kanawha* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 13-14; see also Pen. Code, § 1192.5 [defendant cannot be given a more severe sentence than that specified in the plea without being offered a chance to withdraw the plea].)

Specific performance is appropriate when it will implement the parties’ reasonable expectations without binding the trial judge to an unreasonable disposition. (*People v. Mancheno* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 861; see *Santobello v. New York* (1971) 404 U.S. 257,

It may not be appropriate when an original term of the plea bargain was invalid because inconsistent with law. (People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213 [prosecution may not reduce or waive victim’s right to restitution as term of plea bargain].)

b. Certificate of probable cause  [§ 2.29]

A certificate of probable cause is not required to raise violation of the plea bargain as an issue on appeal. Such an issue is not considered an attack on the plea, even though the remedy may be an opportunity to withdraw the plea. (In re Harrell (1970) 2 Cal.3d 675, 706; People v. Delles (1968) 69 Cal.2d 906, 909-910; People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213; People v. Osorio (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 183, 187, overruled on other grounds in People v. Johnson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668.)

c. Prejudice  [§ 2.30]

Violation of a plea bargain is not subject to harmless error analysis because it is assumed that any violation of the bargain resulted in detriment to the defendant. (People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1026; People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 865; People v. Mikhail (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 846, 858.) However, only a punishment “significantly greater than that bargained for” violates the plea bargain. (Walker, at p. 1027.) If the deviation from the bargain is de minimis – for example, imposition of a mandatory restitution fine at or near the statutory minimum – withdrawal of the plea may be inappropriate. On appeal, an error in imposing a fine not bargained for generally should be corrected by reducing it to the minimum. (Id. at pp. 1027-1030.)
D. Exception to Waiver: Fourth Amendment Suppression Issues  [§ 2.31]

1. Statutory authorization to appeal  [§ 2.32]

Appellate review of a Fourth Amendment search and seizure suppression issue after a guilty plea is expressly authorized by Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m), which provides in part:

A defendant may seek further review of the validity of a search or seizure on appeal from a conviction in a criminal case notwithstanding the fact that the judgment of conviction is predicated upon a plea of guilty.

   a. Policy basis  [§ 2.33]

The policy behind this provision is one of judicial economy. Exclusion of illegally obtained evidence does not go to underlying factual guilt or innocence, but rather to the People’s ability to prove it. If the only contested issue is the suppression motion and the defendant is willing to admit factual guilt, it would be a waste of resources to require a full trial as a prerequisite to reviewing the suppression motion on appeal.

   b. Type of issues preserved  [§ 2.34]

Section 1538.5, subdivision (m) applies only to Fourth Amendment issues. It does not authorize appeals after a guilty plea on efforts to suppress evidence on other grounds, such as violation of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Such issues are waived as a matter of law with the entry of a guilty plea, as are most other evidentiary issues (see § 2.122, appendix). (People v. Superior Court (Zolnay) (1975) 15 Cal.3d 729, 733-734, disapproved on another ground in People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 129-130; People v. Whitfield (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 947, 958-959; People v. Brown (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 116, 124.)

However, an extrajudicial statement of the defendant obtained by exploiting the fruits of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment (e.g., United States v. Crews (1980) 445 U.S. 463, 470, fn. 14 and accompanying text) and thus would be reviewable.

A motion to unseal an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant, if made as part of a suppression motion, is appealable under Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m).
(People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 957; People v. Seibel (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1279, 1285.)

2. Need to make or renew motion after information filed [§ 2.35]

Section 1538.5, subdivision (m) prescribes procedural requisites for raising and preserving a suppression issue:

The proceedings provided for in this section, and Sections 871.5, 995, 1238, and 1466 shall constitute the sole and exclusive remedies prior to conviction to test the unreasonableness of a search or seizure where the person making the motion for . . . the suppression of evidence is a defendant in a criminal case and the property or thing has been offered or will be offered as evidence against him or her. . . . Review on appeal may be obtained by the defendant provided that at some stage of the proceedings prior to conviction he or she has moved for . . . the suppression of evidence.

a. “Proceedings” as used in section 1538.5(m) [§ 2.36]

The last sentence has been interpreted to mean that the motion must be made during the proceedings in which judgment was imposed. If an information is filed, a new “proceeding” commences, and a suppression motion made and denied during the preliminary hearing must be renewed after the filing of the information, or the issue will not be appealable. (People v. Lilienthal (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891, 896-897.)

Lilienthal was decided when municipal and superior courts were separate. Even under “unified superior courts,” where municipal courts no longer exist, the Lilienthal rationale applies: the motion must be made in the proceeding where judgment is rendered. A judge of the unified court sits as a magistrate in a preliminary hearing, and once an information is filed, the trial judge assumes jurisdiction. (People v. Garrido (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 359, 364; People v. Hoffman (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1, 3; People v. Hart (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 479, 485-486; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 23, subd. (e)(7); see also People v. Hinds (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 897, 900.)

17One cautionary note: in reaching their conclusions both Hobbs and Seibel noted that the People had not objected below to the propriety of using a Penal Code section 1538.5 motion as a vehicle for raising a discovery issue. (People v. Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 957; People v. Seibel, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 1285.)

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If a plea is entered under Penal Code section 859a before a judge sitting as a magistrate and then the case is certified to the superior court for judgment, either formally or implicitly, the motion to suppress cannot be renewed, and appellate review of the search and seizure decision is foreclosed. (*People v. Richardson* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 574.)

b. **Method of renewing** [§ 2.37]

A motion to suppress made during the preliminary hearing is renewable by means of a Penal Code section 1538.5 motion. It may also be renewed by means of a section 995 motion to dismiss, arguing the unlawfulness of holding the defendant to answer on the basis of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (See Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m); see also *People v. Lilienthal* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891, 896; cf. *People v. Richardson* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 574 [no renewal of motion possible if certified plea procedure of Pen. Code, § 859a is used].)

When a magistrate grants a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, but a superior court judge reinstates the complaint under Penal Code section 871.5, a defendant need not make another suppression motion before the superior court to challenge the validity of the search on appeal. (*People v. Gutierrez* (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1483 [“Once the door has been shut on defendant, he is not required to knock again. He need not perform a useless act”].)

E. **Exception to Waiver: Issues Going to the Validity of the Plea** [§ 2.38]

Once a defendant has entered a plea of guilty with the approval of the court, the plea agreement is one to which all parties are bound, and the defendant is deemed to have waived the former absolute right to a trial and its concomitant procedural protections. The plea may be withdrawn only in the discretion of the trial court on a showing of good cause (Pen. Code, § 1018) or attacked on appeal (after issuance of a certificate of probable cause) on constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings (Pen. Code, § 1237.5). Simple “buyer’s remorse” – wanting to go to trial after all or to renegotiate the terms of the bargain – does not create an automatic entitlement to withdraw the plea. (*In re Brown* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 686, disapproved on another ground by *People v. Mendez* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098; *People v. Knight* (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 337, 344; *People v. Hunt* (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 103 [defendant’s reluctance in accepting plea bargain is not the same as an involuntary plea].)
Strategic considerations and procedural restrictions come into play when attacking a guilty plea on appeal, as will be discussed in the following sections.

Despite these constraints, a number of bases for attacking the validity of the plea might be asserted on appeal. Discussed below is the cognizability of such issues as:

- **the entry of the plea** – e.g., whether the defendant was denied the right to effective representation by counsel or to self-representation in making the plea; whether the trial court gave incomplete or incorrect advice about the plea, the rights given up by it, and its consequences; and whether the defendant was incompetent or acting under duress when entering the plea;

- **the validity of the proceedings as a whole** – e.g., lack of jurisdiction, prior proceedings or adjudications involving the same or related offenses that might act as a bar to the current litigation, flaws in the initiation of the proceedings, and the expiration of the statute of limitations; and

- **the substance of the plea** – e.g., unauthorized or unconstitutional sentences, pleas to non-existent crimes, and terms of the bargain in violation of public policy.

1. Preliminary caveat for counsel: need to warn client about consequences of challenging the plea [§ 2.39]

As noted in § 2.16, ante, a successful challenge to the plea erases, not only the unwanted burdens of the plea bargain, but also any benefit the client received as part of it. Dismissed charges can be reinstated; higher sentences can be imposed. (See People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 214-215; see § 4.99 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection,” for more detail.) It is therefore crucial the client be fully advised what charges and sentences he or she might be facing upon withdrawal of the plea. Commonly clients do not at first understand the potential drawbacks when they urge attacking the plea; after they learn what might happen, more often than not the response is, “Forget it. I don’t want to give up what I bargained for.”

Appellate counsel can help the client evaluate the risks and benefits of withdrawing the plea. Sometimes the client received little if any benefit from the bargain, ________________

18On occasion the People may attack the validity of the plea. (E.g., People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562.)
while at other times exposure to exceedingly heavy sentences was averted. Consultation with trial counsel is often critical, to give insight into why the plea was negotiated as it was and to assess the likelihood of a better or more severe outcome upon withdrawal of the plea.

As with any decision involving potential adverse consequences, if the client elects to attack the guilty plea, it is advisable to obtain written permission before proceeding. An advisory letter to the client, with a statement to be returned to the attorney acknowledging the potential adverse consequences and explicitly accepting the risks, protects both the client (by spelling out the risks and underscoring the seriousness of the decision) and the attorney.

2. Procedural standards and requirements in attacking plea [§ 2.40]

   a. Adequate appellate record [§ 2.41]

   In order to attack the plea on appeal, the facts establishing the illegality of the plea must be shown on the face of the appellate record. Those facts may be in the transcript of proceedings at the time the plea is taken, as when the defendant is given erroneous or incomplete advice that would preclude a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights. They may also be established at a hearing on a motion to withdraw the plea under Penal Code section 1018.

   If the illegality is not on the face of the appellate record, a petition for writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, or coram vobis (either independent of or collateral to the appeal) will usually be the appropriate vehicle for attacking the plea. (See § 2.72 et seq., post, and § 8.1 et seq. and § 8.66 et seq. of chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies”; Appeals and Writs in Criminal Cases (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 2005) §§ 2.172(A)-2.237, pp. 515-582.)

   b. Motion to withdraw plea [§ 2.42]

   Often an attack on the validity of the plea on appeal will require that a motion to withdraw the plea have been made in the trial court, since otherwise the necessary facts will not be in the appellate record. Abuse of discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewable on appeal. (People v. Francis (1954) 42 Cal.2d 335, 338; People v. Griggs (1941) 17 Cal.2d 621, 624.)

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A motion to withdraw a plea is made under Penal Code section 1018, which provides in part:

On application of the defendant at any time before judgment or within six months after an order granting probation is made if entry of judgment is suspended, the court may . . . , for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. . . . This section shall be liberally construed to effect these objects and to promote justice.

In a motion to withdraw a plea, the defendant carries the burden of proof and must show by clear and convincing evidence there is good cause to withdraw the plea. (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 585; People v. Nance (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1456, citing People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566.) Good cause exists when the defendant was operating under mistake, ignorance, or inadvertence, when the exercise of free judgment was overcome, or when other factors acted to deprive the defendant unlawfully of the right to a trial on the merits. (Nance, at p. 1456, citing Cruz, at p. 566, and People v. Barteau (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 483, 486; People v. Goodrum (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 397, 400-401.) Various grounds are explored in this section, including issues involving the entry of the plea, the validity of the proceedings as a whole, and the terms of the plea bargain.

A ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion. (People v. Nance (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 1456, citing In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 685; 19 People v. Knight (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 337, 344.) The presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt standards do not apply to motions to withdraw a plea because the defendant has already admitted guilt. (E.g., People v. Perry (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 841, 844.)

Certain specialized forms of a motion to withdraw a plea are provided by statute. One example is Penal Code section 1016.5, which requires pre-plea advice of immigration consequences and allows the defendant to move to vacate the judgment if the trial court failed to do so. (See People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885 [receipt of advisement under § 1016.5 does not bar noncitizen defendant from seeking to withdraw guilty plea for good cause on ground defendant was ignorant guilty plea would render him deportable]; People v. Totari (2002) 28 Cal.4th 876, 879, 887 [denial of § 1016.5 motion is appealable order].) Another example is Penal Code section 1473.6, which allows a person no longer in physical or constructive custody to challenge the judgment,

19Brown was disapproved on another ground by People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098.
if there is newly discovered evidence of fraud or perjury or misconduct by a government official. (See People v. Germany (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 784, 787, fn. 2 [order denying such a challenge is appealable].) Still another is section 1473.7, which allows a person no longer imprisoned or restrained to move to vacate a conviction or sentence because of (a) error prejudicing the defendant’s understanding of immigration consequences of the plea or (b) newly discovered evidence of actual innocence.

c. Certificate of probable cause  [§ 2.43]

Arguing the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea on the merits, ineffective assistance of counsel in a hearing on the motion, or otherwise attacking the validity of the plea on appeal requires the defendant to obtain a certificate of probable cause. (People v. Johnson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668.) Penal Code section 1237.5 provides:

No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a revocation of probation following an admission of violation, except where both of the following are met: ¶ (a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings. ¶ (b) The trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court.

Certificates of probable cause are discussed in more detail in § 2.105 et seq., post.

3. Validity issues concerning the entry of the plea  [§ 2.44]

The validity of a plea may be attacked on appeal on the ground the circumstances of its entry violated the defendant’s rights.

a. Violation of right to effective assistance of counsel  [§ 2.45]

The defendant has the right to effective representation in negotiating and entering a plea. The validity of the plea may be affected if counsel did not give accurate and material advice on the potential consequences of either going to trial or pleading guilty. (Lafler v. Cooper (2012) 566 U.S. 156 [because of counsel’s defective advice, defendant rejected plea bargain, went to trial, and received harsher sentence; remedy is to order state to reoffer plea agreement]; Missouri v. Frye (2012) ___U.S.____ [132 S.Ct. 1399] [ineffectiveness shown when counsel failed to communicate plea offer and it lapsed; defendant pled guilty on more severe terms; defendant must show reasonable probability that he would have accepted lapsed offer, that prosecution would have adhered to agreement, and that trial court would have accepted it]; In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th

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230, 240 [trial counsel’s inaccurate advice regarding immigration consequences could, depending on the circumstances, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel]; In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 928 [failing to advise defendant fully of risks at trial, causing defendant to reject plea bargain that would have been approved by trial court];20 People v. Huynh (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1067,1083-1084 [inaccurate advice about parole eligibility date].)

Other examples of infringement on the right to effective assistance of counsel in entering a guilty plea include trial court interference with a defendant’s right to hire an attorney of his or her own choice,21 undue influence on a defendant to accept a plea bargain because counsel obviously is not prepared to proceed to trial,22 and counsel’s failure to determine that an enhancement the prosecutor was offering to dismiss as part of the bargain was in fact invalid.23 (See also cases listed in Wiley v. County of San Diego (1998) 19 Cal.4th 532, 542.)

Ineffective assistance of counsel affecting the entry of the plea must be raised on habeas corpus if the necessary facts are not in the record. (People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 728-729.)

b. Inadequate advice on constitutional and other rights [§ 2.46]

Before accepting the plea, the trial court has a federal constitutional duty to advise the defendant of the constitutional rights to a jury and confrontation of witnesses and the privilege against self-incrimination. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 242-243; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 130-131, disapproved on another ground in Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 305-306 [misdemeanor defendants may plead guilty through counsel with an adequately documented showing they knowingly and intelligently waived constitutional rights]; see People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1143.

20The California Supreme Court denied relief on the basis that Alvernaz had not demonstrated that he would have accepted the offer. (In re Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 945.) In a subsequent federal habeas corpus Alvernaz prevailed. (Alvernaz v. Ratelle (S.D. Cal. 1993) 831 F.Supp. 790.)


23People v. McCary (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1, 8-12.
whether failure to advise invalidates plea to be determined under totality of circumstances].) A waiver of constitutional rights not knowingly, intelligently, properly, or competently made may be appealed. (*People v. Ribero* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 63, citing to *People v. Navarro* (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 755, 758.)

A defendant also must be told of specific constitutional protections waived by an admission of the truth of an allegation of prior felony convictions and of those penalties and other sanctions imposed as a consequence of a finding of the allegation. (*People v. Cross* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164; *In re Yurko* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857.)

c. **Inadequate advice on consequences of plea** [§ 2.47]

The court must also advise the defendant of the direct consequences of the plea, and failure to do so may invalidate the plea. (*Bunnell v. Superior Court* (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 605; *People v. Crosby* (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1354-1355 [defendant must be advised of direct rather than collateral consequences; collateral consequence is one that does not “inexorably follow” from conviction].)

A number of direct consequences are enumerated in *In re Resendiz* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 243, fn. 7, overruled on other grounds in *Padilla v. Kentucky* (2010) ___ U.S. ___ [130 S.Ct. 1473]. They include the range of punishment (see *Bunnell v. Superior Court* (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 605), a restitution fine (see *People v. Walker* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1022), a mandatory parole term (see *In re Moser* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 351-352), registration requirements for sex offenders (see *People v. McClellan* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 367, 376), and alternative dispositions such as commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center (*Bunnell*, at p. 605).

The court has no duty to advise the defendant of indirect or collateral consequences of the plea. These include limitations on parole eligibility factors or good time or work time credits (*People v. Barella* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 261, 271-272), the possibility the conviction could be used in the future to enhance punishment (*In re Resendiz* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 243, fn. 7; *People v. Bernal* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1457), and the possibility that a conviction can serve to revoke an existing probationary grant (*Resendiz*, at p. 243, fn. 7; *People v. Martinez* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 736, 745).

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24*Padilla* held that, as a matter of federal law, counsel has an affirmative obligation to advise the defendant when an offense to which defendant pleads guilty would result in removal from the country. *Resendiz* had limited its holding on ineffective assistance of counsel to actual misadvice.
Penal Code section 1016.5 requires that, before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the trial court must advise a defendant who is not a United States citizen of immigration consequences. The statute allows the defendant to move to vacate the judgment if the trial court failed to do so. In People v. Totari (2002) 28 Cal.4th 876, 879, the Supreme Court held the denial of a motion to vacate a plea 13 years after judgment was imposed is an appealable order. (See also People v. Zamudio (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 203-204.) A trial court’s failure to advise a defendant of the adverse immigration consequences of a plea is prejudicial if it is reasonably probable the defendant would not have pled guilty if properly advised; relief does not require proof defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. (People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555.)

d. Erroneous advice on appealability of issue [§ 2.48]

Sometimes a court may tell the defendant a given issue can be appealed after a guilty plea and even that the court will issue a certificate of probable cause for the issue, when by law the plea forecloses appeal. Obtaining a certificate of probable cause cannot make an issue that has been waived by a plea cognizable on appeal. (E.g., People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896 [Miranda"25 issue]; People v. Padfield (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 218, 227, fn. 7 and accompanying text [statute of limitations, when accusatory pleading alleged statute had been tolled].)


However, mere acquiescence by the court in the defendant’s expressed intention to appeal does not necessarily imply the plea was conditioned on such a promise. (People v. Hernandez (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1361.) If the defendant was given no assurance of appealability, there may be no entitlement to withdraw the plea. (People v. Krotter (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 643, 649; People v. Shults (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 714, 720, fn. 2.)


26People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641 [sanctions for destruction of evidence].)
e. Involuntariness of plea or incompetence of defendant

§ 2.49

A number of issues concerning the defendant’s mental state at the time of entering the plea may be raised in attacking the validity of the plea. Such issues might include coercion, incompetence within the meaning of Penal Code section 1368, or the defendant’s being under the influence of drugs or otherwise mentally disabled.

If the defendant entered the plea as a result of undue influence, duress, or fraud, the plea may be set aside. (E.g., In re Vargas (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1141-1143 [claim that counsel was unprepared and coerced defendant into accepting plea].) Undue influence or duress is not established simply because the defendant has changed his or her mind (In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 686, disapproved on another ground by People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098; People v. Knight (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 337, 344) or because the defendant reluctantly accepted the plea and later decided to withdraw it (People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 103). The claim the defendant’s family pressured him or her into taking the plea is insufficient to constitute duress. (People v. Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208.) False expectations of lenient treatment, even when based on counsel’s advice, are also insufficient. (Mendieta v. Municipal Court (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 290, 294.) Under certain circumstances, a “package-deal” plea bargain can be considered coercive, and so the trial court must scrutinize such a plea carefully. (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 283-284, 287.)

The defendant’s mental competence at the time of the plea also may be raised on appeal if a certificate of probable cause has been granted. (People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 282; see People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 76.) If there is substantial evidence raising a doubt of the defendant’s competence, accepting a guilty plea or entering judgment without having conducted a hearing on present competence is fundamental error. (Laudermilk, at p. 282; cf. In re Downs (1970) 3 Cal.3d 694, 700-701 [doctor testified defendant was given a number of medications, but they did not impair his ability to understand consequences of his actions].) However, substantial evidence means more than mere bizarre statements or actions, statements of defense counsel that defendant is not cooperating with the defense, or psychiatric testimony that defendant is immature, dangerous, psychopathic, or homicidal with little reference to the defendant’s ability to assist in the defense. (Laudermilk, at p. 285.)
4. Validity issues concerning the proceedings as a whole  [§ 2.50]

Although a plea of guilty waives most errors occurring before its entry, those affecting the jurisdiction, constitutionality, or legality of the proceedings may be preserved. (*People v. Kanawha* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 9; *People v. Robinson* (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 363, 369-370; *People v. Turner* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 116, 127-128.)

The fact the issue is cognizable on appeal does not obviate the need to observe the usual procedural prerequisites for preserving issues, such as objecting in the trial court, entering a specific plea when required such as once in jeopardy (*People v. Belcher* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 91, 96), or obtaining a certificate of probable cause (*People v. Jerome* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094-1095).

a. Jurisdictional defects  [§ 2.51]

Fundamental jurisdictional defects are not waived by the plea. Such defects render the proceedings void and can be corrected at any time. Examples of such defects include:

- Statute of limitations, where expiration is shown on the face of the accusatory pleading (*People v. Chadd* (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 756-758 (plur. opn. by Mosk, J.));


“Less fundamental” jurisdictional issues may be waived by a guilty plea. Some examples include:
• Unlawful sentence to which the parties have stipulated (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295);

• Expiration of statute of limitations when the issue is expressly waived in plea bargaining (Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 372-373; cf. People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 757 [issue not waived merely by failure to assert it before pleading guilty]);

• Violation of right to speedy trial, even when guilty plea is entered after erroneous denial of motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds (People v. Egbert (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 503, 511, fn. 3 and accompanying text);

• Improper venue or “territorial jurisdiction” within the state – e.g., denial of a change of venue or objection to territorial jurisdiction (People v. Krotter (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 643, 648).

  b. Prior proceedings involving the same offenses as bar to current litigation [§ 2.52]

A guilty plea does not waive some issues alleging that the current proceedings could not lawfully have taken place in light of previous proceedings involving the same or closely related charges. These issues involve such legal doctrines as multiple prosecutions (Pen. Code, § 654), collateral estoppel, res judicata, and double jeopardy. (See also People v. Castillo (2010) 49 Cal.4th 145 [judicial estoppel precludes court from sentencing SVP committee to indeterminate term after People stipulated to two-year term]; chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision,” § 7.7A, on law of the case doctrine.)

Penal Code section 654, subdivision (a) provides that, if an act is punishable under more than one statute, “an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.” It requires a single prosecution for offenses based on the same conduct. (Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822, 824; see also People v. Lohbauer (1981) 29 Cal.3d 364, 373.) Because the issue goes, not to guilt or innocence, but to the right of the state to try the defendant for the offenses, it concerns the legality of the proceedings and is appealable with a certificate of probable cause if properly raised in the trial court. (People v. Turner (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 116, 123, 127-128.)

The same reasoning applies to claims of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a doctrine precluding, under specified circumstances, re-litigation of claims already
resolved in another proceeding involving the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted.\textsuperscript{27} The doctrine does not involve guilt or innocence but rather seeks to avoid repetitive litigation, conserve judicial resources, and prevent inconsistent decisions, and in fact may be asserted by a guilty party. Thus the issue is not waived by a guilty plea but is appealable within the meaning of Penal Code section 1237.5. (\textit{People v. Meyer} (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1150, 1158-1159.)

A claim of double jeopardy based on a prior conviction or acquittal of the same offense also can be raised after a guilty plea, because it challenges the right of the state to bring the proceeding at all. (\textit{Menna v. New York} (1975) 423 U.S. 61, 62; see also \textit{Blackledge v. Perry} (1974) 417 U.S. 21, 30.) However, a double jeopardy claim based on a contention of improper multiple convictions challenges the nature of the underlying offense, which is admitted by a guilty plea, and is therefore waived. (\textit{United States v. Broce} (1989) 488 U.S. 563, 575-576 [guilty plea waives double jeopardy-based claim that crime charged in indictment was only one, not multiple conspiracies].)

c. Flaws in the initiation of the proceedings [\$ 2.53]

On appeal after a guilty plea the defendant may argue certain improprieties in the initiation of the case if proper objection was made and a certificate of probable cause has been granted. For example, \textit{People v. Cella} (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 905, 912, 916, footnote 6, held cognizable on appeal after a guilty plea an issue involving dismissal of the indictment because of a violation of the Interstate (or Interjurisdictional) Agreement on Detainers (Pen. Code, § 1389, art. IV, subd. (e)). The court noted that because such a violation vitiates the indictment and the prosecution is precluded from proceeding further, the plea does not waive the contention on appeal. (\textit{Cella}, at p. 915, fn. 5; see also \textit{People v. Reyes} (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 524, 530-532.) Similarly, the denial of a motion for dismissal under Penal Code section 1381, which allows a California prisoner to demand a

\textsuperscript{27}The doctrine of res judicata gives conclusive effect to a former judgment in later litigation involving the \textit{same} cause of action – an effect known as claim preclusion. A corollary to the doctrine is collateral estoppel, which applies to later litigation based on a \textit{different} cause of action and gives conclusive effect to the prior resolution of issues litigated in that case. The prerequisite elements for both are: (1) the claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to one litigated in a prior proceeding, (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (\textit{People v. Barragan} (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 253; \textit{People v. Meyer} (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1150, 1158-1159, 1164-1165.)
speedy trial of other pending California charges, survives a guilty or no contest plea. (*People v. Gutierrez* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 105, 108.)

In contrast, the typical constitutionally-based speedy trial claim is waived by a guilty plea because it is based on the premise the passage of time has frustrated the defendant’s ability to defend, and such an issue is removed by a plea of guilty. (*People v. Gutierrez* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 105, 108.) In *People v. Black* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 103, 111-112, when a federal district court’s earlier habeas corpus order gave the state 60 days to retry the defendant, the state court held the defendant’s no contest plea at the retrial precluded an argument that the retrial had begun beyond the deadline.

An eligible defendant can assert the right to pretrial diversion after a guilty plea. (*People v. Padfield* (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 218, 228; see Pen. Code, § 1001 et seq.)

d. **Statute of limitations** [§ 2.54]

If the expiration of the statute of limitations is shown as a matter of law on the face of the pleading, the issue can be raised on appeal after a guilty plea. (*People v. Chadd* (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 757.) However, when the pleading alleges tolling or seeks to invoke the “discovery” rule for starting the limitation period, the question is an evidentiary one waived by the plea. (*People v. Padfield* (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 218, 226.)

28See also Penal Code section 1389 [analogous provision for out-of-state prisoners].


30Under the discovery rule, the limitation period for specified offenses begins when the offense is discovered. (E.g., Pen. Code, §§ 801.5, 803, subds. (c) & (e), 803.5.) To plead this rule, the information should allege facts showing when, how, and by whom the offense was first discovered; lack of knowledge before then; and the reason why it was not discovered earlier. (*People v. Zamora* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 564-565, fn. 26; *People v. Lopez* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 245.)
5. Validity issues concerning the substance of the plea  [§ 2.55]

Although for the most part issues attacking the substance of the plea are non-cognizable on appeal because waived by the plea, at least some issues challenging plea terms as unconstitutional, illegal, void, or contrary to public policy may be preserved.

a. Bargained-for sentences and convictions unauthorized by law or unconstitutional  [§ 2.56]

Unconstitutional terms of plea bargains such as banishment from the country or state may invalidate a plea. (Alhusainy v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 385; In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077.)

However, the general principle that unlawful sentences are beyond a court’s power and can be corrected at any time is usually not applied when the sentence was agreed to as part of a guilty plea bargain. The rationale behind this policy is that defendants who have received the benefit of their bargain have waived any right to complain about it. As the Supreme Court has put it, defendants should not be allowed to “trifle with the courts by attempting to better the bargain through the appellate process.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295; see also People v. Chatmon (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 771, 773; cf. People v. Mitchell (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1009 [defendant may challenge enhancement of which he was never notified or charged and to which he did not admit or plead].)

The principle behind Hester arguably might not extend to sentences that are so defective as to be unconstitutional. Appellate courts have refused to consider cruel and unusual punishment arguments directed at sentences to which the defendant expressly or implicitly agreed in pleading guilty if the defendant (a) failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 89; People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 867-869; People v. Young (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 827, 83231), or (b) explicitly waived the right to appeal (Panizzon, at p. 89; People v. Foster (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 247, 250-252), or (c) raised an argument dependent on facts that were not

31 Young was cited with approval in People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 771, on the certificate requirement. In People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 789-790, the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide whether a certificate of probable cause would be necessary to attack a stipulated maximum sentence on the grounds that it was unconstitutional as cruel and unusual.
developed because of the guilty plea (People v. Zamora (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1627, 1634-1638, People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 107-110; People v. Sabados (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 691, 694-696). However, it is not wholly clear whether a cruel and unusual punishment argument could be considered if the defendant does have a certificate of probable cause, has not waived an appeal, and raises an argument not specific to the facts of the case.

b. Bargain attempting to confer fundamental jurisdiction  
[§ 2.57]

A plea bargain cannot confer fundamental jurisdiction on the court, and a term of the bargain purporting to do so can be attacked on appeal. In People v. Scott (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 910, 915, the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in attempting to resentence the defendant after sentence had already been imposed; although the defendant had agreed to this possibility as part of the plea bargain, the issue was appealable.

c. Terms of bargain contrary to public policy  
[§ 2.58]


For example, specific enforcement of a negotiated provision that the offense falls outside the Mentally Disordered Offender law (Pen. Code, § 2960) would violate public policy because it would undermine the MDO law and release a defendant who poses a potential danger to society. (People v. Renfro (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 223, 228, 231, 233.) Similarily, the duty to register as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290, subdivision (a), cannot be avoided through a plea bargain. (People v. McClellan (1993) 6 32

32The court did not foreclose the possibility that a habeas corpus writ seeking to withdraw the plea might be available. (Renfro, at p. 233.)
In contrast, *People v. Castillo* (2010) 49 Cal.4th 145 held the doctrine of judicial estoppel precluded the court from sentencing a Sexually Violent Predator Act committee to an indeterminate term after the People had stipulated to a two-year term. (However, the committee would be subject to an indeterminate term at any recommitment hearing after the two-year term expired.)

d. **Plea to a legally invalid count or non-existent crime**  
   
   In general, a plea to an offense that does not exist or is legally impossible is void, and the invalidity of the plea can be raised on appeal. In *People v. Collins* (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, for example, the defendant pleaded guilty to and was sentenced for a crime repealed by the Legislature after the plea but before final judgment; the court found the plea was invalid and therefore had to be withdrawn.33 (*Id.* at p. 213.) Similarly, in *People v. Wallace* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1699, the defendant pleaded guilty to Penal Code section 422.7, which is a penalty provision and not an offense in and of itself; the court called the plea a “legal nullity” requiring reversal. (*Id.* at p. 1704; see also *People v. King* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1304 [obligation to register as sexual offender premised solely on condition of probation for nonregistrable offense]; *People v. Soriano* (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 781, 784-785 [forged death certificate not legally an instrument under Pen. Code, § 115]; *People v. Jerome* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1093 [offense of oral copulation with minor under 14 years old is “legal impossibility” when victim was age 15].)
IV. APPEAL BY THE DEFENDANT FROM ORDER AFTER JUDGMENT
[§ 2.60]

Penal Code section 1237, subdivision (b) provides that a defendant may appeal “[from any order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the party.” Common appeals under this subdivision include an order revising or refusing to revise probation conditions, early termination of probation, a contested probation revocation, an order fixing restitution amounts, resentencing, and adjustment in the calculation of credits.

People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155 and Teal v. Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595 articulated an expansive view of “any order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the party.” (Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. (b).) Loper rejected the argument that the defendant must have standing to make the motion whose denial is being appealed. Teal rejected the argument that the right to appeal depends on the underlying merits of the motion or petition. These holdings remove obstacles to appeal often invoked in previous cases.

On the other hand, the trial court’s refusal to reconsider a matter over which it no longer has jurisdiction is not appealable as an order after judgment affecting the defendant’s substantial rights. (People v. Turrin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1200 [dismissing appeal from order declining to modify restitution fine, made after defendant began execution of sentence; trial court had no jurisdiction to rule on merits of motion]; see also People v. Pritchett (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 190, People v. Chlad (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1719, and People v. Gainer (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 636 [court lacked jurisdiction to recall sentence under Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d); denial of recall was not appealable], all distinguished in People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155.)

34 Turrin states in dicta that an order affecting victim restitution (as opposed to a restitution fine) is appealable under Penal Code section 1202.42, subdivision (d), which can be read as granting jurisdiction to issue a “further order of the court” on this matter. (People v. Turrin, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1206; see also People v. Denham (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1210 [court declined to treat notice of appeal from judgment as premature notice of later victim restitution order; order was separately appealable and required separate notice of appeal].)
A. Orders Related to Probation  [§ 2.61]

An order granting probation is considered a “judgment” for purposes of appeal under Penal Code section 1237, subdivision (a), and orders made after the grant of probation are appealable under Penal Code section 1237, subdivision (b), as orders after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant. (See also Pen. Code, § 1238, subd. (a)(5) [appeal by People from post-probation orders].)

1. Terms and conditions of probation  [§ 2.62]

An order denying the defendant’s motion to modify the conditions of probation or imposing more severe conditions after revocation and reinstatement is appealable as an order after judgment. (In re Bine (1957) 47 Cal.2d 814, 817; People v. Romero (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1423, 1425-1426.)

2. Revocation  [§ 2.63]

A decision to revoke probation is not itself an appealable order, but it may be reviewed on appeal from the disposition after revocation.35 (People v. Robinson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 143, 145.)

3. Review of matters occurring before probation grant  [§ 2.64]

An appeal after judgment may not review matters, such as trial proceedings, that occurred before the original judgment, which is considered to be the grant of probation. Those matters are appealable at the time of the grant (Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. (a)) and must be raised then, if they are to be reviewed at all. (People v. Glaser (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 819, 821, citing to People v. Howerton (1953) 40 Cal.2d 217, 219.)

4. Review of sentence  [§ 2.65]

If probation was granted by suspending imposition of sentence, an appeal from the sentencing after revocation of probation can review the sentence. (People v. Robinson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 143, 145.)

35If the defendant admits the probation violation, then under Penal Code section 1237.5 the decision to revoke probation cannot be appealed without the issuance of a certificate of probable cause.
However, if judgment initially was imposed and execution was suspended, an appeal from revocation of probation cannot reach the sentence, because the trial court has no authority to order execution of a sentence other than the one previously imposed. (See Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subd. (c); People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1088.) Thus the sentence must be appealed at the time of the original grant of probation if it is to be reviewed.

5. Orders after grant of probation affecting underlying conviction

An order refusing to permit withdrawal of the plea and dismissal of the charges under Penal Code section 1203.4 after the successful conclusion of probation is appealable as an order after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant. (People v. Romero (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1423, 1425-1426.)

Analogously, the People may appeal reduction of a “wobbler” to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b) as an “order after judgment.” (Pen. Code, § 1238, subd. (a)(5); People v. Douglas (1999) 20 Cal.4th 85, 88.) Presumably a defendant may appeal the denial of such a reduction. (See Douglas, at p. 91.)

B. Resentencing [§ 2.67]

Although ordinarily a trial court loses jurisdiction after the judgment becomes final, in some circumstances it may resentence, or the terms of confinement may be altered. As a general rule, the new sentence is appealable. The right to appeal a refusal to resentencing or grant other relief has a less certain footing, but the California Supreme Court has signaled that it views such rulings as appealable orders after judgment, affecting the defendant’s substantial rights. (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155 [denial of compassionate release under Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (e) is appealable; reviewing other areas where a statute or other law authorizes alteration of a previously imposed sentence; Teal v. Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595 [defendant may appeal denial of resentencing under Pen. Code, § 1170.126 on ground the defendant was ineligible].)

1. Correction of unauthorized sentence [§ 2.68]

An order vacating an unauthorized sentence and imposing a new sentence can be appealed as an order after judgment or as imposition of a new judgment. A sentence is unauthorized if it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case. Such a sentence is considered beyond the jurisdiction of the court and, unless
waived by stipulation as part of a plea bargain (see § 2.24, ante), can be corrected at any time. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354; see also People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852-853; People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6.)

An unauthorized sentence may be detected after judgment by the prosecution, defense, probation department, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the trial court, the appellate court, or in other ways. (See People v. Purata (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 489, 498; People v. Chagolla (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 422, 434.) Unauthorized sentences in the defendant’s favor are discussed extensively in § 4.93 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection.”

2. Sentence recall under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1)  [§ 2.69]

A defendant has a right to appeal a resentencing under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), which provides that the trial court may recall the sentence and resentence the defendant, in the same manner as if judgment had never been imposed, within 120 days of judgment on its own motion, or after 120 days on the recommendation of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. At the resentencing the trial court must follow all the procedures and rules attendant to sentencing. If error occurs, the defendant may appeal from the new judgment. (Cf. Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 463.)

Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) does not confer standing on a defendant to initiate a motion to recall a sentence. (Thomas v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 788, 790.) Formerly, case law had concluded from this fact that the defendant cannot appeal the refusal to recall the sentence. (People v. Pritchett (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 190, 194; People v. Chlad (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1719, 1725.) The Supreme Court cast serious doubt on this line of authority in People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, when it rejected the argument that a litigant’s lack of standing to initiate a proceeding necessarily precludes the litigant from an appeal once the decision is made. (Id. at pp. 898-902, overruling People v. Druschel (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 667 and People v. Niren (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 850.)

3. Resentencing under other laws  [§ 2.69A]

For the most part, resentencing under a statutory provision or refusal to resentence is appealable. People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, found denial of compassionate release under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (e) to be appealable. Teal v. Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595 found denial of resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126 on eligibility grounds to be appealable. Both Loper and Teal surveyed a number of decisions on resentencing and other post-judgment rulings and gave an expansive
reading to the concept of “any order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the party.” (E.g., People v. Herrera (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 590 [recall to correct disparate sentence under Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (f)], overruled on other grounds but approved on appealability holding in People v. Martin (1986) 42 Cal.3d 437, 446, 450; see § 2.72, post.)

4. Sentencing after remand  [§ 2.70]

If the defendant previously appealed and the case was remanded for new proceedings, the imposition of a new judgment is appealable. The reviewability of particular issues depends on the scope of the remand. (People v. Murphy (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 392, 394-397 [new appeal after remand to consider dismissing a strike and to address a cruel and unusual punishment contention cannot raise other sentencing issues]; People v. Smyers (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 666, 667-668 [new appeal after remand for rearraignment and sentencing cannot raise issues arising at first trial].)

C. Credits Calculations and Fines or Fees  [§ 2.71]

An issue as to the correct calculation of pre-sentence custody credits or the assessments of fines, fees, and related monetary matters may be raised on an appeal from the judgment or on an appeal from a post-judgment order concerning these matters. (People v. Salazar (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1557; People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954, 958.)

Reviewability of a credits or fines/fees issue on appeal is, however, subject to the procedural limitation that question must be presented on motion to the trial court if that is the sole ground for appeal. (Pen. Code, §§ 1237.1, 1237.2.) This limitation applies only when the credits or fines/fees issue is the sole issue on appeal and seeks to correct minor ministerial corrections, such as mathematical error, not legal error. (People v. Acosta (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 411, 420; accord, People v. Jones (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 485, 493; People v. Duran (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 267, 269-270; cf. People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1101 [distinguishing Acosta and declining to pass on its result or reasoning].) The requirement does not apply to juvenile cases. (In re Antwon R. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 348, 350.)

An informal letter to the trial court, service on the People, under section 1237.1 or 1237.2 is sufficient procedurally to get the relief by the express terms of those statutes.
D. Other Post-Judgment Rulings  [§ 2.72]

*People v. Loper* (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155 and *Teal v. Superior Court* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595 articulate an expansive view of “any order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the party.” (Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. (b).) *Loper* rejects the argument that the defendant must have standing to make the motion whose denial is being appealed. *Teal* rejects the argument that the right to appeal depends on the underlying merits of the motion or petition. These holdings remove obstacles to appeal often invoked in previous cases.

A number of post-judgment rulings have been found appealable. Some of the most common are discussed in § 2.73 et seq., *post*. In addition to those and sentence recalls discussed in §§ 2.69 and 2.69A, ante, *People v. Loper* (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, in finding denial of compassionate release under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (e) to be appealable, and *Teal v. Superior Court* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, finding denial of resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126 on eligibility grounds to be appealable, surveyed a number of decisions on resentencing and other post-judgment rulings. (E.g., *People v. Connor* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669 [order granting newspaper’s request to make contents of defendant’s probation report public]; *People v. Sword* (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 614 [denial of outpatient status after confinement under a not guilty by reason of insanity finding]; *People v. Coleman* (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 746 [denial of application for release on ground of restored sanity].)

1. **Quasi-appeal from judgment**  [§ 2.73]

An appeal seeking review of a ruling after judgment that would bypass or duplicate an appeal from the judgment is not appealable, even though it is literally an order after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant. For example, many motions to vacate or correct the judgment, petitions for writ of error *coram nobis*, habeas corpus petitions, are actually attacks on the judgment and raise issues that would have been cognizable on a timely appeal from the judgment. (See *People v. Gallardo* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 980-981, citing *People v. Thomas* (1959) 52 Cal.2d 521, 527.) In such a situation, as a matter of policy the courts generally decline to entertain the appeal from the order. (*Gallardo*, at pp. 980-981.)

However, in some limited situations an appeal from such an order will be considered, since the limitation is not a jurisdictional one. (*People v. Banks* (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 380.) Examples might be when the record on appeal would not have shown the error and when the judgment is void. (*People v. Gallardo* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 981.)
2. Ruling on writ petition  [§ 2.74]

Denial of a petition for writ of error *coram nobis* is generally appealable unless, as discussed in § 2.73, the underlying action was a quasi-appeal raising issues that would have been cognizable on a timely appeal from the judgment. (See *People v. Allenthorp* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 679, 683; *People v. Gallardo* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971; *People v. Castaneda* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1612; *People v. Goodrum* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 397; see also § 8.69 of chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies.”)

In similar circumstances, denial of a petition for a writ of mandate or prohibition in the superior court challenging an aspect of the judgment may be appealable as an order after judgment. (Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. (b); see also *Public Defenders’ Organization v. County of Riverside* (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1409-1410 [order granting or denying mandate constitutes final judgment under Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1)].)

Because Penal Code section 1506 fails to enumerate denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus among the appealable orders in those proceedings, it is not appealable. (*In re Clark* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767, fn. 7; see *People v. Gallardo* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 986.36) The remedy is to file a new petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal. (See § 8.49 et seq. of chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies.”) In contrast, the grant of habeas corpus relief is appealable by the People under section 1506.

Other aspects of writs are discussed in detail in chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies.”

3. Penal Code section 1016.5 motion  [§ 2.75]

A post-judgment motion to vacate the judgment under Penal Code section 1016.5 because of inadequate advice by the court on immigration consequences is appealable under Penal Code section 1237, subdivision (b). (*People v. Totari* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 876, 879; see also *People v. Superior Court (Zamudio)* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 197-198; see

36One of the appellants in *Gallardo* sought post-judgment relief based on a claim counsel had misled him as to immigration consequences. The court concluded that claim was nonappealable because it raised only ineffective assistance of counsel, which requires habeas corpus, not *coram nobis*. (*Id.* at pp. 979-980, 987-989, and 988, fn. 9.)
4. Penal Code section 1473.6 or 1473.7 motion [§ 2.76]

A motion to vacate the judgment under Penal Code section 1473.6 (which allows a person no longer in physical or constructive custody to challenge the judgment, if there is newly discovered evidence of fraud or perjury or misconduct by a government official) is appealable. (People v. Germany (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 784, 787, fn. 2; e.g., People v. Wagner (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 774.)

The grant or denial of a motion to vacate the conviction or sentence under Penal Code section 1473.7 (which allows a person no longer in imprisoned or restrained to move to vacate a conviction or sentence either because of (a) error prejudicing the defendant’s understanding of immigration consequences of the plea or (b) newly discovered evidence of actual innocence) is appealable as an order after judgment. (Pen. Code, §§ 1237, subd. (b); 1473.7, subd. (f).)

V. APPEAL BY MINOR AFTER DELINQUENCY FINDING [§ 2.77]

Welfare and Institutions Code section 800, subdivision (a) provides for a broad right to appeal after disposition of a juvenile delinquency adjudication under section 601 or 602 of that code:

A judgment in a proceeding under Section 601 or 602 may be appealed from, by the minor, in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed from, by the minor, as from an order after judgment.

A judgment entered by a referee is appealable when rehearing proceedings under sections 252-254 are complete or the time for initiating them has passed. A ruling on a motion to suppress under section 700.1 is reviewable on appeal even if judgment is based on an admission to the allegations of the petition. Section 800 gives the appeal priority over all other proceedings in the Court of Appeal.37

37See memo on the meaning of statutory priorities, analyzing a 2013 proposal, considered by the Appellate Court Committee of the San Diego County Bar Association, to eliminate priority for criminal appeals except for those in which custody is at stake. http://www.adi-sandiego.com/pdf_forms/Priority_on_appeal.pdf
A parent’s right to appeal from orders affecting the parent’s own interests, such as a restitution order making the parent liable, is recognized by case law as based on Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1). A parent’s right to appeal the general judgment against the minor is not wholly resolved.\footnote{In re Almalik S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 851, 854, held that the insertion of the words “by the minor” into subdivision (a) of section 800 in 1993 eliminated the previous right to appeal by a parent deprived of physical custody of the child by the judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 1435(a).) The court acknowledged that the purpose of the amendment, as shown by its legislative history, was to provide for a People’s appeal in a delinquency proceeding (Almalik S., at p. 854, fn. 1), but did not consider the point that “by the minor” arguably was intended only to distinguish a minor’s appeal from a People’s appeal, not to eliminate a parent’s existing right to appeal. Almalik S. also did not address the due process implications of permitting child custodial decisions affecting the parent’s own rights to be made without a right of parental appeal. Courts have found a right of parents to appeal a money judgment holding them liable for the acts of their child. (In re Michael S. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1443, and In re Jeffrey M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1017 [upholding parent’s standing to appeal money judgment against parent for delinquent acts of child].) Michael S. questioned the correctness of Almalik S. to the extent it suggests a parent has no right to appeal from a delinquency order that affects his or her own interests. (Michael S., at pp. 1450-1451 and fn. 4.) Unpublished case law supports that position, as well. Thus counsel should not allow Almalik S. to be a barrier to a parent’s appeal from a juvenile adjudication.}

A. Judgment  [§ 2.78]

The dispositional order is the judgment. The jurisdictional order finding that the minor comes under Welfare and Institutions Code section 601 or 602 is not separately appealable, but may be reviewed on appeal from the disposition. (In re James J. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1339; In re Melvin S. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 898, 900.)

A ruling on a search and seizure suppression motion is reviewable on appeal after an admission. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 700.1, 800, subd. (a), ¶ 2; see Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m) [analogous provision for criminal cases].)

A juvenile court can convert an unfulfilled restitution order to an appealable civil judgment when it terminates deferred entry of judgment probation. (People v. J.G. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 955.)
B. Pre-Judgment Orders  [§ 2.79]

A finding by the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 that a juvenile is or is not fit to be tried in juvenile court is not appealable by either the minor or the People. Review is exclusively by extraordinary writ. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.772(j); People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 677-680 [People challenging finding of fitness]; People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 713 [minor contesting finding of unfitness], disapproved on another ground in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 33-35; see § 8.71 et seq. and § 8.83 of chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies.”)\(^{39}\)


A minor also cannot appeal a program of informal supervision under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2, because the order by its nature takes place before adjudication and so there is no “judgment” from which to appeal. (In re Rikki J. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 783, 788-789.)\(^{40}\)

C. Inapplicability of Special Procedural Requirements for Criminal Appeals  [§ 2.80]

1. Certificate of probable cause  [§ 2.81]

Penal Code section 1237.5’s requirement of a certificate of probable cause for certain appeals following a guilty plea does not apply to juvenile cases based on an admission. (In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 955.)

\(^{39}\)The standard of review for a finding of fitness or unfitness is an abuse of discretion. (Jones, at p. 680; Chi Ko Wong, at p. 718.) The juvenile court’s findings required under the criteria affecting fitness are findings of fact. (Jones, at p. 680.)

\(^{40}\)In Rikki J., the court conditioned the informal supervision upon the minor’s admission of guilt. (128 Cal.App.4th at p. 788.) The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate vacating the admission because the admission constituted an adjudication, while the Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2 informal supervision program is a pre-adjudication proceeding. (Id. at p. 792.)
2. Custody credits and fines or fees  [§ 2.82]

Penal Code section 1237.1’s procedural limitation on the reviewability of credits issues does not apply to juvenile cases. (In re Antwon R. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 348, 350.) The same interpretation likely applies to issues involving fees or fines under Penal Code section 1237.2.

D. Transfers  [§ 2.83]

If the case was transferred from one county to another, the notice of appeal must be filed in the county where the dispositional order (which is the “judgment”) was made. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 750 et seq., 800; In re Judson W. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 838, 842, fn. 3; In re Carlos B. (2000) 76 Cal.App.4th 50; see also In re J. C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 984 [dependency transfers].)

An appeal filed in the wrong court may be transferred under certain circumstances. (Gov. Code, § 68915; People v. Nickerson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 33, 39-40 [transfer of misdemeanor case from Court of Appeal to appellate division of superior court]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 10.1000 [transfer of case between Courts of Appeal].)

VI. PEOPLE’S APPEALS AND ISSUES RAISED BY THE PEOPLE  [§ 2.84]

People’s appeals are much more circumscribed than defendants’ appeals. First, the constitutional limitations of double jeopardy prevent review of many decisions favoring the defendant (including acquittals, even if rendered after a gravely flawed trial). (See United States v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117.)

Policy considerations also require limits on People’s appeals. As explained in People v. Williams (2005) 35 Cal.4th 817, 822-823:

The prosecution in a criminal case has no right to appeal except as provided by statute . . . . The restriction on the People’s right to appeal . . . is a substantive limitation on review of trial court determinations in criminal

41The transfer order is itself appealable. (See In re Jon N. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 156, [construing analogous provisions for dependency cases in Welf. & Inst. Code, § 375 et seq. and the predecessor to Cal. Rules of Court, current rule 5.610(h)].)
trials . . . Appellate review at the request of the People necessarily imposes substantial burdens on an accused, and the extent to which such burdens should be imposed to review claimed errors involves a delicate balancing of the competing considerations of preventing harassment of the accused as against correcting possible errors . . . . Courts must respect the limits on review imposed by the Legislature although the People may thereby suffer a wrong without a remedy . . . .

(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)

A. People’s Appeals in Criminal Cases [§ 2.85]

1. General authority for People to appeal [§ 2.85A]

There is no general right for the prosecution to appeal an adverse judgment. Penal Code section 1238, subdivision (a) enumerates the grounds for a People’s appeal. These include:

(1) An order setting aside all or any portion of the indictment, information, or complaint.[42]

(2) An order sustaining a demurrer to all or any portion of the indictment, accusation, or information.

(3) An order granting a new trial.[43]

(4) An order arresting judgment.

(5) An order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the people.[44]

(6) An order modifying the verdict or finding by reducing the degree of the offense or the punishment imposed or modifying the offense to a lesser offense.[45]


51
(7) An order dismissing a case prior to trial made upon motion of the court pursuant to Section 1385 whenever such order is based upon an order granting the defendant’s motion to return or suppress property or evidence made at a special hearing as provided in this code [e.g., pursuant to § 1538.5].

(8) An order or judgment dismissing or otherwise terminating all or any portion of the action including such an order or judgment after a verdict or finding of guilty or an order or judgment entered before the defendant has been placed in jeopardy or where the defendant has waived jeopardy.

(9) An order denying the motion of the people to reinstate the complaint or a portion thereof pursuant to Section 871.5.

(10) The imposition of an unlawful sentence, whether or not the court suspends the execution of the sentence, except that portion of a sentence imposing a prison term which is based upon a court’s choice that a term of imprisonment (A) be the upper, middle, or lower term, unless the term selected is not set forth in an applicable statute, or (B) be consecutive or concurrent to another term of imprisonment, unless an applicable statute requires that the term be consecutive. As used in this paragraph, “unlawful sentence” means the imposition of a sentence not authorized by law or the imposition of a sentence based upon an unlawful order of the court which strikes or otherwise modifies the effect of an enhancement or prior conviction.

(11) An order recusing the district attorney pursuant to Section 1424.


47 See People v. Chacon (2007) 40 Cal.4th 558; People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 600-602; People v. Craney (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 431, 439-442; see also Penal Code section 1238, subdivision (b): “If . . . the people prosecute an appeal to decision, or any review of such decision, it shall be binding upon them and they shall be prohibited from refiling the case which was appealed.”


50 See People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580.
Other, more specialized statutory provisions giving the People a right to appeal include Penal Code section 1473.7, subdivision (f) (grant of motion to vacate judgment or sentence because of prejudicial error affecting understanding of immigration consequences of plea or because of new evidence of actual innocence) or section 1506 (grant of habeas corpus).

2. Appeal after grant of probation  [§ 2.85B]

The People may not appeal a grant of probation, but must seek review by writ instead. (Pen. Code, § 1238, subd. (d).) This includes, “appeals that, in substance, attack a probation order, even if the order explicitly appealed from may be characterized as falling within one of the authorizing provisions of subdivision (a). Thus, if the People seek, in substance, reversal of the probation order, the appeal is barred by subdivision (d) however they may attempt to label the order appealed from.” (People v. Douglas (1999) 20 Cal.4th 85, 93; see also People v. Alice (2007) 41 Cal.4th 668, 682-683.)

The prohibition on appealing a grant of probation does not mean all aspects of a case in which a defendant is placed on probation may be reviewed by writ petition alone. It is only when the People effectively mount a direct threat to the defendant’s probation that the appeal prohibition in Penal Code section 1238, subdivision (d) comes into play. (People v. Douglas (1999) 20 Cal.4th 85, 96 [People may appeal order felony charge to misdemeanor, even though defendant granted probation]; see also In re Jeffrey H. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1058 [appropriate for People to appeal order dismissing one count, adding another, and allowing juvenile to admit new allegation as part of plea bargain].)

3. Prosecution issues raised in defendant’s appeal  [§ 2.86]

Under Penal Code section 1252, the Court of Appeal must consider and pass on all rulings of the trial court adverse to the state at the request of the Attorney General.51 In addition, the People may point out an unauthorized sentence or clerical error, which may be corrected at any time. (This possibility raises the potential for adverse consequences from appealing. See § 4.93 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection”; cf. § 2.133, post, on dependency appeals.)

51The People’s right to appeal under section 1252 extends only to trial rulings, not rulings by a magistrate on an issue not raised at trial. (People v. Villalobos (1966) 245 Cal.App. 2d 561, 565, fn. 5.)
This provision is intended to allow decision on issues likely to recur if the case is remanded. (E.g., *People v. Smith* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 269, 272 [claim of error in excluding certain prosecution evidence under Pen. Code, § 1538.5 properly raised by People in event of retrial]; *People v. Dykes* (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 572, 576 [same].)


Section 1252 is not intended to give the People a general right to appeal under the umbrella of a defendant’s appeal. Its purpose is limited to matters brought up as a result of the defendant’s appeal. (See §§ 2.87 and 2.88, ante.)

In *People v. Burke* (1956) 47 Cal.2d 45, 54, dicta on other matter disapproved in *People v. Sidener* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 645, 647), a defendant’s appeal raising a search issue, the Supreme Court refused to consider a claim by the People that the trial court erred in striking a prior conviction allegation because the People could have appealed under Penal Code section 1238, but failed to do so. (*Burke*, at p. 54; see also *People v. James* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 164, 167 [People’s failure to appeal precluded assertion under Pen. Code, § 1252 that trial court had improperly stayed prior serious felony five-year enhancement], *People v. Zelver* (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 226, 236-237.)

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52The People contended that the trial court’s action was unauthorized and thus could be raised at any time, but the appellate court did not address the contention, concluding that the issue had not “appropriately” been brought to the attention of the appellate court. (*People v. James, supra*, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 167, fn. 1; cf. *People v. Crooks* (1997) 55
In *People v. Fond* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 127, 133-134, the trial court imposed a sentence lower than that authorized by statute, finding the statutory term would constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the facts of the case. On the defendant’s appeal, the People attempted to argue the sentence was void as unauthorized. The appellate court held the People waived the argument by failing to appeal. The sentence was not facially “unauthorized,” because it was based on constitutional considerations. It was not subject to correction in the absence of a People’s appeal.

B. People’s Appeals in Delinquency Cases  
[§ 2.89A]

The provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 800, subdivision (b), delineating the scope of a People’s appeal in a juvenile delinquency case, are similar to those of Penal Code section 1238, the criminal case equivalent:

(b) An appeal may be taken by the people from any of the following:

(1) A ruling on a motion to suppress pursuant to Section 700.1 even if the judgment is a dismissal of the petition or any count or counts of the petition. However, no appeal by the people shall lie as to any count which, if the people are successful, will be the basis for further proceedings subjecting any person to double jeopardy.

(2) An order made after judgment entered pursuant to Section 777 or 785.

(3) An order modifying the jurisdictional finding by reducing the degree of the offense or modifying the offense to a lesser offense.

(4) An order or judgment dismissing or otherwise terminating the action before the minor has been placed in jeopardy, or where the minor has waived jeopardy. If, pursuant to this paragraph, the people prosecute an appeal of the decision or any review of that decision, it shall be binding upon the people and they shall be prohibited from refiling the case which was appealed.\(^{53}\)

(5) The imposition of an unlawful order at a dispositional hearing, whether or not the court suspends the execution of the disposition.

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(c) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to authorize an appeal from an order granting probation. Instead, the people may seek appellate review of any grant of probation, whether or not the court imposes disposition, by means of a petition for a writ of mandate or prohibition which is filed within 60 days after probation is granted. The review of any grant of probation shall include review of any order underlying the grant of probation.


VII. PROCEDURAL STEPS FOR GETTING CRIMINAL OR DELINQUENCY APPEAL STARTED  [§ 2.90]

A. Advice to Defendant by Court  [§ 2.91]

Under rules 4.305 and 4.470 of the California Rules of Court, except after a guilty or nolo contendere plea or an admitted probation violation, at the time of sentencing the superior court must advise a criminal defendant of the right to appeal and the right to court-appointed appellate counsel for indigents. In contested juvenile proceedings the juvenile court must provide similar advice to the minor and to a parent, guardian, or adult relative if they are present and may have a right to appeal.54 (Rule 5.590(a).)

B. Responsibilities of Trial Counsel as to Initiating Appeal  [§ 2.92]

Trial counsel has specific statutory and constitutional duties with respect to appeals. These include evaluating the possibility of appeal, advising the client about appealing, and filing an appeal when the client so directs or, if the client is indigent, when counsel believes arguably meritorious grounds exist. (Pen. Code, § 1240.1; see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega (2000) 528 U.S. 470, 479-480.) That duty includes taking all steps necessary to secure adequate appellate review, including a certificate of probable cause in applicable cases. (See Evitts v. Lucey (1985) 469 U.S. 387, 389-390, 396 [right to effective assistance of counsel in complying with procedures needed to perfect appeal, such as Kentucky law requiring filing of “statement of appeal” in addition to brief]; People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 66 [“counsel’s obligation to assist in filing the notice of appeal necessarily encompasses assistance with the statement required by

54See § 2.77, ante, and accompanying footnote on a parent’s right to appeal in a delinquency case.
section 1237.5”; cf. In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 657 [request for CPC is notice of appeal and subject to same principles on timeliness].

1. **Duties under Penal Code section 1240.1** [§ 2.93]

Section 1240.1 specifically provides that in a criminal, juvenile, or civil commitment case trial counsel must, if the client is indigent:

- advise the client whether arguably meritorious grounds for appeal exist and inform the client to consult another attorney on the possibility of an ineffective assistance of counsel issue (subd. (a));

- file a notice of appeal if either (a) counsel believes there are arguably meritorious issues and the client would benefit from appeal or (b) the client asks counsel to appeal (subd. (b), ¶ 1);

- assist in identifying issues and parts of the record relevant to the appeal (subd. (b), ¶ 2); and

- if the client is indigent, assist the client in requesting appointment of appellate counsel (subd. (b), ¶ 3).

    a. **Advising defendant about appeal** [§ 2.94]

The statutory duty under Penal Code section 1240.1, subdivision (a) to advise the defendant about appealing includes counseling the defendant on the existence of appellate issues and also the need to consult another attorney about the possibility of ineffective assistance of counsel. This is somewhat different from the analogous constitutional duty, which is “advising the defendant about the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to discover the defendant’s wishes.” (Roe v. Flores-Ortega (2000) 528 U.S. 470, 478; see § 2.100, post).
b. Filing notice of appeal on request  [§ 2.95]
Under Penal Code section 1240.1, subdivision (b) trial counsel must file a notice of appeal if the defendant so requests. This duty is also of constitutional magnitude. *(Roe v. Flores-Ortega (2000) 528 U.S. 470, 477; see § 2.99, post).*

Counsel’s duty to file a notice of appeal does not preclude a client’s doing so in pro per. (Pen. Code, § 1240.1, subd. (d).)

c. **Filing notice of appeal without defendant request**  
[§ 2.96]

Although normally the decision to appeal is the client’s rather than the attorney’s (see following paragraph), trial counsel has an independent duty to file a notice of appeal if counsel believes there are reasonably arguable issues and need not first obtain the client’s affirmative authorization or instruction to do so.\(^{55}\) (Pen. Code, § 1240.1, subd. (b), ¶ 1; *Guillermo G. v. Superior Court* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1173-1174 [dicta].\(^{56}\)

This provision does not compel counsel to file a notice of appeal over the client’s actual *opposition* to it, however, and after counsel has filed a notice of appeal, the client continues to have the ultimate decision whether to pursue the appeal or abandon it. (See *Jones v. Barnes* (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 751 [“the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal”]; *In re Josiah Z.* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 680-681 [decision not to be made by counsel, but by client or his or her guardian ad litem if minor client is too young]; see *People v. Harris* (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 709, 715 [client, not counsel, responsible for abandoning appeal]; *In re Martin* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 133, 137 [counsel not permitted to abandon appeal without client’s consent by letting it be dismissed for failure to file an opening brief under Cal.

\(^{55}\)Counsel’s duty to file a notice of appeal does not preclude a client’s doing so in pro per. (§ 1240.1, subd. (d).)

\(^{56}\)*Guillermo G.* was construing a dependency notice of intent to file a writ petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (f). It held the Penal Code section 1240.1 duty to seek review when there are arguable issues applies only in delinquency and criminal appeals and not in dependency writs. (See also *In re Alma B.* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1037 [dependency appeals].)
Rules of Court, rule 8.220, then rule 17]; In re Alma B. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1043 [filing appeal requires client’s consent in dependency case]; Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 1.2(a) [client directs objectives of appeal].

d. Trial counsel representation on appeal [§ 2.97]

Filing a notice of appeal does not mean trial counsel is undertaking to represent the defendant on appeal. (Pen. Code, § 1240.1, subd. (b), ¶ 2.) Indeed, representation by trial counsel on appeal is discouraged. One reason is the ethical problem involved in identifying and arguing one’s own ineffective assistance of counsel issues. (People v. Bailey (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1254-1255 [“there is an inherent conflict when appointed trial counsel in a criminal case is also appointed to act as counsel on appeal”].) Another is that trial counsel often lack the perspective and skills necessary for effective appellate advocacy. (In re Marriage of Shaban (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 398, 408-410; Estate of Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1449-1450.)

2. Federal constitutional duties [§ 2.98]

The United States Constitution imposes specific duties on trial counsel with respect to filing an appeal and advising the defendant about appeal.

a. Filing appeal if defendant requests [§ 2.99]


57 Rule 8.360(c)(5)(A)(ii) now provides that if appellate counsel for an appealing defendant is court-appointed, substitution of counsel, rather than dismissal of the appeal, is the appropriate remedy.

entitled to new appeal without showing appeal likely has merit]; United States v. Poindexter (4th Cir. 2007) 492 F.3d 263 and Campusano v. United States (2d Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 770 [counsel must file appeal at defendant’s request even if defendant has waived right to appeal], but see Nunez v. United States (7th Cir. 2008) 546 F.3d 450, 453 [contra, where waiver covers issues to be raised on appeal].)

b. Advising defendant about appeal [§ 2.100]

Roe v. Flores-Ortega (2000) 528 U.S. 470, 480, held counsel has a federal constitutional duty to advise the defendant about an appeal when there is a reasonable ground for thinking either (1) a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are non-frivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) the defendant reasonably demonstrated an interest in appealing. The duty of consultation means “advising the defendant about the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to discover the defendant’s wishes.” (Id. at p. 478.) Prejudice is established from failure to advise when there is a reasonable probability the defendant would have appealed if advised about the right. (Id. at p. 484.) Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356 [as a matter of federal law, counsel has an obligation to advise defendant that offense to which defendant pleads guilty would result in removal from the country]

C. Notice of Appeal [§ 2.101]

1. Court in which to file [§ 2.102]

A notice of appeal must be filed in the superior court where judgment was entered. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(a)(1).) The notice need not specify the appellate court; the Court of Appeal is assumed to be the one in the district where the superior court is located. (Rule 8.304(a)(4).)

An appeal filed in the wrong court may be transferred under certain circumstances. (Gov. Code, § 68915; People v. Nickerson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 33, 39-40 [transfer of misdemeanor case from Court of Appeal to appellate division of superior court]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 10.1000.)
2. **Signature** [§ 2.103]

California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(a)(3) provides: “If the defendant appeals, the defendant or the defendant’s attorney must sign the notice of appeal.”

3. **Contents of notice of appeal following trial** [§ 2.104]

Rule 8.304 of the California Rules of Court prescribes the contents of a notice of appeal after trial. Rule 8.304(a)(4) provides:

Except [for appeals after guilty or nolo contendere pleas or admissions of probation violation] . . . , the notice is sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or order being appealed. The notice need not specify the court to which the appeal is taken; the appeal will be treated as taken to the Court of Appeal for the district in which the superior court is located.

The notice of appeal need not be in any particular format, but use of standardized forms is encouraged, to ensure sufficiency, accuracy, and completeness.

4. **Notice of appeal and certificate of probable cause after guilty plea** [§ 2.105]

In an appeal after a guilty plea, the procedures are stricter and more complicated. The theory is that the defendant’s plea acknowledges guilt and the state’s right to impose


60 Fourth Appellate District forms:
Criminal, delinquency, dependency, extended commitment, Family Code section 7800 appeals, LPS, not guilty by reason of insanity appeals:
http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples.asp

General forms:
Judicial Council, criminal appeals:
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/cr120.pdf
Judicial Council, juvenile delinquency and dependency appeals:

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punishment, and so only in limited circumstances should further issues be considered. In such an appeal, the notice of appeal must conform to the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b), which implements Penal Code section 1237.5.\textsuperscript{61} Rule 8.304(b) provides:

(1) Except as provided in (4), to appeal from a superior court judgment after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or after an admission of probation violation, the defendant must file in that superior court – in addition to the notice of appeal required by (a) – the statement required by Penal Code section 1237.5 for issuance of a certificate of probable cause.

(2) Within 20 days after the defendant files a statement under (1), the superior court must sign and file either a certificate of probable cause or an order denying the certificate.

(3) If the defendant does not file the statement required by (1) or if the superior court denies a certificate of probable cause, the superior court clerk must mark the notice of appeal “Inoperative,” notify the defendant, and send a copy of the marked notice of appeal to the district appellate project.

(4) The defendant need not comply with (1) if the notice of appeal states that the appeal is based on:

(A) The denial of a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5; or

(B) Grounds that arose after entry of the plea and do not affect the plea’s validity.

(5) If the defendant’s notice of appeal contains a statement under (4), the reviewing court will not consider any issue affecting the validity of the plea unless the defendant also complies with (1).

Under these provisions, an appeal after a guilty plea is operative either if the notice of appeal specifies at least one noncertificate ground (sentencing or Pen. Code, § 1538.5 suppression issue) or if a certificate of probable cause has been issued. “Operative” means the appeal will go forward – that is, a record will be prepared and counsel for the defendant, if indigent, will be appointed. (See \textit{People v. Jones} (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1102, 1106-1108, dictum on another point disapproved in \textit{In re Chavez} (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 656.)

\textsuperscript{61}Section 1237.5 applies only when the defendant pleads guilty to the underlying charge; admissions of enhancements do not require a certificate of probable cause. (\textit{People v. Maultsby} (2012) 53 Cal.4th 296.)
For purposes of analyzing the procedures for appealing from a judgment based on a guilty plea, it is useful to distinguish three kinds of guilty plea appeals:

- **Certificate appeals** – those that challenge only the validity of the plea and require a certificate of probable cause to become operative.

- **Noncertificate appeals** – those that raise only issues not requiring a certificate of probable cause.

- **“Mixed” certificate and noncertificate appeals** – those involving both certificate and noncertificate grounds.

  a. **Certificate appeals** [§ 2.106]

The requirement of a certificate of probable cause for appeals challenging the validity of a guilty plea is set forth in Penal Code section 1237.5 and California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b). (See §§ 2.24 and 2.38 et seq., ante, for discussion of what kinds of claims challenge the plea.) A certificate of probable cause is a document issued by the trial court certifying that at least one non-frivolous basis exists for challenging the validity of the plea.62 (People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 62.) The trial judge should issue the certificate wherever there is an honest difference of opinion about the issue. (Id. at p. 63, fn. 4.) Signing the certificate does not mean the trial court believes the contention is probably meritorious. (Ibid.)

One purpose of the certificate requirement is to weed out wholly frivolous appeals and so avoid the costs of preparing records and appointing counsel. (People v. Holland (1978) 23 Cal.3d 77, 84; see also People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1179.) Another is to screen out certain frivolous issues, even if the appeal itself is going forward, so that the Court of Appeal does not need to spend its time disposing of them on the merits. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

Once the certificate is granted, under California law the defendant may raise any cognizable issue not waived by the plea and is not restricted to the issues identified in the certificate. (People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1174.) For example, if the court

62An appeal based on the ineffective assistance of counsel on a motion to withdraw a plea (Pen. Code, § 1018) requires a certificate of probable cause. (People v. Johnson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668.)
grants a certificate on the issue of whether the defendant entered the plea under duress, the defendant may also attack the plea on the ground of inaccurate advice about the constitutional rights waived by the plea. However, the mistaken issuance of a certificate of probable cause purporting to certify an issue waived by the plea cannot make the issue appealable (see § 2.48, ante; People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896), although withdrawal of the plea is a potential remedy.

b. Noncertificate appeals [§ 2.107]

A notice of appeal is operative if it specifies at least one noncertificate ground – (a) an issue involving post-plea matters such as sentencing or (b) an issue seeking suppression of evidence on search and seizure grounds. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m); People v. Jones (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1102, 1108, dictum on another point disapproved in In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 656; People v. Kanawha (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 8; People v. Ward (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 574-576; see People v. Arriaga (2014) 58 Cal.4th 950 [no certificate of probable cause is required to appeal the denial of a Pen. Code, § 1016.5 motion].)

Any noncertificate issue can be raised if the appeal is otherwise operative; it is not necessary that the particular issue to be raised have been specified in the notice of appeal. (People v. Jones (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1102, 1112-1113, dictum on another point disapproved in In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 656.) Thus, if a suppression issue was the sole ground listed in the notice of appeal, a properly preserved sentencing issue may nevertheless be raised – and vice versa. (Ibid.)

c. Mixed appeals [§ 2.108]

If the appeal has both certificate and noncertificate grounds, the appeal is operative and will go forward without a certificate of probable cause if a proper notice of appeal stating noncertificate grounds, as specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4), is filed.63 The defendant can then raise any noncertificate issues, including issues based on grounds other than those mentioned in the notice of appeal. (People v. Jones (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1102, 1112-1113, dictum on another point disapproved in In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 656.)

63See order in People v. Thomas (March 16, 2005, S130587) 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 301, 108 P.3d 860, 2005 Cal. Lexis 2771, vacating Court of Appeal decision dismissing case because the notice of appeal did not state solely noncertificate grounds.
Unless a certificate of probable cause is timely obtained as prescribed in California Rules of Court rule 8.304(b), however, the defendant cannot raise issues challenging the validity of the plea. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1088; see also People v. Thurman (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 36 [same, in context of some counts admitted and others taken to trial]; cf. People v. Maultsby (2012) 53 Cal.4th 296, 302-303 [where defendant tried by jury on underlying charge but admitted enhancement, certificate of probable cause not required to claim he was not given complete advisements before admission].) If a certificate of probable cause has been granted, any properly preserved ground for challenging the validity of the plea is cognizable on appeal, even if not mentioned in the certificate or the request for it. (People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1180.)

D. Time Frames [§ 2.109]

1. Notice of appeal [§ 2.110]

Under rule 8.308(a) of the California Rules of Court, which sets the general time limit for criminal and delinquency appeals, a notice of appeal must be filed no later than 60 days after the judgment or order appealed from. This time limit is jurisdictional—that is, the Court of Appeal has no power to hear the case if the filing is not timely. (In re Jordan (1992) 4 Cal.4th 116, 121.)

After any party files a notice of appeal, the time for any other party to appeal from the same judgment or order is extended until 30 days after the superior court clerk mails notification of the first appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 308(b).)

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64 Numbered rule 31(d) at the time of Mendez.

65 Time requirements are set by rule, rather than statute.

66 Certain remedies are available for defendants whose late filings are attributable to causes beyond their own control. (See § 2.113, post.)
2. **Certificate of probable cause** [§ 2.111]

Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(1) a request for certificate of probable cause must be filed with the notice of appeal. The request must be timely filed – that is, no later than 60 days after the judgment or order appealed from. *(People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1099.)* Like the deadline for the notice of appeal, this limit is jurisdictional. *(Id. at p. 1094; see also In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 650.)* *Mendez* disapproved of earlier, more lenient constructions of these requirements allowing a request to be filed later if the appeal was otherwise operative. *(Mendez, at p. 1098.)*

The trial court must rule on a certificate of probable cause request within 20 days. *(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2).)* If the court denies the request, the defendant must either seek a writ of mandate to compel issuance of the certificate (§ 2.120, post) or forfeit any issues going to the validity of the plea (§§ 2.105, 2.106, 2.108, ante).

3. **Filing date** [§ 2.112]

The notice of appeal is filed when the superior court clerk receives it. *(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.308(a), 8.25(b).)* This time may not be extended, nor may relief from default for failure to file a timely notice of appeal be granted. *(In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 652-653; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.60(d).)*

An exception to the requirement that the superior court clerk must receive the notice of appeal on or before the due date is the “prison mailing” rule. Under California Rules of Court rule 8.25(b)(5), a notice of appeal from a custodial institution is deemed timely filed if it was mailed or delivered to custodial officials within 60 days of judgment, even if not delivered to the superior court until later. *(In re Jordan (1992) 4 Cal.4th 116, 130.)* This rule acknowledges the reality that prison mailing practices are (a) unreliable and notoriously subject to delay and (b) outside the control of inmates. The superior court clerk must retain in the court file the envelope in which the notice was mailed. *(Rule

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67Although rule 8.304(b)(1) says the request for a certificate of probable cause must be filed “with” the notice of appeal, it is sufficient if it is filed at a different time, provided it is within the 60-day limit. *(Drake v. Superior Court (People) (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1462.)*

68Certain remedies are available for defendants whose late filings are attributable to causes beyond their own control. (See § 2.113, post.)
8.25(b)(5.) The same provisions apply to juvenile appeals. (Rule 8.25(b)(5); see Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106.)

E. Remedies for Untimely or Defective Filing of Notice of Appeal and Failure To Obtain Certificate of Probable Cause [§ 2.113]

Failure to file a proper and timely notice of appeal, or obtain a certificate of probable cause when required, deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction and is not subject to ordinary relief from default. (See In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 652-653; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.60(d).) Nevertheless, under some circumstances a notice of appeal may be fixed, or an appeal may be allowed despite the jurisdictional failure.

1. Application to amend notice of appeal [§ 2.114]

If the notice of appeal is timely but defective and the defect can be corrected, the defendant may move to amend the notice of appeal. For example, if only a validity of the plea issue is mentioned in the original notice and no certificate of probable cause has been granted, it may be possible to amend the notice to state a noncertificate ground such as sentencing or a search and seizure suppression issue. The application must show good cause that the defendant intended to appeal on that ground. (People v. McEwan (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 173, 178-179.)

If the sentence was stipulated as part of the plea agreement, “sentencing” could not be a ground for amending the notice, unless the defendant can show good cause that non-stipulated parts of the sentence, such as restitution or credits remain. (See People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68; see also People v. McEwan (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 173.)

The defendant obviously cannot state the appeal is based on the denial of a suppression motion if there was no such motion.

2. Constructive filing doctrine [§ 2.115]

The constructive filing doctrine is a judicially created way of granting relief to defendants who have acted diligently in seeking an appeal and yet, through no fault of their own, have failed to meet the filing requirements.69

69The doctrine of constructive filing can also be invoked to determine a writ petition was timely filed. (In re Antilia (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 622.)
The constructive filing doctrine is generally not recognized in juvenile dependency cases involving termination of parental rights. (*In re A.M.* (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 319.)

a. **Reasonable reliance on counsel to file: Benoit**  [§ 2.116]

*In re Benoit* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72, 80, held that if before the time for filing an appeal has expired, the defendant asks the trial counsel to file a notice of appeal, and trial counsel fails to do so, the defendant’s timely request to trial counsel may be deemed a constructive filing of the notice of appeal – it will be treated as if it had actually been filed on time. (See also *People v. Zarazua* (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1054 [approving motion as substitute for *Benoit* habeas corpus].) Counsel’s failings will not be imputed to the defendant. (E.g., *In re Fountain* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 715, 718 [retained counsel had obligation to file timely and adequate notice].)

*Benoit* would logically apply to failure of counsel to file a declaration requesting a certificate of probable cause. (See *People v. Ribero* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 66 [“counsel’s obligation to assist in filing the notice of appeal necessarily encompasses assistance with the statement required by section 1237.5”]; *People v. Buttram* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 779 [noting grant of constructive filing to obtain certificate of probable cause]; *People v. Duncan* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 744, 746, fn. 2 [granting unopposed request to amend notice of appeal to comply with certificate of probable cause requirement]; cf. *In re Chavez* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643 [declining to decide whether *Benoit* applies].) (See § 2.121, post.)

Constructive filing relief requires diligence by the defendant in pursuing the right to appeal. (*In re Benoit* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72, 86.)

The constructive filing doctrine does not apply when the defendant has not reasonably relied on counsel to file an appeal. (*In re Chavez* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 658 [defendant had not asked trial counsel to appeal and another attorney defendant contacted had not agreed to file notice of appeal]; *People v. Aguilar* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 111, 116 [no indication counsel agreed to file a notice of appeal, and no showing of diligence].)

b. **Other constructive filing**  [§ 2.117]

A prisoner may constructively file a notice of appeal by placing it in the prison mail system within the time limit, even if the clerk of the court receives it after the time expires. (*In re Jordan* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 116, 130; *In re Slobodian* (1947) 30 Cal.2d 362,
367.) The “prison delivery” rule now applies to all documents filed by a prisoner or patient from a custodial institution. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.25(b)(5); see also Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106 [civil complaint]; In re Antilia (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 622 [statutory writ].)

The constructive filing doctrine also extends to prisoners who show diligence but do not file the notice of appeal on time because they relied on conduct or representations of prison officials that lulled them into a false sense of security. (In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d at p. 83; People v. Head (1956) 46 Cal.2d 886, 887-889 [defendant left signed notice of appeal with prison officials, who assured him it would be “taken care of”]; People v. Calloway (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 504, 506-507 [defendant in quarantine during filing period].)

A defendant who is personally ignorant of the right to appeal must show diligence once learning of it. (Castro v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 614, 621, fn. 9, and accompanying text [upon failure of trial court to notify defendant of appellate rights, burden on the People to disprove defendant’s ignorance; People may also argue waiver based on lack of diligence].) This principle extends to minors. (In re Arthur N. (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 935, 941.)

A defendant must show that the particular circumstances actually prevented his filing of a notice of appeal. (In re Gary R. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 850, 853 [minor appellant’s assertion that instructions about right to appeal could be confusing were unconvincing where appellant did not specifically show he was confused].)

c. Procedures [§ 2.118]

Typically a request for relief under Benoit is made by habeas corpus petition or motion in the Court of Appeal. Either is appropriate. (People v. Zarazua (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1054.) Courts differ as to the preferred method; counsel should contact the district appellate project for guidance. Regardless of the vehicle used to seek relief, the document’s title should state that it seeks constructive filing of a notice of appeal.

70Rule 8.25(b)(5) requires the superior court clerk to retain in the case file the envelope in which the notice of appeal was sent. In practice, clerks sometimes forget to do this. As a backup, counsel may ask for a copy of the applicable prison mail log to prove timely delivery to prison officials.
3. **Ineffective assistance of counsel** [§ 2.119]

If failure to file an appeal was caused by ineffective assistance in a constitutional sense (see § 2.98, ante), late filing relief can be sought by habeas corpus or by motion, depending on the practices of the particular court. Ineffective assistance of counsel is shown when counsel fails to file a notice of appeal on request. (Roe v. Flores-Ortega (2000) 528 U.S. 470, 477; Rodriguez v. United States (1969) 395 U.S. 327; see also Peguero v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 23, 28.) It also is shown when the trial attorney failed to advise the defendant about appealing and a reasonable defendant would have wanted to appeal, or the defendant had expressed interest in appealing; prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability the defendant would have appealed if advised about the right.

4. **Mandate from denial of certificate of probable cause** [§ 2.120]

If a request for a certificate of probable cause was improperly denied, the remedy is a petition for writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal. (People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1180; In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 683, disapproved on another ground in People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098; Lara v. Superior Court (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 436, 440-442.) Penal Code section 1237.5 requires the trial court to certify any arguably meritorious appeal to the appellate courts, and the court abuses its discretion if it denies a certificate when the defendant’s request presents any appellate issue not clearly frivolous and vexatious. (People v. Holland (1978) 23 Cal.3d 77, 84; Lara, at p. 440.)

5. **Remedy for failure to obtain timely certificate of probable cause** [§ 2.121]

People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1088, held a request for a certificate of probable cause must be filed within 60 days. (Construing Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 31(a) [now 8.308(a)] & 31(d) [now 8.304(b)(1)].) If a certificate of probable cause is needed and was not timely sought, it is unclear what remedies might be available.

In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 647, held a motion for relief from default under former rule 45(e) (current rule 8.60(d)) of the California Rules of Court is not an appropriate remedy, since that rule specifically allows for relief from default for failure to comply with the rules “except the failure to give timely notice of appeal.” (Id. at pp. 652, 657.) Chavez involved an appeal based solely on a ground for which a certificate is required, and therefore the appeal was never operative. It did not address a “mixed”
appeal situation, in which the notice of appeal states at least one noncertificate issue and thus creates an operative appeal without a certificate. 

Chavez’s analysis is consistent with the jurisdictional character of the notice of appeal time limits, as reflected in California Rules of Court, rule 8.60(d), precluding motions for relief from failure to file a timely notice. In a “mixed” situation, arguably, lack of a certificate is not a jurisdictional defect but only a procedural barrier to an attack on the plea, and an ordinary motion for relief would be appropriate. Nevertheless, after Chavez, rule 45(e) (now rule 8.60(d)) was amended to state expressly that a motion for relief from default is not a remedy to seek an otherwise late certificate of probable cause.

Another possible avenue of relief in both “pure” certificate and “mixed” appeals is habeas corpus. Chavez itself rejected a constructive filing contention on the ground the defendant had not satisfied Benoit’s requirements; the court declined to consider whether Benoit applies at all to late requests for a certificate of probable cause. (In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 658, fn. 7.) Nevertheless, Benoit logically would appear applicable to failure of counsel to file a declaration requesting a certificate of probable cause, and habeas corpus is an appropriate mode of seeking Benoit relief. The defendant has a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in filing a notice of appeal; that right would logically include taking steps essential to perfect the appeal, such as filing a timely request for a certificate of probable cause. (See Roe v. Flores-Ortega (2000) 528 U.S. 470, 477 [duty to advise defendant about appealing and to file notice of appeal at defendant’s request]; Evitts v. Lucey (1985) 469 U.S. 387, 389-390, 396 [right to effective assistance of counsel in perfecting appeal, such as Kentucky law requiring filing of “statement of appeal”]; In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72, 87-88; Pen. Code, § 1240.1, subd. (b) [statutory duty]; People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 66 [“counsel’s obligation to assist in filing the notice of appeal necessarily encompasses assistance with the statement required by section 1237.5”]; see also People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 779 [noting grant of constructive filing to obtain certificate of probable cause]; cf. People v. Duncan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 744, 746, fn. 2 [granting unopposed request to amend notice of appeal to comply with certificate of probable cause requirement].)

71 ADI has used habeas corpus successfully in this situation. Samples are available.

72 In Evitts v. Lucey, the parties did not dispute the district court’s finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Only the question of whether a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal was before the Supreme Court. (Evitts, at p. 392.) The court expressed no opinion about the standards of ineffectiveness applied by the lower courts, which “diverge widely.” (Id. at p. 398, fn. 9.)
Appendix to Part Two  [§ 2.122]

COMMON ISSUES WAIVED BY GUILTY PLEA  [§ 2.123]


• Illegal arrest. (*People v. DeVaughn* (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895-896.)

• Discovery violations, such as failure to disclose the identity of an informant. (*People v. Castro* (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 960, 963; see also *People v. Duval* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1114; but contrast *People v. Hobbs* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 955-957 [challenge to sealing of a search warrant affidavit appealable pursuant to Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m)].)


• Refusal to grant a continuance. (*People v. Kanawha* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 8-9.)


• Denial of motion to sever defendants. (*People v. Sanchez* (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 323, 335.)


• Argument that alleged conduct does not violate statutory proscription. (*People v. Suite* (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 680, 689 [contention that devices possessed were neither destructive nor explosive within meaning of a statute not appealable].)

• Invalid conviction used as part of a subsequent charge. (*People v. LaJocies* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 947, 957-958 [challenge on constitutional grounds to prior felony
underlying current ex-felon in possession of a firearm not appealable following guilty plea to the latter].


• Statute of limitations, if the issue is a question of fact, such as tolling, rather than a matter of law. (*People v. Padfield* (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 218, 224-227 [guilty plea admitted the sufficiency of evidence that statute of limitations had been tolled]; cf. *People v. Chadd* (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 756 [if expiration of statute shown as matter of law on face of the pleading, issue can be raised on appeal after guilty plea].)

• Lack of a speedy trial. (*People v. Aguilar* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 615, 617, 619; see also *People v. Hayton* (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 413, 419 [contention that preliminary hearing was continued beyond the statutory 10-day period without good cause also waived]; compare *Avila v. Municipal Court* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 807, 812 [speedy trial claim not waived by plea of guilty to misdemeanor complaint] with *People v. Hernandez* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1357-1360 [characterizing reasoning of *Avila* as “absurd” and refusing to apply it beyond its facts] and *People v. Stittsworth* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 837, 840-841 [*Avila* rule not applicable where original charges were felonies and became misdemeanors by virtue of the plea].)


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• Denial of a motion for dismissal or sanctions following the destruction of evidence. (People v. McNabb (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 462, 470-471; People v. Halstead (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 772, 781-782; People v. Benweed (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 828, 832; but compare People v. Aguilar (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 221, 224 [denial of motion to suppress evidence related to a container of contraband where the container had been lost or destroyed is appealable pursuant to § 1538.5, subd. (m)], with People v. Avalos (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1576 [concluding Aguilar is contrary to the weight of authority].)

• Failure to arraign defendant on sentence enhancement (People v. Hodges (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103-1104.)


• Illegally obtained confessions, not the result of an unlawful search or seizure. (People v. DeVauhnn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896; In re John B. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 477, 483 [motion to suppress confessions in juvenile court waived by admission].)

• Denial of a Marsden motion, at least when no contention is made that the plea was not intelligently and voluntarily made or that the advice from counsel concerning the plea was inappropriate. (People v. Lobaugh (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 780, 786; cf. People v. Armijo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1171.)

• Cruel and unusual punishment arguments directed at sentences to which the defendant expressly or implicitly agreed in pleading guilty – at least if (a) the defendant fails to obtain a certificate of probable cause or (b) the defendant has explicitly waived the right to appeal at all. (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 771; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 89; see also People v. Foster (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 247, 250-252; People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 867-869; People v. Young (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 827, 829, 832.) It is not wholly clear whether these arguments could be considered if the defendant does have a certificate of probable cause and has not waived an appeal.
PART THREE: DEPENDENCY APPEALS

VIII. DEPENDENCY APPEALS [§ 2.124]

A. Appealable Judgments and Orders [§ 2.125]

1. Juvenile dependency proceedings [§ 2.126]

As pointed out in PART ONE: GENERAL, Welfare and Institutions Code section 395 grants the right to appeal a disposition in dependency proceedings under section 300 et seq. and subsequent orders. Subdivision (a)(1) provides:

A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed as an order after judgment. However, that order or judgment shall not be stayed by the appeal, unless, pending the appeal, suitable provision is made for the maintenance, care, and custody of the person alleged or found to come within the provisions of Section 300, and unless the provision is approved by an order of the juvenile court. The appeal shall have precedence over all other cases in the court to which the appeal is taken.

Juvenile dependency proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 commence with the filing of the petition, and the first hearings include the detention and jurisdictional hearings. The first appealable decision, however, is the one at which the dispositional order – or judgment – is made. (In re T.W. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 723, 729.) Earlier orders, including jurisdictional findings, are not separately appealable but may be reviewed on an appeal from the judgment, meaning the disposition. (Ibid.)

Subsequent orders, such as those at review hearings and proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, are appealable as orders after judgment. (In re Z.S. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 754, 769.)

A significant exception to the appealability of post-judgment orders is an order setting a permanent plan or selection and implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 or a post-termination of parental rights order changing a

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74 PART ONE covers the general law of appealability. PART TWO covers criminal and delinquency appeals.

75 It is possible to challenge issues at the detention hearing by a writ of mandate. (See § 2.140, post; Los Angeles County Dep’t of Children and Family Services v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1408 [dismissal of petition].)
child’s placement under section 366.28, both of which require a writ petition instead of an appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450 et seq., and § 2.8B, ante.)

Dependency appeals, like delinquency appeals, are governed by California Rules of Court, rules 8.405 and 8.406 (filing the appeal), 8.407-8.409 and 8.416(b)-(c) (record), 8.410 and 8.416(d) (augmenting / correcting the record), 8.411 (abandoning), 8.412 and 8.416(e)-(g) (briefing), 8.470 and 8.416(h) (hearing and decision in the Court of Appeal), and 8.472 (hearing and decision in the Supreme Court). (See also rule 5.585 et seq.) Many dependency appeals are fast-track under rule 8.416, and extensions of time require an exceptional showing of good cause (rule 8.416(f)). Parts of these rules incorporate by reference certain other rules on the processes in reviewing courts.

2. Family Code section 7800 appeals [§ 2.127]

Family Code section 7800 appeals are governed by sections 7894 and 7895. (See § 2.159, post.)

B. Reviewability Considerations [§ 2.128]

The right to appeal is limited by the need for (a) standing by the party wishing to appeal and (b) a justiciable controversy. Whether a matter is justiciable depends on whether the sole issue for appeal is moot, ripe for appeal, waived, or forfeited. Typically only issues raised at the hearing being appealed are reviewable.

1. Standing [§ 2.129]

A threshold question before an appeal can proceed is whether a party has standing to appeal. Issues of standing are usually caught by the court or the project before appointment. However, attorneys should verify the party has standing before proceeding with the appeal. If a question about standing arises, the attorney should contact the project immediately to discuss whether the appeal may proceed and what procedures must be taken by the attorney, if any. What determines standing varies by party. For most issues and for the majority of the dependency proceedings, parents, minors, and the County have standing. The nuances affecting each of these parties are discussed below, as well as standing for other parties who may wish to appeal.
a. **Parents**  

A party must be aggrieved by an order to appeal from it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 902; *In re Crystal J.* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 186, 189.) Juvenile dependency cases involve the removal of a child from his or her parent because of health and safety concerns. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.2.) A parent has a constitutional right to custody and care of his or her child. (*Stanley v. Illinois* (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 658.) Thus, unless and until a parent’s rights have been terminated, the parent has standing to appeal from orders made at dependency proceedings involving the parent’s children. (*In re K.C.* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236, citing *In re Marilyn H.* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306.) Parents may not have standing to appeal from the section 366.26 hearing to challenge the court’s denial of a relative placement request. (*In re K.C., supra,* 52 Cal.4th 231). Also, alleged fathers, who are not biological or presumed, may not have standing. (*In re Joseph G.* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 712.)

Parents may not challenge an order that affects solely another party’s right. (See *In re S.A.* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128 [parents lack standing to challenge the competency of the child’s attorney]; but see *In re L.Y.L.* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942 [parent may challenge sibling visitation order because the sibling relationship has substantial consequences on the parent’s interest in the parent-child relationship].) A parent nevertheless may benefit from another party’s appeal and file a brief in support of that party’s position.

b. **De facto parents and relatives**  

Parties other than the parents may also be aggrieved by an order and have standing to appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902; *In re Crystal J.* (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 186, 189.) For instance, de facto parents also have an interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of the child. (*In re B.G.* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 692.) De facto parents may appeal orders affecting their placement rights as to the child. (*In re Vincent M.* (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 943, 953.)

Relatives have standing to appeal from orders relating to the relative placement preference statute. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.3.) For purposes of this statute, “relative” includes grandparents, aunts and uncles, and siblings. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.3, subd. (c)(2); *In re Luke L.* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 680.) After the child is freed for adoption after an involuntary termination of parental rights, any person who has cared for the child is given placement preference and therefore may appeal the denial of his or her placement request. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (k).) Therefore, a grandparent with or
without de facto parent status can appeal from the denial of a placement request as a relative caretaker under this statute. (See *Cesar V. v. Superior Court* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1034-1035.) Counsel should note that appealing de facto parents and relatives are not automatically entitled to receive the full appellate record. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 827.)

c. **Minors**  
§ 2.132

On occasion the minor files an appeal. In the role of appellant, the child must have appointed counsel for the appeal. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.403(b).) Non-appealing minors are not automatically appointed counsel on appeal. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.403(b).) The minor’s trial attorney or guardian ad litem may file a request showing that the child’s best interests cannot be protected without the appointment of separate counsel on appeal. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 317; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.661(c) & 8.403(b)(2).) Although the Court of Appeal has discretion to appoint counsel automatically (*In re Zeth S.* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 415), for reasons of economy generally the Court of Appeal presumes county counsel will address the child’s best interests in its response.

ADI offers guidance on representing a dependency minor on appeal. (See ADI guidelines for minor’s counsel; chapter 5, “Effective Written Advocacy: Briefing,” § 5.63 et seq.)(Appellate counsel must consult with the guardian ad litem.

d. **County counsel appeals**  
§ 2.133

In contrast to Penal Code section 1238, on People’s appeals (see § 2.84 et seq., ante) and Welfare and Institutions Code section 800, subdivision (b) on delinquency appeals, there is no general authority specifically governing the County’s right to appeal or identifying the grounds that may be appealed. Instead, Welfare and Institutions Code section 395 controls appeals filed by the County, just as it controls appeals by any other

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76Unless the parent is also appealing, the parent typically acts as a respondent in a minor’s appeal. The court has discretion whether to appoint counsel for a respondent parent. (*In re Bryce C.* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 226.)


78[http://www.adi-sandiego.com/panel/manual/Chapter_5_Briefing.pdf](http://www.adi-sandiego.com/panel/manual/Chapter_5_Briefing.pdf)
party to the dependency proceeding. Typically the parent is the respondent in a County appeal.

If the County wants to raise an issue it must file an appeal. If an opposing party has already appealed, the County’s case becomes a “cross-appeal.” The general rule that a respondent cannot raise a new issue of its own in a respondent’s brief applies to the County, as it applies to a parent responding to a county counsel appeal. (Cf. Pen. Code, § 1252, at § 2.86 et seq., ante.)

2. **Mootness and ripeness** [§ 2.134]

An appeal will usually be dismissed by the court if it is moot or not yet ripe for review. Certain events may make the appeal moot in dependency cases, such as the return of custody of the child to a parent, the child’s reaching the age of majority (unless the court has extended jurisdiction to age 21), or the death of the appealing parent or child. *(In re Holly H. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1338; In re A.Z. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1177.)* A case is not necessarily moot, however, just because the course of the current litigation will not be affected by a decision, if the party may suffer collateral consequences, including stigma, future legal disabilities, etc. *(In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634.)* And even if it is moot, in some situations the court may decide the case, anyway— for example, if the issue is one of continuing public interest. *(In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1499.)* See § 2.7, ante, for a general discussion of mootness and ripeness. Appellate counsel must maintain ongoing contact with trial counsel throughout the appeal to see whether circumstances have changed.

3. **Waiver and forfeiture** [§ 2.135]

Likely the most common reason for loss of appellate reviewability is waiver or forfeiture – failure to preserve the issue properly at an earlier stage of the proceeding. This topic is addressed in chapter 5, “Effective Written Advocacy: Briefing,” § 5.27.

a. **Waiver** [§ 2.136]

Waiver is an intentional abandonment of a known right. *(In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2.)* A parent may waive his or her right to appeal by negotiated settlement, in which a parent may waive the right to appeal the sufficiency of the
evidence. (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 168.) Also, specific issues may be waived. This occurs most often by submitting on the agency’s recommendations – an action that waives the right to challenge orders made in accordance with those recommendations. (In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580, 589.) Attorneys should note the difference between submitting on the recommendation and submitting on the social worker’s reports. The latter does not forfeit the right to appeal an adverse order, unless a specific objection was required and not made. (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126.)

b. **Forfeiture** [§ 2.137]

Dependency appeals are limited by issues forfeited at juvenile court. (In re Paul W. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 37, 58.) Forfeiture differs from waiver in that it is not an intentional relinquishment of a right but a passive loss of a right based on inaction. (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2.) An issue is forfeited if it was not timely asserted at trial. (In re Paul W. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 37, 58.)

Another procedural requirement subject to forfeiture rules is that an issue must be raised on appeal at the first opportunity. If the order arose at a hearing from which there was an available appeal, it must be raised on appeal at that time. The issue cannot not be raised in appeals from subsequent hearings:

“[A]n unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order.” (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1149–1150.) This “waiver rule” holds “that an appellate court in a dependency proceeding may not inquire into the merits of a prior final appealable order,” even when the issues raised involve important constitutional and statutory rights.


An exception to forfeiture is that claims under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act can be raised at any time during the proceedings. (See In re Alice M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1195; In re A.C. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 854, 860; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.4 [tribe’s right
to intervene at any time]; *In re I.B.* (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 367 [court’s ongoing duty to keep tribe informed].)

c. **Exceptions to waiver and forfeiture**  [§ 2.138]

An attorney should not automatically assume a waived or forfeited issue cannot be addressed on appeal but should research whether the issue falls under an exception. (See more detailed description and authorities in § 5.27 of chapter 5, “Effective Written Advocacy: Briefing.”) The Court of Appeal has inherent discretion to review an otherwise forfeited issue. (*In re S.B.* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293; *People v. Williams* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6.) For example, if the appeal raises a question of law, forfeiture may not apply. (*In re Rebecca S.* (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1313-1314.) Or an objection may have been futile because of prior rulings in the case. Or there may have been an unanticipated change in the law. (See *In re S.B.*, *supra*, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) When the issue implicates the child’s permanence and stability, the court has exercised its discretion to excuse the waived or forfeited issue. (*Ibid.*)


Waiver amounting to passive acquiescence may not apply when constitutional rights are implicated. (*In re Laura H.* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1695-1696.)

4. **Reviewability by hearing**  [§ 2.139]

Once it has been established that a party has standing to appeal and the hearing is appealable, the appellate attorney may address only those issues that are reviewable from the appealed hearing. What is reviewable on appeal depends on the type of hearing appealed and the issues raised in that hearing. (See § 2.135 et seq., *ante*, on waived issues.) Once a disposition or post-disposition order is final and binding, it is not
appealable from a later appealable order. (In re T.G. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 976, 983.) If an issue is not raised on the first appeal for which it is ripe, therefore, it is waived for future appeals. (See a more detailed discussion of potential issues in dependency appeals in § 4.163, et seq., Appendix C of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection,” which includes a checklist of some common issues raised in dependency appeals.)

At any otherwise appealable hearing, if the court decides not to offer future reunification services and instead sets a permanent plan hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, the ruling is not directly appealable but must be reviewed by writ under California Rules of Court, rules 8.450-8.452. All findings and orders made at the hearing setting the section 366.26 hearing must be reviewed by writ. (In re Amber U. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 871.)

a. Dispositional order [§ 2.140]

The first appealable hearing is the one at which the dispositional order is made. (In re T.W. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 723, 729.) An appeal from the disposition may address issues from the detention and jurisdictional hearings, which were not separately appealable.

At the detention hearing, or initial petition hearing, the court reviews the county’s evidence for a prima facie showing that the child or children come under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 319.) The court orders the child detained or releases the child from custody back to the parents. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 319.) Issues on appeal from the detention hearing are limited. Because such matters are time sensitive, issues from the detention hearing often are best reviewed by writ of mandate, petition for rehearing, or demurrer. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.40; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 252; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.486; see also chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies,” § 8.71 et seq.)

At the jurisdictional hearing, the court determines whether the allegations identified in the petition are true and whether the petition can be sustained. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 355.) A number of issues from this hearing focus on the sufficiency of the evidence as to each allegation, as described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.
The dispositional order commences after the court finds a child is a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 358.) This order may be made on the same day as or after the jurisdictional hearing. The child is either detained or released from custody. Disposition orders determine the child’s placement while under the court’s jurisdiction and can include placement in a foster home, with a non-custodial parent, or with a parent with specific conditions for the child’s safety.

b. Status review hearings  [§ 2.141]

Following the dispositional order and depending on the circumstances of the case, there may be as many as four status review hearings. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5.) Each review hearing is set for six months after the last hearing. The initial status review hearing must be six months after disposition, but no later than 12 months after the date the child entered foster care. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.710.) The 12-month review hearing, also known as the permanency hearing, is held six months after the initial review hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f); rule 5.715.) There also may be an 18-month and even a 24-month review hearing in qualifying cases. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.22, subds. (a) & (b), 366.25, subd.(a)(1); rules 5.720, 5.722(a).)

Only issues raised at the review hearing being appealed can be addressed on appeal. Issues regarding detention, jurisdiction, and disposition and other earlier matters are not addressed unless extraordinary circumstances exist. (See § 2.135 et seq., ante, on forfeiture; In re Albert A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1220; In re Cathina W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716.) Counsel should consult with the project attorney to determine whether an exception to this otherwise straightforward rule may apply.

c. Hearings on section 388 petition and other motions  [§ 2.142]

A common motion is a petition to change a court order because of changed circumstances, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. When such a petition is denied, the order is appealable under Welfare and Institutions Code section 395 if the party had standing to file the request. The official form for the petition is Judicial Council
Sometimes denials of section 388 petitions are appealed by de facto parents and relative caretakers who have requested placement of the child in their care after termination of parental rights. (Cesar V. v. Super. Ct. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1034-1035; but see In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 281 [parent does not have standing to appeal relative placement issue unless appeal would help avoid termination of parental rights].)

A section 388 petition may be filed either concurrently with or close in time to another major hearing, such as the termination of parental rights hearing or a review hearing. Because the same circumstances exist at the time of the petition as at the other hearing, these matters are also often consolidated into one appeal.

Rulings on other motions are also appealable under Welfare and Institutions Code section 395. If the ruling occurred in the context of another proceeding, such as a review or section 366.26 hearing, counsel should investigate whether separate notices of appeal need to be filed and whether the appeals should be consolidated. If the notice of appeal lists only the section 366.26 hearing as the hearing appealed from, counsel may consider amending the notice of appeal to add the section 388 petition to the list of orders appealed from.

d. **Termination of reunification services** [§ 2.143]

Orders terminating services typically are not appealed directly because they usually occur at the same hearing setting the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450 et seq.) In that case, review must proceed by writ. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (l); rules 8.450 et seq.) These orders are appealable, however, if that hearing is not set; this might occur, for example, when one parent is found likely to reunify with the child but the other is not. An appeal from the termination of services focuses on the quality of services provided and actions of the appellant at the time of that hearing. New evidence cannot be used in an appeal. (See In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396.)

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e. Termination of parental rights [§ 2.144]

The hearing at which parental rights are terminated and concomitant orders may be appealed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 395. (E.g., *In re Melvin A.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (l).)

f. Post-permanency proceedings [§ 2.145]

Post-permanency planning hearings occur every six months so long as a child is a dependent of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.3.) Possible permanency plans include adoption, guardianship, or another planned permanent living arrangement with a foster parent or relative caregiver. Transition to independent living is another possible permanent plan. (See Welf. & Inst Code, § 366.26, subds. (b), (c)(4).)

Extended dependency jurisdiction past age 18 may be the subject of appeals. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 303, 366.3, subd. (d), 391; *In re Shannon M.* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 282, 293.)

Extended dependency jurisdiction ends automatically when the dependent reaches the age of 21, although the court may terminate jurisdiction before that time. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 303.) The court’s termination of jurisdiction before age 21 may give rise to appellate issues. (E.g., *In re H.C.* (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1261; *In re Aaron S.* (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 507.)

If the dependent chooses to stay in foster care as a nonminor dependent, services may also continue for his or her parents if their rights were not terminated before the dependent reached the age of majority, 18 years of age. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.6.)

A post-termination order changing a child’s placement must be reviewed by writ, not appeal. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.28; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.454 et seq.) See § 2.153 et seq., post.

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IX. PROCEDURAL STEPS FOR GETTING THE DEPENDENCY REVIEW PROCESS STARTED [§ 2.146]

A. Appeal [§ 2.147]

This section addresses the specific requirements pertaining to dependency appeals. For a general discussion of notice of appeal filing procedures, see § 2.101, ante.

1. What orders can be appealed [§ 2.148]

Appealable judgments and orders are discussed in § 2.125 et seq., ante. A judgment in a dependency proceeding at which a dispositional order is made under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 may be appealed in the same manner as any final judgment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395.) Any subsequent order may also be appealed as an order after judgment. (Ibid.)

An appeal cannot be filed from the preliminary proceedings before disposition, such as the detention hearing or the jurisdictional hearing. (In re T.W. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 723, 729.) Orders from these proceedings may be reviewed on appeal from the disposition. If immediate review of such preliminary orders is necessary, a traditional writ of mandate is often the most appropriate means to contest the orders made at a detention hearing. (See § 2.140, ante.)

2. Who can file notice of appeal [§ 2.149]

The notice of appeal may be filed by the appellant or by his or her trial counsel. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.405(a)(1).) The appellant must sign the notice or authorize the trial attorney to sign on his or her behalf. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.405(a)(2); see § 2.103, ante.)

81 If the appellate attorney discovers an error in the notice of appeal, it is important to consult the project, which generally addresses notice of appeal problems before appointment.
In the majority of appeals from dependency cases, the party appealing is the parent. But other parties may have standing to appeal, including the minor, county counsel, de facto parent, grandparent and other relatives. On occasion, a cross-appeal may be filed, and then each appellant would also act as a respondent.

For minors, the notice of appeal must be signed by the child or by the child’s CAPTA guardian ad litem. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.405 (a)(1).)

3. Where to file notice of appeal [§ 2.150]

The notice of appeal from a dependency proceeding must be filed in the juvenile court in which the order being appealed was made. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.405(a)(1).)

4. When to file notice of appeal [§ 2.151]

A notice of appeal must be filed from an appealable matter within 60 days of the judgment or in matters heard by a referee not acting as a temporary judge, within 60 days after the referee’s order becomes final. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a).)

The California Supreme Court has recognized the need for an exception to timeliness rule if a notice of appeal was not timely filed because of the trial attorney’s negligence or the juvenile court’s failure to advise parties of their right to appeal. (See *In re Benoit* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72; § 2.116, ante.) Because of the inherent delay involved in *Benoit* procedures, however, this equitable exception is applied only on rare occasions in dependency proceedings.82 (*In re A.M.* (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 319.) Thus every effort

82Delay avoidance is of primary importance in dependency cases. The child is getting older, and proceedings are continuing in the juvenile court even as the appeal goes forward. Although appeals look at former hearings as static events, the underlying situation is dynamic and ever-changing. (See *In re Zeth S.* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396.)
must be made to file a timely notice of appeal.\textsuperscript{83} If the appellate attorney discovers the notice of appeal was not timely filed, the attorney must contact the project immediately.

5. **Content of notice of appeal** [§ 2.152]

The notice of appeal must identify the particular judgment or order being appealed. (Cal. Rules of court, rule 8.405(a).) Although the court must liberally construe the notice of appeal (rule 8.405(a)(3)), counsel should provide as much information as possible to identify the hearing being appealed.

It is best practice to use a standard form for dependency appeals. In the Fourth District, ADI’s form\textsuperscript{84} is much preferred. Use of the Judicial Council form JV-800\textsuperscript{85} is encouraged where the project or court has not specified a preference. In any event, it is best practice to include the date(s) of the hearing being appealed, the specific orders being appealed if known, appellant’s relation to the child (e.g. mother, father, grandparent, de facto parent, etc.), appellant’s contact information, appellant’s trial counsel and whether appointed or retained, and a request for appointed counsel on appeal, with any financial information the Court of Appeal may require.

Appellate counsel should consult with the project about notice of appeal problems.

\textsuperscript{83} A filing (including a notice of appeal) by a person in a custodial setting is timely if delivered by the due date to an authorized official of the institution. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.25(b)(5); Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106; see § 2.112, ante.)

\textsuperscript{84} http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples.asp under “Notice of Appeal Forms.”

\textsuperscript{85} www.courts.ca.gov/documents/jv800.pdf
B. Writ Petition to Review Orders at Hearing Setting Section 366.26 Proceeding or at Post-Termination Child Placement Hearing  [§ 2.153]

1. Statutory writ requirement  [§ 2.154]

Welfare and Institutions Code sections 366.26 and 366.28 mandate that an order setting a permanency plan hearing or post-termination placement of a child, respectively, is not appealable unless a writ petition under California Rules of Court, rule 8.450-8.452 or 8.454-8.456 has been timely filed and the issues to be reviewed were not decided on the merits. (See also rule 8.403(b).)

This section discusses the procedures to get the writ started. The petition itself is explored more fully in chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies.” A nutshell description of the entire dependency writ process is on ADI’s web page on dependency writs.\(^86\)

Counsel or the client must file a notice of intent to file a writ petition in order to start the process. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450(c), 8.454(c).) The notice activates preparation of the normal record and the process of appointing counsel, if requested.

2. Who may file notice of intent  [§ 2.155]

Normally, the notice of intent is signed by trial counsel for the petitioner or by the client in pro per. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450(c), 8.454(c); see also Rayna R. v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1403-1405.) A notice of intent to file writ petition must be timely filed. (See rules 8.450(e), 8.454(e).) The use of the Judicial Council forms JV-820\(^87\) and JV-822\(^88\) is encouraged to ensure a complete and proper notice of intent is filed.

\(^86\)http://www.adi-sandiego.com/delinq_depend/dependency/dep_writs.asp

\(^87\)http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/jv820.pdf

\(^88\)https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/jv822.pdf
3. When to file notice of intent  [§ 2.156]

   a. From hearing setting section 366.26 hearing  [§ 2.157]

      A notice of intent to file writ petition from a hearing setting the permanency plan
      hearing is timely filed within seven days after the date of the order setting the hearing if
      the party was present. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450(e)(4)(A).) If the party was notified
      only by mail, the notice must be filed within 12 days after the date the clerk mailed the
      notification. (Rule 8.450(e)(4)(B).) If the party was mailed the notice to an address
      outside California but within the United States, the notice must be filed within 17 days
      after the date the notification was mailed. (Rule 8.450(e)(4)(C).) And if the notification
      was mailed to an address outside the United States, the notice must be filed within 27
      days of the date the notification was mailed. (Rule 8.450(e)(4)(D).) When the order
      setting the hearing was made by a referee not acting as a temporary judge, an additional
      10 days are added to the deadline. (Rule 8.450(e)(4)(E).)89

   b. From post-termination child placement order  [§ 2.158]

      When an order designating placement of a dependent child after termination of
      parental rights is to be reviewed, a notice of intent to file writ petition must be filed
      within seven days after the order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.454(e)(4).) If the order was
      made by a referee, then the notice must be filed within seven days after the order becomes
      final under rule 5.540(c). (Rule 8.454(e)(4).) If the party was notified of the order only by
      mail, the notice of intent must be filed within 12 days of the date the notification was
      mailed. (Rule 8.454(e)(5).)90

89 A filing by a person in a custodial setting is timely if delivered by the due date to an
authorized official of the institution. (Rule 8.25(b)(5); Silverbrand v. County of Los
Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106; see § 2.112, ante.)

90 A filing by a person in a custodial setting is timely if delivered by the due date to an
authorized official of the institution. (Rule 8.25(b)(5); Silverbrand v. County of Los
Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106; see § 2.112, ante.)
C. Special Issues with Family Code Appeals  [§ 2.159]

1. Appeals from private terminations of parental rights  [§ 2.160]

After orders affecting parental rights are made at superior court, the orders cannot be set aside, changed, or modified by the superior court but must be reviewed by appeal. (Fam. Code, § 7894.)

a. Termination of parental rights in stepparent adoptions  [§ 2.161]

A Family Code, section 7600, et seq., matter (termination of parental rights in stepparent adoptions) may be appealed in the same manner as an order of the juvenile court declaring a person to be a ward of the juvenile court. (Fam. Code, § 7669, subd. (a).) Before such adoption can occur, the rights of the non-relinquishing birth parent not judicially deprived of custody and control of the child must be terminated. (See Fam. Code, § 8606.) Typical appeals from these proceedings are filed by a birth parent retaining parental rights who did not consent to an adoption by a stepparent and whose rights were terminated at the adoption proceeding. A natural father without presumed father status need not have his rights terminated for the adoption to proceed. (See Fam. Code, § 7800, et seq.) But an alleged father may appeal the order dispensing with his consent for adoption. (Fam. Code, § 7669, subd. (a).)

If a birth parent with parental rights refused to give the required consent or withdrew consent, a Petition to Free the Child from Custody and Control is usually filed. If it is not granted and the requirements under Family Code section 8604 are not met, the adoption petition must be dismissed. (Fam. Code, § 9006, subd. (b); see also § 2.162, post.)
b. Appeals from proceedings freeing child from parental custody and control

A proceeding for declaration of freedom from parental control and custody under Family Code section 7800, et seq., is appealable under section 7894 and 7895. The Court of Appeal must appoint counsel for the indigent appellant appealing from a judgment freeing a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court from parental custody and control. (Fam. Code, § 7895, subds. (a)&(b).)

2. Appeals involving issues of parentage/paternity

The Uniform Parentage Act defines the legal relationship existing between a child and his or her natural or adoptive parents. (Fam. Code § 7600 et seq.) There are four main types of fathers: presumed fathers, biological fathers, alleged fathers, and Kelsey S. fathers. (See Fam. Code §§ 7635, 7550-7558; 7611, subd. (d); Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 849 [constitutional right of biological father to establish himself as a quasi-presumed father if he “promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities—emotional, financial, and otherwise”].) Each type of father has different rights and responsibilities.

The most expansive rights belong to presumed fathers. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435.) Therefore, it is important for the appellate attorney representing a father to verify the status of the father in the trial court. The attorney should review the record for all evidence pertaining to the various types of fathers and check whether the father’s status was properly found. (See chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection,” § 4.175, for possible issues arising from these proceedings.)
- CHAPTER THREE -

PRE-BRIEFING RESPONSIBILITIES

- RECORD COMPLETION -
- EXTENSIONS OF TIME -
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(With hyperlinks to lead subdivisions)

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I. **INTRODUCTION**  [§ 3.0]

This chapter addresses three critical responsibilities of appellate counsel before the opening brief is filed. First, counsel must ensure the record is complete. Second, when it is not possible to complete research and briefing in the time permitted, counsel must seek one or more extensions. Third, if the client wants and is eligible for bail or other form of release pending appeal, counsel should investigate that possibility and take needed action.¹

Many of the procedures discussed in this chapter require a motion. ADI provides guidance on motions at [Motion Practice in the Fourth Appellate District Pertaining to Criminal and Juvenile Cases].²


CAVEAT: The Supreme Court and all Courts of Appeal are moving, at different paces, toward wholly electronic filing. Counsel must always check with the project, court clerk’s office, or court website to determine whether electronic filing is available or mandatory in the particular court. If so, that procedure would supersede the rules for paper filings.

ADI’s electronic service web page and the home page CHEAT SHEET provide information about the ADI email service program.

II. ENSURING AN ADEQUATE RECORD  [§ 3.1]

Appellate counsel has the responsibility to ensure a complete record, in order to permit identification of all arguable issues and provide the necessary factual foundation for the issues raised. (People v. Barton (1978) 21 Cal.3d 513, 518-520; People v. Silva (1978) 20 Cal.3d 489; People v. Gaston (1978) 20 Cal.3d 476; People v. Harris (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 709, 714; People v. Valenzuela (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 381, 393-394.)

A. Overview  [§ 3.2]

California Rules of Court, rule 8.320 describes the “normal record” on appeal in a criminal case – that is, the record to be prepared automatically by the superior court. Rule 8.407 is the juvenile counterpart. The normal record consists of the documents and transcripts of oral proceedings typically needed in the majority of appeals.

3 http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm. Each Court of Appeal has a tab for “Electronic Filing” or “Electronic Filing / Submissions” that provides current guidance.

4 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/eservice_adi.asp

5 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/index.asp
The normal record is not necessarily adequate for every case. Occasionally because of clerical oversight or other problem, the prepared record lacks something that under the rules should be in the normal record. Sometimes the normal record as defined in the rules does not include the material necessary to argue an issue and needs either a pre-certification request for additional record (usually the task of trial counsel) or post-certification augmentation. Sometimes part of a record may have been lost or destroyed. Occasionally the appellate court’s personal inspection of an exhibit is needed. When it is important for the court to consider matters occurring outside of the present proceedings, such as past appeals in the case, a motion for judicial notice (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)) or very occasionally for new evidence on appeal (rule 8.252(c); Code Civ. Proc., § 909; cf. In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396) may be required.6

While under California Rules of Court, rules 8.336(h) and 8.409(c) ensuring prompt preparation of the record is the responsibility of the Court of Appeal rather than counsel, to protect the client counsel should monitor the process and call attention to delays so prolonged as to suggest the case may have slipped through the cracks.

Throughout the appeal, especially in juvenile cases, appellate counsel should stay in touch with trial counsel. Proceedings in the trial court may take place that affect the scope and nature of the appeal. Trial counsel may also be able to provide documents not in the record that appellate counsel should consider.

B. Normal Record in Criminal Case [§ 3.3]

Under rule 8.320(a) of the California Rules of Court, the normal record in a criminal appeal by the defendant (or in a People’s appeal from the granting of a new trial) consists of the clerk’s transcript and the reporter’s transcripts. Juvenile records are treated in § 3.6A et seq., post.)

1. Normal clerk’s transcript [§ 3.4]

The clerk’s transcript is a compilation of selected documents in the case. California Rules of Court, rule 8.320(b) specifies the contents of the normal clerk’s transcript in a criminal appeal:

6 As with all motions, it must be a separately filed document, not part of a brief or petition. (Rule 8.252(a)(1); see also rule 8.54.)
The clerk's transcript must contain:

(1) The accusatory pleading and any amendment;
(2) Any demurrer or other plea;
(3) All court minutes;
(4) All instructions submitted in writing, each one indicating the party requesting it;
(5) Any written communication between the court and the jury or any individual juror;
(6) Any verdict;
(7) Any written opinion of the court;
(8) The judgment or order appealed from and any abstract of judgment or commitment;
(9) Any motion for new trial, with supporting and opposing memoranda and attachments;
(10) The notice of appeal and any certificate of probable cause filed under rule 8.304(b);
(11) Any transcript of a sound or sound-and-video recording furnished to the jury or tendered to the court under rule 2.1040;
(12) Any application for additional record and any order on the application;
(13) And, if the appellant is the defendant:
   (A) Any written defense motion denied in whole or in part, with supporting and opposing memoranda and attachments;
   (B) If related to a motion under (A), any search warrant and return and the reporter's transcript of any preliminary examination or grand jury hearing;
   (C) Any document admitted in evidence to prove a prior juvenile adjudication, criminal conviction, or prison term.

If a record was closed to public inspection in the trial court because it is required to be kept confidential by law, it must remain closed to public inspection in the reviewing court unless that court orders otherwise; and
(D) The probation officer’s report.

(E) Any court-ordered diagnostic or psychological report required under Penal Code section 1203.03(b) or 1369.

In appeals from orders other than a motion for new trial or a judgment based on a demurrer, a more limited normal clerk’s transcript is prescribed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.320(d).) Limited appeals include orders after judgment affecting a party’s substantial rights in criminal cases, such as revocation or modification of probation (both contested and uncontested), resentencing, denials of statutory petitions (e.g., Proposition 47, Pen. Code, § 1016.5), and writ petitions. (See chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started,” § 2.60 et seq.) Frequently court clerks do not include what is necessary, requiring a correction of the record. (See § 3.12 et seq., post, on corrections and augmentations.)

2. Normal reporter’s transcript [§ 3.5]

The reporter’s transcript is a verbatim record of selected oral proceedings in the superior court. California Rules of Court, rule 8.320(c) specifies the contents of the normal reporter’s transcript in a criminal appeal:

The reporter’s transcript must contain:

(1) The oral proceedings on the entry of any plea other than a not guilty plea;

(2) The oral proceedings on any motion in limine;

(3) The oral proceedings at trial, but excluding the voir dire examination of jurors and any opening statement;

(4) All instructions given orally;

(5) Any oral communication between the court and the jury or any individual juror;

(6) Any oral opinion of the court;

(7) The oral proceedings on any motion for new trial;

(8) The oral proceedings at sentencing, granting or denial of probation, or other dispositional hearing;

(9) And, if the appellant is the defendant:
(A) The oral proceedings on any defense motion denied in whole or in part except motions for disqualification of a judge and motions under Penal Code section 995;

(B) The closing arguments; and

(C) Any comment on the evidence by the court to the jury.

In appeals from orders other than a motion for new trial or a judgment based on a demurrer, a more limited normal reporter’s transcript is prescribed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.320(d); see § 3.4, ante, for examples of such proceedings.)

3. Exhibits [§ 3.6]

Under California Rules of Court, rules 8.320(e) and 8.407(e), the record also includes any exhibit admitted in evidence, or refused or lodged; thus counsel may refer to any exhibit in briefing. Unless an exhibit is in the clerk’s transcript, however, the court will not have physical access to it. If counsel wants the court to examine an exhibit, it may be transmitted on request under rules 8.224. § 3.25, post, treats this topic. Detailed guidance is also set forth De-mystifying the Exhibit Review Process in Criminal Cases and on the ADI Fourth District practice pages.

Some courts, such as Division Two of the Fourth District, may prefer other times and methods of transmission; counsel should ask the assigned staff attorney about local variations. Some courts provide a form for requesting exhibits. See ADI Fourth District practice pages. 

http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/fourth_dist.asp


http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/fourth_dist.asp
C. Normal Record in Juvenile Case  [§ 3.6A]

Under rule 8.407 of the California Rules of Court, the normal record in a juvenile appeal, delinquency or dependency, consists of the clerk’s transcript and the reporter’s transcript.10

In fast-track cases, the record should arrive by express mail or the equivalent. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.416(c)(2)(B).) Minor’s counsel will receive a separate copy. (Ibid.)

1. Normal clerk’s transcript  [§ 3.6B]

Rule 8.407(a) of the California Rules of Court provides:

The clerk’s transcript must contain:

(1) The petition;
(2) Any notice of hearing;
(3) All court minutes;
(4) Any report or other document submitted to the court;
(5) The jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders;
(6) The judgment or order appealed from;
(7) Any application for rehearing;
(8) The notice of appeal and any order pursuant to the notice;
(9) Any transcript of a sound or sound-and-video recording tendered to the court under rule 2.1040;
(10) Any application for additional record and any order on the application;

10Local rules and court miscellaneous orders may add materials to the normal record as prescribed by the California Rules of Court. The Fourth Appellate District, Division One, for example, has issued a miscellaneous order adding to both the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts in dependency cases.
Any opinion or dispositive order of a reviewing court in the same case and;

Any written motion or notice of motion by any party, with supporting and opposing memoranda and attachments, and any written opinion of the court.

2. Normal reporter’s transcript  [§ 3.6C]

Rule 8.407(b) of the California Rules of Court prescribes the contents of the reporter’s transcript in a juvenile appeal:

The reporter’s transcript must contain:

(1) Except as provided in (2), the oral proceedings at any hearing that resulted in the order or judgment being appealed;

(2) In appeals from dispositional orders, the oral proceedings at hearings on

(A) Jurisdiction and disposition; and

(B) Any motion by the appellant that was denied in whole or in part; and

(3) Any oral opinion of the court.

3. Exhibits  [§ 3.6D]

Rule 8.407(e) of the California Rules of Court provides for exhibits to be transferred to the Court of Appeal under rule 8.224. § 3.25, post, treats this topic. Detailed guidance for Fourth District variations on this procedure is set forth on the ADI Fourth District practice pages. (See also De-mystifying the Exhibit Review Process in Criminal Cases on the ADI website.)

11Some courts such as Division Two of the Fourth District may prefer other times and methods of transmission; counsel should ask the assigned staff attorney about local variations. Some courts provide a form for requesting exhibits.

12http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/fourth_dist.asp

D. Confidential Matters in Records  [§ 3.7]

Some matters of record are to be handled confidentially, by special procedures. These procedures may apply even if the confidential matter is part of the normal record. Counsel should be aware of these matters and the way they are to be handled. (See generally Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.45-8.47.) Counsel should also guard against disclosure of this material in publicly filed briefs. (See chapter 5, “Effective Written Advocacy: Briefing,” § 5.21.)

1. Juvenile records  [§ 3.7A]

Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 makes juvenile delinquency and dependency records accessible only to the parties and their attorneys and enumerated others, and section 676 makes court hearings confidential, except in specified circumstances. Rule 8.401 of the California Rules of Court makes appellate records and briefs accessible only to the court, parties, appellate projects, and others designated by the court. It also requires additional steps to protect confidentiality, such as the use of first name and last initial, or just initials.

Some materials may be protected still further, such as psychological reports applicable to only one parent, to which other parties are denied access. The caregiver’s address is confidential unless the juvenile court or the caregiver has authorized it to be

14 The ADI website offers more extensive guidance on confidential records at http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/conf_records.asp. See also “Motion Practice in the Fourth Appellate District Pertaining to Criminal and Juvenile cases,” by Anna Jauregui-Law, at http://www.adi-sandiego.com/news_alerts/pdfs/2012/Motion_Practice_2.pdf.


16 By virtue of its relationship with counsel, the project, such as ADI, is treated as counsel. Accordingly, two divisions of the Fourth District have issued orders giving ADI access to juvenile files: Division One Misc. Order No. 112812 and Division Two Misc. Orders, No. 15-4.
released. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 308 (subd. (a)).) Counsel must redact the address\(^\text{17}\) so that it is not readable before sending the record to the client. Similarly, counsel should redact social security numbers. (Rules of Court, rule 1.20, subd. (b)(2)(A).)

2. **Marsden and related transcripts**  [§ 3.8]

A *Marsden*\(^\text{18}\) transcript will be sent initially only to the Court of Appeal and the defendant’s counsel. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.45(d)(2).) If the opening brief raises a *Marsden* issue, the respondent may request a copy of the transcripts under rule 8.47(b)(2)(B). When applicable, the defendant may oppose the request on the ground the transcript contains irrelevant confidential material, citing the pages and line numbers where that material is found. (Rule 8.47(b)(2)(C).) If the defendant files no opposition, the clerk must send the record to the respondent. (Rule 8.47(b)(2)(D).)

Court occasionally use *Marsden*-like procedures for similar defense motions requiring protection against premature disclosure of defense material, such as a defense request for expert funds. *Marsden* issues may be raised in juvenile proceedings, as well. More guidance is available on ADI’s confidential records page.\(^\text{19}\)

*Marsden* issues occur, not only in criminal, but in juvenile cases. (*In re M.P.* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 441, 455.)

3. **Other confidential records and in camera proceedings from which one or more parties were excluded in the superior court**  [§ 3.9]

Except for a probation report or records pertaining to a confidential informant, transcripts and documents related to other kinds of in camera proceedings from which one party or more parties were excluded are transmitted only to the reviewing court and any party who had access in the superior court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.45(d)(2).) An

\(^{17}\)Caregiver addresses are often found on orders regarding the parents’ educational rights, and on proofs of service.

\(^{18}\) *People v. Marsden* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (motion to remove appointed counsel because of failure to provide effective assistance).

example might be a Pitchess motion\textsuperscript{20} or a diagnostic report under Penal Code section 1203.03. The parties on appeal will receive an index of the proceedings showing the date and persons present, but not the substance of the matter.\textsuperscript{21} (Rule 8.45(c).)

A record pertaining to a motion for disclosure of a confidential informant\textsuperscript{22} is sent to the reviewing court only, even though the People had access to it below. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.45(d)(3); see Evid. Code, §§ 1041, 1042.)

A probation report is sent to the reviewing court, the People, and counsel for the defendant who is the subject of the report. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.45(d)(4); see Pen. Code, § 1203.05.\textsuperscript{23})

4. Sealed records  [§ 3.9A]

Sealed records are those made confidential by court order on a case by case basis, rather than by law. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.45(b)(3), 8.46(a), 2.550-2.551.) The records may be closed to public inspection or to inspection by other parties, as well. (Rule 8.45(b)(3).)

The court making the order must weigh the need for confidentiality against the public’s First Amendment right to access to court records, according to criteria set out in

\begin{flushleft}

\textsuperscript{21}The defendant, not the court, is responsible for augmenting the record to include those confidential records. (\textit{People v. Rodriguez} (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 360.) The augmented record goes only to the court.

\textsuperscript{22}http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/conf_records.asp#motions

\textsuperscript{23}An exception to the general rule of access on appeal to those who had access below is necessary in this situation, because a probation report is public until 60 days after sentencing. (Pen. Code, § 1203.05.)
\end{flushleft}
California Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d) and *NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178. (See also Code Civ. Proc., § 124.)

Records sealed in the trial court remain sealed on appeal unless the reviewing court orders otherwise. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.46(b)(1).)

Records not sealed by the trial court may be sealed on order of the appellate court under California Rules of Court, rule 8.46(d), which prescribes the procedures for obtaining a sealing order, lodging a record conditionally under seal, making an order, and dealing with the records. ADI’s website has a sample motion to seal.24 A sealing order must state the findings required by rule 2.550(d) and comply with rule 2.550(e). If the court denies the motion to seal, the document is returned unless within 10 days the party asks it be filed. (Rule 8.46(d)(7).)

Unsealing a record is governed by rule 8.46(e). The party seeking unsealing makes a motion to the reviewing court, showing why sealing is no longer justified under rule 2.550.25 A sample motion to unseal is on the ADI website.26

Matters in briefs and other publicly filed documents must not disclose the contents of the sealed records. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.46(f).) The general procedure is to file a public redacted document and an unredacted, complete version. The documents must be labeled as required in rule 8.46(f)(2) [record already sealed] or (f)(3) [record lodged conditionally under seal].) Sample motions to file under seal are on the ADI website.27

5. Improper inclusion of identification information and other confidential matters in record  [§ 3.10]

Sometimes material that is not supposed to be in the record is inadvertently included. For example, by law the transcripts must not include the names, addresses, or

telephone numbers of sworn jurors; jurors must be referred to by an identifying number.\(^{28}\) (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.332(b).) Other examples might be confidential juvenile records (see, generally, Welf. & Inst. Code, § 827; rule 8.401) and confidential transcripts (rules 8.45, 8.47). These records might include social security numbers (rule 1.201(a)(1)) or psychological evaluations of a non-client parent and addresses of confidential caregivers in juvenile dependency cases (Welf. and Inst. Code § 308). This information must be redacted before transcripts are given to clients.

Upon discovering material that counsel may not be entitled to see, counsel should stop reading that part of the transcript immediately and notify the Court of Appeal and ADI. The court may order return of the records, redaction, or other corrective action. Under no circumstances should counsel send such material to clients or other persons without specific authorization from the court or project.

If the material is appropriate for counsel to review, but not the client, counsel may redact the transcript in order to send it to the client, completely covering the confidential information, if practical. If the changes are more extensive, counsel may ask the court to order the court clerk to prepare a proper copy. If the record is in electronic form, having the clerk do the corrections may be the only alternative.

E. Request for Additions to Record Before It Is Filed in Reviewing Court

[§ 3.11]

Rule 8.324 of the California Rules of Court prescribes procedures for requesting materials not in the normal record, if the record has not yet been certified and transmitted to the reviewing court.\(^{29}\) Ordinarily, trial counsel should make such a request in the

\(^{28}\)The information for unsworn jurors (such as those excused) must not be sealed unless the court finds compelling reason to do so (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(1); rule 8.332(c)), but by policy unsworn jurors should be identified only by first name and initial.

If access to juror identification information is required to handle the case, counsel may apply to the trial court under Code of Civil Procedure section 237, subdivisions (b)-(d).

\(^{29}\)California Rules of Court, rule 8.340 prescribes procedures for changes to the record after it is filed in the reviewing court. (See § 3.12 et seq., post, on corrections and augmentations, and § 3.25, post, on exhibits.)
superior court when filing a notice of appeal or as soon thereafter as possible, but in practice trial counsel seldom do so.

California Rules of Court, rule 8.324(b) provides:

Either the People or the defendant may apply to the superior court for inclusion in the record of any of the following items:

1. In the clerk’s transcript: any written defense motion granted in whole or in part or any written motion by the People, with supporting and opposing memoranda and attachments;

2. In the reporter’s transcript:
   
   (A) The voir dire examination of jurors;
   
   (B) Any opening statement; and
   
   (C) The oral proceedings on motions other than those listed in rule 8.320(c).

Rule 8.407(c) of the California Rules of Court has analogous provisions for requesting additional records in the juvenile court before the record is filed in juvenile appeals.

F. Correcting/Completing and Augmenting Record After It Is Filed in Reviewing Court  [§ 3.12]

Counsel has the responsibility for reviewing all relevant parts of the filed record and ensuring the record is adequate to support all issues raised. If the record delivered to counsel is inadequate in any respects, counsel must take action either to correct or augment it for the needed materials. “Correction” or “completion” is used when parts of the normal record are missing from the filed record. “Augmentation” is used when counsel needs material that is not a prescribed part of the normal record.

Counsel should make review of the record in order to complete it an early priority, because courts may be disinclined to delay the case well into the briefing and/or decisional process to add to the record. Some courts have local rules or miscellaneous orders setting deadlines for these requests. (See § 3.18, post.) To give themselves time for this responsibility, counsel should always monitor their cases on the court website and

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search.cfm?dist=0

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sign up immediately for automatic email notification of developments, including the filing of the record.

See CAVENAT at the beginning of this chapter for possible electronic filing exceptions to the rules that follow.

1. Correcting omissions from normal record [§ 3.13]

Appellate counsel in reviewing the record may notice that matters required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.320(b) or (c) are not included. Rule 8.340(b) provides in relevant part:

If, after the record is certified, the superior court clerk or the reporter learns that the record omits a document or transcript that any rule or order requires included, the clerk must promptly copy and certify the document or the reporter must promptly prepare and certify the transcript. Without the need for a court order, the clerk must promptly send the document or transcript – as an augmentation of the record – to [the reviewing court, the probation officer, the defendant, and the Attorney General and/or district attorney].

Similar provisions apply to juvenile appeals. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.410(a), 8.416(d)(1).)

a. Examples of often omitted materials [§ 3.14]

Any matter prescribed for the normal clerk’s transcript or reporter’s transcript may occasionally be omitted. Certain items, however, are chronically overlooked, and counsel should be especially alert for them.

One example is the written transcript of any electronic recording provided to the trial court under California Rules of Court, rule 2.1040,31 which is a required part of the clerk’s transcript. (Rule 8.320(b)(11).) Another example is any packet of records offered to prove prior convictions under Penal Code section 969b. (Rule 8.320(b)(13)(C).) If these materials were before the superior court but are missing from the appellate record, counsel should request them by means of a rule 8.340(b) letter. Another frequently

31Rule 2.1040 requires a party offering an electronic recording at trial to provide a written transcript of the recording, unless the trial judge orders otherwise. If a transcript of a recording was not provided to the superior court under rule 2.1040, counsel should consult with the assigned staff attorney on how to proceed.
b. Correction procedure  [§ 3.15]

In criminal or non-fast-track juvenile cases, if seeking only to correct an omission in the normal record (not also to augment), counsel should send a letter to the superior court clerk specifically referring to California Rules of Court, rule 8.340(b) or 8.410(a) and stating what portions of the normal clerk’s and/or reporter’s transcripts are missing; an augmentation request in the Court of Appeal is not necessary or appropriate. The letter should describe the missing portions as specifically as possible as to dates, names of reporters, titles of documents, etc. The appeals section of the superior court will prepare and transmit the missing portion of the normal record upon receipt of counsel’s letter. In the Fourth Appellate District counsel should send a copy of the letter to ADI. (Some Courts of Appeal also want a copy; counsel should check with the assigned staff attorney.) Requests filed after the opening brief should be served on opposing counsel. A sample correction letter\(^{32}\) is on the ADI website.

Correction in fast-track juvenile cases is governed by California Rules of Court, rule 8.416(d). Some courts may prefer corrections be handled by augmentation, rather than standard correction processes.

Division One has a form for notifying the Court of Appeal of missing items from the transcripts in fast-track dependency cases.\(^{33}\)

If seeking both correction of the normal record and augmentation to include materials not in the normal record (see §§ 3.21, 3.24, and 3.35, post), counsel must follow local court practices. In the Fourth Appellate District counsel should include all requests in the application for augmentation filed in the Court of Appeal; a separate letter under rule 8.340(b) or 8.410(a) of the California Rules of Court may not be necessary.\(^{34}\)

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\(^{34}\) The Court of Appeal has authority to order correction as well as augmentation of the record. (Rules 8.340(c), 8.410(b).)
The appellate court may not automatically extend time for the brief on learning a correction is underway. Because a California Rules of Court, rule 8.340(b) or 8.410(a) letter request is directed to the superior court and no action is required by the appellate court, it cannot be combined with a request to extend time, but counsel can send the Court of Appeal a separate extension request and use the pending record correction as a reason for needing it. Some courts grant an extension request until a certain number of days after the filing of the corrected record; others require periodic extension requests while the corrected record is being compiled (although the correction rarely takes more than a month).

c. Records of proceedings that occur during appeal [§ 3.16]

When during the appeal the trial court amends or recalls the judgment or makes an order such as one affecting the sentence or probation, California Rules of Court, rule 8.340(a) requires the superior court clerk to send an augmentation including the record of the new proceedings. In juvenile cases the clerk must notify those who received a copy of the record of such orders. (Rule 8.410(b)(2).) Clerks rarely remember this step.

Counsel should keep an eye out for such a development by maintaining regular contact with trial counsel and should seek addition of the record on such proceedings to the appellate record when the occasion requires. (Although rule 8.340(a) speaks of the additional record as an “augmentation,” the requirement of adding it to the appellate record is automatic, without court order. A rule 8.340(b) correction request, rather than a rule 8.340(d) augment request, should therefore be sufficient. A sample form, “Correction of Record – Later Order in Trial Court,” is on the ADI forms and samples page.35 (See also § 3.23, post.)

2. Augmenting the record after it is filed in reviewing court [§ 3.17]

Augmentation is used to obtain materials not in the normal record after the record is certified and transmitted to the reviewing court. This process is governed by California Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a). (Rules 8.340(c), 8.410(b)(1), 8.416(d); see also People v. Gaston (1978) 20 Cal.3d 476, 482-484, People v. Silva (1978) 20 Cal.3d 489, 492-493, and People v. Barton (1978) 21 Cal.3d 513, 518-520.) Requests for additional record

should be submitted to the Court of Appeal, not the superior court, once the record has been filed.  

a. **Timing of request**  [§ 3.18]

Requests to augment or complete the record should be filed as soon as possible after receiving the record and determining that the additional material is needed – almost always before the original opening brief due date. The general expectation is that a request should be filed within 40 days of the later of the filing of the record or the appointment in criminal cases and within 15 days in fast-track dependency cases (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.416(d)(2)).

b. **Identification of materials in request**  [§ 3.19]

In identifying the documents or reporter’s transcript sought, counsel should not just ask for “materials relevant to [a particular issue]” or use other such generalities. The exact record needed should be described with enough detail (dates and nature of proceedings, titles and filing dates of documents, etc.) that the reporter or clerk will not have to guess. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.340, 8.410, 8.155.)

For augmentation of the clerk’s transcript, if the material is not lengthy, counsel may obtain a copy of the document from the superior court clerk, attach the copy to the request to augment, and ask the Court of Appeal to order the copy be made part of the record without preparation of a formal supplemental clerk’s transcript. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.324 and 8.407(c) of the California Rules of Court govern additions to the normal record before it is certified in criminal and delinquency matters. (See § 3.11, ante.)

**Notes:**

36 Rules 8.324 and 8.407(c) of the California Rules of Court govern additions to the normal record before it is certified in criminal and delinquency matters. (See § 3.11, ante.)

A copy of the augmentation material must be included with the copy of the augmentation request served on opposing counsel. If the augmentation documents are so extensive that a supplemental clerk’s transcript will be required, each item should be described as specifically as possible, including the title of the document and the date it was filed. (See rules 8.340, 8.410, 8.155.)

A request to augment the reporter’s transcript must describe the nature of the oral proceedings. The date, time, judge’s name, and reporter’s name (with CCSR number if available) should be provided, along with a citation to the portion of the clerk’s transcript and/or reporter’s transcript that refers to the requested proceeding. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.130(a)(4), 8.155(a)(3).)

**c. Explanation of need for materials  [§ 3.20]**

The request must include a brief statement of why the augmentation is necessary or relevant to the appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.155, 8.50, 8.54, 8.340; 8.410; People v. Hagan (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 34, 39-40 [defendant not entitled to augmentation of record in absence of showing of good cause].) It should describe the general issue to which the augmented record relates and demonstrate, with references to the present record when available, that the material to be augmented was before the superior court judge. For example, a request might refer to court minutes showing denial of a challenge to a juror for cause in seeking augmentation of the reporter’s transcript to include the jury voir dire.

**d. Concurrent request for extension of time  [§ 3.21]**

If a supplemental transcript will have to be prepared, delay in filing the brief can be anticipated. Counsel’s request to augment the record should therefore include or be accompanied by a request to extend time to “30 days after the supplemental record is filed”; court policy may vary on whether the requests should be separate or combined. If the requests are combined, the title of the combined document should clearly indicate both types of requests. (See also § 3.15, ante, and § 3.35, post.)

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38The rule does not require the copy to be certified by the superior court clerk, although it is always proper to ask for a certified copy.
e. Formal requirements  [§ 3.22]

Sample augmentation and extension forms, including combinations of those, are on the ADI website. An augmentation request must comply with rule 8.54 of the California Rules of Court, on motions. The formal requirements for such requests are outlined in ADI’s filing and service chart – including such matters as content, service, filing, any deadlines or formal policies, and oppositions.

See CAVEAT at the beginning of this chapter for possible electronic filing exceptions to these rules.

f. Changes in judgment or other new orders made after record is certified  [§ 3.23]

In a criminal case, if, during the pendency of the appeal and after the record is certified, the trial court amends or recalls the judgment or makes any new order in the case (such as an order affecting the sentence or probation), the superior court clerk must send copies of the amended abstract of judgment or new order and related proceedings, to the reviewing court and the parties as an augmentation of the record on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.340(a).) In practice, it is easy for clerks to overlook this rule; appellate counsel should keep in close touch with the client and trial counsel to find about such developments and remind the superior court clerks of their duty. (Although rule 8.340(a) speaks of the additional record as an “augmentation,” the requirement of adding it to the appellate record is automatic, without court order. A rule 8.340(b) correction request, as opposed to a rule 8.340(d) augment request, should therefore be sufficient to request the material. See § 3.16, ante.)

In juvenile cases, the lower court must notify the reviewing court of the change. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.410(b)(2).) A motion for augmentation would be required.

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40 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/pdf_forms/APPLICATIONS_MOTIONS_AND_MISC_DOCUMENTS.pdf
3. Combining requests for correction and augmentation [§ 3.24]

If both an augmentation and correction of the record are needed, in at least some districts all of the items should be included in a single augmentation request; a separate California Rules of Court, rule 8.340(b) or 8.410(a) letter is not necessary. (The assigned staff attorney should be consulted for local policy on this matter.)

G. Getting Exhibits Before the Reviewing Court [§ 3.25]

Exhibits are part of the record under California Rules of Court, rules 8.320(e) and 8.407(f) and therefore need not be augmented into the record. Unless an exhibit is included in the clerk’s transcript, however, the court will not have physical access to it. If counsel wants the court to see it, the exhibit must affirmatively be brought before the court.

Counsel have a professional responsibility to view exhibits that are potentially critical to the appeal. In some circumstances a project staff attorney can view exhibits on behalf of a panel attorney and make copies. The assigned staff attorney can provide guidance on the procedures for viewing exhibits. Anna Jauregui-Law’s article on *De-mystifying the Exhibit Review Process in Criminal Cases* gives comprehensive guidance for Fourth Appellate District cases.

1. Attachment to brief [§ 3.26]

A copy of some exhibits may be obtained from trial counsel. Certain exhibits, typically documentary exhibits on letter size paper, may be copied by the clerk if necessary. Copies of exhibits may be attached to a brief if the attachments do not exceed a total of 10 pages, but the presiding justice may permit a longer attachment for good cause. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(d).) Exhibits incapable of being copied must be transmitted under rule 8.224. (See § 3.27, post.)


2. Transmission under rule 8.224  [§ 3.27]

Counsel may request an exhibit be transmitted to the court under rule 8.224,\(^43\) which describes the formal method to have exhibits transmitted to the Court of Appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.320(e), 8.407(f).) The court may also order transmission on its own under rule 8.224. Some courts may prefer other times and methods of transmission; the assigned staff attorney can inform counsel of local variations. An example is the Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, which prescribes its own procedures and provides a form.\(^44\)

H. Agreed and Settled Statements and Motion for New Trial  [§ 3.28]

1. Agreed statement  [§ 3.29]

Agreed statements are used, by mutual consent of the parties, in lieu of a normal record or part of the record. They are permitted by California Rules of Court, rules 8.344 and 8.407(d) (e.g., *People v. One 1964 Chevrolet Corvette Convertible* (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 720) but are rare. An agreed statement must conform to rule 8.134, which prescribes contents and procedures, except for the special filing requirement set out in rule 8.344.

2. Settled statement  [§ 3.30]

Settled statements replace unavailable parts of the record. The procedures for obtaining a settled statement are set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 8.346 (see also rule 8.407(d)):

(a) Application

As soon as a party learns that any portion of the oral proceedings cannot be transcribed, the party may serve and file in superior court an application for

\(^{43}\)Some courts may prefer other times and methods of transmission; counsel should ask the assigned staff attorney about local variations. Some courts provide a form for requesting exhibits. See also CAVEAT at the beginning of this chapter for possible electronic filing exceptions.

\(^{44}\)http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/fourth_dist_div2.asp#superior2

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permission to prepare a settled statement. The application must explain why the oral proceedings cannot be transcribed.

(b) Order and proposed statement

The judge must rule on the application within five days after it is filed. If the judge grants the application, the parties must comply with the relevant provisions of rule 8.137, but the applicant must deliver a proposed statement to the judge for settlement within 30 days after it is ordered, unless the reviewing court extends the time.

(c) Serving and filing the settled statement

The applicant must prepare, serve, and file in superior court an original and three copies of the settled statement.

A settled statement is used to ensure the record on appeal conforms to the actual proceedings in the trial court. (People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 585; see also People v. Pinholster (1990) 1 Cal.4th 865, 922 [settled statement of unreported bench conferences between court and counsel].) It may not be used to change the evidence – e.g., to improve on the quality of a sound recording introduced below. (People v. Anderson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 430, 440-441; see also People v. Tuilaepa, supra, at p. 585 [settlement, augmentation, and correction process does not allow parties to create proceedings, make records, or litigate issues they neglected to pursue earlier].)

The settlement process is typically initiated in the superior court. Rules 8.346 and 8.137, as outlined above, govern. (See also rule 8.407(d) (juvenile rule), which refers to rules 8.344 and 8.346.) A sample request is on ADI’s website.45

But an alternative route is available in the Court of Appeal. A party may move to have the record corrected under rule 8.340(c) or 8.410(b)(1), as provided under rule 8.155(c)(1) & (2). A sample request is on ADI’s website.46 The correction can be also done by stipulation. (Rule 8.155(c)(1).) Under rule 8.155(c)(2), the reviewing court may order the superior court to settle disputes about omissions or errors in the record.

See CAVEAT at the beginning of this chapter for possible electronic filing exceptions to these procedures.

45 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples.asp

46 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples.asp
3. **Motion for new trial under Penal Code section 1181, subdivision 9**  

   [§ 3.31]

   The use of a settled statement is typically confined to the loss of a comparatively small portion of the reporter’s transcript of matters heard before the trial court alone. The loss of a significant portion of the record could be cause for filing in the reviewing court a motion for new trial under Penal Code section 1181, subdivision 9. (*In re Stephen B.* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 1; see *People v. Cervantes* (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1117.) If the appeal can be resolved fairly without the transcript, a new trial is not in order. (*See People v. Bradford* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1381-1382; *People v. Pinholster* (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 921-922, and cases cited.)

### III. REQUESTS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME  

[§ 3.32]

Requests for extension of time in criminal and juvenile appeals are governed by California Rules of Court, rules 8.50, 8.60, 8.63, 8.360(c)(4), 8.412(c), and 8.416(f). Extensions are used primarily for the appellant’s opening brief and respondent’s brief and sometimes for the reply brief. They are not available for petitions for rehearing or review, although the last-gasp measure of relief from default can be sought. (Rules 8.268(b)(4) & (c), 8.500(e)(2).) In some courts, counsel on a fast-track case may be required to waive default time provided by rule 8.416(g) in order to obtain an extension.

#### A. **Number of Extensions**  

[§ 3.33]

In most criminal cases, one or two 30-day extensions for filing the appellant’s opening brief are fairly routinely granted, although counsel should consult the assigned staff attorney for current local policies. The courts may entertain more than two extensions, especially in very long record cases, but counsel must specify with particularity the need for additional time. (*See § 3.34, post.*) Extensions are stricter in juvenile cases, especially fast-track dependency appeals under California Rules of Court, rule 8.416.

47On occasion, when counsel knows that 30-day extensions will be inadequate because, for example, the case has a very long record, extensions may be requested in larger increments.
If an extension has not been granted and no opening brief is filed by the due date, in a criminal, delinquency, or non-fast-track dependency case, the court will issue a notice that if the brief is not filed within 30 days and counsel is appointed, new counsel may be appointed or, if counsel is not appointed, the case may be dismissed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.360(c)(5)(A), 8.412(d)(1).) In practice, an order relieving counsel for failure to file a brief is “without compensation,” at least in the Fourth District; the issuance of such an order puts the attorney’s panel status in severe jeopardy and likely terminates it.

In fast-track cases, the “grace” period is 15 days (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.416(g)). Some courts may require that any extension of time waive some or all of this period (see § 3.34, post).

If the late brief is the respondent’s, the notice will say the case may be decided on the basis of the record, the appellant’s opening brief, and argument by the appellant. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.360(c)(5)(B), 8.412(d)(1)(B).)

The court may impose the specified sanction at the appropriate time. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.360(c)(6), 8.412(d)(2).)

B. Grounds for Extension [§ 3.34]

Extensions of time will be granted only upon a showing of good cause in criminal, delinquency, and non-fast-track dependency cases. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.60, 8.63, 8.360(c), 8.412(c).) In juvenile fast-track cases, extensions require an “exceptional showing of good cause” (rule 8.416(f); Code Civ. Proc., § 45); some courts may require counsel to waive all or part of the 15-day “grace” period under rule 8.416(g) (see § 3.33, ante) as a condition of getting an extension of time on the brief.

Acceptable reasons for requiring more time are illustrated in California Rules of Court, rule 8.63(b). Such reasons include work on other appointed appeals (case names and numbers, deadlines, previous extensions, etc., should be listed), facts about the current case like record length and the number and complexity of issues, and other matters that as a practical matter preclude timely filing without undue impairment of quality. *A general “press of business” excuse is not acceptable.* (Rule 8.63(b)(9).) Considerably heightened standards apply to dependency fast-track cases under rule 8.416(f), and stronger reasons are needed to establish the “exceptional showing of good cause” required by rule 8.416(f) and statute (see Code Civ. Proc., § 45).
A common – though by no means universal – policy is to require special justification for more than two extensions. Two 30-day extensions may, however, be excessive given the special needs of the case – for example, fast-track cases under rule 8.416, cases in which immediate custody is at stake, and other time-sensitive situations.\textsuperscript{48} Often, the time available will be limited to a short extension, and multiple extensions will be denied.

Counsel must not give as an excuse that a \textit{Wende-Anders} or \textit{Sade C.} brief\textsuperscript{49} is contemplated or that ADI is reviewing the record for that purpose. Such a statement tends to disparage any merits issues ultimately raised. Similarly, if counsel needs time to explain to the client potential adverse consequences from pursuing the appeal, the existence and nature of such consequences should not be mentioned. Other prejudicial matters might include time spent looking for a fugitive client (could lead to dismissal of appeal); difficulties in dealing with client (could disparage client); and numerous other situations. Counsel should describe the need for more time in generalities that could not work to the client’s detriment. If it is unavoidably necessary to provide some detail to support the amount of time required for a potentially prejudicial matter, counsel may put it in a confidential memo to ADI.

In all extension requests counsel should advise the court in simple terms of the progress made toward preparation of the brief. Counsel should use discretion and not go into great detail regarding illnesses or other personal circumstances.

C. Extensions Pending Augmentation or Correction of the Record \text{[§ 3.35]}

If an augmentation may delay the brief, the augment request may be accompanied by an extension request to, for example, “30 days after the supplemental record is filed.”

\textsuperscript{48}For ways of achieving faster resolution than the normal appeal would afford, see \textit{chapter 1}, “The ABC’s of Panel Membership: Basic Information for Appointed Counsel,” § 1.30 et seq. on “Protecting the Client in Time-Sensitive Cases.”

\textsuperscript{49}A \textit{Wende-Anders} brief is filed when counsel can find no arguable issues. \textit{(People v. Wende} (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; see also \textit{Anders v. California} (1967) 386 U.S. 738; \textit{In re Sade C.} (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952.) Such briefs are discussed in more detail in § 1.24 et seq. of \textit{chapter 1} of this manual, “The ABC’s of Panel Membership: Basic Information for Appointed Counsel,” and § 4.73 et seq. of \textit{chapter 4}, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection.”
Court policy may vary on whether the requests should be separate or combined. If the requests are combined, the title of the combined document should clearly indicate both types of requests. (See §§ 3.21, 3.24, ante.)

Because a California Rules of Court, rule 8.340(b) or 8.410(b)(1) letter request is directed to the superior court and no action is required by the appellate court, a rule 8.340(b) or 8.410(b)(1) letter request cannot be combined with a request to extend time, but counsel can send the Court of Appeal a separate extension request and use the pending record correction as a reason for needing it. Some courts grant an extension request until a certain number of days after the filing of the corrected record; others require periodic extension requests while the corrected record is being compiled. The decision may depend on the magnitude of the correction needed, counsel’s ability to work on other parts of the case before getting the correction, etc.

D. Contents and Form of Extension Request  [§ 3.36]

A sample extension request is on the ADI website.50 This form is the preferred format for extension requests in the Fourth Appellate District. It includes the present and proposed due dates; the number of previous requests; previous notice, if any, under California Rules of Court, rule 8.360(c)(5) or 8.412(d); the dates counsel was appointed and the record was filed; and the reasons for extending time.

Important filing requirements under the California Rules of Court include these steps:

- File with the Court of Appeal an original and one copy, plus copies for the appellate project, opposing counsel (usually, the Attorney General), and all other parties involved in the appeal (such as co-appellants). (Rule 8.44(b)(7).)

- Show proof of service on opposing counsel and any other parties involved in the appeal. (Rules 8.25(a), 8.50(a.).)

50 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples.asp

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• Include self-addressed stamped envelopes for oneself, opposing counsel, and all other parties. (Rule 8.50(c).)\(^{51}\)

• Include the name, address, telephone number, and State Bar number of counsel on the first page of the document. (Rules 8.204(b)(10)(D), 8.40(c).)

The court’s order will typically be stamped directly on the request.\(^{52}\) One copy will be mailed back to counsel in the envelope counsel has provided; the court will forward the additional copies to opposing counsel, the appellate project, and any other parties involved in the appeal. Counsel should also always monitor the Court of Appeal website for the order.\(^{53}\)

See CAVEAT at the beginning of this chapter for possible electronic filing exceptions to the preceding rules and procedures.

IV. RELEASE PENDING APPEAL [§ 3.37]

The California Constitution provides for the right to bail subject to specified exceptions. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12.) The applicable statutory provisions for release pending appeal are Penal Code sections 1272 and 1272.1, discussed in § 3.38 et seq., post.) Proceedings in the appellate court after unsuccessful application in the trial court are governed by California Rules of Court, rule 8.312. The possibility of release pending decision is also available on habeas corpus. (Pen. Code, § 1476.)

\(^{51}\) In some districts such as the Fourth, the Court of Appeal may forward its ruling on the motion to the Attorney General and the appellate project in its daily packet to each, and therefore no prepaid, preaddressed envelope to those entities is required. (Counsel should consult the district project for local practices.) If the district attorney instead of the Attorney General is representing the People, a prepaid envelope addressed to the district attorney is required under rule 8.50(c).

\(^{52}\) In the Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, for rulings on second and subsequent extension requests, the court issues its own separate order.

\(^{53}\) Monitor cases at [http://appellatecases.courthub.ca.gov/index.html](http://appellatecases.courthub.ca.gov/index.html) Some older cases and some that require confidentiality may not be posted.

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Although release pending appeal is not common, under some circumstances appellate counsel may have an obligation to seek it or assist the client or trial counsel in doing so. Indeed, in some cases it may be crucial to preserve even the possibility of meaningful appellate relief. (See § 1.30 et seq. of chapter 1, “The ABC’s of Panel Membership: Basic Information for Appointed Counsel,” on methods of ensuring timely relief.)

Money bail is one possible method to effect release on appeal. The courts may impose alternative conditions to assure a defendant’s presence at all necessary proceedings. (*People v. Overstreet* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 898; *In re Pipinos* (1982) 33 Cal.3d 189, 192, fn. 1.)

Release pending appeal may also be sought when the client is ordered to serve time in county jail as a condition of probation. (*People v. McNiff* (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 201, 205.)

A. **Standards** [§ 3.38]

1. **Eligibility for release** [§ 3.39]

Penal Code section 1272 governs eligibility for release pending appeal:

> After conviction of an offense not punishable with death, a defendant who has made application for probation or who has appealed may be admitted to bail:

1. As a matter of right, before judgment is pronounced pending application for probation in cases of misdemeanors, or when the appeal is from a judgment imposing a fine only.

2. As a matter of right, before judgment is pronounced pending application for probation in cases of misdemeanors, or when the appeal is from a judgment imposing imprisonment in cases of misdemeanors.

3. As a matter of discretion in all other cases, except that a person convicted of an offense subject to this subdivision, who makes a motion for release on bail subsequent to a sentencing hearing, shall provide notice of the hearing in the bail motion to the prosecuting attorney at least five court days prior to the hearing.
Release pending appeal is thus at the discretion of the court in most felony cases. (Pen. Code, § 1272, subd. 3.)

There are exceptions to the eligibility provisions of these sections. For example, convicted felons who have been placed on a “parole hold” are not entitled to release pending appeal even though the alleged offense triggering the hold is a bailable offense, because the Board of Parole Hearings has exclusive jurisdiction over parolees. (Pen. Code, §§ 3040, 5077; In re Law (1973) 10 Cal.3d 21, 24-25; see also In re Fain (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 540, 548.) Juvenile offenders also are not entitled to release pending appeal on the theory that juvenile court procedures contain adequate substitutes for bail. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 628 et seq.; In re Talbott (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1290, 1293; Aubry v. Gadbois (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 470, 473-475.)

2. Considerations for court in exercising discretion whether to grant release pending appeal [§ 3.40]

In In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921, the California Supreme Court held that in exercising its discretion whether to grant release pending appeal, the superior court “may consider (1) the likelihood of the defendant’s flight, (2) the potential danger to society posed by the defendant’s release, and (3) the frivolousness or lack of diligence in defendant’s prosecution of his appeal.” (Id. at p. 933.) Penal Code section 1272.1 incorporates the standards set out in Podesto and In re Pipinos (1982) 33 Cal.3d 189.

Penal Code section 1272.1 also requires the court to include a brief statement of reasons in support of its order granting or denying a motion for release pending appeal, so that an appellate court can determine whether discretion was properly exercised. (See In re Christie (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1107.) “The statement need only include the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.” (Pen. Code, § 1272.1, subd. (c).) In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921 and In re Pipinos (1982) 33 Cal.3d 189 provide guidance in interpreting this requirement. (See, e.g., In re Hernandez (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1262.)

a. Defendant is not likely to flee [§ 3.41]

Subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 1272.1 codifies the first Podesto requirement. The defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is not likely to flee while released.
In determining whether the defendant is likely to flee the court must consider such factors as:

- The ties of the defendant to the community, including employment, duration of residence, family attachments, and property holdings. (Pen. Code, § 1272.1, subd. (a)(1).)

- The defendant’s record of appearance at past court hearings or of flight to avoid prosecution. (Pen. Code, § 1272.1, subd. (a)(2).)

- The severity of the sentence. (Pen. Code, § 1272.1, subd. (a)(3).)

b. **Defendant poses no danger** [§ 3.42]

Under subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 1272.1, the defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence the release would not present a danger to any other person or to the community. In evaluating this matter, the court must consider, among other factors, whether the crime for which the defendant was convicted was a violent felony as defined under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c).54

c. **Appeal is good-faith and substantial** [§ 3.43]

The defendant must demonstrate the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial legal question which, if decided in the defendant’s favor, is likely to result in a reversal. (Pen. Code, § 1272.1, subd. (c).) Under subdivision (c) a “substantial legal question” is defined as “a close question, one of more substance than would be necessary to a finding that it was not frivolous.” (See, e.g., People v. McGuire (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 687, 702-703 [superior court acted within its discretion when it determined appeal presented a substantial legal question].) In making this assessment, the court is not required to determine whether it committed error. (Pen. Code, § 1272.1, subd. (c).)

54 Conviction of a violent felony is only one factor the court may use to determine whether the defendant poses a danger to the safety of others or the community. (In re Hernandez (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1261-1264 [writ petition seeking bail pending appeal denied where defendant, convicted of possessing for sale controlled substances and maintaining place where drugs were sold, did not show by clear and convincing evidence she was not a danger to community].)
B. Procedures [§ 3.44]

See CAVEAT at the beginning of this chapter for possible electronic filing exceptions to the following rules and procedures.

1. Initial application in superior court [§ 3.45]

   A motion for release pending appeal or for a reduction of bail on appeal must be made to the superior court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.312(b).) If the motion is made after the sentencing hearing, the defendant must provide notice to the prosecution at least five court days before the hearing. (Pen. Code, § 1272, subd. 3.)

   In most cases, trial counsel is in the best position to make the motion in the superior court. Trial counsel is most familiar with the facts of the case as well as other matters, such as whether the trial court might be favorably disposed to grant a motion for release pending appeal. Also, trial counsel will most likely be geographically close to the trial court.

   However, the appellate attorney may be helpful in providing an opinion that a “substantial legal question” may be presented on appeal. If a motion for release pending appeal is clearly indicated and trial counsel will not or cannot make the motion, appellate counsel should file the motion in the superior court. (Appellate counsel should consult with the project attorney if personal appearances are necessary and counsel’s office is geographically distant from the trial court.)

2. Application in the appellate court [§ 3.46]

   If dissatisfied with the superior court’s decision on the request for release pending appeal, the defendant may apply to the Court of Appeal. It must include a showing that the defendant sought relief in the superior court and the court unjustifiably denied the application or set bail so high as to amount to a denial of the motion. (Rule 8.312(b); see People v. Remijio (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 12, 13 [high bail was denial of due process].) The application must be served on the district attorney and Attorney General. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.312(c).) Normally an application for release pending appeal is made by motion, but a petition for writ of habeas corpus can also serve that function. (E.g., In re Pipinos (1982) 33 Cal.3d 189, 196-197; see § 8.55 of chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies.”)

The reviewing court may grant temporary release pending its ruling on the application for release during appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.312(d); e.g., In re Fishman (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 632, 633.)

C. Considerations in Deciding Whether To Seek Release Pending Appeal
[§ 3.47]

Determining whether an application for release pending appeal is appropriate is not a mechanical process, but requires sound professional judgment. Considerations include the legal merits of the motion and the underlying appeal and the client’s individual circumstances and wishes.

One factor is the likelihood of success in seeking release, given the statutory criteria and the facts in the particular case. Another is the likelihood of relief on the appeal itself.

Counsel must also consider the date the client is likely to be released from custody. One of the main reasons for seeking release on appeal is to safeguard the possibility of meaningful relief for the client in time-sensitive cases and avoid the possibility the client might end up serving “dead” time – custody in excess of the lawful sentence – in the event of a favorable result on appeal. This might happen, for example, if the sentence is short, a reduction in sentence is probable, or substantial additional credits may be ordered.56

55 As a preliminary step during the initial review of the case following appointment, especially when the sentence is relatively short, appellate counsel should determine the client’s expected release date and calculate how that might be affected by a favorable ruling on appeal.

56 If counsel determines the case might indeed be time-sensitive, a number of options can be considered, in addition to or instead of release pending appeal. This topic is covered in § 1.30 et seq. of chapter 1, “The ABC’s of Panel Membership: Basic Information for Appointed Counsel.”
If counsel determines release might be appropriate, counsel should consult with the client and explain the possible benefits and liabilities of seeking release. The client may want to post a bond or ask counsel to seek release on other conditions. (See, e.g., In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921, 925, fn. 1.)

Release pending appeal is not necessarily desirable in every situation, even if it is theoretically available. If the chances for relief are not strong, the client is often well advised to continue serving the term of imprisonment pending appeal, rather than facing the financial burden of posting bail or the disruption of returning to confinement after affirmance of the judgment on appeal. The decision to seek release should be made by the client, after full and informed consideration of the matter.
– CHAPTER FOUR –

ON THE HUNT:

THE SCIENCE AND ART
OF ISSUE SPOTTING AND SELECTION
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ON THE HUNT: THE SCIENCE AND ART
OF ISSUE SPOTTING AND SELECTION

I. INTRODUCTION  [§ 4.0]

Issue spotting is probably the most important function of lawyering in criminal appeals. An attorney may perform a masterful job of research, analysis, and briefing, but if an issue that would win for the client is overlooked, the attorney has probably rendered legally ineffective assistance. Appellate counsel must therefore work assiduously to develop strong issue-spotting skills and in every case must put maximum effort into ensuring all potential issues have been identified and properly evaluated.

Counsel also have a duty to spot “negative” issues – those that could put the client in a worse position after the appeal than before. Sometimes helping the client avoid the adverse consequence trap is the most valuable service appellate counsel can offer.

II. THE FUNDAMENTALS  [§ 4.1]

A. Approaching the Case  [§ 4.2]

Finding issues on appeal is both a science and an art. Entering the scientist’s laboratory, the appellate lawyer must focus a microscope on the minutest suspicious detail, analytically dissect the facts and law, and question everything that happened or did not happen. Moving to the artist’s studio, the lawyer must engage all his or her capacity for creativity and sensitivity, seeing apparently mundane or discouraging matters from new, imaginative perspectives. Like both the scientist and the artist, counsel on the hunt for issues will find an observant eye, a curious and relentlessly inquiring mind, and sheer perseverance to be absolute prerequisites.

It is best to start with the basics. First, the obvious – the issues litigated below. Then – counsel should question, question, and question some more. If something in the record, either a factual matter or a point of law, seems puzzling, unfair, or otherwise not quite right, counsel should pursue it until satisfied. Not knowing an answer is an easily solved problem. Not even asking the right question can lead to disaster.
B. Going to the “Horse’s Mouth”  [§ 4.3]

The participants at trial – the client and trial counsel – are potentially crucial sources of issues. Even if they do not formulate an issue in terms that can be raised on appeal, their suggestions may raise a red flag.

1. **Trial counsel**  [§ 4.4]

Appellate counsel should ask the trial attorney for input on the most significant, unusual, or especially troubling aspects of the proceedings. Not everything that happens in a trial is in the record, nor does the record fully reflect the flavor and subtleties of the proceedings. Trial counsel may also be able to call the appellate attorney’s attention to missing parts of the record. If ineffective assistance of the trial attorney is a potential issue, it is mandatory to contact trial counsel.¹ (It may not be advisable to allude to that possibility at the initial contact, in order to elicit cooperation on other issues.)

2. **Client**  [§ 4.5]

Counsel should ascertain what the client expects to accomplish from the appeal and allow the client to participate appropriately in the decision-making process. Although counsel makes the final selection among potential issues, the client needs to decide the basic objectives of the appeal. (See § 1.56 et seq. of chapter 1, “The ABC’s of Panel Membership: Basic Information for Appointed Counsel,” on decision-making authority of attorney and client.) Counsel must also explain any potential adverse consequences and determine whether the client wants to proceed. (See § 4.91 et seq., post.)

C. Knowing the Legal Landscape  [§ 4.6]

Experience with appellate issues is one of the most important components of strong issue-spotting skills. This requirement of course poses a difficulty for the newer attorney, but the attorney can cope by working closely with staff attorneys, networking with more experienced panel attorneys, and developing a finely tuned awareness of what is going on in the legal world – in the Legislature and in the California and federal courts. Indeed, the most experienced lawyers must do the same.

¹Discussion with the assigned ADI staff attorney is also required, regardless whether the issue is being for considered for the direct appeal or for a habeas corpus investigation. This requirement does not apply for a brief “fallback” IAC argument (“No objection was required, and if it was, counsel was ineffective for not raising it”).

2
1. **Legal resources**  [§ 4.7]

To keep abreast of changes and develop a deeper understanding of the law, counsel must be attuned to and diligently use the many legal resources available. An indispensable practice is reading new appellate opinions regularly – not just for the holdings, but especially for their underlying analysis. Another way is to keep track of recently enacted and pending legislation. Articles and treatises provide a source of “cutting edge” issues and in-depth critical analysis of the law. Project websites and newsletters may publish “kudos” – recent winning issues. The Internet, as well as numerous printed publications are excellent tools for broadening and sharpening knowledge of the law.

2. **Potentially important pending cases**  [§ 4.8]

Tracking cases pending before the United States and California Supreme Courts is an important duty. The California Supreme Court has a list, and CCAP maintains its own list of both courts. These resources can be reached through [ADI’s website](http://www.adi-sandiego.com/news_alerts/pending_issues.asp).

3. **Networking with colleagues**  [§ 4.9]

It is critical for attorneys of all experience levels to confer with colleagues about cases and issues whenever the opportunity arises. This practice will help avoid the need to reinvent the wheel, will provide ideas for new issues or new slants on old ones, and will serve as a reality check on issues that just won’t fly.

4. **Personal reference resource**  [§ 4.10]

Many outstanding appellate attorneys keep a notebook, a checklist, or some other type of reference system for saving cases, ideas, articles, and other sources of potential issues. The process of writing things down reinforces the information in the mind, and the written format allows counsel to retrieve it efficiently later. § 4.121 et seq., appendix A, enumerates some commonly raised appellate issues that can serve as a starting point or supplement to counsel’s own lists.

______________________________

III. REVIEWING THE RECORD FOR ISSUES  [§ 4.11]

The most critical source of issues in any case is by far the appellate transcript. Except for occasional investigations into potential writs, the search for issues on appeal generally begins and ends with the record. Counsel therefore must scrutinize the record meticulously.

A. Ensuring Adequate Record  [§ 4.12]

Without a complete record counsel will not be able to make the necessary search for issues on appeal. It is appellate counsel’s constitutional responsibility to ensure a complete record. (See People v. Barton (1978) 21 Cal.3d 513, 519-520; People v. Harris (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 709, 714.)

1. Augmentation and correction  [§ 4.13]

The record should be augmented if necessary (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.155, 8.340(d)), and any omission from the normal record should be corrected (rule 8.340(b)). For greater detail, see § 3.12 et seq. of chapter 3, “Pre-Briefing Responsibilities: Record Completion, Extensions of Time, Release on Appeal.”

2. Superior court records  [§ 4.14]

In some instances it will be important to review the superior court file or exhibits. Sometimes the original transcripts will have gaps, or reference will be made to documents, tapes, physical evidence, and other items not in the transcripts. Occasionally vital information turns up that is not even suggested in the normal record – for instance, jury notes. An ADI staff attorney often can review the file on behalf of appointed attorneys located far from the superior court, although sometimes the needs of the case demand that appointed counsel personally review the file.

3. Proceedings not in transcripts  [§ 4.15]

Counsel should be alert for proceedings not in the transcripts, such as bench or in-chambers conferences. Sometimes counsel can find out what happened by calling trial counsel or the court reporter. If the proceeding is potentially significant to the appeal, counsel should attempt to incorporate it into the record. If a reporter’s transcript cannot be
prepared, counsel may seek to prepare a settled or agreed statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.134, 8.137, 8.344, 8.346.)

When a substantial portion of the proceedings is not available, because for example the reporter’s notes have been lost, a motion to vacate the judgment may be in order. (See Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 9.)

4. Improper material in record  [§ 4.16]

Counsel should also be alert for materials not supposed to be in the record. (See ADI’s web page on confidential records and the California courts’ Nondisclosure of Identity Policies.) For example, by law the transcripts must not include the names, addresses, or telephone numbers of sworn jurors; jurors must be referred to by an identifying number. (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.332(b).) Other examples might be confidential juvenile filings (see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 827; rule 8.401) and confidential transcripts (rule 8.47), as well as social security numbers (rule 1.201(a)(1) and addresses required to be confidential (e.g., Welf. and Inst. Code § 308 [foster parents]).

Upon discovering material that counsel is not supposed to see, counsel should stop reading that part of the transcript immediately and notify the Court of Appeal and ADI. The court may order return of the records, redaction, or other corrective action. Under no circumstances should counsel send such material to clients or other persons without specific authorization from the court or ADI.


5The information for unsworn jurors (such as those excused) must not be sealed unless the court finds compelling reason to do so (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(1); rule 8.332(c)), but by policy unsworn jurors should be identified only by first name and initial.

If access to juror identification information is required to handle the case, counsel may apply to the trial court under Code of Civil Procedure section 237, subdivisions (b)-(d).
B. The Initial Review of the Record  [§ 4.17]

The initial reading of the record will give a comprehensive picture of the contours of the appeal. It is wise to set aside an uninterrupted block of time to give the record undivided attention. This will help counsel develop a sense of the proceedings as a whole and also facilitate timely completion of the record if necessary. It may be helpful to write up and organize the rough transcript notes while everything is still fresh in mind.

1. Clerk’s transcript  [§ 4.18]

Counsel should ordinarily begin review of the record by reading the clerk’s transcript, looking for total continuity to ensure critical pieces are not missing. It is important to determine what happened to every allegation, every motion, and every party. If something enters the picture that is puzzling or incomplete or dubious, it should be added to the list of questions to be investigated.

2. Reporter’s transcript  [§ 4.19]

Counsel should then read the reporter’s transcript, taking concise notes with page references. The overall evidentiary picture can be filled in as counsel goes through direct, cross, redirect, and recross testimony. Counsel should scrutinize any motions, noting the arguments made on both sides, the evidence offered, and the disposition and reasoning offered by the court. It is important to review every significant objection and its disposition and to record any matters that apparently should have been objected to but were not.

C. Spotting Potential Issues  [§ 4.20]

While reading the record, counsel should compile a list of potential issues. At the first stage counsel should strive to be over-inclusive – anything counsel cannot positively reject should be on the list. The search for issues begins with a wide-open, creative, anything-goes approach; only later is critical judgment applied to sort out the arguable issues from those to be discarded.

1. Issues litigated at trial  [§ 4.21]

Working with the obvious is a productive initial approach. This means looking for “flagged” issues, such as objections, motions, and rejected instructions. Flagged issues are an exceedingly important screening device. First, a party generally may not raise
issues on appeal if they were not raised in the proceedings below. Second and conversely, failure to raise on appeal a meritorious issue litigated below may give rise to an allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

2. **Jury instructions** [§ 4.22]

   Special scrutiny is called for in reviewing those parts of the proceedings where most errors generally are made and those parts where the standards of review and prejudice are most favorable to the appellant. In cases tried to a jury, one of these areas is the instructions.\(^6\) Counsel should inspect jury instructions minutely – in several different ways.

   a. **Court’s selection of instructions to be given** [§ 4.23]

      First, counsel should compare written instructions from which the judge was reading, and any rejected ones, with standard approved instructions such as CALCRIM.\(^7\) It is helpful to use checklists of sua sponte and other important instructions to ensure the correct ones were selected.

   b. **Oral rendition of instructions** [§ 4.24]

      Second, counsel must analyze the oral instructions in the reporter’s transcript to make sure that they correspond with the printed ones and that the law *as stated to the jury* was complete and correct in light of the facts of the case. What the court actually said – not what it intended to say – is how the jury was “instructed.” The court might have

\(^6\) Many instructional errors can be raised despite lack of objection in the trial court. (See Pen. Code, § 1259: “The appellate court may . . . review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.”)

\(^7\) California Criminal Jury Instructions, officially approved by the Judicial Council. Their use is “strongly encouraged.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1050(e).) If an alternative is used, it should be “accurate, brief, understandable, impartial, and free from argument.”
misread the text at some point or have improvised.8 (See People v. Silva (1978) 20 Cal.3d 489, 493; People v. Gloria (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.)

c. Printed instructions sent into jury room [§ 4.25]

Third, counsel needs to review any printed instructions sent into the jury room, if available. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1093, subd. (f), 1137.) Sometimes they are redacted improperly or contain irrelevant, prejudicial, or legally incorrect information. In the event of a conflict between oral and printed instructions given the jury, the latter govern. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 717.) Thus an error in the printed instructions may well be prejudicial.

d. Reasonable doubt [§ 4.26]


Since failure to explain reasonable doubt properly can be reversible per se, counsel should always make sure adequate instruction was given. (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 277-278 [incorrect reasonable doubt instruction]; cf. People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342 [omission of instruction altogether is subject to harmless error analysis under Chapman9]; People v. Mayo (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 535 [omission of CALJIC No. 2.90 not federal constitutional error when other instructions repeatedly stated jury must find every element beyond a reasonable doubt].)

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8 The oral instructions as they appear in the reporter’s transcript are not necessarily a precise record of what the judge said. (See People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 189-194.)

Response to jury request for additional instruction  [§ 4.27]

An area of exceeding importance is the trial court’s handling of a jury question or request for additional instruction. The jury’s query signals it is focusing on that area, and so an erroneous response is likely to be found prejudicial. (See People v. Thompkins (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 244, 253.)

Counsel should analyze the content of the court’s answer for correctness, responsiveness, and understandability. It is also critical to review the procedure used – e.g., whether the answer was provided in open court and whether the client and counsel were present and were given a chance for prior input. (People v. Dagnino (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 981 [counsel’s presence at reinstruction required unless waived]; see also People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 613-614 [communications must be in open court].)

3. Sentencing  [§ 4.28]

In a criminal case, counsel should look very closely at sentencing, a complicated area fraught with potential for error. The sentence imposed should be checked against the statute in effect at the time of the crime. Issues involving such matters as enhancements, consecutive sentences, Penal Code section 654, strikes, credits, fines or fees, and probation conditions – to name only a few – need to be considered. Attorneys are encouraged to consult with ADI if they are not extensively familiar with the law of sentencing.

4. Uncommon but “big” issues  [§ 4.29]

Counsel should be on the alert for errors that are unusual but occur occasionally – some can be of momentous importance when they do occur. For example, if the client was convicted of a crime committed a considerable time ago, it is advisable to check for statute of limitations or ex post facto issues and to ascertain whether the law has changed in the client’s favor since the crime. Jurisdictional and venue questions can arise in unusual proceedings or events involving multiple counties, as when a minor is transferred from one county to another. Prior proceedings in the same case may suggest the need to scrutinize for collateral estoppel, res judicata, double jeopardy, multiple prosecution, and similar issues.
5. **Recent and potential changes in the law**  [§ 4.30]

Counsel should be alert to relevant issues opened up by recent developments in the law, such as new decisions and grants of review of certiorari in the California or United States Supreme Court. These issues often can be raised on the client’s behalf, even at later stages of an appeal. If a change in the law occurred after trial, the appellate court usually will find it unnecessary to have raised the point below. The subject of taking advantage of favorable changes in the law is treated extensively in a memo on the ADI website, which also offers a web page following important recent changes and analyzing their potential effect.\(^{10}\)

6. **Checklist**  [§ 4.31]

*Appendix A* lists a number of issues commonly raised on criminal appeals and can serve as the starting point for a checklist. *Appendix C* offers a list of common dependency issues, and *Appendix D* does the same for delinquency appeals. It should go without saying that each attorney must (1) modify and supplement the list as experience and legal changes dictate and (2) confirm and update the issue and its underlying authorities every time the issue is raised.

7. **Issues that may hurt the client**  [§ 4.32]

A special problem in issue spotting is adverse consequences. Counsel should look not only for errors against the client, but for favorable ones, too. If a favorable error resulted in an unauthorized sentence or other unlawful disposition, the client may face additional time. (See § 4.91 et seq., *post*, on adverse consequences.) Often pursuing an appeal will make it more likely the error will be noticed and corrected. (E.g., *People v. Ingram* (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1397 [sentence increased from 27 years-life to 61 years-life because of unauthorized sentence discovered on appeal], disapproved on another ground in *People v. Dotson* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547.)

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\(^{10}\)Memo on taking advantage of favorable changes:


Web page on recent changes:

IV. ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION OF ISSUES  [§ 4.33]

After counsel has compiled a list of all possible issues to be considered on appeal, the winnowing process begins. During the review and elimination process, counsel should annotate the list of potential issues, assessing each in writing and explaining why issues are retained or rejected. This method will systematically cover all possible issues. It will also document counsel’s handling of the issues; if there is later occasion to review the file, counsel will have a record what issues were considered and why they were or were not raised.

Those issues obviously not supported by the facts after the record review is complete or by the law after quick research, or any so trivial a prejudicial error argument would essentially be impossible, can be discarded early.

A more searching analysis will be needed for the remaining issues. Evaluating an issue requires assessing not only its legal merits, but also its reviewability, the standard of review, the standard of prejudice, and other rules, principles, and presumptions governing appellate review.

ADI articles offer a multi-perspective view of the issue-selection process. The article, To Brief or Not to Brief: Marginal Issues11 explores the tension between the need to advocate zealously on the client’s behalf and the attorney’s duty as an officer of the court to refrain from pursuing frivolous claims. It reviews the standards set out below for assessing arguability. The news alert entry on Assertive Issue Selection12 looks at the opposing tendency to omit issues merely because they can be contested or might be rejected by the court. It points out the standard for arguability is whether a court reasonably might accept the argument, not whether the court actually will.


A. Reviewability  [§ 4.34]

An issue may not be reviewable on appeal because the appellate court has no power to review the decision or, if it has the power, almost always declines to exercise it.

1. Jurisdiction  [§ 4.35]

The appellate court may lack jurisdiction. For example, a valid notice of appeal may never have been filed; appeal prerequisites such as a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(1)) may not have been met; or the judgment or order appealed from may not be appealable as a matter of law.

2. Mootness and ripeness  [§ 4.36]

Usually the court will decline to exercise its discretionary reviewing power if a case is moot or is not yet ripe for decision. A case is moot if its resolution will not be binding on or otherwise affect the parties to the litigation. It is not ripe unless “‘the controversy . . . [is] definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests . . . [and] admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170-171.) If a controversy is moot or unripe, a decision would be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which ordinarily is outside both the proper functions and jurisdiction of an appellate court. (Id. at p. 170; see also People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084; Lynch v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 910, 912.)

13 A case is not necessarily moot because the course of current litigation will not be affected. If the defendant may suffer collateral consequences, including stigma, or future legal disabilities, etc., the case is not moot. (People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338, 345; People v. Nolan (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1213 [even if defendant not subject to further punishment, is opportunity to erase stigma of criminality].) (See chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus,” § 9.3, on mootness under federal law.)
A California court may exercise discretion to decide a moot case if it involves issues of serious public concern that would otherwise elude resolution.\textsuperscript{14} \textit{(California State Personnel \textit{v.} California State Employees Association} (2006) 36 Cal.4th 758, 763, fn. 1; \textit{People \textit{v.} Hurtado} (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1179, 1186; \textit{In re M.} (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23-25 [detention of juvenile before jurisdictional hearing]; \textit{In re Newbern} (1961) 55 Cal.2d 500, 505 [contact with bondsman]; \textit{In re Fluery} (1967) 67 Cal.2d 600, 601 [credits for time in jail].) Similarly, the ripeness doctrine does not prevent courts from “resolving concrete disputes if the consequence of a deferred decision will be lingering uncertainty in the law, especially when there is widespread public interest in the answer to a particular legal question.” \textit{(Pacific Legal Foundation \textit{v.} California Coastal Com.} (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170.)

3. Review by writ [§ 4.37]

Certain pretrial issues, those affecting whether the trial should proceed at all, and some decisions needing expedited decision may require a writ petition.

A notable example in dependency proceedings is a court decision to end reunification efforts and set a hearing to determine a permanency plan for the child. At this point the dominant consideration is permanent stability for the child. An appeal from the decision to set a hearing would prolong the uncertainty for many months, and so Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 requires any challenge to the decision to be made initially by writ. This procedure is governed by California Rules of Court, rules 8.450-8.452. A similar requirement applies to proceedings challenging a post-termination order affecting the child’s placement. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.28; rules 8.454-8.456.)

In criminal proceedings, the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary hearing to support the information is reviewable only by pretrial writ. (Pen. Code, §§ 995, 999a.) Examples of other criminal statutory writs include Penal Code sections 279.6, 871.6, 1238, subdivision (d), 1511, 1512, and 4011.8. (See § 8.83 et seq. of \textit{chapter 8}, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies,” for further discussion of statutory writs.)

\textsuperscript{14}In the federal system, in contrast, because of the “case or controversy” requirement of article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution, mootness as to the individual litigants defeats jurisdiction. \textit{(Massachusetts \textit{v.} E.P.A.} (2007) 549 U.S. 497; see § 9.3 of \textit{chapter 9}, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”)
Some issues are reviewable by either pretrial writ or appeal from a final judgment, but under different standards. While error may be sufficient to justify issuance of certain pretrial writs, appeals require a showing that the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Defects at the preliminary hearing, for example, cannot be reviewed after judgment unless the defendant demonstrates how they affected the trial. (People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529.) Denial of a speedy trial is similarly reviewable after judgment only on a showing of prejudice to the outcome of the case.\textsuperscript{15} (People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 766-769 [state constitutional right to speedy trial and statutory right to speedy trial under Pen. Code, § 1382].)

4. Standing [§ 4.38]

Lack of standing may also preclude the court from considering an argument. For example, in a search or seizure situation, or an issue involving self-incrimination, the appellant lacks standing to raise an issue regarding the violation of someone else’s rights. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 881-882; see also In re P.R. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 936.) Another example, in a dependency case: “A parent’s appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights confers standing to appeal an order concerning the dependant child’s placement only if the placement order’s reversal advances the parent’s argument against terminating parental rights.” (In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 238.)

5. Forfeiture or waiver [§ 4.39]

Probably the most common reason for the Court of Appeal to decline to decide a particular issue is failure to raise it in the lower court. Usually, if the lower court has not had a chance to consider the issue or the opposing party has not had a fair chance to introduce evidence on the subject, the issue will not be considered on appeal. The objection must state the ground on which it is based, to give the trial court an opportunity to correct any error. (In re E.A. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 787.)

\textsuperscript{15}In contrast to the standard on appeal, a Penal Code section 1382 violation entitles the defendant to pretrial dismissal regardless of prejudice. (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 604-605; People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 769.)
Counsel may consider ways around forfeiture or waiver16 obstacles, such as arguing: the issue was obvious to all parties and the trial court, even without a formal objection; the issue was raised indirectly or substantially, even if not exactly as formulated on appeal; raising it would have been futile in light of other rulings by the trial court; the issue implicates fundamental due process; trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to raise it; or the law has since changed. (See more detailed description and authorities in § 5.27 of chapter 5, “Effective Written Advocacy: Briefing.”)

6. **Motions requiring renewal at later stage**  [§ 4.40]

Certain motions have to be renewed at a specified point to be preserved for appeal. Pretrial motions in limine, for example, may have to be renewed at trial. (*People v. Morris* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 189-190, disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Stansbury* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1.) Search and seizure motions made at the preliminary hearing must be renewed in the trial court under Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m). (See further discussion of this requirement in § 2.35 et seq. of chapter 2, First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started.”)

7. **Invited error**  [§ 4.41]

Invited error is another reason for a court to reject an argument other than on the merits. In such a situation the appellant by his explicit words or actions has solicited some type of action that is legally incorrect. To constitute invited error, the action must have resulted from an intentional tactical decision. (*People v. Marshall* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 931; see, e.g., *In re G.P.* (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1193.)

8. **Credits and fines or fees issues – Penal Code sections 1237.1 and 1237.2**  [§ 4.42]

Other limitations are imposed by Penal Code section 1237.1, which applies to issues based on the calculation of credits, and section 1237.2, which applies to fines, fees,

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16Technically, “waiver” refers to an explicit and intentional relinquishment of a right, while “forfeiture” refers to loss of entitlement to raise an issue on appeal because of failure to follow procedures required to preserve it. (*In re S.B.* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2.) The distinction was largely ignored in older opinions, which used “waiver” for both meanings.
and other monetary assessments. Both require an application to the trial court for correction of the alleged errors before the issue may be raised as the sole issue on appeal. The requirements do not apply to juvenile cases. (In re Antwon R. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 348, 350.) The application may be made informally.

9. Fugitive dismissal doctrine [§ 4.43]

Another limitation, derived from common law, applies when the defendant absconds while an appeal is pending. An appeal by a fugitive is subject to discretionary dismissal. One theory underlying this doctrine is that the court no longer has control over the person to make its judgment effective. (People v. Fuhr (1926) 198 Cal. 593, 594; People v. Redinger (1880) 55 Cal. 290, 298; People v. Buffalo (1975) 49 Cal. App.3d 838, 839 [giving defendant 30 days to surrender]; cf. People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 399 [defendant fled during appeal, but was recaptured the same day; dismissal rule held inapplicable]; People v. Puluc-Sique (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 894 [deported defendant not fugitive].)


The court has discretion to reinstate the appeal. (See People v. Clark (1927) 201 Cal. 474, 477-478 [refusing to reinstate appeal a year after it was dismissed; power to reinstate “should only be exercised in those cases where it is plainly made to appear that a denial of its exercise would work a palpable injustice or wrong upon the appellant”]; People v. Kang (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 43, 47 [defendant escaped before sentencing; appeal filed in absentia was dismissed, then reinstated after his recapture two years later].)

Federal due process and equal protection do not require a state to give the defendant a particular time to surrender, to reinstate the appeal after he is recaptured, or to treat defendants who escape before appealing the same as those who escape after appealing. (Estelle v. Dorrough (1975) 420 U.S. 534, 537-539; Allen v. Georgia (1897) 166 U.S. 138, 142; see also Molinaro v. New Jersey (1970) 396 U.S. 365, 366, and Bohanan v. Nebraska (1887) 125 U.S. 692 [dismissals by Supreme Court during certiorari

Before dismissing, the court in Clark decided the case on its merits, because it had been fully briefed before the escape.

17Before dismissing, the court in Clark decided the case on its merits, because it had been fully briefed before the escape.
proceedings after state judgments]; cf. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States (1993) 507 U.S. 234, 249 [striking down Eleventh Circuit rule mandating automatic dismissal of appeals filed after defendant recaptured; there must be some reasonable nexus between defendant’s conduct and appellate process].

10. Previous resolution of matter  [§ 4.44]

The appellate court will not usually consider an issue on its merits if it has already been resolved in a binding form, as under the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case. Under law of the case, for example, the appellate court’s decision on a question of law governs in all subsequent proceedings in that case – even if on a second appeal the Court of Appeal believes it should have decided differently the first time; some exceptions apply, as when there is a contrary supervening decision by the California Supreme Court. These doctrines are treated in more detail in § 2.52 of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and What It Takes To Get an Appeal Started.”

B. Standard of Review – Degree of Deference to Findings Below  [§ 4.45]

Standards of review involve the various degrees of deference the appellate court will give the findings and rulings in the lower court. In assessing the viability of potential appellate issues, counsel must weigh whether and to what extent the appellate court will reconsider decisions made in the proceedings below.

1. Abuse of discretion  [§ 4.46]

A high degree of deference to the decision below is given under the “abuse of discretion” standard. The reviewing court asks whether the trial court’s decision was one a reasonable court could have made or whether it exceeded the bounds of reason. It does not ask what the appellate court would have decided, or what the trial court perhaps should have decided. It asks whether any reasonable decision-maker could have made the decision.

18A heightened abuse of discretion standard is used in assessing the dismissal of a juror for inability to perform – the more stringent “demonstrable reality” test. (People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 450; People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 474; People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052.)
The abuse of discretion standard is often applied to issues involving judgment calls, such as sentencing, disposition, withdrawal of the plea, evidentiary rulings, motions for new trial, and Marsden\(^{19}\) and Faretta\(^{20}\) motions.\(^{21}\)

Part of the reason for using a deferential standard like abuse of discretion is that the trial court is in a position far superior to that of a reviewing court in making judgment calls, because the trial court observes the proceedings firsthand and can assess more precisely such multiple intangible factors as witness credibility and interpersonal dynamics that must go into the decision-making process. Another reason is to avoid routinely second-guessing the trial court’s decisions and possibly undermining its authority in presiding over courtroom proceedings. Still another is to conserve appellate court resources.

Although the appellate court’s deference to the decision below is high under the abuse of discretion standard, it is not absolute. (People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 712, fn. 4 [standard “is not designed to insulate legal errors from appellate review”]. People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 742 [when “trial court’s decision rests on an error of law, as it does here, the trial court abuses its discretion”].) All exercises of discretion must be guided by legal principles and policies, not arbitrariness or caprice. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977; e.g., People v. Jacobs (2015) 156 Cal.App.4th 728, 736-737 [test is whether “reasonable basis for the action” is shown]; In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519.) A trial court abuses its discretion if no reasonable decision-maker could have made that decision under the circumstances.

2. Substantial evidence  [§ 4.47]

A similar standard, applicable to factual findings, is the “substantial evidence” test, which is used when assessing sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict or rulings on motions. Like the abuse of discretion test, it asks whether a reasonable decision maker could have reached the conclusions it did. Specifically, the substantial evidence test asks

\(^{19}\)People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (motion to remove appointed trial counsel because of defective performance).

\(^{20}\)Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (right to self-representation at trial).

\(^{21}\)A decision by a trial court based on an error of law is an abuse of discretion. (People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737,746.)
whether a reasonable trier of fact could have made the factual determinations actually made in the case, given the applicable burden of proof. It requires evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. \((People \text{ } v. \text{ } Johnson \text{ } (1980) \text{ } 26 \text{ } Cal.3d \text{ } 557, \text{ } 578.)\)

If the issue is sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction in a criminal case, the question for the appellate court is whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt in light of all the evidence.\(^\text{22}\) \((Jackson \text{ } v. \text{ } Virginia \text{ } (1979) \text{ } 443 \text{ } U.S. \text{ } 307, \text{ } 319.)\) Different burdens of proof, such as “clear and convincing evidence” and “preponderance of the evidence,” apply in different contexts.\(^\text{23}\) (E.g., \textit{In re Jasmon O.} \textit{(1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 422-423}, and \textit{In re Angelia P.} \textit{(1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924 } \text{[clear and convincing in termination of parental rights case]}; \textit{People v. Lucas} \textit{(2014) 60 Cal.4th 153} and \textit{People v. Arriaga} \textit{(2014) 58 Cal.4th 950 } \text{[preponderance standard on certain collateral matters in criminal proceeding]}; see \textit{Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.} \textit{(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1059, 1082, conc. opn. of Brown, J. } \text{[evidence sufficient under preponderance standard, but not under clear and convincing one].}\(^\text{24}\) The substantial evidence test varies accordingly.

This standard, like the abuse of discretion one, is deferential to the decision maker below. Part of the reason is practical – the jurors or other trier of fact see the witnesses and evidence in person and can weigh it more precisely than an appellate court looking at a cold record. In addition, in cases tried to a jury, because juries bring into the courtroom community values and a collective common sense, they are given an institutional role as primary trier of fact. To preserve their authority and ensure reasonable finality of the judgment, their decisions are subject only to deferential substantial-evidence review in the appellate courts. Another reason is to conserve appellate court resources. \((See \text{ } People \text{ } v. \text{ } \text{ })\)

\(^\text{22}\)The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. \((People \text{ } v. \text{ } Johnson \text{ } (1980) \text{ } 26 \text{ } Cal.3d \text{ } 557, \text{ } 576-577.)\)

\(^\text{23}\)See ADI’s practice article, \textit{Sufficiency of the Evidence: Does the Burden of Proof “Disappear” on Appeal?}\)

\(^\text{24}\)In non-judicial contexts, standards may be more deferential. For example, courts use the “some evidence” standard in reviewing parole decisions by the Governor or Board of Parole Hearings. \((In \text{ } re \text{ } Shaputis \text{ } (2011) \text{ } 53 \text{ } Cal.4th \text{ } 192, \text{ } 210; \text{ } In \text{ } re \text{ } Rosenkrantz \text{ } (2002) \text{ } 29 \text{ } Cal.4th \text{ } 616, \text{ } 658.)\) In contrast to judicial decisions, there is no definitive “burden of proof” governing these highly discretionary executive and administrative decisions; rather the courts intervene only to prevent arbitrary or capricious action in violation of due process. \((Ibid.)\)
In some circumstances the reviewing court will not defer at all to the lower court, but will reach an independent decision; this standard is called “de novo” review. It applies primarily to questions of law. It is used, for example, with respect to issues involving statutory construction (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71; People v. Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860, 871; In re Dakota J. (2015) 242 Cal.4th 619); the legal correctness of instructions (People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 570-571); voluntariness of a statement if facts are undisputed (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 404); and legal conclusions about facts (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 900-901 [prosecution’s due diligence in locating witness]).

The theory here is that an appellate court is institutionally in a superior position to decide a question of law. Its judges occupy higher office than trial judges and usually have more experience in the law; appellate decisions are collective; and the Court of Appeal’s fundamental processes are intrinsically deliberative. (See People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 986, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 672, fn. 9.) A decision maker resolving purely legal questions does not gain any advantage by personal presence in the courtroom; indeed, there is an advantage to distance.

Another policy reason not to give trial judges the primary role in determining legal matters is that, while fact-finding and running a courtroom are case-specific roles, the law is supposed to mean the same no matter where in the jurisdiction it is being applied. Assigning trial judges the final say on the law, with only deferential review, would almost certainly fragment legal interpretation and introduce inconsistency and unpredictability into the system.

Mixed standards of review apply when the issue involves questions of both fact and law. (See People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1264, fn. 8; People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 984-988, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 672, fn. 9; Adoption of Myah M. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1539.) The
appellate court must (1) determine what “historical facts” have been established, under a deferential substantial evidence standard, (2) determine the applicable legal principles, a de novo question, and (3) reach a legal conclusion about those facts, usually under a de novo standard of review. (People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 608-609 [suggestiveness of pretrial lineup]; People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1127 [probable cause for involuntary HIV testing]; People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597 [reasonableness of detention].)

An example of such an approach is the legality of a detention or search. First considering what findings of fact the trial court made (for example, what information the officer had before taking action), the appellate court determines whether those findings were supported by substantial evidence – i.e., whether a reasonable trier of fact could have made the findings by a preponderance of the evidence. The appellate court then decides independently and de novo whether, given those facts, the officer’s conduct was reasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597.)

Sometimes a decision involving a nominally mixed issue may be characterized as “predominately” one of law or fact, and the standard of review will be applied accordingly. (E.g., People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1264-1272 [if trial court grants new trial, its finding of prejudice from juror misconduct is to be reviewed deferentially]; but see People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 582-583 [finding of no prejudice from juror misconduct reviewed de novo]; People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 900-901 [prosecution’s due diligence in locating witness is primarily question of law]; see People v. Ogunmowo (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 67 [de novo review is appropriate standard for mixed question of fact and law that implicates constitutional right, here, effective assistance of counsel].)

C. Standard of Prejudice  [§ 4.50]

An error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial. Although a few types of errors automatically call for reversal (see § 4.51, post), an issue otherwise will not be successful on appeal unless counsel can demonstrate to the court not only that there was error but also that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Pen. Code, §§ 1258, 1404; Evid. Code, §§ 353, 354.) In assessing this critical question, counsel must take account of the applicable standard of prejudice, asking, “What likelihood of prejudice must be shown to get a reversal or other relief?” Counsel must then weigh the facts of the case in light of this standard, asking, “Can a reasonable argument be made that the error was prejudicial?”
1. **Prejudicial per se** [§ 4.51]

The standard most favorable to the appellant is prejudicial or reversible per se. Prejudicial per se errors automatically require reversal. They involve “structural error” – violation of certain rights fundamental to the integrity of the proceedings. Such error is an intrinsic miscarriage of justice and requires reversal without a showing that the outcome would have been different in the absence of the violation. A harmless error analysis is unnecessary because prejudice is presumed by operation of law. (See *Arizona v. Fulminante* (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309-310; *Rose v. Clark* (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 577-578.)

Examples of prejudicial per se errors include:


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25 Failure to provide counsel on appeal to brief an arguable issue is also reversible per se. (*Penson v. Ohio* (1988) 488 U.S. 75.) Placing severe restrictions on attorney-client communication may be reversible per se as the equivalent of denying counsel altogether. (*People v. Hernandez* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1510.)

26 Not all kinds of suspensions from practice result in absence of counsel within the meaning of article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. (*Vigil*, at p. 533.)

27 In contrast, the right to an unbiased prosecutor under Penal Code section 1424 is not structural error, but is judged under the test of *People v. Watson* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. *People v. Vasquez* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 47, 66-71.)

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error in denying Faretta request at preliminary hearing subject to harmless error rule when defendant later accepted counsel). 28


• Defendant’s lack of competence to stand trial (People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 Cal.3d 80, 94; see Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 378; cf. In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901 [in dependency case, incompetent parent made to appear through guardian ad litem; due process error in procedure for appointing guardian is not structural error, but one subject to harmless error analysis]; People v. Shiga (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 22 [failure to exercise discretion re inquiry into competence and Faretta capability is structural]).


28 In People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 243-245, the court noted but did not decide the standard of prejudice for a Faretta waiver not made knowingly and intelligently. It reviewed decisions in the lower California courts, which are split, and in the federal circuits, which generally use reversible per se; in this case, the error was reversible even under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. (Cf. People v. Wrentmore (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 921, 931, and People v. Williams (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1588 [right to counsel and thus to self-representation in Mentally Disordered Offender proceeding is statutory, subject to harmless error test].)


[omission of two or more elements of offense in instruction does not automatically make error reversible per se]).\textsuperscript{31}


- Denial of defendant’s right to be present at trial, when his absence was not attributable to his own voluntary conduct (see \textit{People v. Ramos} (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 897 \{court erred in excluding self-represented defendant excluded from courtroom because of disruptive conduct, with no standby counsel to represent him during his absence\}; \textit{Riggins v. Nevada} (1992) 465 U.S. 127, 137 \{administration of psychotropic medication against defendant’s will during trial: “whether the outcome of the trial might have been different if Riggins’ motion had been granted would be purely speculative”\}; \textit{Frantz v. Hazey} (9th Cir. 2008) 513 F.3d 1002 \{self-represented defendant, presence at in-chambers substantive discussion\}).


- Denial of transcript of previous trial \textit{(People v. Hosner} (1975) 15 Cal.3d 60.)

In some of these situations, the error pervades the entire proceedings and establishing prejudice would be inherently speculative – for example, lack of counsel, defendant’s lack of competence, reasonable doubt instruction, and lack of an impartial judge. In others, the right involved is based on fundamental values more or less extrinsic to the accuracy of trial outcomes – for example, discrimination in selection of jurors, right to counsel of choice or self-representation, and public trial. The right to a jury falls into both categories.

2. Reversible unless lack of prejudice is shown beyond a reasonable doubt \textit{(Chapman)} [§ 4.52]

The standard of prejudice next most favorable to the appellant is that of \textit{Chapman v. California} (1967) 386 U.S. 18, which held violations of most federal constitutional

\textsuperscript{31}Good faith error by trial court in denying defendant’s peremptory challenge to a juror is not federal constitutional error. \textit{(Rivera v. Illinois} (2009) 556 U.S. 148, 157.)
rights require reversal unless the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation did not affect the result. Chapman error is distinctive in its source (the federal Constitution), in placing the burden of proof on the beneficiary of the error (such as the state or county), and in creating a high standard for showing harmlessness (beyond a reasonable doubt). It applies in dependency as well as criminal cases. (In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 134.)

Some examples of this type of error were enumerated in Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 577-578:


Other examples of Chapman error are:

• Introduction of an out-of-court statement of a non-testifying codefendant (Brown v. United States (1973) 411 U.S. 223, 231-232);

32Exceptions to the applicability of Chapman for federal constitutional errors are those that are reversible per se (§ 4.51, ante) and those governed by specialized “boutique” tests, such as ineffective assistance of counsel issues, prosecutorial suppression of evidence, and conflicts of interest on the part of defense counsel (§ 4.54 et seq., post).

33Hopper found no facts to support instruction on a lesser included offense and thus concluded that an Alabama statute forbidding such instruction in capital cases, invalidated in Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, did not prejudice the defendant within the meaning of Chapman.
• Prosecutorial misconduct in commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18);

• Introduction of an involuntary confession (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309-310);

• Failure to instruct directly on reasonable doubt (People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 34234; People v. Vann (1971) 12 Cal.3d 220, 227-228; People v. Flores (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 199);

• Omission of an element in instructing on an offense (Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 9-12, 16; People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400 [omission of two or more elements of offense in instruction does not automatically make error reversible per se]; People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819 [failure to instruct on crime of conviction, if defendant conceded it had been committed, but contended another perpetrator was responsible]; People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 502-503)35;

• Instructing the jury that malice should be presumed in the absence of contrary evidence (Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570);

• Misstating a potential theory of conviction (Byrd v. Lewis (9th Cir. 2009) 566 F.3d 855, 866-867);

• Instructing on improper theory of criminal liability (Hedgpeth v. Pulido (2008) 555 U.S. 57);

If the jury is instructed on the requirement for reasonable doubt, but reasonable doubt is not defined, the omission is state error tested under the prejudice standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.

The California Supreme Court in Flood did not decide whether in some instances an instructional omission might be “the equivalent of failing to submit the entire case to the jury – an error that clearly would be a ‘structural’ rather than a ‘trial’ error” (18 Cal.4th at p. 503); Mil held the omission of more than one element is not automatically reversible, but must be evaluated for the significance of the error in context (53 Cal.4th 400).
• Unjustifiably requiring defendant to wear shackles visible to the jury (Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 635; People v. McDaniel (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 742);

• Failure of counsel to object to closure of courtroom during jury selection (Weaver v. Massachusetts (2017) __ U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 1899]; and Blakely36


(See also list of Chapman cases in Arizona v. Fulminante, at pp. 306-307.)37

In dependency cases, Chapman has been applied to alleged due process errors, such as excluding relevant evidence. (In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 134),

3. Not reversible unless the appellant shows it is reasonably probable the error affected the outcome (Watson) [§ 4.53]

The most common standard of prejudice, and the one least favorable to the appellant, is found in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. This standard puts the burden on the appellant to show it is reasonably probable the error affected the outcome of the case. The Watson standard is applied to virtually all errors based on statutory, common-law, or state constitutional violations except those implicating fundamental rights and affecting the basic integrity of the proceedings.


37An undetermined issue is what standard applies for a Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 waiver not made knowingly and intelligently. In People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 243-245, the court reviewed decisions in the lower California courts, which are split between the per se and Chapman standard, and in the federal circuits, which generally use reversible per se; in this case, the error was reversible even under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.

Good faith error by trial court in denying defendant’s peremptory challenge to a juror is not federal constitutional error and is therefore not governed by Chapman. (Rivera v. Illinois (2009) 556 U.S. 148.)
“Reasonably probable” does not mean the appellant must show the error more likely than not the error affected the outcome. “Probable” in this context does not mean a more than 50% chance, “but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.” (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715, italics original); People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 [if probabilities of prejudice and harmlessness are equally balanced, appellant has necessarily shown miscarriage of justice]; see also People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 351; Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050-1051; People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 918; ADI practice article Some Tips for Arguing Watson Prejudice More Persuasively. 38)

Just a few examples of error governed by the Watson test are error in admitting evidence that was irrelevant or violated Evidence Code section 352, error affecting expert testimony, many forms of prosecutorial misconduct, denial of a Pitchess motion 39 or motion for a physical lineup, 40 and ordinary instructional error. 41

ADI’s article 42 on arguing the relatively difficult Watson standard most effectively suggests, in summary: (1) remind the court to apply the correct College Hospital 43 “reasonable chance” test rather than the bare “reasonably probable” one, which too readily calls to mind the incorrect and more onerous “more likely than not” standard; (2) argue prejudice concretely, in terms of the facts of the case, rather than merely stating a conclusion (see § 4.60 et seq., post); and (3) define the “more favorable outcome”


43 College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715.

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optimally, considering more easily demonstrable possibilities than an outright acquittal, such as a hung jury or conviction of a lesser offense.\textsuperscript{44}

4. “Boutique” tests of prejudice  [§ 4.54]

Certain kinds of errors are governed by specialized tests unique to that area. Common examples are ineffective assistance of counsel, suppression of material favorable evidence by the prosecution, defense counsel conflict of interest, and juror misconduct.

a. Ineffective assistance of counsel  [§ 4.55]

Ineffective assistance of counsel is judged by \textit{Strickland v. Washington} (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694, which held that unreasonably deficient performance by counsel is reversible only if the defendant shows a “reasonable probability” a different result would have occurred without the error.\textsuperscript{45} (E.g., \textit{Lee v. United States} (2017) ___ U.S. ___ [137 S.Ct. 1958, 1965, 198 L.Ed.2d 476] [when defendant claims counsel’s deficient performance deprived him of trial by causing him to plead guilty, defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”].) A reasonable probability is defined as a probability sufficient to affect “the reliability of the result” (\textit{Strickland v. Washington}, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 693) or, in other words, to undermine “confidence in the outcome” (\textit{id.} at p. 694).\textsuperscript{46} It does not mean more likely than not and does not authorize use of a preponderance of the evidence standard. (\textit{Id.} at pp. 693-694; see also \textit{Woodford v. Visciotti} (2002) 537 U.S. 19, 23-24.)

\textsuperscript{44}E.g., \textit{People v. Soojian} (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 491, 520 (hung jury is more favorable to defendant than guilty verdict).

\textsuperscript{45}The \textit{Strickland} “reasonable probability” standard is similar in phrasing and meaning to the \textit{Watson} “reasonably probable” standard. (\textit{Richardson v. Superior Court} (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050-1051; cf. \textit{People v. Howard} (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 41, 47-48, fn. 4.)

\textsuperscript{46}\textit{Strickland} “specifically rejected the proposition that the defendant had to prove more likely than not that the outcome would be altered. . . .” (\textit{Woodford v. Visciotti} (2002) 537 U.S. 19, 22; \textit{Strickland}, at p. 693; \textit{Richardson v. Superior Court} (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050; see \textit{College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court} (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715.)
To assess prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to investigate properly, for example, the court must compare the evidence that actually was presented to the jury with that which could have been presented had counsel acted appropriately. (*Karis v. Calderon* (9th Cir. 2002) 283 F.3d 1117, 1133.)

b. **Prosecutorial suppression of evidence**  [§ 4.56]

The prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence only if the evidence is (1) favorable to the defense and (2) material on guilt or punishment. (*United States v. Bagley* (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 674; In re *Sassounian* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-545; see *Turner v. United States* (2017) ___ U.S. ___; *Brady v. Maryland* (1963) 373 U.S. 83.) Materiality in turn depends on whether there is a “reasonable probability” that, if the evidence had been disclosed to the defense, the result would have been different. (*Bagley*, at p. 678; *Sassounian*, at p. 544.) A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. (*Bagley*, at p. 685; *Sassounian*, at p. 544.) Since failure to disclose is not error at all unless it is reasonably likely to have affected the outcome – i.e., to have been prejudicial – a determination of error is necessarily a determination of prejudice. (*Sassounian*, at p. 545, fn. 7.)

c. **Defense counsel conflict of interest**  [§ 4.57]


47*Doolin* harmonized the California and federal standards. Formerly, the court had held the California Constitution imposes a more rigorous standard than the federal one,
Except when the attorney was forced to represent concurrent conflicting interests over objection (Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 490-491), to satisfy the deficient performance requirement the defendant must show the conflict actually affected the adequacy of counsel’s representation, in the sense of causing counsel not to represent the defendant as vigorously as he or she might have without the conflict, “as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.” (Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 171; see also Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 272; Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335, 347-350; People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417-418; United States v. Rodrigues (9th Cir. 2003) 347 F.3d 818, 820, 823-824.)

As to the prejudice prong of the test, prejudice is presumed if counsel actively represented co-defendants with conflicting interests at the same time. (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 418.) Reversal is automatic if the attorney had such a conflict and made a timely objection to the conflicted representation. (Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 488.) The United States Supreme Court has left open the question whether successive representation of clients with conflicting interests is subject to the presumption of prejudice. (Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 176; cf. Doolin, 45 Cal.4th at p. 420 [presumption limited to concurrent representation of conflicting interests]; Houston v. Schomig (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3d 1076, 1083 [evidentiary hearing ordered to determine whether alleged successive representation conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance and, if so, whether that deficiency affected “the result of the proceeding”).] In other situations, the presumption of prejudice is inapplicable, and the defendant must “demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Doolin, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 429-430, quoting Mickens, 535 U.S. at p. 166, in turn quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694.)

d. Juror misconduct [§ 4.58]

Juror misconduct involving receipt of information about the case from outside sources requires reversal if there appears a substantial likelihood of juror bias. (In re requiring reversal for even a potential conflict if the record supports “informed speculation” that the defendant’s right to effective representation was prejudicially affected by the conflict. (E.g., People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 174-175; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 995; see also People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1005, 1014; People v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86, 105; see cases overruled on this point in Doolin, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.)
Bias may be found in two ways: (1) the extraneous material is inherently prejudicial – i.e., in itself substantially likely to have influenced a juror; or (2) under the circumstances of the case, the court determines that it is substantially likely a juror was actually biased against the defendant. If there is a substantial likelihood that a juror was actually biased, reversal is required even though the court is convinced an unbiased jury would have reached the same verdict. “[A] biased adjudicator is one of the few structural trial defects that compel reversal without application of a harmless error standard.” (People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 579; see People v. Solorio (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 398 [prosecution failed to rebut presumption of prejudice from jurors’ discussion of why defendant did not testify, when topic came up several times during deliberations].)

5. Cumulative error [§ 4.59]

Even if the prejudice from one error might not by itself justify reversal, counsel may still be able to argue for reversal on the ground the errors were collectively or cumulatively prejudicial. (See People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 844; People v. Criscione (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 275, 293; People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795; People v. Kent (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 207, 217-218; People v. Williams (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 34, 58.)

If any of the errors to be considered in aggregation presents a federal constitutional question, then the cumulative error argument also presents a federal question to be reviewed for prejudice under the Chapman standard. (People v. Woods (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 106, 117; United States v. Rivera (10th Cir. 1990) 900 F.2d 1462, 1470, fn. 6; see also Cargle v. Mullin (10th Cir. 2003) 317 F.3d 1196, 1220.)

6. Arguing prejudice [§ 4.60]

Prejudice can be assessed in a number of ways, depending on the nature of the error, its relationship to the facts as presented at trial, the theories of the defense and prosecution, and any evidence of its actual effect on the jury. (ADI’s article on arguing the relatively difficult Watson error most effectively is summarized in § 4.53, ante.)

a. Errors inherently carrying a high probability of prejudice
[§ 4.61]

Some kinds of error are inherently likely to cause prejudice – for example, comments by persons in authority such as judges or prosecutors, instructions, confessions, and evidence of other crimes or gang affiliation. While unless structural they do not automatically require reversal, they heighten the probability of prejudice and warrant especially close scrutiny. Examples include:

• *Statements by judges*: “[J]urors rely with great confidence on the fairness of judges, and upon the correctness of their views expressed during trials.” (*People v. Lee* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 707, 715-716.)

• *Statements by prosecutors*: As a public official charged with representing the general interest and attaining justice, a prosecutor may have special stature in the eyes of the jury, and so his or her misstatements may carry significant weight.

• *Instructions*: Instructions are inevitably crucial in leading jurors (who are for the most part unschooled in the law) to a conclusion. (See *People v. Clair* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [*“jurors treat the court’s instructions as a statement of the law by a judge”*].)


• **Confessions**: The defendant’s own words inevitably carry heavy weight before a jury; it is difficult to ignore a confession or substantial admission of guilt.\(^{52}\)

• **Evidence of other crimes or gang affiliation**: The fact that the defendant has committed other crimes or has criminal affiliations, such as gang membership, might sway a jury to convict, regardless of the evidence on the current charge, if they think: “He did it before and so probably did it this time,” or “He’s a bad person who should be punished, even if not guilty now,” or “He’s a menace to society and should be taken off the streets.”\(^{53}\)

b. **Prominence of error**  [§ 4.62]

An error may be prejudicial because it played a prominent role in the case. In contrast, prejudice will be more difficult to establish when the error was relatively trivial, involved tangential or uncontested matters, or happened only once and without particular emphasis. Factors include:

• **Centrality to issues**: The error may have directly affected the key issue in the case, such as identity or mental state. It may have filled a substantial gap in the prosecution’s or county’s case or damaged the heart of the defense.\(^{54}\)

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• **Emphasis given error:** An error may have been repeated or exploited or given special emphasis by the prosecutor or county during argument.\textsuperscript{55} As the Supreme Court has put it: “‘There is no reason why we should treat this evidence as any less “crucial” than the prosecutor – and so presumably the jury – treated it.’”\textsuperscript{56}

• **Jury’s focus in area related to error:** The jury may have asked for rereading of testimony or instructions or asked questions related to the area of the error. When the jury gives signs that the matters affected by the error are the very ones it considers troublesome or important, prejudice can often be inferred.\textsuperscript{57}

c. **Closeness of the case** [§ 4.63]

One of the most crucial factors is whether the case was closely balanced or relatively lopsided. Indicators of the closeness of a case include:

• **Evidence:** A case in which the state or county case is weak or the defense is strong may well be affected by an error.\textsuperscript{58} Conversely, in a one-sided case heavily


weighted against the defense, convincing a court of prejudice is difficult even under Chapman.

• **Length of jury deliberations:** Lengthy deliberations often are interpreted to mean the jury was struggling with the issues and considered the case a close one. On the other hand, a short deliberation time can indicate probable prejudice, if without the error the evidence would have seemed sufficiently close to have required substantial deliberation time. Whether the deliberations were exceptionally long or short depends of course on the complexity of the case.

• **Partial acquittal:** The jury’s refusal to convict on some counts may indicate a close case. As one court has said: “In view of the verdict’s reflecting the jury’s selective belief in the evidence [by acquitting appellant on two of three counts], we cannot conclude otherwise than that the [error] . . . was prejudicial.”

Other signs of a close case may be jury questions and reports of a deadlock. (People v. Diaz (2015) 227 Cal.App.4th 362, 382-385.)

d. **Evidence linking error to verdict** [§ 4.64]

The court may find prejudice if there is evidence of a causal connection between the verdict and the error:

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Cal.App.2d 488.

59 *In re Martin* (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 51 (22 hours over five days); *People v. Rucker* (1980) 26 Cal.3d 368, 391 (nine hours); *People v. Woodard* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 329, 341 (six hours); *People v. Anderson* (1978) 20 Cal.3d 647, 651 (several days); *People v. Collins* (1968) 68 Cal.2d 319, 332 (eight hours); *People v. Steele* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 67, 74 (four days of deliberation); *People v. Fuentes* (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 444, 455-456 (nine days).


• **Proximity:** If the verdict was rendered in close proximity to the error, prejudice may be inferred. For example, if the court gave an erroneous instruction during difficult jury deliberations and a guilty verdict followed almost immediately, it may be reasonable to conclude the error affected the result. 62

• **Comparative results:** The fact a prior proceeding or another count without the error had a more favorable result is another factor suggesting prejudice. 63

D. Appellate Tests and Presumptions  [§ 4.65]

Another important factor to be weighed in assessing the strength of a potential issue on appeal is who has the burden of persuasion on a given question and how the appellate court will view evidence that is in conflict or is absent from the record.

1. **General principles of review**  [§ 4.66]

Most presumptions and principles on appeal favor the respondent. For example, the judgment is presumed to be correct. Accordingly:

• Conflict and silence in the record are resolved in favor of the decision below. *(People v. Woods* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673; *Denham v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; *In re Jason L.* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.)

• An appellate court will presume the trial court had adequate reasons for a decision, unless the record affirmatively shows otherwise. *(Denham v. Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; *People v. Golliver* (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1620.) There is an exception when the law requires reasons to be stated explicitly. *(In re Manzy W.* (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1210-1211 [remanding where law required court to declare whether offense was felony or misdemeanor].)

• The trial court is presumed to have known and followed the law. *(People v. Braxton* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 814; *People v. Stowell* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114;


- The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-577.)

- Under the “right result, wrong reason” principle, even if the court gave legally incorrect reasons for a decision such as admitting or excluding evidence, no error will be found if legally correct reasons would require the same result. (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 972; D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18-19.)

- The jury is presumed to have followed the instructions if they are correct and consistent. (People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 331; People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1090; cf. Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307, 324, fn. 9.)

- Judges, clerks, and court reporters are presumed to have performed their duty. (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 661; People v. Ward (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 604, 608; see Evid. Code, § 664.)

- For most errors, the burden is on the appellant to show prejudice – i.e., to prove the error actually affected the result. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837.)

2. Viewing the evidence [§ 4.67]

How the court views the evidence depends on what the issue is. On most sufficiency of the evidence issues, the court will look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, assuming those credibility decisions and those inferences that support the judgment.

Other tests of the evidence may be used for other issues. For example, when the issue is whether it was proper to give an instruction on imperfect self-defense, which reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter by negating malice, the standard is whether

64See § 4.50 et seq., ante, for further discussion of prejudice standards.
there was evidence of imperfect self-defense sufficient to “deserve consideration by the jury” – meaning a reasonable jury could properly have found a reasonable doubt as to malice from the evidence. (*People v. Barton* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, fn. 8.)

E. Final Selection of Issues  [§ 4.68]

Once the reasonably arguable issues are identified and evaluated, the question remains whether these issues should ultimately be included in the appellant’s opening brief. It might be in the client’s best interests to omit some of these issues (or even abandon the appeal), for a number of reasons.

1. Selectivity versus inclusiveness  [§ 4.69]

An attorney’s duty to raise arguable issues has long been the subject of debate. Some experienced attorneys insist an appellate attorney has a duty to raise every arguable or non-frivolous issue; they argue, the attorney must give the client a chance to prevail, even against the odds, by at least raising the issues – after all, the attorney is not infallible in judging issues, and occasionally “lightning strikes.” Failure to raise an issue on an appeal may forfeit it in later appeals if there are follow-up proceedings. (E.g., *People v. Senior* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 531; cf. *People v. Rosas* (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 107.)

Other attorneys take the position that inclusion of too many issues distracts the court and undermines stronger issues in the case. They aver that often one of the greatest benefits appellate counsel can give the client is counsel’s experience in knowing what issues *not* to raise. The United States Supreme Court in *Jones v. Barnes* (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 751-754, took this side and held there is no federal constitutional duty to raise every non-frivolous issue, even if the client wants them to be raised:

> One of the first tests of a discriminating advocate is to select the question, or questions, that he will present . . . . Legal contentions, like the currency, depreciate through over-issue. The mind of an appellate judge is habitually receptive to the suggestion that a lower court committed an error. But receptiveness declines as the number of assigned errors increases. Multiplicity hints at lack of confidence in any one. . . . [M]ultiplying assignments of error will dilute and weaken a good case and will not save a bad one.

(*Id.* at p. 752, internal quotation marks omitted; see also *Davila v. Davis* (2017) ___ U.S. ____ [137 S.Ct. 2058, 2067, 198 L.Ed.2d 603] [*“Effective appellate counsel should not*...*”*)]
raise every nonfrivolous argument on appeal, but rather only those arguments most likely to succeed . . . . Declining to raise a claim on appeal, therefore, is not deficient performance unless that claim was plainly stronger than those actually presented to the appellate court”].

This manual favors the selective approach. Counsel should consider the overall strategic impact of each issue. They might ask: Will the issue strengthen the probability the client will get meaningful relief, or will it drag stronger ones down to the “lowest common denominator,” thus diminishing the client’s chances? Are there so many issues that the court will become irritated or weary of reading the brief and turn to the opponent’s brief for illumination? Will the good points get lost in the maze of “all but the kitchen sink”?

2. Context [§ 4.70]

The question whether to include weak issues is relative, depending on other issues in the case. If there are a number of much stronger ones, the argument for selective omission is usually quite persuasive. If all of the issues are fairly weak, there may or may not be a reason to exclude some. If there are no other issues, a weak but arguable one should be briefed. This is especially true in non-criminal cases, where omitting weak issues does not earn the client the right to court review of the record, but merely guarantees virtually automatic dismissal of the appeal. This matter is explored in an ADI memo on arguability, “To Brief or Not To Brief: Marginal Issues.” (See also § 4.84, post.)

65 A commonsense qualification to the “comparative strength” test, understood as the likelihood of success, is the scope of relief to be obtained if it succeeds. A slam-dunk winner that will take one year off a 250-year sentence of course should be raised, but the relief will probably be trivial in context. Counsel should think long and hard about shunning a longer-shot (but still reasonable) issue that might result, for example, in a finding the confession was inadmissible and thus the whole conviction should be nullified. The two issues cannot be seen as commensurate for purposes of assessing their strength.

3. **Potential for adverse consequences** [§ 4.71]

Another reason not to raise an issue might be that it would call attention to an error in the defendant’s favor. Often pursuing a particular issue, or even the appeal itself, makes it more likely the error will be noticed and corrected. If the client could get a more burdensome disposition by pursuing the issue or the appeal, counsel should advise the client of the possibility of abandonment. (See § 4.91 et seq., *post*, on adverse consequences and § 4.150 et seq., appendix B; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.316, 8.411 [voluntary abandonment of appeal].)

4. **Practical benefit from remedy** [§ 4.72]

An issue may appropriately be omitted if the client does not want the remedy it would provide or would not benefit from the remedy. For example, returning to court for a new sentencing or hearing may not be beneficial to the client. While in court the client may lose a favored placement or good job in prison or earn fewer credits – and frequently just end up with the same result as before the remand.

In dependency cases, the client may not want the remedy argued for. For example, the client may not want the child to be placed with a particular relative, or an alleged father may not wish to be declared the presumed father if doing so might introduce the possibility of child support obligations.

In order to prevent an “unwanted remedy,” appellate counsel should first check with trial counsel to determine how likely it is the client will end up in a better position from reversal and then advise the client what might reasonably be expected. The decision as to the ultimate remedy to be sought is the client’s.
V. WHAT TO DO WHEN COUNSEL CANNOT FIND ANY ISSUES [§ 4.73]

Appointed counsel who has found no arguable issues after a diligent search must follow a specific procedure – *Wende-Anders-Sade C.*\(^{67}\) – regardless of whether the

appointment is designated as assisted or independent. Depending on whether the case is criminal or civil, the court may have certain responsibilities, as well.

No-issue appeals have been addressed with some frequency by both the United States Supreme Court\(^\text{68}\) and California Supreme Court.\(^\text{69}\) The courts have a constitutional duty to provide effective counsel on appeal in criminal cases (see *Evitts v. Lucey* (1985) 469 U.S. 387; *Douglas v. California* (1963) 372 U.S. 353), and therefore counsel’s failure to assert any issues poses problems, not only for the client and counsel, but also for the court.

A. What Is Meant by an “Arguable” Issue  \([\S\ 4.73A]\)

An “arguable issue” is one that, in counsel’s professional opinion, has a reasonable potential for success and that, if resolved favorably to the client, will result in a reversal or modification of the judgment. (*People v. Johnson* (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 106.) This matter is explored in an ADI memo on arguability, “*To Brief or Not To Brief: Marginal Issues*,”\(^\text{70}\) as well in the earlier passages of this chapter.

The ultimate test for an arguable issue is whether a reviewing court could reasonably accept the argument and find the client entitled to some kind of relief, in light of (a) relevant law, (b) the facts in the case, and (c) applicable appellate standards for reviewing judgments. If no reviewing court could reasonably do so, the issue is frivolous. *All* of these conditions for arguability must be satisfied.

Note that the test is whether an appellate court *could reasonably* accept the argument – not whether it actually *will* do so. An appellate attorney must be an assertive


advocate. Assertive advocacy asks, “How can I make this issue work?” rather than “Might the court reject this?” There are potential responses to almost every issue – very few are obvious candidates for a concession from the opposing party. The question is whether those responses are truly insuperable, in which case the issue is frivolous, or whether they merely mean there are alternative reasonable outcomes to the case. The job of an appellant’s attorney is to present the court with arguments it could reasonably accept and use his or her best skills to persuade it to accept them. It is not to decide ahead of time whether the court will or should accept them. Keeping this model in mind will facilitate assertive issue selection and help distinguish counsel’s role from that of the court.

Counsel should also understand that the first prong of the test – support within the relevant law – does not mean counsel necessarily must give up when confronted with either an absence of authority or actual adverse authority. If there is no extant law to support the position, the brief may say so and offer credible reasons why the law should be as counsel urges. If the law is adverse, the argument must acknowledge that fact and may urge the law should be changed, provided there are plausible grounds to support the contention, based on cognizable legal principles, logic, and/or policy. (E.g., People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444, 447 [“counsel serves both the court and his client by advocating changes in the law if argument can be made supporting change”].) If there is adverse Court of Appeal authority but the Supreme Court has not yet reached the issue, if the Supreme Court has given signals it is reconsidering a legal rule, or if there is a reasonable possibility of federal relief, it may well be appropriate to raise the issue, as long as counsel acknowledges the contrary law.

B. Pre-Briefing Procedure  [§ 4.74]

The inability to find arguable issues triggers special pre-briefing procedures and also special responsibilities on the part of appellate counsel. Specifically, counsel must double check all possible sources of issues and must obtain a second opinion and approval from the appellate project. The client must be told and advised of the possibility of filing a pro per brief or letter. The brief must follow special rules for no-merit filings.

1. Completion and additional review of record  [§ 4.75]

Counsel should ensure the record is complete before concluding a case may not have any arguable issues and before asking the project for a review. If the case still
appears to lack issues, it often may be profitable for counsel to review the record again, eliminating nothing from consideration. A new issue may emerge, or a credible way of reformulating an issue previously rejected may appear.\footnote{See April 2008 ADI news alert and article on the topic of criteria for arguable and frivolous issues and ways of converting a borderline issue into a credible one: Alert: \url{http://www.adi-sandiego.com/news_alerts/pdfs/2008/April-2008-News-Alert.pdf} Article: \url{http://www.adi-sandiego.com/news_alerts/pdfs/2008/AA-Arguable-issues-memo-final.pdf}}

2. **Project approval** [§ 4.76]

Under the California project-panel system and judicial policy, approval by the assigned project staff attorney is required before any attorney, assisted or independent, makes a no-issue filing. Counsel must submit a complete draft *Wende-Anders* brief or *Sade C.* letter brief or brief\footnote{The letter brief format is required in all three divisions of the Fourth Appellate District for *Sade C.* cases. Other districts may have different expectations, and so counsel must consult the project for guidance. Regardless of format, the contents must conform to the requirements of *In re Phoenix H.* (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 843.} (see § 4.77 et seq., *post*) to the project attorney and also, in most situations, tender the record for further review.\footnote{In fast-track dependency cases, the project normally gets its own copy of the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.416(c)(2)(B).)} The attorney must detail the issues considered and rejected and give reasons.

C. **Wende-Anders-Sade C. Filing** [§ 4.77]

*Anders v. California* (1967) 386 U.S. 738 held counsel must file, not just a simple letter saying there are no issues, but a brief outlining the facts and the possible issues in the case. (See also *People v. Feggans* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444.) The California Supreme Court interpreted *Anders* in *People v. Wende* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and concluded counsel must set forth the facts in the case, but need not (1) explicitly state counsel has been unable to find issues or (2) ask to withdraw. (*Wende*, at p. 442.) Some courts permit or require the brief be in letter form.
1. **Facts** [§ 4.78]

The statements of case and facts should be relatively thorough. This gives the court guidance in its own review of the record. It also documents counsel’s efforts – an important matter for the court, the project, the client, and counsel’s own protection. These considerations apply in dependency cases, as well, even though the court is not required to review the record.

2. **Description of issues** [§ 4.79]

A question of some disagreement is whether a no-issue filing should describe the issues counsel considered. *Anders v. California* (1967) 386 U.S. 738, 744-745, held counsel must file a “brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal” and pointed out such a brief would “induce the court to pursue all the more vigorously its own review because of the ready references not only to the record, but also to the legal authorities as furnished it by counsel.” In *Smith v. Robbins* (2000) 528 U.S. 259, however, the United States Supreme Court held listing possible issues is not invariably required by the Constitution, if other safeguards are in place.

Some courts have strong preferences one way or the other as to the listing of issues, and counsel should naturally heed those. Some courts indifferently leave the matter to counsel’s discretion, and some are not clear one way or another. (See, e.g., *People v. Kent* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 293 [Fourth Dis., Div. 3: encouraging listing of issues and disagreeing with since-withdrawn opinion from another panel of same court criticizing that practice].)

ADI for the most part encourages listing of issues and applicable authorities. It is a way of stimulating and organizing counsel’s thoughts, suggesting issues to the Court of Appeal it might not otherwise consider, and demonstrating counsel’s efforts to the court, the project, and the client. In non-criminal cases, this policy becomes a nearly absolute requirement, because the court will not read the record unless counsel gives it a reason to; a failure to list issues deprives the client of even that slim opportunity to snatch the case away from virtually certain dismissal.

Such a listing, however, must be done properly. Counsel must not argue the merit or lack of merit of any issue listed, but must neutrally describe the issues considered and any relevant authority, without urging any conclusions. (If the brief urges *relief* because of the issue, it is contradicting the characterization of the case as a no-merit one. If it...
affirmatively argues the issue should be rejected, counsel is impermissibly arguing against the client.)

3. Withdrawal of counsel  [§ 4.80]

It is not necessary for counsel who finds no arguable issues to seek leave to withdraw, as long as he or she does not describe the appeal as frivolous. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 442.) Indeed, counsel should not do so. (In re Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 544 [“[i]f appointed counsel . . . finds no arguable issues, counsel need not and should not file a motion to withdraw”].) Counsel should inform the client of the right to request the court relieve counsel if the client so wishes.74 (Id. at p. 536; see § 4.82, post.)

4. Sending record to client  [§ 4.81]

Counsel may and normally should send the record to the client before or as soon as the brief or letter brief is filed, so that the client can file a pro per brief or letter, if permitted and desired. (Counsel should consider whether any parts of the record are not legally available to the client and redact or withhold those parts.) Alternatively, if counsel believes there is a reasonable possibility counsel will need the record – e.g., the court may order supplemental briefing by counsel – and the client has expressed a lack of interest in filing a pro per brief, counsel may retain the record and tell the client it is available on request. Counsel may make a copy of some or all of the record for future reference.75

74The purpose of relieving counsel would ostensibly be to leave the client in proper and so situated to file a pro per brief. But, except for dependency cases, the client has a right to file such a brief, anyway, when counsel has filed a no-issue brief. (See § 4.85, post.)

75A modest amount of copying for counsel’s use in the event the court orders supplemental briefing is compensable. Any substantial copying, however, requires specific justification and should be cleared with ADI.
5. Declaration of counsel  [§ 4.82]

The brief should include counsel’s declaration that the client has been informed of
the nature of the brief, any right to file a pro per brief, the opportunity for access to the
record, and the right to ask counsel be relieved.\(^{76}\) (See \textit{In re Conservatorship of Ben C.}
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 536.)

D. Appellate Court Responsibilities  [§ 4.83]

1. Independent review of record  [§ 4.84]

\textit{Wende} held that, in a first criminal or delinquency\(^{77}\) appeal of right, \textit{Anders}
requires the appellate court to review the entire appellate record independently, to confirm
the lack of arguable issues, before disposing of the case. (\textit{People v. Wende} (1979) 25

This duty does not apply to non-criminal cases, such as LPS conservatorship (\textit{In re
304), not guilty by reason of insanity civil commitment (\textit{People v. Martinez} (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 1226), and sexually violent predator (\textit{People v. Kisling} (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 288) cases, nor to appeals from post-judgment orders such as motions to set
aside a plea because of invalid immigration advice (\textit{People v. Serrano} (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 496).

2. Pro per brief  [§ 4.85]

In a first criminal or delinquency appeal as of right or a civil commitment
proceeding, the court must give the appellant an opportunity to file a pro per brief. (\textit{In re
Conservatorship of Ben C.} (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529 [LPS]; \textit{People v. Wende} (1979) 25

\footnote{The purpose of relieving counsel would ostensibly be to leave the client in pro
per and so situated to file a pro per brief. But, except for dependency cases, the client has
a right to file such a brief, anyway, when counsel has filed a no-issue brief. (See § 4.85,
post.)}

\footnote{\textit{In re Kevin S.} (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97 held \textit{Wende-Anders} applies to
delinquency appeals. Most appellate courts have assumed that without discussion.}
239 Cal.App.4th 288, 292 [sexually violent predator]; People v. Taylor (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 304 [mentally disordered offender]; see also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 120.) This duty does not apply in a juvenile dependency case. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835.) The court will normally give the client a deadline; counsel should monitor this and ask for an extension of time on the client’s behalf when reasonably necessary.

3. **Briefing by counsel of arguable issue that court finds**  [§ 4.86]

   If, in its review of the record or consideration of any pro per brief filed, the court finds an arguable issue, the court must request counsel to brief it and may not decide the case without the benefit of such briefing. (Penson v. Ohio (1989) 488 U.S. 75, 81-83.) This duty is at a constitutional level for cases in which the party has a constitutional right to counsel on appeal. If the right to appointed counsel is based on statute instead, the duty to seek briefing by counsel is presumably implicit in the statute. If for some reason counsel had been permitted to withdraw or counsel is disabled from arguing the issue, new counsel must be appointed to do the briefing. (Penson, at pp. 81-83.)

4. **Decision**  [§ 4.86A]

   In a criminal or delinquency appeal, after conducting a Wende review and finding no issues, the court normally issues a written opinion. Under some circumstances it may dismiss the appeal instead. In dependency appeals, dismissal upon receipt of a Sade C. filing is common. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.) The theory of dismissal is essentially that the appellant has abandoned the appeal by failing to assert any claims. (Ibid.)

   If the client has filed a pro per brief in a first criminal appeal of right, the court must issue a written opinion with reasons given. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106.) Although normally the court need not respond to a client’s pro per brief if the client is represented by counsel (People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 173), in the Wende situation the pro per brief has greater status. For one thing, counsel has expressly failed to advocate relief for the client; for another, the pro per brief is a matter of right, not subject to the

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78Counsel may become disabled from briefing an issue by characterizing it as frivolous. (See People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 442.) ADI policy is that counsel must not characterize issues as having or lacking merit, but should simply describe them. (See § 4.79, ante.)

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court’s discretion.\textsuperscript{79} \textit{(Kelly, at p. 120.)} If such a brief is filed, the Court of Appeal opinion must set out the facts, procedural history, convictions, and sentence, and it must describe the contentions, stating briefly why they are being rejected. \textit{(Id. at p. 124.)} In other words, it must satisfy the state constitutional requirement that decisions determining causes must be “in writing with reasons stated.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14.)

Such a decision serves a number of functions besides fulfilling the state constitutional requirement of a written opinion. It provides guidance to the parties and other courts in subsequent litigation; it promotes careful consideration of the case; it conserves judicial resources by making a record of what has been decided and, possibly, persuading the defendant of the futility of further litigation. \textit{(People v. Kelly} \textit{(2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 120-121.)}

The duty to produce a written opinion in a no-issue case with a pro per brief arguably applies in a non-criminal case, as well, under \textit{People v. Kelly} \textit{(2006) 40 Cal.4th 106. Article VI, section 14, of the California Constitution applies to civil as well as criminal cases.} (\textit{Lewis v. Superior Court} \textit{(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232.)}

E. Choice Between Brief on the Merits and No-Issue Treatment \textsuperscript{[§ 4.87]}

In cases where there is no other issue, the question arises whether counsel should raise a weak issue (a “\textit{Wende} buster”) or simply file a \textit{Wende-Anders} brief. An April 2008 \textit{ADI news alert}\textsuperscript{80} and an accompanying \textit{practice article}\textsuperscript{81} discuss the criteria for arguable and frivolous issues and ways of converting a borderline issue into a credible one.

1. Sure loser \textsuperscript{[§ 4.88]}

If the issue is a sure loser, it is best to opt for the no-issue approach. Often counsel, engaged in understandable wishful thinking, will judge an issue as arguable though weak when it is in fact frivolous. But in a criminal or delinquency case, that approach deprives the client of the right to the court’s review of the record. Counsel can list the “loser” issue

\textsuperscript{79}It is not a right in the dependency context. \textit{(In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835.)}


among the *Anders* issues and give the court a chance at least to consider it. The project will give counsel the benefit of a second opinion on the matter.

An exception is when the issue, though a sure loser in the state courts, is being preserved for later federal review. (See §§ 9.44 et seq. and 9.66 et seq. of chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”) If there is a reasonable possibility of federal relief, the issue should be raised in a regular brief, not a *Wende* brief. Counsel should acknowledge the unfavorable California law and any effect of *Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455. Counsel can then state forthrightly that the issue is being raised to preserve it for federal review. Counsel should be sure to petition for review to exhaust state remedies properly.82

There is no tactical advantage to the no-issue brief if the court is not going to read the record, as is true in most non-criminal cases except delinquency appeals. Counsel should then give the benefit of any doubt to raising the issue. But if there is no doubt, counsel’s ethical duty is to refrain from asserting frivolous claims.

2. **Weak but not frivolous issue**  [§ 4.89]

If the issue is just weak but not frivolous or a sure loser, counsel should include it and file a regular brief on the merits. When counsel files a no-issue brief, he or she is certifying, as the client’s advocate and as an officer of the court, that there is nothing to argue. If that turns out not to be true, the court may conclude counsel carelessly overlooked or misjudged the issue or intentionally mischaracterized the case.

This rule is especially strong in a non-criminal case, where there is no right to a court review of the record and hence no strategic advantage to the client from filing a no-issue brief.

3. **Meritorious but trivial issue**  [§ 4.90]

For the same reasons that a weak but non-frivolous issue should be briefed (§ 4.89, ante), counsel also should file a brief on the merits when the only issue is not weak at all – in fact, it may be completely meritorious – but is trivial in that it will give little if any practical benefit to the defendant, at least at present. Examples of possibly ___________________________

82An exhaustion petition for review under California Rules of Court, rule 8.508, is sufficient for preservation purposes. (See chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision,” § 7.70.)

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inconsequential error might be minor clerical inaccuracies in the record and imposition of a concurrent term that should have been stayed under Penal Code section 654.

Counsel should first try to correct the error in the trial court, if possible. Beyond that, counsel should either raise the issue in a substantive brief or else get the client’s written waiver of it and file a legitimate no-issue brief.

VI. ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES: POTENTIAL RISKS OF APPEALING  [§ 4.91]

An appellant’s attorney not only must wield the familiar sword attacking reversible error, but also must carry a shield, ensuring at the very least the appeal will “do no harm.” Although double jeopardy and due process principles generally prevent penalizing the exercise of the right to appeal, in certain cases the defendant may actually be worse off because an appeal was pursued or because it was “successful.”

Adverse effects from appealing can include such perils as an increased sentence, reinstatement of dismissed charges, or the addition of more serious charges on remand. They also can entail non-penal consequences that may be more onerous than the original disposition. Some of the adverse effects may be minor; others, catastrophic.

In dependency cases, adverse consequences tend to be more limited. Some results favorable to the client may have been unauthorized and would be subject to correction on appeal – for example, a finding of presumed fatherhood or an offer of reunification services. Some matters brought up in the dependency appeal may be used against the client in any concurrent criminal proceeding. A non-legal consequence could be alienating the social worker or foster parents, resulting in decreased visitation or even its denial altogether.

Thus a crucial aspect of issue spotting and selection is identifying errors in the client’s favor, assessing how a particular issue or remedy might backfire, and when necessary advising the client whether to pursue the appeal. Failure to do so can be a serious breach of the attorney’s responsibilities to the client. Proper advice can save both the client and the attorney. (See People v. Harris (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 709, 715 [no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for proceeding with appeal when counsel informed defendant of possible consequences and defendant decided to pursue appeal].)

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83See § 4.150 et seq., appendix B, listing common examples of unauthorized sentences – mistakes in the defendant’s favor that can be corrected at any time.
A. General California Rule Against Greater Sentence After Appeal: People v. Henderson [§ 4.92]

Generally, under California law, after a successful appeal a defendant may not receive a greater sentence on those charges for which the defendant was convicted in the first trial. People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 495-497, established that California double jeopardy and due process principles generally forbid such an increased sentence. Henderson was based primarily on the rationale that allowing a greater sentence after appeal would unduly burden the right to appeal and deter challenges to erroneous judgments. (Id. at p. 497; see also People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 214; In re Ferguson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 79, 82.)

The Henderson rule applies in a number of contexts, such as:

- When the defendant is originally sentenced to life, retrial may not result in a death sentence, even if new factors justifying death are presented at the second trial. (People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 497 ["defendant’s right of appeal from an erroneous judgment is unreasonably impaired when he is required to risk his life to invoke that right"].)

- A defendant who originally receives concurrent sentences may not receive a greater sentence through consecutive sentences on retrial after a successful appeal. (See People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281-282.)

- A defendant may not receive an increased fine or statutory restitution fine on retrial after a successful appeal. (People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 69

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69 In People v. Utter (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 366, 369, the court did permit imposition of consecutive terms on retrial, but only because it was not for the same offenses and the new sentence was not higher than the initial sentence; in fact, the court noted the defendant would be eligible for parole earlier than under the original sentence.

70 Restitution fines must be distinguished from restitution orders designed to compensate victims for their losses and restitution ordered as a condition of probation. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1202.4, 1203.1, 1203.1k; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6 [juvenile proceedings]; compare People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355 [restitution fine cannot be increased on retrial after appeal] with People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641 [victim restitution is not punishment for Henderson double jeopardy purposes and can be imposed for first time on resentencing after appeal]; see also People v. Daniels (2012)
When a defendant is granted probation at the first trial, a denial of probation at retrial is warranted only when the court affirmatively states for the record new facts that would have warranted denial or revocation of probation in the first instance. (People v. Thornton (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 324, 327.)

A minor who has successfully challenged a juvenile court adjudication cannot be retried as an adult in criminal proceedings. (In re David B. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 931, 936, cited favorably in In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865, 876.)

The Henderson rule applies when a challenge to a judgment after trial is by habeas corpus, as well as appeal. (In re Ferguson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 79.) (Cf. § 4.99, post, on pleas.)

B. Unauthorized Sentence as Exception to Henderson Rule

An unauthorized sentence – one not permitted by law – is an exception to the Henderson prohibition against an increased sentence as a result of appeal. Such a sentence is subject to judicial correction at any time, with or without an appeal. (People v. Neal (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1120; People v. Massengale (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 689, 693; see also In re Renfrow (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1251 [on revocation of probation, court must correct previously imposed sentence if it was unauthorized].) Correction of such a sentence is not a penalty for exercising the right to appeal, since the correction could be done at any time and would be required even if the defendant had not

208 Cal.App.4th 29 [increase in one component of monetary sentence will not render punishment more severe if another component is reduced by equal amount; Henderson requires only that the aggregate monetary sentence, not each component thereof, be no more than that originally imposed].

People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482. The Henderson rule is described more fully in § 4.92, ante.

appealed. Thus the proscription against a higher sentence after appeal laid down in People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, does not apply. (Massengale, at p. 693.)

1. Risk to defendant from appealing  [§ 4.94]

If an unauthorized sentence is discovered on appeal, imposition of a proper judgment, even a more severe one, is permitted and indeed required. (People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 764, dictum on unrelated point disapproved in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 583, fn. 1.)

Pursuing an appeal poses the risk an erroneously lenient sentence that would otherwise go undetected will be discovered and corrected to a more severe one. The court may notice the error. The Attorney General may also find the error and seek correction; even if the prosecution did not object to an unauthorized sentence in the lower court, it may raise the issue on a defendant’s appeal. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354; see also People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 853.)

Appellate counsel must be alert to this possibility and advise the client if a potential problem is spotted. (See § 4.117 et seq., post, on measures to take.)

2. Nature of unauthorized sentence  [§ 4.95]

An unauthorized sentence is the “imposition of a sentence not authorized by law or the imposition of a sentence based upon an unlawful order of the court which strikes or

73If the original aggregate sentence was authorized but that sentence was structured in an unauthorized manner, the new aggregate sentence may not be increased. (See People v. Mustafaa (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1311-1312; see also People v. Torres (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1432-1433 [following Mustafaa].)

74In federal appeals, an unauthorized sentence may not be increased unless the government appeals or cross-appeals. (Greenlaw v. United States (2008) 554 U.S. 237.)

75In contrast, the prosecution’s failure to object to a discretionary sentencing choice forfeits the right to appeal the issue. (People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303 [failure to impose restitution fine and parole revocation fine forfeited by prosecution’s failure to object because trial court has discretion not to impose those fines in certain cases]; People v. Burnett (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 257, 261 [failure to impose sex offender fine pursuant to Pen. Code, § 290.3 not unauthorized because not mandatory if judge finds defendant unable to pay].)
otherwise modifies the effect of an enhancement or prior conviction.” (Pen. Code, § 1238, subd. (a)(10).) A sentence is unauthorized if it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the case. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354; cf. People v. Fond (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 127, 133-134 [sentence lower than that permitted by statute not “unauthorized” if, for fact-specific reasons, trial court found statutory term would be cruel and unusual punishment].) A sentence not authorized by law exceeds the jurisdiction of the court. (People v. Neal (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1120; see also In re Birdwell (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 926, 930.)

Examples of unauthorized sentences in the defendant’s favor include a sentence other than the alternatives specified in the governing statute, failure to pronounce judgment after a valid conviction, failure to impose a mandatory enhancement or fine or fee, one-third midterm when a fully consecutive sentence is mandated, probation when prohibited by statute, incarceration in county jail when that is not a statutory option, an erroneous stay under Penal Code section 654, and credits not allowed by law. A more complete list with examples from case law is compiled in § 4.151 et seq., appendix B, post.)

3. Exceptions  [§ 4.96]

On occasion a statutorily unauthorized sentence may not be challenged or corrected on appeal.

a. Limits on prosecution’s right to challenge unauthorized sentence on appeal  [§ 4.97]

If the unauthorized sentence is a term of a plea bargain, the prosecution may be estopped from challenging it: an agreement to a given sentence generally forfeits the right to argue it is unauthorized. 76

On the flip side, a defendant may not complain that a sentence negotiated as part of a plea bargain is harsher than that allowed by statute: “[D]efendants who have received the benefit of their bargain should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to better the bargain through the appellate process.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295 [defendant may not complain negotiated sentence violates Pen. Code, § 654]; see also People v. Harris (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1227 [defendant may waive mandated custody credit in order to receive other sentencing considerations].) Similarly, the defendant may not argue the sentence is more lenient than allowed by law as a ground for withdrawing the plea. (People v. Beebe (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 927, 932-936 [defendant estopped from challenging term of plea bargain calling for unauthorized

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The doctrine of forfeiture may likewise bar the prosecution from challenging a statutorily unauthorized sentence on a defendant’s appeal if the People should have appealed. (See People v. Fond (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 127, 133-134 [by failing to appeal, People forfeited fact-specific attack on trial court’s determination that statutory sentence was cruel and unusual punishment]; see § 2.89 of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started,” on exceptions to People’s right to raise issues on defendant’s appeal.)

b. Remaining potential for adverse consequences [§ 4.98]

The potential for adverse consequences remains even if the prosecution has no right to challenge an unauthorized sentence: the court has the discretion to correct the sentence on its own initiative. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [court raised and corrected sentencing error in People’s appeal, despite People’s forfeiture of right to raise issue on appeal by failing to object in trial court]; People v. Beebe (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 927, 936 [applying estoppel based on plea bargain, but warning “appellate courts cannot be expected to apply this doctrine in every case in which . . . [the plea] exceeds the court’s jurisdiction”]; see also § 2.55 et seq. of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started,” on terms of plea bargain void as unauthorized or contrary to public policy.)

C. Sentence After Withdrawal of Guilty Plea As Exception to Henderson Rule [§ 4.99]

A defendant who successfully attacks the validity of a guilty plea on appeal and seeks to withdraw the plea generally may receive a higher sentence than the original. (People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 764-765, dictum on unrelated point disapproved in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 583, fn. 1.) The order vacating the conviction nullifies post-plea proceedings, returning the defendant to the pre-plea position.


reduction of non-wobbler felony to misdemeanor].)

77The Fond court held the sentence was not facially “unauthorized,” because it was based on constitutional considerations. Thus it was not subject to correction at any time in the absence of appeal.

78People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482. The Henderson rule is described more fully in § 4.92, ante.
1. Loss of benefits of plea bargain  [§ 4.100]

Renouncing the plea bargain means renouncing its benefits as well as its burdens. The sentence on the count to which the defendant pleaded guilty can be increased upon conviction, and any counts dismissed as a result of the bargain can be reinstated. (People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 769, overruled on another point in People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896, fn. 5; People v. Aragon (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 749, 756-757.79

2. Possibility court may void bargain on own initiative  [§ 4.101]

Even if the defendant does not directly attack the plea on appeal, it is possible (although not common) for the reviewing court to determine the plea bargain is void and vacate it on its own initiative. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [court has authority to correct sentencing error itself, even if parties cannot].) An example might be a term of the bargain that contains an unauthorized sentence or violates public policy.80 (See People v. Renfro (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 223, 228, 231, 233 [negotiated provision that offense falls outside the Mentally Disordered Offender law, Pen. Code, § 2960, would violate public policy because it would undermine that law and release a defendant who poses potential danger to society]; cf. People v. Castillo (2010) 49 Cal.4th 145 [Attorney General bound by stipulation of district attorney to two-year SVP term].)

3. Argument alleging breach of plea bargain  [§ 4.102]

An argument that the prosecution or trial court repudiated or violated the plea agreement can risk an increased sentence because a frequent remedy for such an error is vacating the plea bargain. Normally there are two possible remedies for breach of the

79 An unusual exception was People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 214-217, in which the crime to which the defendant had pled guilty was repealed before sentencing. The Supreme Court vacated the plea because the trial court had no jurisdiction to impose sentence for a non-existent crime. However, the court ordered that on remand the sentence could not be greater than the original; since the plea had been invalidated by operation of law, not renounced by the defendant, he was entitled to retain the benefit of the bargain.

80 These topics are discussed further in § 2.55 et seq. of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started,” on plea bargains requiring unauthorized sentence or violating public policy.)

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bargain – withdrawal of the plea or specific enforcement of the bargain. (*People v. Mancheno* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 860-861; *People v. Kaanehe* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 15.) While specific performance would not be an adverse consequence, withdrawal of the plea would open the door to the possibility of an increased sentence.

Specific performance is appropriate when it will implement the parties’ reasonable expectations without binding the trial judge to an unreasonable disposition. (*People v. Mancheno* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 861.) Withdrawal of the plea is the appropriate remedy when specific performance would limit the judge’s sentencing discretion in light of new information or changed circumstances. (*Ibid.; see People v. Kaanehe* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 13-14; see also Pen. Code, § 1192.5 [defendant cannot be given a more severe sentence than that specified in the plea without being offered a chance to withdraw the plea]; but see *Doe v. Harris* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64 [plea agreement reference to a statutory consequence of conviction (e.g., a registration requirement) is not an implied promise that any subsequent legislative changes to that statutory consequence will not apply to the defendant].)

§ 2.27 et seq. of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started,” further explores the topic of non-compliance with the plea bargain.

D. **Added Charges After Appeal As Possible Exception to Henderson Rule**

*§ 4.103*

Remand for a new trial conceivably could result in a greater sentence if at retrial it gives the prosecution a reason or occasion to add other charges that are not barred by such legal impediments as a twice-dismissed count, expiration of the statute of limitations, or speedy trial violation.

If there appears to be the potential for additional charges as a result of appeal, counsel should consult with trial counsel and the assigned ADI staff attorney.

81To repudiate the bargain, the prosecution need only violate one term of the plea. The harmless error doctrine does not apply because it is assumed that any violation of the bargain resulted in detriment to the defendant. (*Mancheno*, at p. 865; *People v. Mikhail* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 846, 858.)

82*People v. Henderson* (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482. The *Henderson* rule is described more fully in § 4.92, ante.
1. Additional charges initially not tried or retried because of original conviction  [§ 4.104]

Reversal on appeal may give the prosecution an incentive to file charges – or to retry charges originally mistried – that it would not otherwise have filed if its “bird in the hand,” the first conviction, had remained on the books.

For example, the prosecution may initially decide against pursuing a charge because the defendant has already suffered a conviction for a crime carrying a heavy sentence. It might change its mind, however, if that conviction is reversed on appeal. The defendant then may face, not only retrial on the reversed charge, but prosecution on the charge originally not pursued. (See People v. Villanueva (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 411 [greater sentence on retrial of mistried firearm enhancement allegations after reversal on appeal is permissible]; People v. Bolton (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 541, 549 [no prohibition against increased aggregate sentences following successful appeal when new sentence “is based on additional criminal convictions that were not at issue in the successful appeal and on which the defendant could have been retried without violating double jeopardy”]; Arnold v. Superior Court (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 984 [assault charge originally dismissed at prosecution’s request under Pen. Code, § 1385 after mistrial, because defendant serving murder sentence; when conviction was reversed on appeal and retrial ended in acquittal, assault charge was properly refiled];83 People v. Dontanville (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 783 [sex offense that came to light during first murder trial was properly charged for first time after murder conviction reversed and retrial ended in acquittal].)

Henderson arguably does not prevent this result because the prosecution had the right to try the additional charge regardless of whether there was an appeal – the charge is not a penalty for appealing. The defendant might still be able to allege vindictive prosecution, if the facts warrant it. (See § 4.112 et seq., post; e.g., People v. Puentes (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1480 [mistried felony charge originally dismissed in interests of justice after sentence on misdemeanor, which was later reversed; reinstatement of felony charge on remand was presumptively vindictive].)

Counsel should also consider that Penal Code section 1382 entitles a defendant to a retrial of mistried allegations within 60 days, and a dismissal of such charges unless good cause to the contrary is shown. The defendant must move for dismissal to invoke this right. Good cause may be shown by the pendency of appellate proceedings, if they

83The Ninth Circuit upheld this decision in Arnold v. McCarthy (9th Cir. 1978) 566 F.2d 1377.
potentially affect the count to be retried. *(People v. Villanueva (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 411, 423-424.)*

2. **Removal of Kellett barrier** [§ 4.105]

Conceivably reversal could remove an obstacle that would otherwise have barred new charges under Penal Code sections 654 and 954 and *Kellett v. Superior Court* (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822, 827, which requires a single prosecution for all offenses in which the same act or course of conduct played a significant part. A conviction and sentence are a bar to subsequent prosecution of any offense omitted in the initial proceedings. (*Kellett*, at p. 827.) If the conviction and sentence no longer exist, the previously unfiled charges possibly could be tried along with the older, reversed one, thereby potentially increasing the punishment. (See *People v. Brown* (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 317, 322-323 [no *Kellett* barrier to adding charges at retrial after mistrial].)

E. **Non-Penal Dispositions as Exceptions to Henderson Rule** [§ 4.106]

If a consequence of a successful appeal or appellate issue is not “punishment” under double jeopardy principles, the proscription of *People v. Henderson* (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, against greater sentences after appeal does not apply, even though the subsequent disposition may be more onerous to the defendant than the original one.

1. **Victim restitution** [§ 4.107]

One area for concern over non-penal adverse consequences is compensatory victim restitution. In *People v. Harvest* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, at resentencing after an appeal, the trial court for the first time imposed victim restitution of $36,301. The Court of Appeal upheld the restitution order, concluding compensatory victim restitution “is not punishment and is therefore not constitutionally barred.” (*Id.* at p. 645.) The court distinguished *People v. Hanson* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 361, which held restitution *fines* are punishment within the meaning of the double jeopardy doctrine. *Harvest* did not mention *People v. Zito* (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 736, 741, which held compensatory victim restitution and a restitution fine, whose combined amount exceeded the combined statutory limit in effect at the time of the crime, would be considered unauthorized as ex post facto punishment.

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84 *People v. Henderson* (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482. The *Henderson* rule is described more fully in § 4.92, ante.
2. Confinement upon finding of incompetence to stand trial  

   If the conviction is reversed for a new hearing on competence to stand trial under Penal Code section 1367 et seq. and the defendant is found incompetent on remand, the resulting commitment can be as long as the shorter of three years or the maximum sentence for the most serious crime charged – a period that may be longer than the original prison sentence. Further, the calculation of credits may be less generous. (See Pen. Code, § 1375.5; People v. Waterman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 565, 567 [conduct credits].)

3. Confinement upon finding of not guilty by reason of insanity

   A longer potential confinement than a straight prison sentence and restricted credits may result if, on remand, the defendant could be found not guilty by reason of insanity (Pen. Code, § 1026 et seq. or committed to the Youth Authority as a youthful offender (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1731.5 et seq.).

4. Loss of attorney-client confidentiality

   Another possible non-penal adverse consequence, encountered often in habeas corpus cases alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, is suspension of the attorney-client privilege and concomitant compromise of confidentiality. In responding to the allegations in the writ proceedings, the former trial counsel may divulge damaging communications from the client and other information obtained during their relationship.

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85 Principles of due process and equal protection prohibit indefinite confinement of a person found unable to stand trial and impose certain procedural and substantive requirements. (Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715; In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798.)

86 The maximum period of commitment is the longest prison term that could have been imposed. (Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (a); see People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56, 63; People v. Hernandez (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1237.) The commitment may be extended beyond this time. (Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b).) It is civil in nature. (People v. Angeletakis (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 963, 967-971.)

87 Constitutionally, the commitment may not exceed the maximum time the defendant would serve if sent to state prison. (People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236; People v. Sandoval (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 73, 89; see People v. Franklin (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 250; cf. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1770.)

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While the confidential evidence produced at that hearing will be privileged in a later retrial, as a matter of judicially declared use immunity (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 691-695), that privilege can be waived by the defendant’s actions at the retrial (id. at 695-696). In any case, the disclosure of secret information may pose problems for the defendant apart from its later use as evidence.

5. **Personal detriment** [§ 4.111]

Even if no legal adverse consequences might occur, the client personally may lose out after “winning” on appeal. Real life does not always follow legal logic. For example, sometimes it may not be to a defendant’s personal and practical benefit to get a new sentencing proceeding. The same sentence may be virtually foreordained, given the facts and the judge, while having to leave prison for court may cost the client a favored job or location within the institution, or cause disruption in activities and relationships.

To prevent an “unwanted remedy,” appellate counsel should contact trial counsel when needed to get a feel for probable outcomes on remand, then consult with the client about the practical considerations. In the end, as with potential legal consequences, the decision whether to seek a particular remedy or pursue the appeal at all is the client’s. (See § 1.58 of chapter 1, “The ABC’s of Panel Membership: Basic Information for Appointed Counsel,” on the client’s role in decision making.)

F. **Federal Limitations on Greater Sentences After Appeal** [§ 4.112]

Federal double jeopardy provisions do not prohibit a greater sentence after appeal. The federal right to due process, however, does protect against vindictive prosecution. (North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 725, overruled on other grounds in Alabama v. Smith (1989) 490 U.S. 794, 798-799.) Vindictiveness against a defendant, by either a trial judge or a prosecutor, for successfully attacking the first conviction violates fundamental due process because fear of ending up worse after an appeal could deter the defendant from seeking review of a conviction. (Pearce, at p. 725.)
A defendant must object at resentencing on grounds of vindictiveness or risk waiving the issue. (*People v. Williams* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 649, 654-656.)

1. **Statement of reasons for greater sentence** [§ 4.113]

To protect against an inference of vindictiveness, the trial court must articulate reasons for a more severe sentence. The reasons must be based on “objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant” that took place after the original sentencing. (*North Carolina v. Pearce* (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 726.) The facts on which the increased sentence is based must be put on the record, “so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal.” (*Ibid.*)

2. **Presumption of vindictiveness** [§ 4.114]

If adequate objective justification for the higher sentence is not provided, a presumption of vindictiveness may arise. (*North Carolina v. Pearce* (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 726; see also *Blackledge v. Perry* (1974) 417 U.S. 21, 27; *United States v. Goodwin* (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 374; e.g., *People v. Puentes* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1480 [mistried felony charge originally dismissed in interests of justice after sentence on misdemeanor, which was later reversed; reinstatement of felony charge on remand was vindictive]; but see *Alabama v. Smith* (1989) 490 U.S. 794, 803 [no basis for presumption when second sentence imposed after trial is heavier than first sentence following guilty plea, overruling *Simpson v. Rice*, companion case decided in *Pearce*].)

If the presumption does not arise or is rebutted, the defendant must affirmatively prove actual vindictiveness. (*Wasman v. United States* (1984) 468 U.S. 559, 569.)

   a. **How presumption may be rebutted** [§ 4.115]

In order to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness, the prosecution has the burden of demonstrating “(1) the increase in charge was justified by some objective change in circumstances or in the state of evidence which legitimately influenced the charging process and (2) that the new information could not reasonably have been discovered at the time the prosecution exercised its discretion to bring the original charge.” (*In re Bower* (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865, 879.)

The presumption of vindictiveness has been found rebutted when there was an intervening conviction for another offense, even if the offense was committed before the original sentencing (*Wasman v. United States* (1984) 468 U.S. 559, 571-572), and when
new information was discovered about the crime or the defendant during the new trial (Texas v. McCullough (1986) 475 U.S. 134, 141-144; contrast Nulph v. Cook (9th Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 1052, 1062 [after successful challenge to sentence, state applied different calculation method, drastically increasing sentence beyond what it had originally determined would be excessive]).

b. When presumption does not apply  [§ 4.116]

The presumption of vindictiveness is limited and does not apply in all cases. (See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith (1989) 490 U.S. 794, 801 [no presumption when first sentence followed guilty plea and second followed a trial; overruling Simpson v. Rice, companion case decided in Pearce]; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe (1973) 412 U.S. 17, 26-27 [second sentence imposed by jury with no knowledge of first]; Colten v. Kentucky (1972) 407 U.S. 104, 116-117 [greater sentence was imposed by a second court in two-tier trial system]; People v. Williams (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 649, 658-659 [no presumption where defendant’s appeal was unsuccessful, People’s appeal succeeded, and new sentence one year longer than original but still within terms of plea bargain].)

G. Counsel’s Responsibilities Regarding Potential Adverse Consequence
   [§ 4.117]

Counsel has a duty to advise the client and to seek direction from the client after identifying potential adverse consequences from pursuing a particular issue or the appeal in general. The advice involves:

1. Weighing the magnitude and likelihood of potential benefits from the appeal against the magnitude and likelihood of risk  [§ 4.118]

The assessment of potential benefit from the appeal includes such questions as: What relief is possible from pursuing the appeal? Given the substantive law, the applicable standards of review and prejudice, and the facts of this case, what are the chances of such relief?

The potential downside calculation includes such factors as: How much additional time or what other burdens would the client face from the adverse consequence? Is the law clear on this point, or is a contrary position arguable? How evident is the error on the face of the record? How has the court handled such errors in the past?

If there are issues offering a strong chance of significant relief, it may be worthwhile to risk a minor adverse consequence. The reverse could be true if issues are
weak or would have minimal effect on the ultimate disposition and the adverse consequence is substantial.

2. Taking into account the possibility the error would be discovered and corrected even if the appeal were dismissed  [§ 4.119]

The client may suffer the adverse consequence even without appealing. Errors may be detected and corrected through other mechanisms than appeal. If the consequence is probably going to occur, anyway, there is little point to giving up the appeal. However, making such a prediction is hazardous and uncertain at best.

An unauthorized sentence, for example, may come to the attention of the trial court or prosecution in later proceedings involving the same client or others, in review of files, or in a wholly unanticipated and haphazard way. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation regularly reviews inmate sentence records, and it reports errors, including recently discovered unauthorized sentences, to the trial court.88 It is helpful to review the superior court file and obtain a copy of the most current prison records on the client’s sentence, to see if the error has already been corrected – in which case the appeal poses no additional risk.89

3. Leaving the ultimate decision to the client  [§ 4.120]

Counsel must assess these factors thoroughly and offer the client the best possible professional judgment. Since the assessment can be highly speculative, however, the decision necessarily entails rolling the dice. In the end, the client must serve the time or suffer any other consequence, and so the client must decide.

Indeed, the ultimate decision whether to pursue an appeal is always the client’s. (Jones v. Barnes (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 751-754 [“the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty,

88The department’s detection rate is erratic. An unauthorized sentence may well be noticed when it is apparent on the face of sentencing documents, such as the abstract of judgment and probation report, which routinely go to the department. On the other hand, the department may not discover an error if the invalidity of the sentence depends on facts not observable in such records.

89Needless to say, in making any contact with the court, any law enforcement agencies, or the department, counsel should not divulge that the purpose is to see whether an unauthorized sentence has been corrected.
waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal’’]; In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 680-681; see also People v. Harris (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 709, 715 [client, not counsel, responsible for deciding not to pursue appeal]; In re Martin (1962) 58 Cal.2d 133, 136-137 [counsel not permitted to give up right to appeal without client’s consent by letting it be dismissed under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.360(c)(5) & (6)]; In re Alma B. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1043 [appeal without client’s consent]; see generally Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.2(a).)

Counsel should advise the client of the relative risks and benefits, then have the client send a decision in writing. It is helpful to provide a form with check boxes for continuing or dismissing the appeal. Counsel should remind the client that an attorney has no authority to dismiss an appeal without the client’s consent; if the client fails to respond, therefore, counsel must proceed with the appeal.
CHECKLIST OF SOME COMMON ISSUES RAISED ON CRIMINAL APPEALS  

The following non-exhaustive list includes some general issues to check as part of counsel’s regular review of the record.

NOTE: The issues and citations are just a starting point for research. The law changes frequently, and so the checklist and law must be continuously reviewed and updated.

- **Charge.  [§ 4.123]**

  Confirm that the crime for which the defendant was convicted was adequately charged or is a lesser included offense of the crime charged. (See *People v. Toro* (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, dictum on unrelated point disapproved in *People v. Guiuan* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 568, fn. 3; see also *People v. Bailey* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 740; *People v. Macias* (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 957; *People v. Hamernik* (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 412.)

- **Demurrer.  [§ 4.124]**


- **Statute.  [§ 4.125]**

  Check the statute under which the defendant was convicted.

  - Does the wording of the statute at the time the offense was committed literally cover the conduct in question; was it intended to do so? (See *Fiore v. White* (2001) 531 U.S. 225.)


Was the defendant convicted under a general statute when a more specific one covers his conduct? (*In re Williamson* (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651, 654-655; see also *People v. Murphy* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86 [if general statute covers same conduct as special statute, court infers Legislature intended conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under special statute].)

Was the statute under which the defendant was punished unconstitutionally enacted? (*People v. Armogeda* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 428 [Legislature could not amend a voter-enacted law in a way inconsistent with the terms and intent of that law].)

Pleadings and proof  [§ 4.126]

Look for adequate specificity in the information regarding the date of the offense, property at issue, etc. Is it clear what conduct was at issue? (*People v. Arias* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1009 [failure to plead attempted murder was deliberate and premeditated required life sentence be reduced to that for unpremeditated attempted murder].) Do charges make clear defendant will be subject to an increased sentence if certain findings are made? (See *People v. Sawyers* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 713; *People v. Wilford* (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 827.) Check for material variances between the pleading and the evidence at trial. Did the trial court properly allow any amendments to the information? (*People v. Lettice* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 139; see *People v. Rogers* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1353.) Check
for material variance between evidence produced at trial and evidence produced at preliminary hearing to prove any particular count. (E.g., People v. Graff (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 345.)

- **Subject matter, personal, and territorial jurisdiction** [§ 4.127]

  Confirm proper jurisdiction existed. Usually this is a non-issue, but it crops up in the occasional case and can be significant when it does occur. (E.g., In re Steven R. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 812.)

- **Change of venue** [§ 4.128]

  Look for motions seeking a change of venue, usually because of prejudicial pretrial publicity. (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 523-524; People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1124-1132.)

- **Statute of limitations** [§ 4.129]

  Investigate this issue when the crime was committed a substantial time before it was prosecuted. It has gained special vigor since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Stogner v. California (2003) 539 U.S. 607. The relevant limitations periods are set out in Penal Code sections 799 to 805. (See also Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 370-377 [defendant can waive statute of limitations to plead guilty to lesser included offenses]; People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 756-757; People v. Doolittle (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 589; People v. Simmons (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 778; People v. Lynch (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1262; People v. Le (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1356-1362; People v. Lopez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 244-252.) Be aware that the statute may have run as to lesser offenses, even if it has not as to greater charges. (E.g., People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078.)

- **Bars to relitigation** [§ 4.130]

  Inquire whether some part of the case was litigated in another proceeding. The doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, law of the case, or rule of consistency might apply. (See generally People v. Mena (2012) 54 Cal.4th 146, 166 [resolution of issue on merits by pretrial writ precludes later appellate review as law of the

Multiple prosecutions and convictions  [§ 4.131]

Review potential issues involving multiple prosecutions and convictions, including double jeopardy problems. Double jeopardy principles and related statutory provisions are multifaceted. (See People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 563-565.) Some examples include:

- Had the case previously been dismissed under Penal Code section 1387 (see also Pen. Code, § 1387.1)? (People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303.)


- Did the prosecutor deliberately provoke a mistrial in the first proceeding? (People v. Batts (2003) 30 Cal.4th 660.)

- Had the defendant previously been convicted or acquitted of the present charge or an offense included within it? (E.g., Evans v. Michigan (2013) 568 U.S. 313 [midtrial directed verdict and dismissal, based on trial court’s mistake as to element of offense, was “acquittal” for double jeopardy purposes]; Blueford v. Arkansas (2012) 566 U.S. 599 [statement by jury of preliminary vote does not constitute acquittal for jeopardy purposes]; People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 299-302 [acceptance of guilty verdict on lesser included offense precludes retrial on greater]; People v. Pedroza (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 635 [because judge granted motion for new trial on grounds of insufficient evidence, no retrial allowed; but order of acquittal is appealable]; Brown v. Superior Court (People) (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1511 [when jury acquitted of some charges but hung on others, at retrial, prosecutor had duty of showing renewed charges were based on different conduct and charges from those on which the jury had reached a
verdict]; *People v. Sullivan* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 242 [where jury has reached a verdict on a substantive count, but is hung on an enhancement, the court should take the verdict on the count and declare a mistrial as to the enhancement; to discharge the jury without a verdict on the count is tantamount to an acquittal and double jeopardy is implicated].)

Before the current proceeding, did a court find insufficient evidence to support the conviction? (*Burks v. United States* (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 18, and *People v. Hatch* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 271-272 [U.S. and California Constitutions preclude retrial if trial court determines evidence was insufficient to support conviction as a matter of law, but not if court exercised its power to weigh evidence or its discretion to dismiss].)

Was there a previous appeal in the case? (See *People v. Henderson* (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 495-497 [California double jeopardy and due process principles generally forbid imposition of a greater sentence on retrial or resentencing on the same charges after a successful appeal]; see § 4.92 et seq., ante.)

Was the defendant convicted on both a greater offense and a lesser included one (*People v. Pearson* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 355) or different forms of the same offense for the same conduct (*People v. Vidana* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632)?

used as evidence of consciousness of guilt in prior murder trial in which he was acquitted.)

- **Speedy trial**  [§ 4.132]

Determine whether Penal Code sections 1381 and 1389 demands were made and whether the issue of speedy trial on statutory or constitutional grounds was raised below. Pay special attention to whether prejudice on appeal can be shown. (See *Betterman v. Montana* (2016) ___ U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct. 1609, 194 L.Ed.2d 723]; *Barker v. Wingo* (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530; *People v. Wagner* (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1039; *People v. Harrison* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 225-227; *People v. Catlin* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 107; *People v. Archerd* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 615, 640.) Also look for prejudicially prolonged precharging delaying, which can violate due process. (*United States v. Lovasco* (1977) 431 U.S. 783, 789; see *People v. Booth* (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1284.)

- **Severance and consolidation**  [§ 4.133]


- **Discovery**  [§ 4.134]

Consider issues regarding the information disclosed, or not disclosed, to the defendant or prosecution. For example:


Prosecution or defense failure to comply with discovery order in timely fashion. (*People v. Gonzales* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1744, 1750, 1753-1754; see Pen. Code, § 1054 et seq.)


Competence to stand trial  

Examine Penal Code section 1368 issues regarding the defendant’s competency to stand trial.

- **CAVEAT:** Be cautious in this area; the client may not want the remedies such an issue might offer. (See § 4.106, ante, on non-penal adverse consequences.)

Was there substantial evidence of incompetence before the court, or did the court express doubt about the defendant’s competence, so that section 1368 proceedings should have been held? (*People v. Rodas* (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219; *People v. Lightsey* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668; *People v. Koontz* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1064; *People v. Marks* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1340-1344; see *Drope v. Missouri* (1975) 420 U.S. 162; *Pate v. Robinson* (1966) 383 U.S. 375; cf. *Moore v. Superior Court (People)* (2010) 50 Cal.4th 802 [defendant in SVP proceeding does not have due process right to be tried or civilly committed only while mentally competent]; *In re Bryan E.* (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 385 [competence in juvenile proceedings governed by Welf. & Inst. Code, § 709]; see also United States v. Gillenwater (9th Cir. 2013) 717 F.3d 1070 [defendant has constitutional right to testify at competency hearing; counsel may not waive it].

Consider also the remedy of a retrospective competency hearing. (People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219; People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 710-711; People v. Ary (2011) 51 Cal.4th 510, 520, fn. 3.)

☐ Admonitions and waivers of rights  [§ 4.136]

Check all pleas of guilty, admissions of priors, waivers of jury trial, and submission on the preliminary hearing transcript.

☐ Was the defendant specifically admonished on the constitutional rights to a right to jury trial, to confrontation, against self-incrimination? Do both the advisement and the defendant’s personal waiver appear explicitly on the record? (See People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151; People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 493-495; see Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1178-1179 [prejudice from failure to give explicit admonitions judged by totality of circumstances indicating voluntary and intelligent plea]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 130-133.  

☐ Was the defendant adequately advised of the consequences of the plea? (In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 243, fn. 7; Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 605.) If the defendant is not a citizen, did the trial court advise that conviction of the offense may result in deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization? (Pen. Code, § 1016.5.)

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90See § 2.46 of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started.”


92See § 2.47 of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started.”
Did the trial court honor the defendant’s right to enter a plea of his or own choice or put on a defense, despite counsel’s disagreement with the decision? (People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803 [right to defense at guilt phase]; People v. Rogers (1961) 56 Cal.2d 301 [right to enter plea personally]; Pen. Code, § 1018 [plea to be made personally by defendant]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.778 [right to plead no contest without consent of counsel]; cf. People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1298-1300; People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739 [no right to plead guilty to capital offense without counsel’s consent, as required by Pen. Code, § 1018].)

Did the court properly find a factual basis for the plea? (Pen. Code, § 1192.5; see People v. v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110.)

Did the trial court inform the defendant before the plea that its approval is not binding, that the court may withdraw its approval later, and that, if it does, “the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw his plea if he desires to do so . . .”? (Pen. Code, § 1192.5; People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1253.)

Was the defendant adequately advised of the consequences of a plea under People v. Vargas (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1107, providing for a specified sentence if the defendant appeared for sentencing and a heavier one if he or she did not?

Was the defendant advised of the right to a jury trial on civil commitment and personally waive it? (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113 [MDO commitment extension]; People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160 [NGI recommitment].)

Representation  [§ 4.137]

Review possible denials of or infringements on the right to counsel or the right to self-representation at any stage. For example:

Right to self-representation.


- Standard for ability to represent self. (*Indiana v. Edwards* (2008) 554 U.S. 164 [state law may constitutionally require higher standard of competence to represent self than to stand trial]; cf. *People v. Johnson* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519 [California courts may deny self-representation to mentally ill defendant who has been found competent to stand trial but is unable to present a basic defense by self, if permitted by *Faretta*93]; *People v. Gardner* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 945.)

- Right to enter a plea of own choice or put on a defense, despite counsel’s disagreement with the decision. (*People v. Frierson* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803 [right to defense at guilt phase]; *People v. Rogers* (1961) 56 Cal.2d 301 [right to enter plea personally]; Pen. Code, § 1018 [plea to be made personally ability to represent self]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.778 [right to plead no contest without consent of counsel]; cf. *People v. Alfaro* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1298-1300; *People v. Chadd* (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739 [no right to plead guilty to capital offense without counsel’s consent, as required by Pen. Code, § 1018].)


93 Under *Johnson*, the test for self-representation is higher than competence to stand trial. It asks whether the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the point he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present the defense without the help of counsel. (53 Cal.4th at p. 530.)
*Marshall v. Rodgers* (2013) 569 U.S. 58 [state court determination that right to counsel was not violated by denying counsel to file new trial motion was not contrary to or unreasonable application of federal law, after defendant had waived counsel on three occasions].


- Substitution of counsel.
  - Right to discharge retained counsel without cause. (*People v. Ortiz* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 983; *People v. Lara* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 139, 153-164 [motion to discharge retained counsel must be granted if timely and is not subject to Marsden standards for replacement of appointed counsel].)

Conflicts of interest.\textsuperscript{94} These come in many forms (see \textit{People v. Bonin} (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 833-836), including:


- Entering into a contract to write a book about the case. (\textit{People v. Bonin} (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 836.)

\textbf{Jury selection} [§ 4.138]


\textsuperscript{94}California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.7 allows for representation by a conflicted attorney if the defendant consents in writing after full disclosure. However, it is doubtful that a client can ever waive the duty to practice competently; if the conflict is fundamental, the consent may be ineffectual. (\textit{Wheat v. United States} (1988) 486 U.S. 153, 159-163; \textit{People v. Jones} (2004) 33 Cal.4th 234; \textit{In re A.C.} (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 994; \textit{Klemm v. Superior Court} (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 893; San Diego County Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 1995-1, section 4; Los Angeles County Bar Association Formal Opinion No. 471.)

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deliberations is also potentially important. (E.g., *People v. Garcia* (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 542.) See *People v. Gutierrez* (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, on the constitutional duties of counsel, trial courts, and appellate courts.

### Trial process and conditions  [§ 4.139]


- **Ability to present defense, access to compulsory process.** (*Ake v. Oklahoma* (1985) 470 U.S. 68 [appointment of experts for defense]; *Chambers v. Mississippi* (1973) 410 U.S. 284 [cross-examination of person who repudiated confession to crime defendant accused of]; *People v. Treadway* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 562 [plea agreement between prosecutor and co-defendant forbidding co-defendant from testifying at defendant’s trial denied right to compulsory process and due process right to present a defense].)


Review motions that were made and consider whether others should have been made. Be sure the trial court’s ruling is supported by the record. (See People v. Perez (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 736.) The possibilities are many, but some common motions to be on the alert for include:

- Motions in limine.
- Penal Code section 1385 motion to dismiss, including Three Strikes issues. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.)
- Defense request for a continuance. (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 660-661.)
- Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment search and seizure grounds. Make sure trial counsel appropriately moved to suppress and scrutinize the court’s reasoning in denying the motion. (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 829-837; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 794-795.)
- Motion to suppress the defendant’s extrajudicial statements as involuntary or as violative of Miranda.95 (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Evid. Code, §§ 402-405, 1220; Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436; but see United States v. Patane (2004) 542 U.S. 630, 639-640 [failure to give Miranda warning does not require exclusion of physical evidence that is fruit of voluntary statement].)96

95A confession issue is not preserved if the defendant pleads guilty. (People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896; cf. Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m) [search and seizure issue].) However, if the trial court induced a plea by representing that the issue is appealable, the plea itself can be challenged. (DeVaughn, at p. 896.) If the plea was induced by counsel’s erroneous advice as to appealability, ineffective assistance of counsel may be argued.


Motion for new trial. (Pen. Code, § 1181.)

- **Evidentiary errors**  
  [§ 4.141]

  Reflect on each piece of evidence that was introduced against or by the defendant, especially any that was contested, and note whether a timely objection was made (see Evid. Code, § 353). Why was the evidence introduced? Should it have been excluded or included or limited? Just a few among the many possible areas of evidentiary issues might be:


Privileges that were claimed or that should have been claimed, such as the privilege against self-incrimination or the marital or attorney-client privilege. (Evid. Code, § 900 et seq.)


Foundational requirements and prerequisites for the admissibility of evidence. (E.g., Evid. Code, §§ 400 et seq. [preliminary facts], 700 et seq. [competence of witnesses], 1222, subd. (b) and 1223, subd. (b) [certain admissions].)

Extrajudicial statement of non-testifying co-defendant. (E.g., Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 132; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, 526-527.)

Accomplices’ testimony. (Pen. Code, § 1111; CALCRIM Nos. 334, 335; CALJIC No. 3.10 et seq.)

Writings. (Evid. Code, § 1400 et seq.)

“Testimony” through repeated leading questions without meaningful witness responses. (People v. Murillo (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 448.)

Prosecutorial misconduct  [§ 4.142]

Consider whether the prosecutor may have committed misconduct. This issue often arises in final argument but also occurs in examination of witnesses and other facets of the trial. Examples include:


7. Urging jurors to preserve civil order, deter future lawbreaking, “send a message” about a current crisis, or accomplish some goal unrelated to the
defendant’s own guilt or innocence. (*United States v. Sanchez* (9th Cir.) 659 F.3d 1252; cf. *People v. Martinez* (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 965-966 [no misconduct in imploring jury to send a message to the community to “restore the confidence and the trust” in system when determining whether to impose capital punishment].)

- Mischaracterizing the law. (*People v. Centeno* (2015) 60 Cal.4th 659 [inaccurate characterization of reasonable doubt and use of misleading visual aids].)

### Jury instructions [§ 4.143]

Scrutinize the instructions with particular care. (See § 4.22 et seq. of this chapter, *ante.*) Instructional error is one of the most fruitful areas and one of the most successful on appeal.97 Counsel’s review should include the written instructions selected to be given, those rejected, the judge’s oral rendition, any printed version sent into the jury room, and any given in response to a jury query.

- Did the instructions fully and accurately state the basic elements of the offenses?

- Did the instructions properly set forth the applicable burdens of proof, especially the most fundamental one, proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?

- Were any instructions misleading or confusing? Were technical terms defined?

- Were all applicable sua sponte instructions given?

- Were appropriate unanimity instructions (e.g., CALCRIM Nos. 3500-3502) given?

- Was there evidence to support the giving of each instruction?

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97Many instructional errors can be raised despite lack of objection in the trial court. (See Pen. Code, § 1259: “The appellate court may . . . review any instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.”)
Were special instructions required? Examples might be cautionary instructions, limiting instructions, and instructions relating to accomplices (Pen. Code, § 1111; People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 547), expert witnesses, and corpus delicti requirements (e.g., People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1180).


Did the instructions adequately put forth the defense theory of the case?


Did the court respond appropriately – in terms of both procedure and substance – to any jury questions during deliberations? (See People v. Fleming (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 754 [when jury asks question during deliberation, a technically correct statement of law in response that does not correctly instruct on the subject of query, requires reversal]; People v. Thompkins (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 244, 250 [jury’s request for clarification is signal jury believes are this is critical issue; trial court must treat seriously].)

**Jury deliberations**  
[§ 4.144]

Watch for any jury notes and the answers given, as well as discussions among the parties on the appropriate response. Look for other unusual occurrences during jury deliberations, such as juror misconduct (e.g., Remmer v. United States (1954) 347 U.S. 227), and check with trial counsel. Examine any substitution of one or more jurors during deliberations. Were these matters raised in a motion for a new trial? (See People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513 [questions invading deliberative process]; People v. Johnson (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 486 [remand for release of
jurors’ identifying information where declarations established jurors’ hearsay that they considered defendant’s failure to testify in reaching guilty verdict]; see also People v. Solorio (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 398 [prosecution failed to rebut presumption of prejudice from jurors’ discussion of why defendant did not testify, when topic came up several times during deliberations].

☐ Rendering of verdict  [§ 4.144A]

Were the correct procedures for receiving and recording a verdict observed? Did the jury follow the rules on lesser included offenses, alternative verdicts, degrees, enhancements, etc.? Did the judge properly handle any irregularities or ambiguity in the way the verdicts were returned? Was the jury polled correctly? Were all of the jurors present? (E.g., People v. Bailey (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 376; People v. Brown (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 211; People v. Garcia (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 542.)

☐ Sufficiency of the evidence.  [§ 4.145]

Review the evidence on which the conviction rested, to determine whether it meets constitutional and statutory requirements.

☐ Could a reasonable trier of fact find each element of each offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt? (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 315; People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767-769.)

☐ Did the trial court improperly refuse to acquit at the close of the prosecution’s case?98 (Pen. Code, §§ 1118, 1118.1; see People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 268; People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 505; People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 520-521; In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 729-732; People v. Valerio (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 912, 919-920.) The test is whether, given “the evidence [at the time of the motion], including reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the offense charged.” (Lines, at p. 505.)

☐ Were special evidentiary standards met – for example, corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony under Penal Code section 1111 and corpus delicti

98To raise the issue on appeal, the defendant must have made a motion under Penal Code section 1118 or 1118.1 (court and jury trial, respectively). (People v. Smith (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1464.)
requirements (e.g., *People v. Alvarez* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161 [evidence independent of defendant’s statements required for conviction])?

- **Motion for a new trial (Pen. Code, § 1181)**  
  [§ 4.146]

  Scrutinize the motion, its factual and legal grounds, and the reasons for the court’s ruling. This is often a valuable clue to major issues in the case.

  - If one ground was that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence under Penal Code section 1181, subdivision 6, determine whether the court used the correct standard. A weight of the evidence question tends to be confused with the question of legal insufficiency. The former is easier for the defendant to show. (See *People v. Robarge* (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628; *People v. Dickens* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1245.)

  - If the trial court reduced the offense on the ground under Penal Code section 1181, subdivision 6, make sure the lesser offense is in fact included in the crime of which the jury convicted the defendant. (See *People v. Bailey* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 740 [court may not reduce jury verdict of escape to attempted escape, because latter has an element – specific intent – the former does not have].)


- **Sentencing**  
  [§ 4.147]

  Analyze every aspect of the sentence and the sentencing procedures meticulously. Errors in sentencing are quite common. A few issues of the many possible issues to investigate include:

  - Did the sentence comply with statutory and rule provisions as to selection of prison vs. probation; the lower, middle, or upper term; concurrent vs. consecutive sentences; enhancements (Pen. Code, § 1170 et seq.; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.401 et seq.); Three Strikes sentences (Pen. Code, §§ 667, 1170.12); conditions of probation; restitution orders; and Penal Code section 654 applications? (See *People v. Ahmed* (2011) 53 Cal.4th 156 [how multiple enhancements interact when they are attached to one offense].)
Did the court abuse its discretion in making any of these decisions? Was the court aware of the breadth of its sentencing discretion?

Has the statutory punishment changed since the time the offense was committed?

- If it has been increased, the defendant cannot receive a greater sentence than it was at the time of the commission of the offense. (Calder v. Bull (1798) 3 U.S. 386, 390-391 [describing ex post facto law]; see also Peugh v. United States (2013) 569 U.S. 530 [imposing new, longer guideline sentence promulgated after date of offense is ex post facto violation]; Collins v. Youngblood (1990) 497 U.S. 37, 42; but see People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749 [court security fee imposed under Pen. Code, § 1465.8 is not criminal penalty and does not violate prohibition against ex post facto laws].)

- If it has been reduced, the defendant normally should get the benefit of the change. (See Bell v. Maryland (1964) 378 U.S. 226, 230; People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295; In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740; cf. People v. Floyd 31 Cal.4th 179.)

Were the correct procedures used at sentencing?

- If a guilty plea case, did the judge who took the plea also do the sentencing? (In re K.R. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 295; People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749.)

- Was the proceeding timely? (Pen. Code, § 1381; People v. Wagner (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1039, 1056.)

- Did the trial court provide all required statements of reasons?

- Was counsel present?

- Did the defendant have a chance to address the court? (See Pen. Code, §§ 1200, 1201; compare People v. Evans (2008) 44 Cal.4th 590 [statutory right must be exercised before judgment is imposed, be under oath, and be subject to cross-examination].)

- Did the court state that it had read the probation officer’s report?

Did the sentence violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment?

If the offense was committed when the defendant was a juvenile and the sentence was equivalent to life without possibility of parole, was there a chance for the defense to present evidence on the mitigating factors of youth for an eventual youthful offender parole hearing? (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261.) If the defendant is not eligible for such a hearing, does the sentence constitute cruel and unusual punishment? (People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349.)

Correspondence of charge, conviction, and sentence

Compare the information, jury verdict, oral pronouncement of judgment, and abstract of judgment. Do they all correspond?

Custody credits

Recheck all custody credits awarded. Multiple offenses, whether in the same or different proceedings (Pen. Code, § 669), parole or probation holds and revocations, and a variety of statutory provisions often make computation of credits confusing.100 (E.g., People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314.) Penal Code section 1237.1 requires an application in the trial court for correction of presentence custody credits as a prerequisite to raising the issue as the sole one on appeal.101

99See articles at http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/pract_articles.asp under BLAKELY/ CUNNINGHAM/ BLACK II.

100See further discussion in § 4.42, ante, and §§ 2.13, 2.25, and 2.71 of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started.”

101The requirement applies only to minor ministerial corrections, such as mathematical error, not legal error; a legal issue regarding custody credits may be raised as a single issue without first seeking correction in the superior court. (People v. Delgado (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 761.)
Fines and fees  [§ 4.149A]

- Confirm that all fines, fees, and similar monetary assessments have been imposed correctly. This area is a frequent source of error because it is changing rapidly. It is also a source of frequent adverse consequences, because trial courts easily overlook mandatory monetary assessments.\(^{102}\)

- Penal Code section 1237.2 requires a application in the trial court for correction of such assessments as a prerequisite to raising the issue as the sole one on appeal.

- Determine whether the court considered the defendant’s ability to pay. (People v. Duenas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157.)

Restitution  [§ 4.149B]

- Was notice given of the amount sought? (People v. Foster (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 939.)

- Was defendant present? If not, see Penal Code section 977.

- Was the evidence substantial to support the award? (People v. Thygesen (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 988.) Was the victim’s economic loss incurred as a direct result of the defendant’s criminal behavior? (Pen. Code, § 1202.4; People v. Crisler (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1508.)

- Did the trial court make a clear statement of the calculation method? (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663-664.) Did the trial court take into account the time value of money in considering a lump sum payment versus a series of fractional payments spread out over time? (People v. Pangan (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 574, 581.)

- For restitution orders against a juvenile for graffiti, did the orders comply with the tailored statutory scheme (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 742.14 & 742.16)? (Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300.)

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\(^{102}\)The Central California Appellate Program website has a useful fines chart that can assist counsel. [https://www.capcentral.org/criminal/crim_fines.asp](https://www.capcentral.org/criminal/crim_fines.asp)
Did the trial court have jurisdiction to modify the restitution amount? (See, e.g., *People v. Waters* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 822; *Hilton v. Superior Court* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 47 [trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify defendant’s probation to impose additional restitution after defendant’s probationary term had expired].)

Was a separate notice of appeal filed if the restitution hearing was post-judgment? (*People v. Denham* (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1210.) If not, and more than 60 days have passed since the order, a petition or motion seeking *In re Benoit* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72 relief may be necessary.
EXAMPLES OF UNAUTHORIZED SENTENCES [§ 4.151]

Listed below are illustrations of unauthorized sentences in the defendant’s favor that might result in an increased sentence if discovered in an appeal. Counsel should consider developing a supplemental checklist and adding to it as new examples of unauthorized sentences arise.

- Failure either to impose sentence or dismiss a charge for which the defendant was convicted [§ 4.152]


- Sentence on uncharged lesser offense without the defendant’s consent [§ 4.153]


- Sentence not specified in the applicable statute [§ 4.154]

  *People v. Pitmon* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 44, fn. 2 (prison term other than one of statutory alternatives); *People v. Superior Court (Buckbee)* (1931) 116 Cal.App. 412, 413-414 (county jail rather than state prison sentence).

- Probation granted although prohibited by law [§ 4.155]


- Mandatory consecutive sentence error [§ 4.156]


- **Failure to sentence on enhancement**  
  §§ 4.157


- **Dismissing penalty in violation of statute**  
  §§ 4.158

  Direct violations of a statutory mandate in dismissing an allegation (such as a strike under *People v. Superior Court (Romero)* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) might be found unauthorized and thus correctable on a defendant’s appeal.

- An example is dismissal of a strike solely for purposes of plea bargaining in violation of Penal Code sections 667, subdivision (g) and 1170.12, subdivision (e). (See also *People v. Campos* (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 438 [refusal to impose gang alternate penalty mandated by Pen. Code, § 186.22 was unauthorized].)

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77Counsel may argue that in such a situation the defendant is entitled to remand to request dismissal of the enhancement (see *Bradley*, at p. 392), but this argument may not prevail (see *People v. White Eagle* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1521; *Irvin*, at p. 190; *People v. Cattaneo* (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1577, 1589).
On the other hand, the court’s exercise of discretion in dismissing an allegation under Penal Code section 1385 is arguably not reviewable on the merits unless the People appeal in their own right, although counsel should advise the client of the possibility the court might find otherwise.\(^78\) (See *People v. Ramos* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 432, 435 [People’s appeal], disapproved on other grounds in *People v. Fuhrman* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 947, fn. 11.)

**Penal Code section 654 error  \([§ 4.159]\)**


- Imposing the lower term and staying the higher term, in violation of Penal Code section 654, subdivision (a):\(^79\) *People v. Crowder* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1371 (even when defendant was sentenced on two counts in separate proceedings, Pen. Code, \(§\) 654, subd. (a) requires longer of two potential terms). *People v. Kramer* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 720 (enhancement considered along with offense in determining which of defendant’s convictions received longest sentence).

**Failure to impose mandatory fines or fees  \([§ 4.160]\)**


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\(^78\) *People v. Williams* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162-164, which found the dismissal of a strike to be an abuse of discretion under the facts of that case, was a People’s appeal. (See also *People v. Smith* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852-853 [sentence not unauthorized if error not correctable without considering factual issues on the record or remanding for additional findings]; *People v. Scott* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354-355 [discretionary sentencing decisions imposed in “procedurally or factually flawed manner” forfeited by failure to object].)

\(^79\) The requirement that the court choose the “longest potential term of imprisonment” was added in 1997 to abrogate *People v. Norrell* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1. A sentence for a crime committed before the effective date of the amendment would not be subject to that restriction.

- If the fine or fee can lawfully not be imposed under some circumstances, failure to impose it is not unauthorized: People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303 (restitution and parole revocation fines under Pen. Code, §§ 1202.5, 1202.45 forfeited by prosecution’s failure to object because trial court has discretion not to impose them in certain cases); People v. Burnett (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 257, 260-263 (failure to impose sex offender fine under Pen. Code, § 290.3 not unauthorized because not mandatory if judge finds defendant unable to pay).

- Mistake in awarding custody credits [§ 4.161]


- Failure to impose mandatory condition of probation [§ 4.162]

CHECKLIST OF SOME COMMON ISSUES RAISED ON DEPENDENCY APPEALS  [§ 4.164]

The following list includes some general issues to check as part of counsel’s regular review of the record.

NOTE: The issues and citations are just a starting point for research. The law changes frequently, and so the checklist and law must be continuously reviewed and updated.

☐ General: timeliness of hearings  [§ 4.165]

Determine whether the hearings are held timely. Each of the hearings has its own timeline set out by statute:

- File petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 290.1, 290.2, 338.)
- Detention hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 315; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.670.)
- Jurisdiction hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 334; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.670(f).)
- 6-month review hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.21, subd (e); Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.695(j), 5.710.)
- 12-month review hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 361.5, subd. (a), 366.21, subd. (f).)
- 18-month review hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (g).)
- Section 366.26 hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f).)
- Supplemental petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 387.)
General: potential issues for every hearing  [§ 4.166]


- Termination of jurisdiction and family court orders (exit orders). (In re Ethan J. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 654 [court may not end jurisdiction when child refuses to visit mother and court knows visitation order will not be followed]; In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961 [juvenile court exit order precluding modification of custody order was error].)

- Guardian ad litem appointments for parents – usually mental illness, development delay; sometimes parents are minors. (In re Esmeralda S. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 84.)


**Detention hearing**  
*[§ 4.167]*

The detention hearing’s purpose is reflected in Welfare and Institutions Code section 315 – the juvenile court must conduct such a hearing “to determine whether the minor shall be further detained” or released from custody. *(Los Angeles County Dept. of Children and Family Services v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1408.)* It must take place within three court days after the child is detained. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 313, subd. (a) [dependency petition must be filed within 48 hours (excluding nonjudicial days) of detention], 315 [detention hearing shall take place no later than one judicial day after dependency petition is filed].)

At the detention hearing after the filing of the petition, the juvenile court must release the child to the parents unless a prima facie showing has been made that the child comes within section 300. *(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 319; In re Heather B. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 535; see Los Angeles County Dept. of Children and Family Services v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1408.)*

An order made before the disposition orders (see § 4.169, post) cannot be appealed. *(In re James J. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1339, 1342.)* Thus matters at the detention hearing are not separately appealable. They may be reviewed by writ or on appeal from the disposition. *(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395; see In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442.)*
Jurisdictional hearing  [§ 4.168]

At the jurisdictional hearing, court must determine whether the minor is person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and thus within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.

- An order made before the disposition orders (see § 4.169, post) cannot be appealed. (In re James J. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1339, 1342.) Thus the jurisdictional findings are not separately appealable. They may be reviewed on appeal from the disposition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395.)


- If more than one state is involved, check for compliance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. (Fam. Code, §§ 3400-3465.) If California is the child’s home state under the UCCJEA, then California has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination. (See In re Baby Boy M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 588 [insufficient evidence to show California was home state].) Subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even after termination of parental rights. (In re Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 508.) The UCCJEA applies to international custody disputes including Mexico. (Fam. Code, § 3405; In re A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661 [mother failed to show that the juvenile court's efforts to contact Mexico were insufficient]; In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125 [temporary hospital stay alone was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction]; In re A.M. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 593; In re Jorge G. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 125.)

- A dependency petition must contain a concise statement of facts to support the conclusion that the child is a person within the definition of each of the sections and subdivisions alleged. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 332; In re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626.) The juvenile court may order the agency to file a dependency petition. (In re M.C. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 784.)

- Was there sufficient evidence to support jurisdiction? Jurisdictional findings must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and the agency bears the
burden of proof. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242.)

Examples for allegations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300:

- Jurisdiction over a child can be assumed based on allegations against only one parent. (In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470.)

- Section 300, subdivision (a): “The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.” (In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634; In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428; see In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 [no need to show parental neglect when unruly teenager is at risk of harm from her own rebellious conduct].)

- Subdivision (b)(1): The agency must demonstrate three elements: (1) an omission in providing care for the child; (2) causation; and (3) serious risk of physical harm or illness to the minor, or a substantial risk thereof. (In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537; see In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622.)

- Subdivision (b)(2): This allegation requires a finding that a child was commercially sexually exploited and the child’s parents were unable to protect them. (But see In re M.V. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1495.)


- Subdivision (d): Child is suffering or at risk of suffering sexual abuse because of parent or guardian’s conduct or failure to protect. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766; In re Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84; but see In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, overruled in I.J. as to whether abuse of child of one gender is evidence supporting jurisdiction over children of other gender].)
Subdivision (e): A toddler (under five years of age) has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent or by a person the parent reasonably should have known was physically abusing the child under section 300, subdivision (e). Circumstantial evidence may support a finding. *(K.F. v. Superior Court* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1382; *In re E.H.* (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 659.)

Subdivision (f): Jurisdiction is established when the parent has caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect. *(In re Z.G.* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 705; *In re A.M.* (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1380.)

Subdivision (g): Abandonment or failure to provide for a child. A finding is erroneous when an incarcerated parent had relatives available to care for the child. *(In re Isayah C.* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684.) The circumstances must be present at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. *(In re Aaron S.* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 202, 208.) Jurisdiction can be assumed if the parent is simply absent or missing. *(David B. v. Superior Court* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1010.) It does not require an intent to abandon. *(D.M. v. Superior Court* (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1129.) A petition under subdivision (g) was properly sustained when an incarcerated father showed no interest in the welfare of his children. *(In re James C.* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 484.)

Subdivision (h): The allegation that a child was freed for adoption by the parent is rarely found in original petitions and occurs only when a legal orphan is removed from prospective adoptive parents. (But see *In re Jayden M.* (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1458.)

Subdivision (i): An allegation is made that a child was subject to an act of cruelty. A finding the parent intended to harm is not required: it is enough that the parent intended the act itself. *(In re D.C.* (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1012.)

Subdivision (j): Alleges a child’s sibling was abused or neglected. The court need only consider the totality of circumstances. *(In re R.V.* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837.)

If the agency plans to rely on Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1 to provide a presumption affecting the production of evidence, then the parents are entitled to notice this section will be relied on and the agency is required


- Possible forfeiture occurs when trial counsel “submits on the agency’s recommendations” instead of submitting on “the agency’s reports.” *(In re Richard K.)* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580.

### Dispositional hearing [§ 4.169]

Although the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings are often held together, the disposition occurs after the court takes jurisdiction and finds the petition true. At the disposition hearing, the court must decide whether to declare the child a dependent and, if the child is declared a dependent, whether to keep the children with their parents or place them elsewhere. *(Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, subd. (d) & 361.)*

The court must remove the child from the parent’s custody if clear and convincing evidence establishes that continued custody would pose “a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” of the child. *(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c)(1).)*

### Placement


- Is a non-custodial parent available? *(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.2, subd. (a).)* Did a non-custodial parent request placement? If so, was that parent denied placement? *(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.2.)* The court must place the child with a non-custodial parent unless it finds such a placement is detrimental. *(In re Patrick S., III)* (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254.

Relative placement preference continues throughout reunification, and the agency is required to investigate relative placement even if a new placement is not required. (*In re Joseph T., Jr.* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 787.)

- If placement is out of state, confirm the placement was compliant with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. (Fam. Code, § 7900 et seq.) If the child is placed with a non-custodial parent living out of state, an approved ICPC evaluation is not required. (*In re A.J.* (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 525; *In re Z.K.* (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 51; but see *In re Suhey G.* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 732.)

- If siblings, were they placed together? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 306.5.)

**Reunification plan**

- Was the reunification plan sufficiently tailored to remedy the alleged problem? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 16507; *T.J. v. Superior Court* (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229; *Patricia W. v. Superior Court* (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 397, 420; see also *In re A.G.* (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994 [error for the juvenile court to find the agency provided reasonable services to father in Mexico]; *In re J.P. et al.* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616 [reunification services must be provided in a language the parent understands].)

- Was there sufficient evidence to require the parent to comply with each component of the reunification plan? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 362, subd. (c); *In re A.E.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1 [court may order father into services even though he is non-offending parent when he does not understand gravity of underlying abuse]; *In re Jasmin C.* (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 177; *In re Christopher H.* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001.) 80

- Were time limits appropriate? Time limits for reunification services begin when the child is removed from both parents. (*In re A.C.* (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 636.)

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80 A parent may not be held in contempt for failing to comply with reunification services and court’s orders. (*In re Nolan W.* (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217.)
• Were parents adequately supported in their efforts? (Amanda H. V. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340 [agency cannot tell mother she is enrolled in proper programs for year and at last minute use mistake about that to terminate services].)

Denial of reunification services
• Was the court permitted to deny reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)?
• Did sufficient evidence support the court's finding that one of the subdivisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b), applied?

Visitation
• Juvenile court may not delegate authority to allow visitation to any party or nonjudicial official. (In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119 [delegated to mother].)

Was there any evidence that the problem in existence at the time of the jurisdictional hearing impacted the parent's ability to provide for the child? (In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537.)

Conduct of proceedings
• Did the agency notify parents of possibility that reunification efforts would be bypassed? Did the agency satisfy the requirements of the bypass provisions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5? (K.F. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1369; In re D.F. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 538; Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586.) Bypass provisions can apply to custodial or
Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition  [§ 4.170]

The purpose of a section 388 petition is to request a hearing to modify or set aside a previous court order because of changed circumstances or new evidence. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388, subd. (a).)

A section 388 petition may be filed by a parent or anyone having an interest in the dependent child. The petition may be filed at any time during the course of the case. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388, subd. (a).) A parent must file a section 388 petition prior to termination of parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing. (In re Ronald V. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1803.)

Did the court make a prima facie finding on the petition? The court may deny the petition ex parte and without ordering a hearing if the petition fails to state a change of circumstances/new evidence and it does not appear the requested modification will promote the best interest of the child. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388, subd. (c); In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246; In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519.)

Did the petition make the required showings (a) that there is a change in circumstances and (b) that the child’s best interests would be served by a modification? (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503.)

- It is the petitioner’s burden, as the moving party, to show there is new evidence or changed circumstances and that the proposed change is in the child’s best interests. (In re Michael D. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1074.)

- The allegations of the petition may not be conclusory but must be specific and factually describe the evidence. (In re Hashem H. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1791.)

Was it error to deny an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition?


- The court must order an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a petition if it appears the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change in order. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388, subd.

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Did the court abuse its discretion in denying a section 388 petition?


- Did the trial court apply the proper burden of proof for the section 388 petition? (*In re L.S., Jr.* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183.)


Review hearing  [§ 4.171]

The court must review the family’s situation at least at six-month intervals and determine whether to maintain or modify the dependency or return the child to the parent. (*Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21; Bridget A. v. Superior Court* (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285.) There is a statutory presumption the child will be returned to parental custody unless the court finds the child’s return would create “a substantial risk of detriment to the physical or emotional well-being” of the child. (*Cynthia D. v. Superior Court* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242.) The court must also determine whether reasonable reunification services have been offered.

A decision made at a review hearing is normally appealable (*Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395), but if the court decides to discontinue reunification efforts and set the case for a permanent plan hearing, the decision must be reviewed by writ under California Rules of Court, rules 8.450-8.452.

- Verify notice was proper. (*In re DeJohn B.* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 100.)

Was the case plan designed to help the parents overcome their initial problems? (*In re Riva M.* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.)

Was there sufficient evidence of reasonable services? Did the social services agency do more than simply provide a list of referrals with little assistance? (*In re J.E.* (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557 [reunification services were insufficient because they were not tailored to the needs of the family]; *In re Taylor J.* (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1446 [providing two lists of services but little additional assistance did not amount to reasonable services]; *In re Alvin R.* (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962.)

Where was the child placed? Was a relative or non-related extended family member considered in placement? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.3; *In re Sarah S.* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 274.)

If there are siblings, were they placed together? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 306.5; See *County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 627, 642; but see *In re Luke H.* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1082.)


**Subsequent petition** [§ 4.172]

A Welfare and Institutions Code section 342 subsequent petition is used for children who are already dependents when there are “new facts or circumstances” that bring them within a category of section 300 “other than those under which the original petition was sustained.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 342; *In re A.B.* (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1358.)


Were the court’s findings supported by substantial evidence? (*In re A.B.* (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1358.)

Were the facts and circumstances in the petition different from the sustained allegations in the original petition? Verify there were additional grounds for jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 342.)

**Supplemental petition** [§ 4.173]

A Welfare and Institutions Code section 387 supplemental petition is used to change the placement of a dependent child from the physical custody of a parent, guardian, relative, or friend to a more restrictive level of court-ordered care. (*In re T.W.* (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154.)

Did the petition allege facts establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a previous disposition order was ineffective? (*In re F.S.* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 799, 808.)

Did the proceedings conform to due process? (See *In re Daniel C.H.* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 814.)

Does clear and convincing evidence establish that the child’s current placement was not effective in protecting the child, so that the child may be removed from parental custody to a more restrictive level of placement? (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 361, subd. (c), 387; *In re T.W.* (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1168.)

Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing  

The permanency plan, or selection and implementation, hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 occurs after the court has determined to discontinue reunification efforts. Section 366.26 sets out the order of legal preference for the permanent plans. Termination of parental rights and adoption are preferred. In order to terminate parental rights, the court must find: (1) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the minor will be adopted; and (2) that there has been a previous determination that reunification services will be terminated. (*Cynthia D. v. Superior Court* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242.)


Did the court give proper advisement of the writ requirement at the referral hearing? (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.590(b).)

- This is an issue only if proper notice was not provided. If there was inadequate advisement, the parent may raise the merits of the order setting a section 366.26 hearing, including a reasonable services issue, on the appeal. (*In re Hannah D.* (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 662 [failure to give oral writ advisement does not excuse appellant’s failure to bring writ petition as long as written notice was given]; *In
Were the requirements for the timing of the notice followed?

Were the parents present at the referral hearing? Were the parents represented?

If the child is over 10 years old, was he/she notified of the right to attend the section 366.26 hearing? (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 349, subd. (a), 366.26, subd. (h)(2); In re Desiree M. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 329.)

Adoptability

Did the court make an adoptability finding by clear and convincing evidence, as is required? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051.)

The court may find general adoptability – the child’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it likely a family will be willing to adopt – or specific adoptability – a prospective adoptive family has expressed interest or willingness. (E.g., In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145; In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642.)

Exceptions to termination (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c).)

Did the parent request application of an exception? If not, was the exception forfeited? (In re P.C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 279, 288-289.)

Is there a relative available, capable, and willing to be the child’s legal guardian? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A); In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296.)

Is the parental relationship such a benefit to child that it would be detrimental to lose? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Parent must have had regular visitation and a strong parent-child relationship. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567.) Factors to be considered for the second prong of this exception are listed in In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454.

Did the child (age 12 or older) object to termination? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii); see In re Christopher L. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1334.)

• Is the child’s current foster family unable or unwilling to adopt? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(iv); In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051.)

• Will the termination cause a substantial interference with a sibling relationship? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v); In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 283.) Use a two-prong test – how strong the existing bond between the siblings is and whether termination will interfere with the sibling relationship. In the process the court must consider the child’s need for a permanent placement versus the importance of the sibling relationship. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952; see In re I.R. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 201 [sibling exception did not apply when minors’ levels of maturity were not adequately advanced to be able to experience more than the simplest level of sibling bond with infant sister].)

• If the child is an Indian child, would termination not be in the child’s best interest? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(vi); In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292.)


• “At each hearing at which the court was required to consider reasonable efforts or services,” did the court find reasonable services were not provided? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(d)(2)(A); In re A.L. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 628.)

Was the permanent plan appropriate?

• Adoption. (E.g., In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051.)


Parentage determinations  [§ 4.175]

- Did the agency and the juvenile court ask about paternity at the earliest possible time, starting at detention? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.635(a).)

- Was a possible father notified of the dependency case and his rights to change his paternity status with Judicial Council form JV-505? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2, subd. (b); but see In re Marcos G. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 369 [harmless error when father did not take action for more than a year after the initial notice].)

- Was the type of father correctly identified? The dependency court recognizes four types of fathers: presumed, biological or natural, alleged, and a quasi-presumed or Kelsey S. father (see Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816)?

- Were the rights of any presumed father observed? Such a father has the highest status under the law. It is created by statutory presumption. (Fam. Code, § 7611.)

  - “A man who has neither legally married nor attempted to legally marry the child’s natural mother cannot become a presumed father unless (1) he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child, or (2) both he and the natural mother execute a voluntary declaration of paternity.” (Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586; see Fam. Code, §§ 7611, 7570; Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1043, 1050-1051; In re Tanis H. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1218.) A presumed father is entitled to custody and reunification services. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 448-449.)

  - Statutory presumed fatherhood is based not on a biological connection but rather on a man’s relationship with the child or the child’s mother, and therefore, genetic testing has limited applicability in determining presumed father status. (Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (a); In re D.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1238; In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56, 69.)

  - “A man who receives a child into his home and openly holds the child out as his natural child is presumed to be the natural father of the child.” (In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56.) That presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence in an appropriate case. (Id. at p. 59; Fam. Code, § 7612, subd. (a).)
Did the case involve a quasi-presumed, or *Kelsey S.*, father? To attain such a status, the father must show he did everything he could to assume parental responsibilities but was thwarted by the mother from receiving the child into his home and openly holding out the child as his natural child. (Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (d); *Adoption of Emilio G.* (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1133 [father fails to show he qualifies as a *Kelsey S.* father]; *Adoption of Baby Boy W.* (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 438 [father qualified as a *Kelsey S.* father].) Under *Adoption of Kelsey S.* (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, a father who has made an adequate showing has a constitutional right to block an adoption unless he is an unfit parent.

Was the father a biological or natural father? Such a father has established biological paternity but is not a presumed father. (*In re Zacharia D.* (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 449, fn. 15.) Biological fathers may be eligible for reunification services, relative placement consideration, and placement of the child if the court determines that the services will benefit the child. (See *In re John M.* (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564; *Francisco G. v. Superior Court* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 596.) Where a child has a presumed and a biological father, the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing to reconcile competing paternity interests. (*In re P.A.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 974.)

Was the father an alleged father? He may be a biological father, but paternity has not been established. Alleged fathers are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard but little else and certainly not reunification services or placement of the child. (*In re Christopher M.* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 155; *In re Paul H.* (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 753, 760; *Francisco G. v. Superior Court* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 596.)

Did the case involve unconventional parentage issues? The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) is not applied in a gender-neutral way to allow a step-mother to be found a presumed mother. (*In re D.S.* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1088.)

- In cases where two women intend to act as parents, the court has applied the UPA to recognize two presumed mothers. (*E.C. v. J.V.* (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1076; *S.Y. v. S.B.* (2012) 201 Cal.App.4th 1023.)

- Previously, the juvenile court was limited to finding a child had two presumed parents. (*In re M.C.* (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 197 [overturned by legislative action in Fam. Code, § 3040].) A new subdivision now allows the juvenile court to “find that more than two persons with a claim to parentage . . . are parents if the court finds
that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child.” (Fam. Code, § 7612, subd. (c); In re M.Z. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 53 [boyfriend appeals the court’s denial of his status as a third parent]; In re Donovan L., Jr. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1075.)

ICWA issues  [§ 4.176]

The Indian Child Welfare Act is a federal statute (25 U.S.C.§1901 et seq.) and is codified in California under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 224 to 224.6 and the California Rules of Court, rule 5.480 et seq. The statute presumes it is in a child’s best interests to retain tribal ties and cultural heritage, and in the tribe’s interest to preserve future generations. (In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460; In re Crystal K. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 655, 661.) ICWA is also an attempt to recognize and redress what Congress described as an “alarmingly high percentage of Indian families broken up by removal.” (25 U.S.C. §1901(4) & (5).)

Did the agency and court comply with the duty to inquire?

• The agency and the juvenile court are required to inquire about possible Indian heritage and to have the parents complete an ICWA-020 form at the parents’ first appearance. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a); In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636; In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450; In re E.H. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1330.)

• If the agency knows or has reason to know the child is an Indian child, the agency must make further inquiries of the parents and extended family members about possible Indian heritage. (Rule 5.481(a)(4)(A); In re Kahlen W. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1414, 1422.)

• Because the tribe has the right to intervene at any stage of an involuntary child custody proceeding, the duty to ascertain the child’s Indian status is a continuing one. (25 U.S.C. § 1911(c); Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 224.3, subd. (f), 224.4; In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1; In re I.B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 367; In re Jonathan D. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 105.)

Were all required notices given?

• Notice is required whenever the court knows or has reason to believe the child is an Indian child; the child’s status need not be certain. (In re Kahlen W. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1414, 1422.)

• The agency is required to provide actual notice to all named tribes from which the child may have heritage of the proceedings involving

- In determining whether the notice is proper, it is important to thoroughly review the noticing documents and the return receipts. It is essential to ensure all the information provided by the parents is included in the ICWA-030 form. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (5).)

- The notice must be sent to the chairperson or designated agent for service of process of each tribe. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (a)(2); In re H.A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1213.) Further, the documentation showing notice to the tribes must be filed with the juvenile court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.482(b); In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 507.)

- Information: The agency is required to provide all the information about family members it has gathered on the form and the information must be correct including dates, names and locations, where known. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (5); In re S.E. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 610; In re Jennifer A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 692, 705.)

- The determination that a child is an Indian is the exclusive province of the tribe. ICWA requires notice be as complete as possible to assist with the determination. (In re Jonathan D. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 105, 110.)

- The court has a sua sponte duty to assure compliance with the notice requirements of ICWA. (In re Nikki R. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 844, 852.)

☐ Were applicable special procedures followed?

- The child is not Indian unless a parent is a tribal member. (In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83.) But, since the only entity with authority to determine who is a tribal member is the tribe itself,
arguably notice still must be provided to the tribe. (See In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1; In re Michael V. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 225.)


- Before terminating parental rights to an Indian child, the juvenile court must satisfy ICWA requirements. (In re Jonathon S. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 334, 339.) In addition, special evidentiary burdens apply. Parental rights may not be terminated if doing so would substantially interfere with the child’s connection to his/her tribal community. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.485.)

For assistance with interpretation of ICWA, the Bureau of Indian Affairs has published detailed guidelines for state courts to use in implementing ICWA in child custody proceedings. (80 Fed. Reg. 10146-02 (2015).) These are not intended to have binding legislative effect but are entitled to great weight. (C.F. v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 227; In re Kahlen W. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1414, fn. 3.)

Non-minor dependents [§ 4.177]

The juvenile court has discretion to retain jurisdiction over a dependent until he or she attains the age of 21 years but until recently the utility of doing so was limited by insufficient funds to assist non-minor dependents. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 303, § 4.177)

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81 Even if the parent denies being a tribal member, one may argue the denial is insufficient to establish the child is not an Indian child. The parent might be unaware of his or her tribal membership status. (See In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460.)

82 Thus, even if the parent denies being a tribal member, the denial is insufficient to establish the child is not an Indian child. The parent might be unaware of his or her tribal membership status. (See In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460.)
subd. (a.) In 2012, the California Fostering Connections to Success (CFCS) Act permitted the state to take advantage of federal funding for extended foster care benefits. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 303; 42 U.S.C. § 675(8).)

Section 391 as amended by the CFCS Act provides that a dependency court may not terminate jurisdiction over a non-minor unless a hearing is conducted under the section.

Issues include:


- Whether a non-minor’s efforts were adequate to continue extended foster care. (In re R.G. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1090; but see In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 765 [placement in juvenile hall was sound basis to end extended foster care].)


- Whether a nonminor can remain dependent after he/she gets married. (In re H.C. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1261.)
CHECKLIST OF SOME COMMON ISSUES RAISED ON DELINQUENCY APPEALS  

The following list includes some general issues to check as part of counsel’s regular review of the record.

NOTE: The issues and citations are just a starting point for research. The law changes frequently, and so the checklist and law must be continuously reviewed and updated. The issues below are distilled, for the most part, from the article, “Representing A Minor on Appeal in a Juvenile Delinquency Case,” which is updated periodically on ADI’s website.

☐ Capacity  

Does clear and convincing evidence defeat the presumption that a minor under the age of 14 is incapable of committing a crime? (Pen. Code, § 26; People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 280; In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 231; In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 862.)

☐ Deferred entry of judgment  

Deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) is available in juvenile cases involving felony allegations, if certain prerequisites are met. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 790-795.)


☐ There is a right to appeal a denial of DEJ (e.g., In re Sergio R. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 597), but there is no right to appeal where DEJ is granted (Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 303, fn. 3; In re T.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1433 [restitution order is a component of the DEJ order and not appealable].)

☐ Writ of mandate may be available, depending on what issue is in contest. (Luis M. v. Superior Court, supra, 59 Cal.4th 300 [restitution order vacated]; G.C. v. Superior Court (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 371 [minor who received DEJ raised a question of law concerning the juvenile court’s belief...
that it was not required to consider ability to pay restitution for vandalism under Welf. & Inst. Code, § 742.16].

**Dual jurisdiction**  [§ 4.182]

Does the case involve both the delinquency and dependency proceedings and, if so, have the proper procedures and protocols for the minor’s best needs been followed? (*In re Joey G.* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 343, 348-349; *In re Marcus G.* (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1012-1013; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 241.1.)

**Informal probation**  [§ 4.183]


**Admissions**  [§ 4.184]

- Did the minor admit to the allegations of the petition without consent of counsel? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 657, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.778(d); *In re Alonzo J.* (2014) 58 Cal.4th 924, 939.)

- Does clear and convincing evidence support a finding the minor lacked capacity to understand the consequences of his or her admission because of a developmental disability? (See, e.g., *In re Matthew N.* (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1420.)

**Pre-trial issues**  [§ 4.185]

- Ensure that the offender was a minor on the date of the offense, that proceedings commence in juvenile court and are transferred to adult court under proper circumstances, i.e., if unfit (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 706, subd. (a)(1)), and if at least 14 years old but not 16 years old, also the charged offense is a felony falls under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b).

Note: An order granting or denying a motion to transfer jurisdiction to adult court is not an appealable order. Appellate review would be by extraordinary petition (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(g)), a task for trial counsel. If trial counsel should have sought, but neglected to seek, writ review and it is reasonably probable the minor would have
prevailed, then ineffective assistance of counsel should be investigated.

- Pre-trial procedural issues are many and complex, too varied to be covered here. The reader is referred to ADI’s Juvenile Delinquency Articles page, especially Representing a Minor on Appeal in a Juvenile Delinquency Case.

- Same judge for admission and disposition  [§ 4.186]

  Like a guilty plea in adult court, an implied term of every admission in juvenile court is that the judge who accepts the admission will be the judge who imposes the disposition. (K.R. v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 295, 312.)

- Procedural options  [§ 4.187]

  - After making a true finding, did the court consider setting aside the finding and dismissing the petition in the interests of justice and the welfare of the minor or, if the minor is not in need of rehabilitation, setting forth the specific reasons for dismissal in the minutes (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782; cf. Pen. Code, § 1385); or not adjudging the minor a ward and place him or her on probation for less than six months (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725, subd. (a))? (See also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202 [list of permissible sanctions, e.g., fines, community service, probation conditions.])

  - If the court adjudged the minor a ward, did the court consider the range of options, such as:
    - Placing the minor on unsupervised probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 727, subd. (a));
    - Placing the minor on supervised probation at home (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, but see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 727, subd. (a));

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• Placing the minor with a relative or in a licensed group or foster home (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 727, subd. (a));

• Committing the minor to juvenile hall or a county camp or ranch (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (a)); or

• Committing the minor to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 731)? (See also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202 [list of permissible sanctions, e.g., fines, community service, probation conditions].)

Did the court consider dismissing the petition – an act that operates to erase the juvenile adjudication as if it never occurred (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782; People v. Haro (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 718, 720) or recall a case in which commitment to the Division of Juvenile Facilities was ordered for the purpose of ordering an alternative disposition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 731.1, subd. (a)) or where the minor is under parole supervision (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 731.1, subd. (b))? 

Probation conditions  [§ 4.188]

The juvenile court may impose reasonable terms and conditions of probation. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 725, 730, subd. (b).)

Such conditions must be “fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 730, subd. (b)); In re Antonio C. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1033.)


Commitment  [§ 4.189]
The reader is referred to ADI’s juvenile articles page.\(^{85}\)

- Did the court find the commitment imposed was likely to produce a probable benefit to the minor? (In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557, 565-567.) Does the record contain some evidence that the court appropriately considered and rejected reasonable alternative placements as ineffective or inappropriate? (In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1159; In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250.)

- Welfare and Institutions Code section 733 precludes a Division of Juvenile Facilities commitment for juvenile court wards under 11 years of age, wards suffering from illness that would “probably endanger the lives or health” of other inmates, and wards whose most recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true by the court is not described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) or Penal Code section 290.008, subdivision (c), and who are not otherwise ineligible for commitment to DJF under the section.

- If a ward is committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities, did the wardship petition include a non-qualifying offense precluding such a disposition? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 733, subd. (c); In re D.B. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 941, 944.)

- The court must determine whether the minor has committed one of the offenses listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b). If so, the Division of Juvenile Facilities has jurisdiction over the minor until age 25. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1769, subds. (a)-(c); In re Emilio C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1064.)

- When an offense has degrees or is a wobbler (i.e., it can be either a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an adult), the court must make an express finding as to the degree of the offense or designate the offense as a felony or misdemeanor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 702; Pen. Code, § 1157; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.778(f)(9); In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 487; In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1209; In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616, 618-620.) The admission of an allegation charged as a felony or calculation of the maximum period of confinement as a felony is insufficient. (E.g., In re Manzy W., supra, at pp. 1207-1208; In re Ricky H.

When a minor is removed from the custody of his/her parents, the court must calculate the maximum length of confinement. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (d).) A minor cannot be confined in excess of the maximum term that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the same offenses. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 726, subd. (d), 731, subd. (c).)

When a minor is removed from parental custody but not committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities, the court must set the maximum at the longest potential sentence provided for by statute, taking into account both the offenses committed and enhancements. (In re Eddie L. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 809, 813-816.) If a minor is committed to DJF, rather than just calculating the maximum period of confinement, the court must exercise its discretion in setting the maximum period of confinement. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 731, subd. (c).)

**Restitution fines** [§ 4.190]

Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 refers to two restitution fines – a restitution fine per se and a victim restitution fine – analogous to restitution fines for adult offenders under Penal Code section 1202.4.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 subdivision (a)(2)(A) is the counterpart to Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b). If the minor is found to be a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for committing of one of more felony offenses, the court must impose a fine between $100 and $1000, regardless of the minor’s ability to pay. (In re Enrique Z. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 464. 470; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (b)(1), (c) & (f).) However, this fine may be waived if the court finds there are compelling and extraordinary reasons to support the waiver and states them on the record. (§ 730.6, subd. (g)(1).) If the minor is a ward for a misdemeanor offense, the fine shall not exceed $100. (§ 730.6, subd. (b)(2).)

The amount of the subparagraph (A) fine is set at the discretion of the court commensurate with the seriousness of the offense. (§ 730.6, subd. (b).) In setting subparagraph (A) fines, the court “shall consider any relevant factors including, but not limited to, the minor’s ability to pay, the seriousness and
gravity of the offense and the circumstances of its commission, any economic gain derived by the minor as a result of the offense, and the extent to which others suffered losses as a result of the offense.” (§ 730.6, subd. (d)(1).) The minor bears the burden of demonstrating a lack of ability to pay. (§ 730.6, subd. (d)(1).)

A victim restitution fine under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 subdivision (a)(2)(B) is the counterpart to Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (a). The reader is referred to ADI’s juvenile articles page.

Other fines  [§ 4.191]

Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.5, the court may levy a discretionary fine against the minor up to the amount that could be imposed on an adult for the same offense, if the court finds that the minor has the financial ability to pay the fine. (In re Steven F. (1994) 21 Cal App.4th 1070, 1080.)

Parents may be obligated to pay for restitution, fines, penalty assessments (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.7; Civil Code, §§ 1714.1, 1714.3 [joint and several liability], probation supervision, legal services, and “reasonable costs of support” if the minor is confined (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 903, 903.1, 903.15, 903.2, 903.25, 903.45, 903.5). Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.7 imposes joint and several liability on the parents of the minor for the economic damages arising out of the criminal acts of their child. (In re Michael S. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1448-1449; In re Jeffrey M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1025.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.7, however, limits a parent’s liability to $25,000 for each tort of the minor. Civil Code sections 1714.1 and 1714.3 further limit monetary damages. Also, Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.7 expressly permits a court to consider a parent’s inability to pay.

Money judgment  [§ 4.192]

Has a parent been held liable for a money judgment for the child’s acts? If so, the parent may appeal. (E.g., In re Michael S. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1443; In re Jeffrey M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1017.)

Sealing records  [§ 4.193]

Five years after the termination of juvenile court jurisdiction or upon reaching age 18, individuals have the right to seal juvenile records, with some exceptions, by petition to the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Once sealed, the proceedings are deemed never to have occurred and the person can properly reply accordingly to any inquiry about the events. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781, subd. (a)(1)(A).)

The court and probation department have an affirmative duty to inform minors who have had wardship petitions filed on or after January 1, 2015, about the right to seal. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781, subd. (h)(1).)

- A potential issue is whether the court abused its discretion in denying the petition because it determined that rehabilitation has not been attained to the satisfaction of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781, subd. (a)(1)(A).)

- Another is whether the court erred in denying a request to remove the lifetime sex offender registration when the defense presents evidence to show the individual has been rehabilitated and the juvenile adjudication did not involve a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) (forcible sex) crimes committed when the individual was 14 years or older. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781, subd. (a)(1)(C)-(D).)

The court has an independent duty to seal records when a minor satisfactorily completes a supervision program or probation. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786, subd. (a).) Once sealed, the arrest and other proceedings in the case are deemed not to have occurred and the minor may reply accordingly to an inquiry by employers, educations institutions, or other persons or entities regarding the arrest and proceedings in the case. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786, subd. (b).) Example of issues include:

- Did the court abuse its discretion in making a finding that the minor did not satisfactorily complete a program or probation? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786, subd. (a) & (c)(1).)

- Did the court abuse its discretion by not sealing records from a prior petition? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786, subd. (f)(1).)
• Did the court abuse its discretion by not sealing records in the custody of a public agency (other than law enforcement agencies, the probation department, or the Department of Justice), such as a school? (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786, subd. (f)(2).)
- CHAPTER FIVE -

EFFECTIVE WRITTEN ADVOCACY:

BRIEFING
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I. INTRODUCTION  [§ 5.0]

The brief is the foundation of appellate advocacy. It is the most important and often the only medium (when oral argument is waived) for reaching the court. Counsel’s responsibility is to ensure all briefs are accurate, professional, and persuasive. “[C]ompliance with formal requirements, clear and effective writing, proficiency in research and the use of authorities, strong analytical skills, and mastery of the art of advocacy” are all essential. (Appellate Court Committee, San Diego County Bar Association, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001) § 6.3, p. 193.)

This responsibility is especially acute in appeals covered by the appointed counsel program. The attorney must not only carry the heavy burden of establishing legal grounds to overturn a final judgment, but also bring fundamental credibility to the client’s cause, in order ultimately to convince the court to rule in the client’s favor.

II. APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF  [§ 5.1]

Every appellant’s attorney must give the utmost attention and care to the preparation of a persuasive opening brief. That brief is the pivotal document in virtually every appeal. The client’s chances for relief will be profoundly affected by its contents, tone, and effectiveness. It sets up the framework for everything that follows. It gives the

1This handbook is no longer published and has not been updated since 2001, but may be available in libraries and appellate offices. Although contents may be obsolete in part, it does have excellent guidance for appellate practitioners. Many other sources provide guides for the preparation of effective briefs. See, e.g., Robinson, How to Write Effective Statements in Criminal Appeals, Appellate Advocacy College (2000); and Rudman, Effective Argumentation, Appellate Advocacy College (2000). Other Appellate Advocacy College materials are available at: http://www.courts.ca.gov/5614.htm
court the first picture of the factual background of the case and introduces the principal legal authorities and concepts to be discussed. The most important function, perhaps, is determining what issues will be the basis of the appeal. The entire “conversation” among the parties and the court will revolve around the issues raised in the opening brief.

The appellant’s opening brief bears a heavy laboring oar. No court reverses automatically: the judgment is presumed to be correct, and the appellant must persuade it to upset the judgment. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)

As a consequence, virtually all of the presumptions and principles on appeal favor the respondent. (See § 5.54, post.) For example, conflict and silence in the record are resolved in favor of judgment. The trial court is usually presumed to have had adequate reasons for a decision and to know the law; and even if the court gave legally incorrect reasons for a decision, no error will be found if legally correct reasons would require the same result. The jury is presumed to have followed the instructions if they are correct and consistent. Judges, clerks, and court reporters are presumed to have performed their duty. Finally, for most kinds of error, the burden is on the appellant to show prejudice – that is, to show the error actually affected the result. To overcome all of these and similar obstacles, the appellant’s opening brief must build a compelling case for relief.

A. General Structure  [§ 5.2]

A typical appellant’s opening brief usually contains, in approximate order, a green cover, a table of contents, a table of authorities, an introduction (optional but highly recommended), a statement of appealability, a statement of the case and statement of facts confined to matters shown in the record, arguments with headings or subheadings summarizing each contention, a conclusion, a word count certificate, and a proof of service. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.40, 8.204 (a)(1) & (2), 8.212, 8.360, 8.412(a), 8.480(a), 8.482(a).) It may have attachments. (Rules 8.204(d), 8.360, 8.412(a), 8.480(a), 8.482(a).) ADI’s website has templates for both issue and no-issue briefs.

3 Quite often in civil (including juvenile dependency) cases, but infrequently in criminal and juvenile delinquency cases, the facts and case will be combined into a single chronological narrative. Both formats are acceptable; counsel should reflect on whether the combined or separate presentation will be more effective in the particular case.

3 If the appellant is a corporation or other entity, rule 8.208 on certificates of interested parties also applies. (Rule 8.361.)

4 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples.asp
Other formalities for briefs as required by the California Rules of Court are detailed in § 5.68 et seq., post. These include such matters as form (paper, type, spacing, numbering, copying, binding, length, signature), filing, service, and deadlines.

B. Cover of Brief  [§ 5.3]

The cover, preferably of recycled stock, must be green and must set forth the title of the brief; the title, trial court number, and the Court of Appeal number of the case; the names of the trial judge and each participating trial judge; the name, address, telephone number, California State Bar number, and fax and email information if available of each attorney filing or joining in the brief (except supervisors); and the name of the party that each attorney represents. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(b)(10), 8.360, 8.412(a(2)), 8.480(a), 8.482(a), 8.40(b) & (c); see also Ct. App., Fourth Dist., Local Rules, rule 2 [plastic and acetate covers not permitted].)

No-issue briefs or letters identifying no arguable issues must be identified as such prominently on the cover of a brief or first page of a letter. For example, in a criminal case, instead of “Appellant’s Opening Brief,” it could be labeled “Brief Submitted on Behalf of Appellant Under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and Andes v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.” In a dependency case, a Sade C. letter or brief could be labeled “(Letter Brief/ Brief) Submitted on Behalf of Appellant Under In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952.” This label helps the Court of Appeal identify it for internal processing purposes.

Appointed attorneys in the Fourth Appellate District are required to include the following statement after the attorney’s name and other identifying information:

By appointment of the Court of Appeal under the Appellate Defenders, Inc., [assisted or independent] case program.

5Wende-Anders briefs and Sade C. letters or briefs are filed when appointed counsel is unable to find any arguable issues to raise on appeal. They are discussed in more detail in § 1.24 et seq. of chapter 1, “The ABC’s of Panel Membership: Basic Information for Appointed Counsel,” and § 4.73 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection.”
C. Tables  [§ 5.4]

1. Topical index  [§ 5.5]

A topical index (table of contents) is required by the California Rules of Court. (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(A).) It is more than a technical requisite: it is an important device of advocacy. The table of contents reiterates the argument headings (see § 5.24, post), which in turn should summarize the arguments in a concise, clearly understandable, and forceful manner. This preview gives the reader a conceptual framework for assimilating the facts and the arguments. In other words, the topical index acts as a “window” to the brief, shaping the reader’s approach to all that follows – and, ideally, predisposing the reader to be persuaded. (Appellate Court Committee, San Diego County Bar Association, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001), § 6.24, p. 200.)

2. Table of authorities  [§ 5.6]

The table of authorities must separately list “cases, constitutions, statutes, court rules, and other authorities cited.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(A).) It must indicate on which page(s) of the brief each authority is cited. (“Passim” is used when an authority is used so often it is inconvenient to list each reference.)

The organization of the table of authorities is a matter of convention, not rule. The Appellate Court Committee, San Diego County Bar Association, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001) in section 6.25 at page 200, suggests the following arrangement, which is familiar to the court and thus convenient for it to use:

- Cases: list in alphabetical order by the case title, regardless of court or jurisdiction.
- Constitutions: The United States Constitution goes first, then the California Constitution, and then other state constitutions alphabetically. Within each

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constitution the listing is numerical, first by articles and then by amendments.

- Statutes: List California statutes alphabetical order by code and, within each code, in numerical order by section. List general laws by date, most recent to oldest. Federal statutes follow the same pattern. Statutes of other states are listed alphabetically by state and, within each, by code and then section number.

- California court rules: Arrange numerically.

- Other authorities, such as treatises: Group alphabetically by author or, if there is no author, by title.

A heading separates and identifies each type of authority (“Cases,” “Statutes,” “Rules,” etc.). (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(A).)

D. Introduction [§ 5.7]

An introduction is not required, but it can be very useful, and appellate justices have repeatedly stressed how valuable they find a good introduction. It gives an immediate overview of the case and helps the reader focus on relevant matters when approaching the brief. An introduction concisely highlights the key facts and issues. It often presents a cogent statement of the result sought and the reasons the court should reach it. An introduction is a good place for presenting a “theme” for the appeal, a distinctive way of characterizing the client’s cause, carried throughout the brief, that gets the reader’s attention and compellingly punctuates the need for relief. (Garner, The Winning Brief (2d ed. 2003) has some excellent, innovative suggestions for framing a case in a way that inclines the reader to the client’s point of view.)

Ideally the introduction should be no more than a paragraph to a page or so in length, except for unusually complex cases, and should avoid sounding merely repetitive of the statements of the case or facts and the argument headings.
E. Statement of Appealability [§ 5.8]

Rule 8.204(a)(2)(B) of the California Rules of Court requires the opening brief to “state that the judgment appealed from is final, or explain why the order appealed from is appealable.” Preferably located at or near the start of the text in the brief, this statement assures the court it has authority to decide the case and helps counsel identify the occasional case for which a remedy other than appeal might be needed. The following are examples of appropriate statements of appealability:

1. Criminal appeal after a trial [§ 5.9]

This statement of appealability is appropriate for an appeal from a judgment imposed after trial in a criminal case:

This appeal is from a final judgment following a trial and is authorized by Penal Code section 1237, subdivision (a).

2. Criminal appeal from an order after judgment [§ 5.10]

This statement of appealability is appropriate for an appeal from an order after judgment in a criminal case:

This appeal is from an order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the defendant, and is authorized by Penal Code section 1237, subdivision (b).

3. Criminal appeal after a guilty plea [§ 5.11]

Any one or any combination of the following statements may be used, as applicable to the case:

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Examples of such appeals might be a probation revocation or change in the terms of probation, a restitution order, or a correction of an unauthorized sentence. See § 2.60 et seq. of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started.” In applicable situations, include references to People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155 or Teal v. Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595.
This appeal is from a final judgment following a guilty plea and is based on the sentence imposed, within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(B). It is authorized by Penal Code section 1237.

This appeal is from a final judgment following a guilty plea after denial of a Penal Code section 1538.5 motion, within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(A). It is authorized by Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m).

This appeal is from a final judgment following a plea of guilty and issuance of a certificate of probable cause, as prescribed by California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(1) & (2). It is authorized by Penal Code section 1237.5.[9]

4. Juvenile law or family law appeal  [§ 5.12]

The following statement is appropriate for an appeal after entry of the dispositional order in juvenile delinquency proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 601 or 602:

This appeal is from a final judgment in proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section [601 or 602] and is authorized by Welfare and Institutions Code section 800.

This language may be used for a juvenile dependency case under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300:

This appeal is from [a judgment entered under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300][an order under Welfare and Institutions Code section (e.g., 366.21, 366.22, 388 – specify)] and is authorized by Welfare and Institutions Code section 395.

or

[9]Note to counsel: A certificate of probable cause is required to raise an issue attacking the validity of the plea, or denial of a motion to withdraw the plea, or a stipulated sentence. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b); People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 76.) (See § 2.43 and § 2.105 et seq. of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and What It Takes To Get an Appeal Started.”)
This appeal is from a judgment entered after a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 and is authorized by Welfare and Institutions Code sections 366.26, subdivision (l) and 395, subdivision (a)(1).

For proceedings under Family Code section 7802, the statement of appealability might read:

This appeal is from a judgment entered under Family Code section 7802 et seq. and is authorized by Family Code section 7894.

5. **Appeal from civil commitment** [§ 5.13]

One of the following statements may be used for an appeal from an involuntary civil commitment:

This appeal is from a final judgment in a Sexually Violent Predator proceeding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. and is authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1.

This appeal is from [an extension of] a commitment under the Mentally Disordered Offender law under Penal Code section 2960 et seq. and is authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1.

This appeal is from a commitment under the LPS conservatorship law under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5300 et seq. and is authorized by section 5352.4 of that code.

This appeal is from an extended detention of a youthful offender under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800 et seq. and is authorized by section 1803 of that code.

This appeal is from [an extension of] a commitment of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity under the Penal Code section 1026 et seq. and is authorized by section 5352.4 of that code. (*People v. Coleman* (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 746.)

6. **Other** [§ 5.14]

For other proceedings counsel should cite the order or judgment being appealed and the statutory or other authorization for the appeal. For example, an appeal from a
finding of incompetence under Penal Code section 1368 is an appeal from a final judgment in a “special proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, formerly § 963; People v. Fields (1965) 62 Cal.2d 538, 540.)

F. Statement of the Case  [§ 5.15]

Rule 8.204(a)(2)(A) of the California Rules of Court requires the brief to “state the nature of the action, relief sought in the trial court, and the judgment or order appealed from.” The purpose of this rule is to give the Court of Appeal a concise overview of the relevant trial court proceedings. Usually this would include, in chronological order: the charges,\(^\text{10}\) relevant motions and rulings, the type of proceeding,\(^\text{11}\) the verdict or other result, the judgment and sentence, and the date the notice of appeal was filed.\(^\text{12}\)

The statement should include only information relevant to the issues or necessary to give the appeal an intelligible setting. It should not quote or paraphrase pleadings or other documents extensively or offer excessive detail about dates and procedures not material to the issues. One page or less will often suffice. If numerous charges and convictions are involved and the information is relevant to the appeal, a chart may be useful. The key is to offer the court procedural context and focus.

Factual matters mentioned in the statement of the case (and elsewhere) must be supported by citation to the record – usually to the clerk’s transcript in this section of the brief. The citation must include the volume if applicable and the exact page where each matter can be found. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)

Citations in a given paragraph need not follow every sentence or individual bit of information, if they are all to the same page of the transcript. But they must be provided at least at the conclusion of each paragraph and be sufficiently frequent to pinpoint for the reader precisely where the information can be located. It is unhelpful and improper to offer a long narrative followed by a sweeping citation – e.g., “II C.T. pp. 2-135.”

\(^{10}\)Normally the charges mentioned in the statement of the case would be those in the last accusatory pleading (information or indictment). It is unnecessary to mention earlier versions of the pleading superseded by amendment, unless they are relevant to the issues in the case.

\(^{11}\)E.g., jury or court trial, guilty plea, probation revocation, Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 or 6600 proceeding.

\(^{12}\)If the notice of appeal was constructively filed – e.g., under In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72 – note that fact.
G. Statement of Facts [§ 5.16]

This statement summarizes the facts of the underlying offenses. It is required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C), which provides the opening brief must include “a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record.” The facts must be supported by citation to the record, including the volume if applicable and exact page where the particular fact can be found. (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); see Berg v. Traylor (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 809, 812, fn. 2.) Generally, in the statement of the facts, citations will be to the reporter’s transcript. As with the clerk’s transcript, § 5.15, ante, these citations should be sufficiently frequent to pinpoint for the reader precisely where the information can be located. It is unhelpful and improper to offer a long narrative followed by a sweeping citation – e.g., “R.T. pp. 48-125.”

If the appeal follows a guilty plea, the facts may be gleaned from the preliminary hearing transcript, the defendant’s statements in court, the probation report, and other sources. Counsel should be aware that all details in such sources are not necessarily official “facts” and should take care to note this in the brief when the sources cited contain potentially prejudicial information not admitted by the plea.

As the rule indicates, the presentation should be “summary” and include “significant” facts. A tedious recitation of every detail found in the transcripts, whether material or not, is boring and distracting. More specific detail can always be set forth in particular argument sections, where facts will be fresh in the reader’s mind and the relevance of the information will be evident. However, the exposition of the facts should provide sufficient information for the court to understand why the defendant was convicted and to assess the issues in light of the whole case. Thus a careful balance must be reached.

The overall goal in presenting the facts is to start the job of persuading the court to reach the desired result. The facts offer a chance to tell a coherent story, to humanize the client, to set forth the basis for the legal arguments, and to build both counsel’s and the client’s credibility. The following guidelines help achieve these goals.

1. State the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment [§ 5.17]

This imperative among imperatives for an appeal after a trial\textsuperscript{13}\ has several components:

- The statement should present as “fact” whatever the trier of fact found to be true, as necessarily implied by the verdict or other findings. (In a typical defendant’s appeal, the “facts” would be the evidence supporting the prosecution’s case.)

- The statement should not omit any material evidence supporting the judgment, even if – indeed, especially if – it is unfavorable to the client.

- Evidence presented by the losing party and presumably rejected by the trier of fact should be separated from the “facts” and expressly labeled as such. (In a typical defendant’s appeal, the statement of facts would include a separate section labeled “defense.”)

(See Appellate Court Committee, San Diego County Bar Association, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001) §§ 6.31-6.39, pp. 203-204.\textsuperscript{14})

By no means do any of these principles require that evidence inconsistent with the judgment (e.g., evidence impeaching the prosecution witnesses) be ignored altogether. It is often important to describe evidence inconsistent with the verdict in order to set the stage for arguing error (such as failure to instruct on a certain defense) or for demonstrating prejudice. Further, omission of facts favorable to the client is usually poor advocacy. The goal is not to induce the court to despise and reject the client, but rather quite the opposite: the facts should deftly draw the court into seeing the case from the client’s point of view, so that it will be receptive to the client’s contentions and the need for relief. A skillful presentation honestly renders the facts in a way even the opposing party would agree is fair, while guiding the court to accept the client’s position on the issues.

\textsuperscript{13}Different rules may apply when there has been no resolution of the underlying facts – for example, a judgment on a demurrer, summary judgment in a civil case, etc. Many specific issues – such as instruction on a particular defense – are likewise judged by a different presumption.

\textsuperscript{14}This handbook is no longer published and has not been updated since 2001, but may be available in libraries and appellate offices. While some content is obsolete, it does offer excellent guidance for appellate practitioners.
2. **Do not inject opinion into the statement of facts** [§ 5.18]

The statement should have only “facts.” It should not contain argument or judgments about the facts. For example, this section is not the place to express the explicit opinion that a certain witness was “thoroughly impeached” or a scientific test was “unreliable.”

Nevertheless, it is proper and indeed usually advisable to state objectively evidence that might suggest such a conclusion:

The eyewitness observed the defendant from more than 200 feet away at 11:00 p.m. in an unlighted alley. (II R.T. pp. 280-281.) She was not wearing her glasses to assist her 20:400 vision. (II R.T. p. 285.)

The accident reconstruction expert used a homemade device, fashioned from roller skates and never subjected to clinical testing, to conclude the defendant’s car was going at speeds in excess of 100 m.p.h. (II R.T. pp. 455-456, 470.)

But the facts should be stated, as just illustrated, in the neutral tone of a reporter, not the opinionated voice of an editorial writer (or advocate). The argument section of the brief is the place to urge the conclusions to be reached from these facts. (See Appellate Court Committee, San Diego County Bar Association, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001) § 6.38, p. 203.)

3. **Tell a short, readable story; do not simply repeat the testimony** [§ 5.19]

The statement of facts should tell a story – normally, a chronological narrative of the material events constituting and surrounding the underlying offense. (E.g., *Chen v. County of Orange* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 926, 931, fn. 1 [“jumbled gestalt . . . is not very helpful in explaining to the reader what the facts of the case are”; thus court follows “chronologically oriented statement of facts” in opposing brief].) It should strive to capture the interest and concern of the reader. An encyclopedic witness-by-witness recapitulation of the testimony (rather like a deposition summary) is rarely helpful to understanding the case and is almost never engaging or persuasive. A series of paragraphs

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starting “Witness A testified that . . .” and “Witness B testified that . . .” is usually a tip-off that the statement has rendered the facts mechanically, rather than thoughtfully.16 (Appellate Court Committee, San Diego County Bar Association, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001) § 6.35, p. 202.)17

The statement should be as short as possible, including only information that has some bearing on the outcome of the appeal or that is necessary to understanding the context of the facts and issues. If the nature of the case demands a lengthier statement, descriptive subheadings can be useful. For example, subheadings can segregate evidence involving multiple incidents (“February 5 robbery at Vons”; “March 1 robbery at Mobil station”).

In dependency cases, especially, it is rarely helpful to submit a report-by-report or hearing-by-hearing summary of the transcripts. Doing so may bore or confuse the reader, and considerably lengthen the statement of facts. The statement of facts should read like the story of a family.

4. Be meticulously accurate   [§ 5.20]

Nothing destroys counsel’s and, derivatively, the client’s credibility more than an inaccurate presentation of the facts or inaccurate (or missing) citations to the record. This is especially true, of course, of material facts; but inaccuracy on even collateral details will erode and ultimately undercut the effort to persuade. Inaccuracy includes relevant and misleading omissions, as well as affirmative misstatements. (See § 5.84 et seq., post, on credibility and accuracy as one of the essentials of persuasiveness.)

5. Observe the confidentiality of certain records and respect the privacy of participants   [§ 5.21]

In preparing the statement of the facts, counsel should guard against disclosure of information protected by law, court order, or judicial policy. Details from probation and diagnostic reports, transcripts of in-camera proceedings, sealed records, juvenile court records, and similar matters, unless elsewhere disclosed in the public record, should not

16Common sense may dictate otherwise in a particular situation. For example, occasionally it is necessary to highlight who said what – e.g., “witness A said the robber was tall and skinny; witness B was quite certain he was short and stout.”

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be included in the facts. If necessary for presentation of the case, the confidential facts should be included in an unredacted brief filed under motion to seal (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.46(e)), along with a public redacted brief. (See § 5.45A, post, for more detail.)

In dependency cases, all surnames are confidential, as is the address of confidential caregivers.\(^{18}\) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 308, subd. (a).) Similarly, “protected persons” – including victims of sex crimes, minors innocently involved in court proceedings, LPS conservatees, trial jurors and sworn alternate jurors, and some victims and witnesses in criminal matters – generally should be kept anonymous. Counsel may refer, for example, to “Susan T.,” “the complaining witness,” “the child,” “J.L.,” etc.\(^{19}\) Identifying information – e.g., last names, middle names or middle initials, street addresses, full birth dates, parent’s last name if same as minor’s, etc. – should also be avoided. (See California Style Manual (4th ed. 2000) §§ 5.9, 5.10.)

The general issue of observing confidentiality in briefs is discussed in § 5.45A, post. The ADI website also offers an extensive analysis and guidance on confidential records and briefs referring to them.\(^{20}\)

H. Argument: Preliminaries [§ 5.22]

Before it is possible to begin the legal analysis, thought must be given to how the arguments will be set up and organized.

1. Order of arguments [§ 5.23]

The order in which the arguments are arranged can be a fairly significant strategic decision. A common rule of thumb is that the strongest issues should go first. It is indeed poor tactics to start off a brief on the wrong foot with a flabby, marginal issue. The court is likely to think, “This is probably the best they’ve got; the case must be a loser.”

\(^{18}\)When sending transcripts to the client, appellate counsel are generally advised to redact caregiver surnames. If the transcripts are in electronic form, it may be necessary to contact the court for a redacted electronic form. Consult ADI.

\(^{19}\)The ADI website discusses this policy: [http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/conf_records.asp#limited](http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/conf_records.asp#limited)

However, leading off with an issue of very narrow scope, even if the strongest in terms of likely success, can diminish the stature of later, much broader arguments. In criminal cases, for example, issues concerning trial would normally precede sentencing issues because the former tend to be perceived as the “bigger” ones. An argument urging the sentence must be reduced from 35-to-life to 34-to-life may be a “slam dunk,” but putting it in a lead-off position tends to relegate to second-class status an attack on the defendant’s confession that formed the basis for the whole conviction.

A broadest-to-narrowest arrangement of groups of issues, with the stronger points first within each group, is often a good solution. (Appellate Court Committee, San Diego County Bar Association, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001), p. 206.)

2. Headings [§ 5.24]

Argument headings are required by rule. A brief must “state each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) To comply with this requirement, the heading must be a complete sentence, not just a label.

Minimal compliance with rule requirements is a bare beginning, not an end. Much more, the heading is a tool of advocacy that should communicate the client’s position to the court instantly, concisely, and compellingly. The goal is that court upon reading the heading will think, at least tentatively: “That sounds like a really good point. I wonder how the respondent will ever answer it.”

To be persuasive, the heading should be specific, not just general and conclusory, and should succinctly explain the underlying rationale of the argument. (A “because” clause is often helpful in achieving this goal.) For example, a heading for a contention concerning the admissibility of a confession because of an alleged Miranda violation could variously be worded:

21This handbook is no longer published and has not been updated since 2001, but may be available in libraries and appellate offices. While some content is obsolete, it does offer excellent guidance for appellate practitioners.

22The court may disregard a point not mentioned in a heading or subheading. (People v. Schnabel (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 83, 84, fn. 1.)

• **Label (unacceptable):** “Inadmissible Confession.”

• **General and conclusory (unpersuasive):** “The Confession Was Inadmissible.”

• **Specific and explanatory (begins the job of persuasion):** “The Confession Was Inadmissible Because It Was Elicited by Continued Questioning After Defendant Unequivocally Invoked His Right to Silence.”

Insufficiency of the evidence to support a robbery conviction might be described in these ways:

• **Label (unacceptable):** “Insufficient Evidence.”

• **General and conclusory (unpersuasive):** “The Evidence of Robbery Was Insufficient.”

• **Specific and explanatory (begins the job of persuasion):** “The Evidence of Robbery Was Insufficient Because the Victim Admitted She Was Never Subjected to Any Intimidation, Force, or Threat of Force.”

Subheadings are helpful, particularly if the argument is complex, but should not be overused to the extent they visually clutter the brief or distract the reader by accentuating the organizational scheme instead of the substance.24

3. **Defining the issue at the outset** [§ 5.25]

   In the text of the argument, the contention and desired result should come first. The appellate court wants to know up front what the trial court allegedly did wrong, what legal theory supports that allegation, and what conclusion to draw from the errors. This sets up the conceptual framework for assimilating the facts and law. Sometimes the argument heading is sufficient for this purpose, but with more complicated issues an expanded explanation of several sentences (or, very rarely, paragraphs) is usually needed.

4. **Setting the procedural and factual context of the issue before reviewing the applicable law in depth** [§ 5.26]

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24As a matter of good style, no subheading should stand alone. If there is an “A,” for example, there should also be a “B”; a “1” requires a “2,” etc.
This point is critical – and often not observed: *The argument should never dive into an abstract legal discussion without first relating it to the facts of the case.* The Court of Appeal wants to know right away whether the issue was raised below, how the trial court ruled on it, and what reasons the trial court gave. It also wants to know the facts that gave rise to the contention.\(^{25}\)

The court is exceedingly busy deciding real cases and is unlikely to be receptive to anything it perceives as extended academic discourse. Indeed, the court may well lose interest altogether and turn to the respondent’s brief to find out what the case is really about. Needless to say, having the court learn about one’s own issues from the opposing party is a disaster of high order in the effort to persuade.

5. **Addressing questions of potential waiver or forfeiture** [§ 5.27]

The Court of Appeal always wants to know how the issue was dealt with in the trial court. One reason is to assure itself the issue has properly been preserved for review on appeal. Failure to make a proper objection or otherwise raise an issue in the trial court often means it is forfeited or waived,\(^{26}\) for purposes of appellate review.\(^{27}\) (E.g., *In re E.A.* (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 787.) If there is any fairly obvious question of forfeiture, the opening brief should address the problem forthrightly. Experience shows an opponent is quick to notice and raise such matters.

A number of strategies may be used to overcome potential forfeiture obstacles:

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\(^{25}\)The facts related to a given issue are not necessarily stated in the light most favorable to the judgment in the argument section. For example, if an issue is failure to instruct on self-defense, the evidence supporting self-defense should be described as if it were true: the appellate court need not defer to the jury as trier of fact when the jury has never had a chance to consider the matter.

\(^{26}\)Technically, “waiver” refers to an explicit and intentional relinquishment of a right, while “forfeiture” refers to loss of entitlement to raise an issue on appeal because of failure to follow procedures required to preserve it. (*In re S.B.* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2.) The distinction was largely ignored in older opinions, which used “waiver” for both meanings.

\(^{27}\)Many issues are waived if the defendant entered a guilty plea or admission. (See § 2.19 and § 2.123, appendix, of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and What It Takes To Get an Appeal Started.”)
• The opening brief may contend that no objection was necessary, because the error was jurisdictional, obvious, or fundamental or involved purely legal issues or a sua sponte duty. (E.g., Pen. Code, § 1259; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 33, fn. 10, overruled on other grounds in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 484; People v. Hernandez (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1376, 1383 [errors in instructions given can be raised without objection if they affect substantial rights]; In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 191 [unauthorized sentence may be corrected at any time];28 Sime v. Malouf (1949) 95 Cal. App. 2d 82, 115-117.)

• The brief can urge that an objection adequate to preserve the issue was made, even though not exactly in the same form as on appeal, because it gave the trial court a fair opportunity to rule on the essence of the matter and gave the opponent an adequate chance to present argument and evidence on it. (E.g., People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 431, 435 [objection under Evid. Code, § 352 adequately apprises trial court of argument that admission of evidence would have legal consequence of violating federal due process and so preserves due process issue for appeal];29 People v. Scalzi (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 901, 907.)

28Cf. People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 235 (impermissible probation condition not “unauthorized sentence” for this purpose and requires objection).

29Partida’s rationale is rather abstruse. It distinguishes the question whether the trial court committed error for reasons other than those stated in the trial objection from the question whether the alleged error in overruling the objection violated due process. Counsel should frame the issue as exactly as possible in the terms used in the opinion, in order to distinguish earlier, closely similar cases, with which Partida apparently does not disagree, such as:

• People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 273, fn. 14: “Defendant claims that by denying his motion, the court committed error not only under Evidence Code section 352, but also under the United States Constitution including the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He failed to make an argument below based on any federal constitutional provision. Hence, he may not raise such an argument here.”

• Duncan v. Henry (1995) 513 U.S. 364, 366: “The California Court of Appeal analyzed the evidentiary error by asking whether its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, not whether it was so inflammatory as to prevent a fair trial. . . . [T]hose standards are no more than ‘somewhat similar,’ not ‘virtually identical.’ . . . [M]ere similarity of claims is insufficient to exhaust.”

• It may argue an objection would have been *futile*, given the state of the law at the time or the trial court’s previous rulings. (*People v. Turner* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 703 [pertinent law changed so unforeseeably after trial it is unreasonable to expect defendant to have made anticipatory objection]; *People v. Perkins* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1567 [futile to object to multiple incidents of judicial misconduct].)

• If the case is a potential vehicle for a newly announced objection requirement, the brief may argue it would be *unfair* to hold the defendant to it. (*People v. Welch* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237-238 [requirement of objection to probation condition not retroactive; unfair to hold defendant to standards not in existence at time of sentencing].)

• The issue might be raised via ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing on appeal or in a habeas corpus petition that the attorney either could not conceivably have had a reasonable tactical purpose for failing to object or did not in fact have such a purpose. (E.g., *In re Rocha* (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 252; *People v. Burnett* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 151; see *People v. Mitchell* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 442 [such an argument must be developed properly, explaining how counsel’s failure fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and resulted in prejudice].)

If one or more of these arguments or some equivalent cannot credibly be made, counsel should seriously question whether the issue should be raised at all.

30It is rarely proper to raise ineffective assistance of counsel as an issue on appeal, as opposed to habeas corpus. The issue should not be raised in an appellate brief except in the unusual circumstance where (a) there are no conceivable tactical reasons for counsel’s actions or (b) the record affirmatively shows that trial counsel in fact did not have valid reasons for the actions. In most cases, establishing ineffective assistance of counsel depends on facts outside the appellate record and thus requires habeas corpus. (See ADI newsletter at [http://www.adi-sandiego.com/news_alerts/pdfs/bef2005/2004_july.pdf](http://www.adi-sandiego.com/news_alerts/pdfs/bef2005/2004_july.pdf), pp. 2-3, and § 8.1 of chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies.”)
6. Identifying the standard(s) of review  [§ 5.28]

To assess the arguments the reviewing court needs to know the degree of deference it must give to the trial court’s findings. At some point in the argument, therefore – usually fairly early – the relevant standard or standards of review must be established. This part of the argument may discuss, as well, which party has the burden of proving or disproving the error and how heavy that burden is. Unless the standard of review is in dispute, the discussion should be short. (See § 4.45 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection,” for more detail on this topic.)

The most common standards of review are abuse of discretion, substantial evidence, and de novo. When an issue involves both factual and legal issues, a mixed standard may be applied.

a. Abuse of discretion  [§ 5.29]

Under this standard, the reviewing court will not second-guess the trial court’s exercise of judgment unless no reasonable judge could have reached that result. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162; People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977; see chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection,” § 4.46) This standard is applied to a wide range of decisions involving the conduct of the trial – severance or joinder, change of venue, admissibility of evidence, order of proceedings, continuances, sentencing, etc.31

The theory is that the trial court is in the best position to observe the proceedings, parties, jurors, witnesses, etc., and to make judgment calls about the steps needed to handle the case in an orderly way. In addition, a reviewing court’s routine substitution of its judgment for that of the trial court would undermine the trial court’s authority.

b. Substantial evidence  [§ 5.30]

The “substantial evidence” standard is similar to “abuse of discretion” in the degree of deference, but is applied to factual findings rather than the exercise of judgment. (See chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection,” § 4.47.) Under this standard, the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the trier of fact unless the findings are not supported by substantial evidence – which means no reasonable trier

31A decision by a trial court based on an error of law is an abuse of discretion. (People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737,746.)
could have made those findings under the applicable burden of proof. (*Jackson v. Virginia* (1979) 443 U.S. 307; *People v. Johnson* (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-577.) For example, in a criminal case the Court of Appeal will not reverse a jury verdict of guilty for insufficient evidence unless no reasonable jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It will not disturb a trial court’s finding of *fact* on a search and seizure issue unless no reasonable judge could have made that finding by a preponderance of the evidence.\(^{32}\) (*People v. Lawler* (1978) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160.)

The theory is that the jury or trial court is in the best position to observe the demeanor of witnesses and can weigh evidence more accurately than can an appellate court looking at a cold record. A jury also brings into the courtroom community values and a collective common sense. To preserve the authority of the jury or trial court and ensure reasonable finality of their decisions, the system has given them the institutional role as primary trier of fact.

c. **De novo review** [§ 5.31]

The reviewing court does not defer at all to the lower court under the “de novo” standard, which applies most commonly to issues of pure law. (*People v. Gordon* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1242-1243; see chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection,” § 4.48.) Examples might be the interpretation of a statute, the legal correctness of a jury instruction, the *reasonableness* of a search and seizure, or the constitutionality of a certain procedure.

The theory here is that a reviewing court is institutionally in a superior position to decide a question of law: its judges occupy higher office than trial judges and usually have more experience in the law; appellate decisions are collective; and the court’s fundamental processes are intrinsically deliberative. Further, the law is supposed to mean the same no matter where in the jurisdiction it is being applied; assigning trial judges the final say on the law, with only deferential review, would almost certainly fragment legal interpretation and introduce inconsistency and unpredictability into the system.

d. **Mixed standard of review** [§ 5.32]

If the issue has mixed questions of fact and law, the appellate court will apply the deferential “substantial evidence” standard to the factual questions and the de novo

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\(^{32}\)The question whether the search or seizure was *reasonable* is one of law, not fact, and is governed by another standard. See §§ 5.31 and 5.32, post.
standard to the legal ones. (See chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection,” § 4.49.) An example is a search and seizure issue. What observations the officer made before conducting a search would be a factual question, and the reviewing court will defer to the trial court’s findings if they are reasonable, i.e., supported by substantial evidence. The question of whether the search was reasonable given these observations, on the other hand, is a legal one, to be reviewed de novo. (*People v. Leyba* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597.)

I. **Legal Analysis** [§ 5.33]

Once the argument is introduced and its context is established as described above, the legal framework must be constructed. The principles and authorities governing the issue need to be set forth, and the law must be applied to the present case – the most important and often most difficult part of the argument.

Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) of the California Rules of Court requires the brief to “support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.” That requirement in itself is deceptively simple. As all experienced appellate lawyers recognize, good advocacy requires more than “some” argument and “some” citation of authority, even though that may satisfy the minimum requirements of the rules. The ultimate goal is to support each argument with the skillful use of legal reasoning and authority and to structure it so that it is logical, clear, concise, and persuasive. The following principles offer a guide to this often elusive goal.

1. **Setting forth the law: analogy and analysis** [§ 5.34]

   It is important to take great care in the use of authorities. One of the most common and most serious mistakes is citing cases only to quote abstract legal principles recited in the opinion and failing to analyze their factual context, actual holding, or analogous relationship to the present case. While of course some cases stand primarily for a particular legal principle, many are important because they apply established principles to a particular set of facts. Whenever appropriate, counsel should use factually similar

33**Where a point is merely asserted by counsel without any argument of or authority for its proposition, it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion.’ (Citation.)’ (*People v. Morse* (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 259, 275; see also *People v. Stanley* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [if point not supported, court may treat it as waived]; *Jones v. Superior Court* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th. 92, 99 [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues waived’’]; *Berger v. Godden* (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1118.)
authorities: those are far more persuasive than mere quotations. This approach also helps avoid misinterpretations caused by taking statements in opinions out of context. It is especially important in fact-intensive arguments, such as those raising sufficiency of the evidence and abuse of discretion issues.

Persuasive explication of the law requires analysis, not just description. A series of paragraphs beginning, “In People v. X, the court held . . .,” with no effort to explain X’s concrete relevance to the issue at hand, does not advance the argument very far or hold the audience’s attention very long. The Appellate Court Committee, San Diego County Bar Association, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001) section 6.54, page 208,\(^{34}\) observes:

You will rarely have an authority so completely on point that no discussion is necessary. You need to argue why Case A and Case B apply and suggest the conclusion you want, and why Case C does not suggest a contrary conclusion (i.e., why it can be distinguished). You will need to deal with general principles, public policies, rules, subtle variations of rules, and the reasons behind rules. In short, you will have to analyze the law and argue what it means or should mean in your case.

2. **Purposes and policies behind the law**  [§ 5.35]

The purposes behind a rule of law are often critical to understanding its meaning. Judicial interpretations and legislative history may also need to be examined.

A requirement in a state statute may have had its genesis in the need to conform to federal constitutional requirements. A judicial gloss on a criminal statute may have originated because of the disparity between the penalties for the enumerated offense and another, similar one. A seemingly-clear phrase in a common-law test may have meant something very different when the test was first formulated.

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\(^{34}\)This handbook is no longer published and has not been updated since 2001, but may be available in libraries and appellate offices. While some content is obsolete, it does offer excellent guidance for appellate practitioners.
(Rudman, Effective Argumentation, Appellate Advocacy College (2000), p. 13.)

Various sources for statutory history are available.

For rule history, the Judicial Council maintains materials showing the reasons behind the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule of the California Rules of Court. It is available online for the years 1997 and later. ADI has a short guide to doing rule history research using this resource.

3. Shakespeare versus ABC’s [§ 5.36]

Assessing the extent of legal information individual justices will bring to the case and pitching the argument to an appropriate level of sophistication can be tricky. As Rudman says, “[I]t is a mistake to assume that the court knows the law.” (Rudman, Effective Argumentation, Appellate Advocacy College (2000) at p. 9.) That rather irreverent observation reflects the reality that justices tend to be generalists rather than specialists, particularly on esoteric points of law. And new justices with a background primarily in civil law need more introduction to fundamental principles of criminal and juvenile law than do seasoned appellate jurists.

On the other hand, it can be numbing and even mildly insulting to start at too elementary a level – for example, expounding at length on the holding of *Miranda* or the applicability of the exclusionary rule to evidence seized in violation of the Fourth

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Amendment. Common sense and some familiarity with the background of the court\textsuperscript{40} will be the best guides. Rudman suggests:

\begin{quote}
[A] paragraph or two at most should suffice to state elementary principles of criminal or constitutional law. . . . More or less explication may be necessary, depending on the familiarity of the court with the general issue. E.g., an “open fields” issue may require more discussion of legal background than a “stop and frisk” issue, a Massiah issue more than a \textit{Miranda} issue.
\end{quote}

(Rudman, \textit{Effective Argumentation}, Appellate Advocacy College (2000) at p. 9.)\textsuperscript{41}

4. \textbf{Adverse law and significant counter-arguments} \hfill [\S 5.37]

For both ethical and credibility reasons, counsel must advise the court of binding adverse authority. It is futile and extremely counterproductive to try to hide such law. The authority needs to be confronted and either distinguished or challenged as wrong. Even if the authority is not strictly binding but is almost sure to be highly persuasive – as with direct Court of Appeal precedents or strong dicta from the California or United States Supreme Court – the brief should almost always acknowledge it.

Consideration should also be given to citing prominent adverse decisions from a federal court of appeals (especially the geographically local court – in California, the Ninth Circuit) or an exceptionally well-known decision from another state. Citing such authority lends credence to the brief and offers the opportunity to blunt the impact of the adverse law before the opponent has a chance to exploit it.

For the same reasons, it is usually a good idea to discuss up front fairly obvious points almost surely to be raised by opposing counsel or discerned by the court, rather than saving rebuttal for the reply brief. Otherwise, the court will be left at the end of the opening brief with an almost inescapable question: “But what about . . . ?” Such a question subverts the goal of having the court finish the opening brief at least tentatively persuaded on the merits. Waiting for the reply brief also runs the all-too-frequent risk that the respondent will miss the counter-argument but the court will not. That means the

\textsuperscript{40}On the Court of Appeal website at \url{http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm}, each court has, as one of the topics related to it, biographical statements about the justices.

\textsuperscript{41}\url{http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/lecture11.pdf}
rebuttal may be presented for the first time at a highly disadvantageous stage (a petition for rehearing) and may be held to have been forfeited altogether.

On the other hand, as the probability decreases that a particular non-binding authority or counter-argument will be used, counsel confronts contrary strategic considerations. It may not be a good idea to invite attention to a potential weakness that may never otherwise be perceived or to create a number of “straw men” merely for the purpose of rebutting them. It is weak advocacy to structure an argument around a series of points beginning, “The respondent may contend that . . . .” Counsel must weigh the relative advantages of raising the point spontaneously versus keeping the focus on the strongest and most obvious issues until and unless counsel’s hand is forced.

5. Use of quotations [§ 5.38]

Quotations are most effective (a) when they are used to deliver special dramatic impact or (b) when they are needed to set out exact language.

If used for the first purpose (rhetorical effect), quotations must be kept concise. Lengthy blocks of quotations not only fail to impress, but also stupefy and inevitably issue a loud invitation, certain to be heeded: “Please ignore me.”

If the precise language is at issue, however, as when a statute or jury instruction is being analyzed, full quotation, not just paraphrase, is essential. A brief must be adequate within its own two covers in order to persuade. Forcing the reader to look up something critical in an external source just to understand the argument is annoying, distracting, and potentially dangerous: in the process the brief loses its audience, perhaps permanently. If the quotation is long, the key passage can be emphasized or quoted by itself in the main body, with the full context in a footnote.

J. Prejudice [§ 5.39]

An important and often decisive part of the argument is showing the court how the error affected the outcome of the case to the client’s detriment. The most compelling demonstration of error will mean nothing if the respondent persuades the court the error had no effect on the case. Indeed, a showing of prejudice is required by California Constitution, article VI, section 13, Penal Code sections 1258 and 1404, and Evidence Code sections 353 and 354. (See also Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) § 4.50 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection,” deals at length with issues of prejudice.
1. **Standards** [§ 5.40]

There are three principal standards by which error is assessed:

- reversal per se – the relatively rare standard used for “structural” error that affects the basic integrity of the proceedings;\(^{42}\)

- reversal unless the record demonstrates the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt – *Chapman* error,\(^{43}\) the standard for most federal constitutional errors; and

- reversal only if the record demonstrates a reasonable probability that but for the error the result would have more favorable for the defendant – *Watson* error,\(^{44}\) the standard for most errors of state law.

These are not rigid categories allowing for easy pigeonholing of all errors. Their source (e.g. federal Constitution, state law) is one factor. Others include how fundamental or absolute a right or procedure is, and how difficult and speculative the job of assessing prejudice is.

Some areas of the law, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial failure to disclose favorable defense evidence, and conflicts of interest on defense counsel’s part, use specialized “boutique” standards of prejudice. (See § 4.54 et seq. of *chapter 4*, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection.”)

2. **Establishing prejudice in the case** [§ 5.41]

Prejudice can be established in a number of ways. Some kinds of error inherently carry a high probability of prejudice, such as confessions, comments by judges or


\(^{44}\)*People v. Watson* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818; see § 4.53 of *chapter 4*, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection.” *College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715, italics original: “‘[P]robability’ in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.”
prosecutors, and evidence of other crimes or gang affiliation. Sometimes the error may be prejudicial because it was exploited or given special prominence by the prosecutor during argument. The error may have directly affected the key issue in the case. The jury may have asked for rereading of testimony or asked questions related to the area of the error. The fact the case was close factually, or the jury deliberated a long time, or the verdict occurred in close proximity to the error may be used to establish prejudice.


K. Federalization [§ 5.42]

It can be important to “federalize” an issue where appropriate – that is, show the applicability of federal law (usually, the federal Constitution). Doing so gives the client the opportunity to present the claim in federal court by certiorari or habeas corpus. (See Duncan v. Louisiana (1995) 513 U.S. 364, 365-366; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) [a state petitioner must exhaust all available state remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus relief].) Exhaustion of state remedies is treated more extensively in § 9.66 et seq. of chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”

1. Issues that might be federalized [§ 5.43]

Many issues directly implicate federal law, such as self-incrimination, cruel and unusual punishment, and double jeopardy. Other federal issues may be less obvious. For example, the clear misapplication of state constitutional, statutory, or case law may constitute a deprivation of federal due process or equal protection. (Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346-347 [state sentencing statute created liberty interest in right to jury sentencing]; see Toney v. Gammon (8th Cir. 1996) 79 F.3d 693, 699-700 [defendant had federal due process liberty interest in being sentenced under correct interpretation of state statute, which required trial court to exercise discretion]; Walker v. Deeds (9th Cir. 1995) 50 F.3d 670, 673 [liberty interest in application of state statute requiring trial court to make individualized determination as to whether defendant is habitual offender]; Rust v. Hopkins (8th Cir. 1993) 984 F.2d 1486, 1493 [liberty interest in having sentencing authority apply statutorily prescribed standards and procedures]; Willeford v. Estelle (5th Cir. 1981) 637 F.2d 271, 272 [liberty interest in having trial judge exercise statutorily prescribed sentencing discretion].)


2. Method of federalizing an issue in the brief [§ 5.44]

As explained more fully in § 9.71 et seq. of chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus,” although federalizing an issue need not be time-consuming or elaborate, the issue needs to be sufficiently highlighted and well developed to give the state court notice it is being raised as a separate ground for relief. For this purpose it is important to:

- State the federal claim in a heading or subheading of the argument and not bury it in the text.46 (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
- Set forth the specific factual bases for the federal claim. (Kelly v. Small (9th Cir. 2002) 315 F.3d 1063, 1069.)
- Cite the specific federal legal authority for the claim, including the federal constitutional provisions relied on and any leading cases, especially those of the United States Supreme Court.47 (Gray v. Netherland (1996) 518 U.S. 152, 162-163.)
- Present argument (not a bare, conclusory claim), articulating a legal theory for why the facts violated the constitutional provision. (Castillo v. McFadden (9th Cir. 2004) 399 F.3d 993, 1002.)

46 The state court may disregard a point not mentioned in a heading or subheading (People v. Schnabel (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 83, 84, fn. 1), thus running the risk the federal court will find procedural default.

47 If the United States Supreme Court has already granted certiorari to consider a related constitutional issue, the brief should cite the pending case, the applicable parts of the United States Constitution, and relevant United States Supreme Court precedents.
3. **Follow-through needed to exhaust state remedies**  [§ 5.45]


Rule 8.508 of the California Rules of Court allows an abbreviated petition for review when the primary intention is to exhaust state remedies and the case does not present grounds for plenary review by the California Supreme Court within the terms of rule 8.500(b) of the California Rules of Court.48

If the Court of Appeal omits an issue in its opinion, the Supreme Court normally will decline to review it unless the omission is called to attention of the Court of Appeal in a petition for rehearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).) To avoid possible procedural default, it is therefore advisable to file a petition for rehearing.49


49Attorneys Clifford Gardner and Richard Neuhaus raised contrary considerations in an article once posted on the California Appellate Defense Counsel website. ADI continues to adhere to the position stated here. We have researched this issue extensively and prepared an analysis, which is available to criminal appellate defense attorneys on request, so that they can make an informed decision. Staff attorney Cindi Mishkin or executive director Elaine Alexander can provide copies.
L. Protecting Confidentiality [§ 5.45A]

Counsel should take care in briefing not to disclose confidential matters that may be in the record. This problem arises in all juvenile cases, where both the transcripts and the briefs are closed to public inspection (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 827; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.401), and in cases with sealed records (rule 8.46). It also may come up in cases involving, for example, Marsden and related records, probation and diagnostic reports, defense requests for expert funding, confidential informants, medical records or psychological evaluations in dependency cases, etc. In all such cases, counsel should consider the possibility that the need for confidentiality persists after trial and, if so, should avoid inappropriate disclosure. (See rule 8.46(g) [disclosure of nonpublic material in public records prohibited].)

If reference to non-public matters is essential, counsel may file a complete, unredacted brief with a motion to seal (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.46(e)) and a public, redacted version deleting references to the confidential matters. In redacting, however, counsel must remove only legally protected or sealed material from the public brief. The public has a First Amendment right to access court records unless otherwise

50Counsel’s first responsibility is make sure the record on appeal includes the confidential materials, so that counsel can consider whether they contain arguable issues. Chapter 3, “Pre-Briefing Responsibilities: Record Completion, Extensions of Time, Release on Appeal,” § 3.7 provides guidance. See generally http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/conf_records.asp

51http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/conf_records.asp#juvrecords

52http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/conf_records.asp#sealed

53People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (motion to remove appointed counsel because of failure to provide effective assistance). See http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/conf_records.asp#marsden

54http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/conf_records.asp#probation

55http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/conf_records.asp#defense

56http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/conf_records.asp#motions

57Motions to seal should explain why sealing is necessary under the criteria laid out in rule 2.550(d)-(e). (Rule 8.46(e)(6).)
provided by law. (See also Code Civ. Proc., § 124; NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178.)

If the confidential material was protected from disclosure to the prosecution, as well as the public, in the trial court, and counsel concludes the need for confidentiality continues on appeal, counsel may seek a protective order guarding against disclosure by the Attorney General to the trial prosecutor. (See James G. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 275, 277 fn. 1, & 284.) If that measure is not possible, appellate counsel may consult with trial counsel and the client on the relative merits of waiving the issue versus waiving confidentiality.

The possibility of the court’s denying sealing raises practical considerations. Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.46(d)(7), the unredacted version will be returned unfiled unless within 10 days the party informs the court it elects to file it publicly. Because that period may be insufficient to obtain the client’s consent to waive the issue or forgo confidentiality, counsel must seek the client’s decision proactively at an early stage.

Sometimes counsel will not have access to the confidential records – for example, those involving Pitchess motions and confidential informants. In those situations, counsel may merely refer to the fact that an in camera hearing was held and ask the Court of Appeal to review the record for error, without briefing from either party.

Briefs should also be sensitive to privacy interests in identifying persons, whether on the cover, in headings, or in the text. Victims of sex crimes and parties involved in

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58 Usually, the need for protecting against disclosure of the defense no longer exists on appeal, because the defense was revealed at trial. Appellate counsel should consult with trial counsel when in doubt.


60 Evidence Code sections 1041 and 1042; People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948; see http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/conf_records.asp#motions

61 The defendant, not the court, is responsible for augmenting the record to include those confidential records. (People v. Rodriguez (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 360.) The augmented record goes only to the court.
juvenile court or other confidential proceedings generally should be kept anonymous—
e.g., “Susan T.,” “the complaining witness,” “the child,” etc.\textsuperscript{62} (See California Style Manual (4th ed. 2000) §§ 5.9, 5.10.)

M. Joinder with Other Parties’ Arguments  [§ 5.45B]

If there are other parties in a single appeal with compatible positions, counsel may
divide briefing responsibilities among them and then join each other’s arguments. This
approach is indeed highly encouraged, because it promotes judicial economy. It is
approved by the California Rules of Court. (Rule 8.200(a)(5); 8.360(a); 8.412(a).)

Joinder must be done thoughtfully, not casually. Some issues may apply identically
to each defendant, and then a simple joinder is sufficient, provided the original briefing is
fully satisfactory. Many issues, however, will require individualized argument on such
matters as whether it was properly preserved, how it applies to the particular client, how it
may have prejudiced him or her, what remedy is appropriate, etc. Counsel’s responsibility
is to represent the individual client as effectively as possible, and that includes any
matters in which counsel joins.

Especially egregious are arguments joining other parties’ points “to the extent they
may benefit my client.” This approach suggests counsel expects the court or opposing
counsel to decide what benefits the client and how. It is an abdication of counsel’s own
responsibility to do exactly that. (\textit{People v. Bryant} (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335.) If the brief
joined in was filed earlier, counsel must specify what the points joined are and fill in any
needed details. If it has not yet been filed, the opening brief may advise the court of the
possibility of a later joinder letter or supplemental brief, but counsel must then file
whatever document is required to present the issue properly.\textsuperscript{63}

N. Conclusion to the Brief  [§ 5.46]

The concluding section of the brief may concisely summarize the contentions,
unless that would be unduly repetitive of the arguments or argument headings. Argument
summaries in the conclusion are often valuable in complex issues or cases with multiple
issues. The conclusion can offer an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the relationship

\textsuperscript{62}The ADI website discusses this policy:
\texttt{http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/conf_records.asp#limited}

\textsuperscript{63}ADI’s news alert of October 2014 addresses this matter.
among the arguments and the way they interact to present a compelling case for relief. It is also a good place to remind the court of any “theme” developed through the brief and the implications for the result being urged.

The conclusion should state the exact relief sought for each contention. For example:

Because the evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction of simple kidnaping in count one, the conviction on that count must be reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the charge without leave to refile.

Because the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of simple possession of cocaine as to counts two and four, those counts must be reversed for a new trial.

Because the trial court relied on improper factors in imposing the upper term on count three, first degree robbery, the matter must be remanded for resentencing on that count.

O. Attachments  [§ 5.47]

Rule 8.204(d) of the California Rules of Court states that “A party filing a brief may attach copies of exhibits or other materials in the appellate record or copies of relevant local, state, or federal regulations or rules, out-of-state statutes, or other similar citable materials that are not readily accessible.” This approach facilitates the appellate court’s review when such materials are important to the resolution of the issues. The combined attachments may not exceed 10 pages without leave of court. (Ibid.)

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(c) requires that any citable\(^{64}\) unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeal and any opinion available only in a computer data base must be attached to the brief.

\(^{64}\) Rule 8.1115(b) lists the narrow and fairly rare occasions when it is appropriate to cite an unpublished California opinion. For further discussion of publication and citability, see § 7.8 et seq. of chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision.”
III. RESPONDENT’S BRIEF  [§ 5.48]

Although ordinarily appointed appellate attorneys represent appellants, occasionally counsel are called on to handle a People’s or County’s appeal or otherwise are cast into the role of respondent. (See Pen. Code, § 1238.) In such a situation, it will be necessary to file a respondent’s brief. Many of the principles for good brief writing discussed in the preceding treatment of the appellant’s opening brief apply to the respondent’s brief. This section addresses a few considerations especially applicable to a respondent’s brief.

A. Importance  [§ 5.49]

A respondent’s brief is covered by rules 8.200(a)(2), 8.360(c), and 8.412 of the California Rules of Court and is of supreme importance to the appellate process. It is important systemically: if no respondent’s brief is filed, there may well be no defense of the lower court’s judgment in the appellate court, and the adversary system on which the decision-making process is based will fail to perform its function.

It is obviously important to the respondent as a party, as well. The respondent’s brief is usually that party’s one and only chance to make a comprehensive written presentation to the appellate court. The brief responds to the appellant’s contentions and offers an opportunity to show how the appellant’s arguments are legally or logically flawed and why the authorities the appellant relies on do not compel a conclusion favorable to the appellant. It can call the court’s attention to procedural and other formal obstacles to resolution on the merits, such as forfeiture or waiver, invited error, res judicata, collateral estoppel, law of the case, non-appealability, or lack of standing. It can analyze the alleged errors in context and urge they caused no prejudice to the appellant. It can help the appellate court see the respondent’s case through the eyes of the respondent, can take away the momentum established by the appellant’s having had the stage alone during the opening brief, and can ultimately be used to persuade the appellate court the lower court was correct.

65 In cases where there are cross-appeals by both the defendant and the People, unless the court orders otherwise the defendant files the first opening brief; the People file a combined appellant’s opening brief and respondent’s brief; then the defendant files a combined respondent’s and reply brief; the People file a reply. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.216(b), 8.360(e), 8.412(a)(2).) A combined brief must address the points in each appeal separately but provide a single summary of the facts. (Rule 8.216(b)(2).) Rule 8.40(b)(2) governs the cover color.
B. **Formal Considerations** [§ 5.50]

For the most part a respondent’s brief should follow the general form for the appellant’s opening brief, as detailed above. Rule 8.204(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court requires a table of contents, table of authorities, headings, argument supported by authority, and citations to the record. A statement of appealability is unnecessary. (See rule 8.204(a)(2).) The brief may adopt the statement of the case and facts in the appellant’s brief, if they are satisfactory, but doing so may deprive the respondent of a chance to begin the job of persuasion right at the start of the brief. The rules as to form discussed in § 5.68 et seq., *post*, apply to a respondent’s brief.

C. **Formulation of Issues** [§ 5.51]

The respondent should answer the principal contentions by the appellant, but is not bound to agree to the way they are formulated. The respondent may restate the issues as the respondent sees them and may rearrange them, if necessary, to make a logical presentation.

1. **Restating the appellant’s contentions** [§ 5.52]

The respondent of course will want to frame the issues in a way most likely to result in a favorable outcome to the respondent. If the appellant has overstated or otherwise incorrectly represented the law or facts and formulated the issues accordingly, the respondent must urge the court to view the case from a different perspective. It is a dubious tactic, however, to recast the appellant’s contentions in a form weaker than the appellant presented them and weaker than they really are and then to answer only the weaker version, hoping the court will uncritically accept the respondent’s statement of what the appellant is contending. That approach leaves the respondent vulnerable, since the appellant (who has the last word in briefing) is likely to jump on the failure to answer the real contention; and even if the appellant overlooks the attempted transformation of the issues, the court likely will not.

Ideally counsel should state the opposing party’s contention so skillfully even that party would say, “I wish I had said it that well” – and then refute it. (This does not mean,  

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66 Indeed, failure to address the appellant’s contention might even be seen as a concession. (*People v. Bouzas* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 480.)
of course, that counsel for a criminal defendant in a respondent’s role should bring up new issues on the prosecution’s behalf.67)

2. Developing issues of procedural default  [§ 5.53]

As noted above, matters such as forfeiture or waiver, invited error, lack of standing, estoppel, and other obstacles to resolution on the merits may prevent consideration of some issues the appellant has raised. Counsel for respondent should review each issue carefully for compliance with procedural prerequisites and point out problems in this area.

Doing so is not just opportunism or mean-spirited insistence on “technicalities.” The procedural requirements serve a public policy. For example, rules of forfeiture or waiver exist to shield the trial process from endless repetitions because of failure to call a problem to the court’s attention at a time when it can be cured on the spot. They also protect parties from being “sandbagged” and having to endure (and, sometimes, pay for) still another trial. (People v. Gibson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1468.) Rules on res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case serve to preserve the stability of judgments and guard against the costs of repetitive litigation.

Usually it is advisable for the respondent’s brief to address the issues on the merits, even if strong procedural default arguments are made. The court may disagree with the respondent on the question of default, and in that event as a matter of self-protection the respondent will want to have gotten its arguments and authorities on the merits before the court.

D. Appellate Presumptions and Principles  [§ 5.54]

Most presumptions and principles on appeal favor the respondent, and the respondent must be poised to take advantage of them. For example:


67 The Attorney General has somewhat different obligations here, since a prosecutor has a special duty to promote the ends of justice. (United States v. Augurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 110-111; In re Ferguson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 525, 531; People v. Kasim (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1378.)
• An appellate court will presume the trial court had adequate reasons for a
decision, unless the record affirmatively shows otherwise (or unless the law
requires reasons to be stated explicitly). (Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
2 Cal.3d 557, 564; People v. Golliver (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1620.)

• The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment.
(People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-577.)

• The trial court is presumed to know the law. (People v. Braxton (2004) 34
Cal.4th 798, 814; People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644,
overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th
Torres (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 189, 192.)

• Under the “right result, wrong reason” principle, even if the court gave
legally incorrect reasons for a decision such as admitting or excluding
evidence, no error will be found if legally correct reasons would require the
same result. (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 972; People v.
Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976; D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18-19.)

• The jury is presumed to have understood and followed the instructions if
they are correct and consistent. (People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312,
331; People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1090; cf. Francis v. Franklin
(1985) 471 U.S. 307, 324, fn. 9.)

• Judges, clerks, and court reporters are presumed to have performed their
duty. (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 661; People v. Ward (1953)
118 Cal.App.2d 604, 608; see Evid. Code, § 664.)

• For most kinds of error, the burden is on the appellant to show prejudice –
that is, to prove the error actually affected the result. (People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837.)68

A respondent should keep these advantages in mind and make skillful use of them
when possible.

68See § 5.39, ante, and § 4.50 et seq. of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting
and Selection,” for further discussion of prejudice standards.
E. **Primary Focus: Salient Points in the Case** [§ 5.55]

The respondent’s brief should always keep in mind the likely response of the court to the conversation between the parties. What did the appellant say that is most likely to persuade the court? The respondent should focus on rebutting or neutralizing that. What are the weakest points in the appellant’s case? The respondent’s brief should prominently call them to the court’s attention and take maximum advantage of them. However, it is poor tactics to point out every trivial error in the appellant’s brief, because that can make the respondent look petty and bury the good points among the inconsequential.

F. **Concessions** [§ 5.56]

Occasionally it may be necessary to concede a particular point raised in the opening brief because the appellant has proved it conclusively. In such a case, the respondent’s brief should do so forthrightly. It will enhance the credibility of the respondent’s entire case and make the arguments on the remaining issues all the more persuasive, because counsel will have shown the ability and willingness to exercise critical judgment in the course of advocacy.

G. **Steadfast Professionalism** [§ 5.57]

Sometimes an appellant will make absurd arguments or attack the respondent or even respondent’s counsel personally. It is vital respondent’s counsel not take the bait and answer in kind, but instead keep a professional tone. The court will note and appreciate the difference between the respondent’s professionalism in focusing on the merits and the appellant’s lack thereof.

IV. **APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, NON-APPEALING MINOR’S BRIEF, AND SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF** [§ 5.58]

A. **Appellant’s Reply Brief** [§ 5.59]

The principal formal and practical purpose of a reply brief is to respond to the points and authorities raised in the respondent’s brief. Reply briefs in criminal cases are permitted under rules 8.200(a)(3), 8.360(a), and 8.412(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court. They are due 20 days after the respondent’s brief is filed (rules 8.360(c)(3),
8.412(b)(3)) and should follow the general principles and forms required for all briefs, as detailed in § 5.1 et seq., ante, and § 5.68 et seq., post.69

1. Importance of reply briefs [§ 5.60]

Attorneys in the ADI program are expected to file reply briefs in their cases unless strong justification appears for not doing so. It is the rare case indeed when the opening and respondent’s briefs have so thoroughly covered the issues that nothing further could be said on behalf of the client. Further, a reply brief is an exceedingly important tool of advocacy that performs a number of critical strategic functions:

• The reply brief is a chance to answer the respondent’s arguments and authorities.

• It offers an opportunity to counter procedural obstacles such as forfeiture or invited error and to rebut claims of harmless error.

• A reply brief can take account of new legal developments, arguments by the respondent not anticipated in the opening brief, and other “surprises.”

• It can reshape, refine, or bolster arguments that are basically sound but were less than optimally stated in the opening brief. (But see § 5.61, post, on not raising new issues.)

• Filing a reply brief avoids the possibility the court might construe silence as an acknowledgment of weakness or an outright concession. (See Johnson v. English (1931) 113 Cal.App. 676.) This is a special danger when the respondent has raised a point not anticipated in the opening brief.70

69 In cases where there are cross-appeals by both the defendant and the People or County, unless the court orders otherwise the defendant files the first opening brief; the People or County files a combined appellant’s opening brief and respondent’s brief; then the defendant files a combined respondent’s and reply brief; the People file a reply. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.216(b), 8.360(e), 8.412(a)(2).) A combined brief must address the points in each appeal separately but provide a single summary of the facts. (Rule 8.216(b)(2).) Rule 8.40(b)(2) governs the cover color.

70 It may be advisable to add a disclaimer to a reply brief saying that failure to address a matter in the brief is not a concession, but rather a reflection of counsel’s belief the subject has been covered adequately in the opening brief.
• Replying communicates confidence in the case. Conversely, failing to answer suggests discouragement and resignation to inevitable defeat.

• A reply brief can retake the psychological initiative temporarily seized by the respondent in its attack on the opening brief arguments and redirect the momentum in the appellant’s favor. It can show why, despite the respondent’s efforts to salvage the case, relief for the client is compelled.

• It is a chance to have the last word in written form and to leave a final impression on the court before it drafts an opinion. (Most if not all California appellate courts have draft opinions or bench memos reaching a tentative conclusion before oral argument.)

2. Restriction against raising new issues [§ 5.61]

Although a reply brief may be used to beef up or reshape the approaches taken in the opening brief in light of the respondent’s positions, it is not the place to raise truly new issues. (Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 482, fn. 10; Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764.) It properly functions as an answer to the respondent’s brief, not as a new opening brief.71

If the appellant wants to raise a genuinely new contention after filing the opening brief, the proper procedure is to submit a supplemental opening brief, along with a request to the presiding justice for permission to file it.72 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(4); § 5.64 et seq., post.) Simply inserting the new issue into the reply brief runs a high risk the court will refuse to consider it. By the time the court gets around to making that ruling, it may well be too late to file a supplemental opening brief; courts in exercising

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71 One reason for this restriction is fairness to the respondent. The rules do not provide a chance to answer the reply brief. The respondent thus could be deprived of a chance to answer genuinely new issues raised for the first time in the reply brief.

72 Fourth Appellate District divisions are split on the question whether counsel should simply file a supplemental brief or move to strike the original and replace it with a new combined opening brief. Counsel should call the court clerk or consult ADI when in doubt. Fourth Appellate District policies are posted on the ADI website at: http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/fourth_dist.asp
their discretion under rule 8.200 tend not to be receptive to filings changing the basic contours of the appeal after most of the work is done. The issue will then be lost.73

3. Preparing a reply brief  [§ 5.62]

A common first reaction to getting a respondent’s brief is to feel daunted. Counsel for the appellant ideally had persuaded himself or herself in the opening brief that this is a strong case. Now the respondent is throwing cold water all over those compelling points and raising some objections counsel had not even considered. The natural temptation is to put the brief away and say, “I’ll think about it tomorrow.” This may suffice for an initial psychological defense mechanism, but the reply brief is due in 20 days, and so fairly soon it is time to reopen the respondent’s brief and really think about it.

More often than not, appellant’s counsel is pleasantly surprised. Those confident assertions by the respondent can actually be answered, the allegedly devastating cases are not so unequivocal as the respondent has painted them,74 and there really is a good case for showing the client was prejudiced by the errors at trial. At this point counsel can recapture the sense of being on the road to a likely win.

The whole focus of the reply brief should be to hammer home the message, “There is no way around it; relief is compelled.” For maximum effectiveness, counsel should keep these key goals and concepts in mind:

a. Aim for conciseness  [§ 5.62A]

The reply brief should be concise and to the point. Although it may be useful to summarize the basic arguments in order to put the reply in context, there is no need to rehash the opening brief – indeed, doing so at length may prompt the court to stop reading the reply. The purpose is to rebut the respondent’s positions and to explain succinctly the reasons the court needs to grant the relief requested, not to reargue the whole case from scratch.

73There is an exception for briefing before the California Supreme Court. California Rules of Court, rule 8.520(d)(1) permits supplemental brief(s) “limited to new authorities, new legislation, or other matters that were not available in time to be included in the party’s brief on the merits.” The brief must be filed no later than 10 days before oral argument. (Rule 8.520(d)(2).)

74It is a good idea to examine the respondent’s authorities carefully, especially where an edited version is used in the briefing. The actual holdings may be far different from the way the respondent has painted them.
Counsel is well advised to reread the opening and respondent’s briefs together before writing the reply. The opening and respondent’s briefs typically are filed several months apart, and so the appellant’s counsel needs a refresher when resuming work on the case at the reply brief stage. But the court has a different frame of reference: it will probably read all briefs at one sitting and so will find unnecessary repetition boring, even irritating. The reply will be more focused and effective if it just gets to the point.

b. Take tactical advantage of omissions in respondent’s brief or attempts to water down the issues [§ 5.62B]

It is a common tactic on the part of respondents to ignore a position difficult to refute or convert it into something much weaker. The reply brief can take advantage of such tactics by noting the respondent’s failure to refute the real argument and insisting that the issues be defined, debated, and decided in the way the appellant has framed them.

c. Follow commonsense rules for answering the opponent’s points [§ 5.62C]

Many of the principles discussed in § 5.48 et seq., ante, for respondent’s briefs apply as well to reply briefs. Counsel should focus on countering the strongest points made by the respondent and calling attention to the areas of weakness. The reply should not pounce on immaterial petty errors in the respondent’s brief. If necessary, it should forthrightly concede when the respondent has proved conclusively that a point raised in the opening brief is invalid; this will enhance the credibility of the appellant’s entire case and make the arguments on the remaining issues all the more persuasive.

If the respondent’s attorney has adopted a dismissive, scornful, and disrespectful tone, the reply brief should not answer in kind. Counsel need not be worried that the court will be impressed by the respondent’s interjections of “nonsense,” “balderdash,” “hogwash,” and other efforts to substitute name-calling for analysis; to the contrary, the appellant’s professionalism will stand in prominent contrast to the respondent’s display of the opposite.

B. Non-Appealing Minor’s Brief [§ 5.63]

The role of a non-appealing dependency minor’s attorney has long been the subject of puzzlement. Unlike the usual counsel for an appellant or a respondent, minor’s counsel has no pre-determined adversarial position to take. The minor may side with either the appellant or the respondent or stake out an independent position, depending on the issues and the child’s needs. Although a traditional adversarial role does not apply, the law
nevertheless provides for minor’s counsel in the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, §317) and, on a determination of need, in the appellate court (Welf. & Inst. Code, §395, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.403(b)(3)).

In theory, minor’s counsel role is to determine what result of the appeal is best for the minor. This certainly includes advocating for the minor’s wishes, if the client is of an age and mental capacity to have meaningful preferences. But it is not that simple, because counsel also must protect the minor’s best interests and above all safety, regardless of the child’s wishes. The complexity of the task requires, in some instances, specialized training and consultation with other experts. Regardless, counsel’s role on appeal is to advocate for the result preferred by, or in the interests of, the minor, not to act as a “judge” as to whether the appellant or the respondent has the better legal argument.

1. Appointment of appellate counsel and minor’s counsel’s guidelines [§ 5.63A]

Appointment of appellate counsel for a non-appealing minor used to be universal in the Fourth Appellate District, although not in other districts. Because the indeterminacy of minor’s counsel’s role was such a pervasive issue in the district, ADI and other advocates worked with the court to develop minor’s counsel guidelines, which laid out the court’s expectations and the duties and limitations associated with counsel’s role. The guidelines covered such matters as communication and investigation, principles to follow in developing a position, nature of the minor’s filings, argument, facts outside the record, and developments in the trial court.

Budgetary constraints ultimately forced the courts to confine appointment to cases where a particular showing of need is made. Generally the presumption is that the County can adequately fulfill its assigned role of protecting the minor’s interests on appeal. But the County also has the assigned role of defending the trial court’s decision on appeal. When there is doubt the child’s interests were well served by the decision below, the County faces a conflict of interest, and the minor may need independent counsel. Other reasons for appointing minor’s counsel may include inadequate briefing by either or both of the parties, conflicting interests among minors, the minor’s interest in participating, conflict between the minor and trial counsel or the County, post-judgment factual changes, etc. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.661(f) [factors trial counsel should consider in recommending independent appellate counsel for the minor].) If counsel for another party has reason to believe an appellate attorney should be appointed for the minor, counsel should contact the project and minor’s trial attorney.

The minor’s counsel guidelines have evolved considerably with new case law and court policy – especially the shift to selective rather than routine appointment of minor’s
counsel. The current guidelines\textsuperscript{75} are on the ADI website. Counsel for minors throughout the state may benefit from them, although always taking care to confirm with the applicable project what local policies may apply.

2. Briefs and other filings [§ 5.63B]

As to briefing, the role of non-appealing minor’s counsel in times of routine minor’s counsel appointment was an investigative, protective one with the presumptive filing being a joinder letter. This was appropriate because most often the County is able to represent the minor without conflict. Under the selective-appointment regimen, however, non-appealing minor’s counsel is not appointed unless there is doubt as to the process below or the propriety of a simple joinder. Thus minor’s counsel more often now is thrust into a conventional adversarial advocate’s role, where the attorney provides full briefing. Accordingly, the minor’s counsel guidelines\textsuperscript{76} provide the non-appealing minor’s filing may be:

- **Letter:** A letter or short letter brief is appropriate if the minor’s position is served by joining in the position taken by one of the parties. It may present additional points and authorities. A letter brief is less costly to produce than a full brief, without tables and the like. But if it is more than five pages long, single-spaced reading gets unduly tedious. The filing should then be converted to a conventional brief with yellow cover. The point, after all, is to have it be read.

- **Brief:** Full briefing is appropriate if the parties’ briefing does not adequately present the minor’s position, if the minor wants to state a position significantly different from that of either party, or if for other reasons appellate counsel deems it necessary to protect the minor’s interests. The minor’s brief should have a yellow cover.

In either case, the guidelines provide, the letter or brief should state what the minor’s position is and why. (See § 5.63C, post.) In the typical case, it should contend whether the judgment should be affirmed, reversed, or modified, and it should indicate that the position is taken because of the minor’s preferences and/or best interests. The points and authorities or other legal arguments presented should be those that support the minor’s position in favor of affirmance, reversal, or modification.

\textsuperscript{75}http://www.adi-sandiego.com/delinq_depend/dependency/juvenile_guide.asp

\textsuperscript{76}http://www.adi-sandiego.com/delinq_depend/dependency/juvenile_guide.asp
3. **Position on appeal**  [§ 5.63C]

The briefing guidelines above presuppose counsel has already determined the minor’s position on appeal (in favor of reversal, affirmance, modification, etc.). But choice of position can be in doubt – and then it can easily become the single most crucial decision appellate counsel must make. (See approach to taking a position laid down in ADI guidelines.77)

*In re Josiah Z.* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664 offers some principles for the process of selecting the minor’s position on appeal. In that case, the appellate attorney was considering whether to abandon an appeal filed by minor’s trial counsel. The court determined the decision belonged to the client or, in the case of young children, the minor’s CAPTA guardian ad litem,78 a role ordinarily filled by minor’s trial counsel. Extending *Josiah Z.* to choice of the fundamental position to take on appeal, most often it should be clear to appellate counsel what side the minor should take: the minor should take the same position on appeal as that taken by trial counsel in the lower court.

But the waters can get very muddied very quickly. Grave complications arise when the appellate attorney concludes trial counsel/guardian ad litem was indisputably wrong, and the position is detrimental or even dangerous to the child.79 Sometimes the minor personally and the guardian ad litem are in conflict.80 Other combinations of factors, such as the minor’s maturity and mental capacity, the position of the County, other siblings, multiple caregivers, etc., can enter the mix. It is impossible to lay down black-and-white rules for these situations, we have discovered. The imperative is to **contact the project.**


78Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) (42 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq.). The act authorizes federal funding of state child protective programs if among, other things, the state ensures appointment of a specially trained guardian ad litem in every judicial proceeding involving the child. Generally in California, the child’s dependency trial counsel acts as the CAPTA guardian ad litem. The guardian’s authority extends to appellate proceedings. (*Josiah Z.*, 36 Cal.4th at p. 681.)

79*Josiah Z.* noted it may be possible for the appellate court to appoint another CAPTA guardian ad litem for the appeal to break the impasse. (*Josiah Z.*, at p. 682, fn. 8.) Replacing appellate counsel is another option. The project and appellate counsel must make the decision in consultation.

80*Josiah Z.* pointed out that at some point the minor attains the capacity to make the decision himself or herself. (*Josiah Z.*, at p. 681, fn. 7.)
Important policy and systemic interests are in play, as well as the client’s personal interests. The project director may well need to become involved.

C. **Supplemental Brief** [§ 5.64]

1. **Leave of court required** [§ 5.64A]

If the appellant wants to raise a genuinely new contention after filing the opening brief, the proper procedure is either to move to strike the original opening brief and file a new one with the new issue or to submit a supplemental opening brief. Either procedure requires the permission of the presiding justice. \(^{81}\) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(4).) Counsel should consult the project or the court clerk’s office about the procedure to be used.\(^{82}\)

The amended opening or supplemental brief procedure is suitable when an unexpected development occurs, such as a new case, new proceedings in the lower court, changes affecting the parties, etc.

Sometimes, unfortunately, it is necessary because counsel overlooked or misjudged an issue when filing the opening brief or the opening brief is seriously deficient in some way. Because counsel is expected to make every effort to file a proper opening brief to begin with, the need to file the brief may subject counsel to justifiable criticism. Nevertheless, if the client could be prejudiced by the deficiency and especially if the alternative is ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, it is imperative to file the brief and avert possible disaster.\(^{83}\)

It is improper to file an incomplete opening brief with the expectation of filing an amended opening or supplemental brief with the remaining issues, merely because counsel is in a time crunch when the opening brief becomes due.

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\(^{81}\)If the court requested the brief, permission is implied.

\(^{82}\)Fourth Appellate District courts want counsel to move to strike the original and replace it with a new combined opening brief. Counsel should contact the court clerk or consult ADI to confirm current policy, since it tends to change or vary with circumstances.

An amended opening brief may be filed, with court permission, to correct errata. For minor corrections, the court perhaps may accept a letter. Counsel should check on the prescribed procedure before acting.

The rule for amended or supplemental briefs is the earlier, the better: an amended or supplemental brief after the respondent’s brief requires supplemental briefing by the respondent and may interrupt the court’s handling of the case, as well.

2. Filing as a matter of right [§ 5.64B]

a. Supreme Court remand [§ 5.64C]

An exception to the requirement of the presiding justice’s permission applies when the Supreme Court has remanded or transferred a case for further proceedings in Court of Appeal. (See chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision,” § 7.94.) Within 15 days after finality of the remand or transfer order, the parties may file briefs limited to matters arising after the previous Court of Appeal decision, unless the presiding justice permits briefing on other matters. The opposing party may file a response within 15 days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b).)

b. New authority – supplemental letter in Court of Appeal [§ 5.64D]

Rule 8.254(a) of the California Rules of Court permits a supplemental letter in the Court of Appeal to call attention to a significant recent authority. It must be filed as soon as counsel learns of the new authority; if filed after oral argument, it may address only new authority that became available after that argument. (Rule 8.254(c).)

The letter must cite only the authority and the pages of a previously filed brief affected by it – no argument is allowed. (Rule 8.254(b).) If briefing with argument is needed, counsel should proceed under rule 8.200(a)(4) and seek leave of court to file an amended or supplemental brief.

c. New authority – supplemental brief in Supreme Court [§ 5.64E]

If counsel’s case is in the California Supreme Court, rule 8.520(d)(1) of the California Rules of Court permits supplemental brief(s) “limited to new authorities, new legislation, or other matters that were not available in time to be included in the party’s brief on the merits.” The brief must not exceed 2,800 words and should be filed no later than 10 days before oral argument. (Rule 8.520(d)(2).)
V. RESEARCH AND CITATIONS  [§ 5.65]

A. Citation Form  [§ 5.66]

The Court of Appeal uses the system of citation adopted by the California Reporter of Decisions and based on the California Style Manual (4th ed. 2000). Because use of another system, such as the Harvard “Bluebook,” potentially distracts the court’s attention from the substance of an argument to the form, ADI recommends the Style Manual system. Likewise, the Judicial Council Appellate Advisory Committee’s comment to California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(b) states: “Brief writers are encouraged to follow the citation form of the California Style Manual (4th ed., 2000).” However, a brief that consistently follows either system is acceptable. (Rule 1.200.)

It is extremely important to give the exact page number from which a cited quote or point is located. The court has expressed impatience toward and even occasional distrust of attorneys who have failed to do so. ADI staff attorneys consider compliance with this requirement in evaluating panel attorneys’ work.

Parallel citations to the California Reporter are not necessary or desirable in the text of the brief, but they can be helpful in the table of authorities. Full parallel citations

84 The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (20th ed. 2015).


86 Most rules have exceptions; the commonsense one here is that no pinpoint citation is needed (although it is always proper) when the case in its entirety is well known for a legal principle – e.g., Teague v. Lane (1989) 489 U.S. 288 [retroactive application of changes in the law]; Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [self-representation at trial]; Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [guilty plea advice]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 and People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [prejudicial error]; Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [defendant’s statements to police]; In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952 [no merit dependency briefs]; Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 [California stare decisis].

87 Parallel citations to unofficial reports are added during editorial preparation of opinions for the Official Reports. They are not required for the original opinion, although their inclusion is preferred. (California Style Manual (4th ed. 2000), §§ 1:1[F], 1:12.)
for United States Supreme Court cases, including the Supreme Court Reporter and Lawyer’s Edition, preferably should be provided in both the table and the initial citation in the text.\textsuperscript{88} (California Style Manual (4th ed. 2000), § 1:32[B].)

B. Updating Cited Authorities [§ 5.67]

Attorneys should of course be sure all research is current. This includes checking the current validity of cases, recent amendments to statutes and rules, and other potential changes. A published California opinion may be cited as soon as it is certified for publication or ordered published. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(d).) With computerized legal data base systems, attorneys have at their fingertips powerful resources, some of which are cost-free.

A surprisingly large number of attorneys overlook the need to determine whether a case has been depublished or granted rehearing, or the California Supreme Court has granted review. One cannot cite the Court of Appeal opinion in the first two situations, and must note the grant of review in the third. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(c)(1)(B), 8.1115(a), (e)(1).) For any case not yet in a bound volume, the attorney should always check the cumulative subsequent history table in the back of the latest official advance sheets book, a court website, or an up-to-date electronic citation data base.\textsuperscript{89} For further discussion of citability and publication, see § 7.8 et seq. of chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision.”

\textsuperscript{88} Although the Reporter of Decisions follows this practice, it is not “wrong” – violative of any rule – to omit the parallel citations. The order in which the Supreme Court Reporter and Lawyers’ Edition are listed is optional.

\textsuperscript{89} Rule 8.1115(a) refers only to California opinions. Therefore, unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions may be cited. If the cited out-of-state opinion is available only in a computer-based source, rule 8.1115(c) requires it to be attached to the brief in which the case is cited or, if citation is to be made at oral argument, to a letter submitted a reasonable time in advance of the argument.
VI. BRIEFING FORMALITIES  [§ 5.68]

CAVEAT: The California appellate courts have made significant progress toward universal use of the TrueFiling system for attorney filings. Counsel and other users must always check with the project, court clerk’s office, or court website to determine whether TrueFiling is available or mandatory for a particular filing in a particular court.

Courts of Appeal: As of October 30, 2017, TrueFiling is mandatory for attorney filings in the Courts of Appeal. It is governed by rules 8.70 through 8.79 of the California Rules of Court. These rules change procedures for filing with the court and also prescribe some formatting changes. Always check for any supplemental local requirements, which may affect pagination, bookmarks, security and safety of documents, signatures, number of copies, manner of filing and service, verification of filing, proof of service, etc. The Courts of Appeal have web pages spelling this out.

Supreme Court: The Supreme Court has issued its own rules for electronic filing of petitions for review and related filings, as well as capital proceedings. It requires a paper copy, as well. As of this revision of the Manual (Sept. 2017), TrueFiling in the Supreme Court does not yet cover filings in review-granted cases, non-capital original proceedings, or similar actions.

http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm. Each Court of Appeal has a tab for “Electronic Filing” or “Electronic Filing / Submissions” that provides current guidance.

TrueFiling becomes mandatory in the Second District on October 30, 2017. It is the last district to adopt it.


http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm

The ADI website has a “Summary of Filing and Service Requirements.” The electronic service web page and CHEAT SHEET provide additional information.

A. Form of the Brief [§ 5.69]

Unless a specific criminal or juvenile rule applies, briefs in criminal and juvenile cases must comply, as far as practicable, with the rules governing the form of civil appellate briefs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.360(a), 8.412(a)(2); see rules 8.204(a) & (b), 8.40(a).) Under rules 8.480 and 8.482, the criminal rules govern briefs on appeals from conservatorship and sterilization proceedings.

See CAVEAT at § 5.68, ante, for possible electronic filing and service exceptions.

1. Paper [§ 5.70] Applies to paper filings only

White or unbleached paper, 8½” x 11” in size, of at least 20-pound weight is required. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(b)(1), 8.360(a), 8.412(a)(2).) Line-numbered pleading paper is not permitted. (Rule 8.204(b)(5).)

2. Type [§ 5.71]

Briefs may be prepared through use of a typewriter or a computer as defined under California Rules of Court, rule 8.204. (Rules 8.360(a), 8.412(a).) The type style must be roman, but italics, boldface, and underscoring may be used for emphasis. Case names must be italicized or underscored. Headings may be in uppercase letters. (Rule 8.204(b)(3).) In computer-produced briefs, the type size, including footnotes, must be at least 13-point; the typeface may be either proportionally spaced or monospaced. (Rule 8.204(b)(2) & (4).) In typewritten briefs, the type size, including footnotes, must be at

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95 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/filing_service_chart.asp

96 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/eservice_adi.asp

97 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/index.asp

98 Exceptions to some formal requirements may be allowed for those who are filing in forma pauperis or who are incarcerated. (E.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(b)(11)(A) & (C).)
least standard pica, 10 characters per inch, unless an unrepresented prisoner has access only to a typewriter with only elite type, 12 characters per inch. (Rule 8.204(b)(11)(C)).

3. **Line spacing**  [§ 5.72]

The lines of the text must be at least one-and-a-half-spaced. Double spacing is generally preferred by the court as easier to read. Given that brief length is governed by word rather than page count (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.360(b)(1), 8.412(a)(3)), there is little reason to use more cramped and less readable spacing. Headings and footnotes may be single-spaced (six lines to a vertical inch). Quotations may be block-indented and single-spaced. (Rule 8.204(b)(5)).

4. **Margins**  [§ 5.73]

The margins must be at least one and one-half inches on the left and right, and at least one inch on the top and bottom. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(b)(6)).

5. **Page numbering**  [§ 5.74]

The pages of the brief must be consecutively numbered. The pages must be consecutive starting with the cover. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.74(b), 8.204(b)(7)).

6. **Bookmarks**  [§ 5.74A]

Bookmarking a brief filed electronically can be enormously helpful. It is now mandatory in many appellate courts. The Fourth Appellate District web page on electronic filings explains: “A bookmark is a text link that appears in the Bookmarks Panel of Adobe Reader and Adobe Acrobat.” It enables the reader to navigate easily to the desired location. Counsel should check court or project websites for requirements and instructions on creating bookmarks. California Rules of Court, rule, 8.72(a) permits courts to publish their electronic filing requirements. These can be found on Court of Appeal [web pages][99] under Electronic Filing.

Under the Fourth District [Electronic Formatting Requirements][100], for example, an appellate brief, a petition, response, motion, or similar document submitted through TrueFiling must include electronic bookmarks to the following items in the brief: table of

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[99]http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm


Go to Table of Contents
contents, table of authorities, all headings and subheadings, certificate of word count, certificate of interested entities or persons, proof of service, and to the first page of each exhibit or attachment, if any. Each bookmark to an exhibit or attachment must include the letter or number of the exhibit or attachment and a description of the document. If the exhibits or attachments are submitted in multi-part electronic files, each separate file must have its own table or index with bookmarks stating the contents of the file.

See chapter 7,101 “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision” for petition for review requirements.

7. Copying  [§ 5.75]  

Applies to paper filings only

The brief may be reproduced by any process that creates a clear, letter-quality black image. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(b)(1).) Typewritten briefs must be filed as photocopies. (Rule 8.204(b)(11)(A).) In copying, both sides of the paper may be used. (Rule 8.204(b)(4) & (b)(11)(B).)

8. Binding  [§ 5.76]  

Applies to paper filings only

2017 change: A paper document must not be bound on the left margin unless otherwise provided by local rule or court order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(b)(8).) By custom, service copies should be stapled in the upper left corner.

9. Length  [§ 5.77]  

In non-capital criminal and juvenile cases in the Court of Appeal, briefs may not exceed 25,500 words,102 (including footnotes but excluding tables, attachments, and certification),103 unless the presiding justice gives permission for a longer brief. (Cal.

101 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/panel/manual/Chapter_5_Briefing.pdf

102 If the brief is typewritten, the limit is 75 pages. (California Rules of Court, rule 8.360(b)(2).) Note that criminal and civil rules differ here; in civil appeals, rule 8.204(c) limits length to 14,000-words or 50 pages.

103 In the combined briefs required by rules 8.216 and 8.360 for cross-appeals, the length limit is subject to rule 8.204(c)(4) (double the length of a normal brief).
Rules of Court, rules 8.360(b)(1), 8.412(a)(3).) Some courts rarely grant such permission.\textsuperscript{104}

California Rules of Court rule 8.204(c)(3) excludes from the limits any attachments referenced in rule 8.204(d), such as exhibits and other materials in the appellate record; but under rule 8.204(d) the attachments are themselves subject to a separate 10-page limit, unless the presiding justice grants permission for a longer attachment.

A file may not exceed 25 megabytes. If the document exceeds that limit, it must be submitted as multiple files. (Court of Appeal web pages\textsuperscript{105} under Electronic Filing)

10. Signature $[\S\ 5.78]$

A brief need not be signed, and it may not be feasible with TrueFiling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.75(b), 8.204(b)(9).) If it is signed, the court expects counsel of record, not associate counsel or some other person, to sign the brief.

\textsuperscript{104}As a matter of effective advocacy, counsel should make every effort to keep briefs concise and avoid having to request special permission under rule 8.360(b)(5). In the unusual situation, a very lengthy record with multiple complex issues may necessitate a brief in excess of the limit.

\textsuperscript{105}http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm
B. Filing and Service $^{106}$ [§ 5.79]

TrueFiling applies to attorney filings in all Courts of Appeal as of October 30, 2017, when the Second District $^{107}$ launches it.

1. Time [§ 5.80]

In criminal cases and juvenile appeals not under rule 8.416 of the California Rules of Court, the opening brief is due within 40 days after the filing of the record in the Court of Appeal, unless the court grants an extension of time. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.360(c)(1), 8.412(b)(1).) In a juvenile fast-track case under rule 8.416, $^{108}$ the opening brief is due in 30 days. (Rule 8.416(e).)

The respondent’s brief is due 30 days after the opening brief is filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.360(c)(2), 8.412(b)(2), 8.416(e)(2).) The appellant’s reply brief is due 20 days after the respondent’s brief is filed. (Rule 8.360(c)(3), 8.412(b)(3), 8.416(e)(2).) A brief for a non-appealing dependency minor represented by counsel is due 10 days after the respondent’s brief is filed. (Rule 8.412(b)(4).)

Briefing times in criminal and juvenile cases may be extended on court order, but not by stipulation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.60, 8.63, 8.360(c)(4).) In a criminal, delinquency, or non-fast-track dependency appeal, if the appellant or respondent fails to file its brief, notice under rule 8.360(c)(5) or 8.412(d) will be issued, advising the party that if the brief is not filed in 30 days the following sanctions may be imposed: (a) the appellant is told new counsel may be appointed $^{109}$ or, if there is no appointed counsel, the

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$^{106}$ Information about filing and service requirements is summarized on ADI’s Filing and Service pages.

See CAVEAT at § 5.68, ante, for possible electronic filing and service exceptions

$^{107}$ http://www.courts.ca.gov/8872.htm

$^{108}$ These cases include judgments terminating parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 or freeing a child from custody and control under Family Code § 7800 et seq. They also include all dependency appeals in the Fourth Appellate District, Divisions One and Three. (Rule 8.416(a).)

$^{109}$ In practice, an order relieving counsel for failure to file a brief is “without compensation.” The issuance of such a notice imperils the attorney’s panel status.
appeal may be dismissed; (b) the respondent is told the case may be decided on the
record, the opening brief, and the appellant’s oral argument, if any. In a fast-track
dependency appeal, the notice is the same except that the period allowed is only 15 days.
(Rule 8.416(g).) The court may require this time be shortened by the amount of any
extension granted.

California Rules of Court, rules 8.360(c)(4), 8.412(c), 8.416(f), 8.50, 8.60, and
8.63 govern extensions of time. See also § 3.32 et seq. of chapter 3, “Pre-Briefing
Responsibilities: Record Completion, Extensions of Time, Release on Appeal.” In
juvenile fast-track cases, extensions require an “exceptional showing of good cause” (rule
8.416(f); Code Civ. Proc., § 45); some courts may require counsel to waive all or part of
the 15-day “grace” period under rule 8.416(g) (see preceding paragraph) as a condition of
getting an extension of time on the brief.

Counsel can confirm whether and when pleadings are filed in their cases and
discover any court action on them by accessing the online docket on the Court of Appeal
website. They can retrieve the case page and look at the bottom of the page for “Click
here to request automatic e-mail notifications about this case.”

IMPORTANT PRACTICE POINT: By ADI policy, counsel should register for
automatic e-mail notification of developments in every case for which they are
responsible.

2. Number of copies  [§ 5.81]  Applies to paper filings only

With paper filings, an original brief plus four copies, with proof of service, must
be filed in the Court of Appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.44(b)(1).) This requirement
may be modified or eliminated if the court uses electronic filing.

110 http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/index.html
3. Service [§ 5.82]

A copy of the brief must be served on appellate counsel for all parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.25(a).)\textsuperscript{111} Other service requirements are spelled out in the Filing and Service Charts\textsuperscript{112} on ADI’s website. Note that, for effective program management, ADI requires service on certain individuals (e.g., trial counsel) and entities (e.g., ADI) not mentioned in the California Rules of Court. See CAVEAT at § 5.68, ante, on electronic filing and service requirements.

The project may require documents served on recipients with a service email address be accomplished by email or TrueFiling. See, e.g., ADI’s CHEAT SHEET\textsuperscript{113} and ADI’s e- service page\textsuperscript{114} for current information on Fourth District filings.

VII. PERSUASIVENESS [§ 5.83]

Persuasive written advocacy is an art and a learned skill. The measures needed to turn mechanically “okay” position statements into persuasive arguments vary to some extent according to the case, the court, and counsel’s own personality, and this kind of individuality should never be ignored. However, certain universal requirements always apply – credibility, forceful and effective use of the written word, and technical proficiency in the language.

\textsuperscript{111}Rule 8.25(a) technically requires service to be done before filing. Given the practical need to complete the proof of service and mail or email all documents in one step, essentially contemporaneous service is satisfactory.

What is not satisfactory is putting off required service until counsel just “gets around to it.” That violates the spirit as well as letter of the service laws, puts opposing counsel at a disadvantage, and risks inquiry as to how counsel came to make untrue statements under penalty of perjury in the proof of service.

\textsuperscript{112}\url{http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/filing_service_chart.asp}

\textsuperscript{113}\url{http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/service_quick_reference.asp}

\textsuperscript{114}\url{http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/eservice_adi.asp}
A. Credibility [§ 5.84]

An attorney is the client’s window to the court. If the attorney is not rigorously credible, the client will have a hard time persuading the court to grant relief. Counsel therefore needs to consider thoughtfully what enhances or undercuts credibility.

1. Accuracy [§ 5.85]

As every sworn witness knows, the law at all times seeks and demands “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.”

“The truth”: Counsel must meticulously avoid any misstatements of law or fact or citation. Even one slip-up, especially on a material point, can cripple not only the case, but years of effort to build the attorney’s reputation.

“The whole truth”: Accuracy includes thoroughness. It is not sufficient to avoid incorrect statements: all relevant information must be included, so that the court receives an undistorted picture. Omission of relevant unfavorable information – “hiding the ball” – is especially devastating to credibility.\textsuperscript{115}

“Nothing but the truth”: Even on relatively immaterial details, inaccuracies are harmful. Counsel should avoid breezy exaggerations, “lazy” statements based on untested assumptions or hazy memory instead of investigation, misquotation or improperly attributed quotation, and the like. After catching counsel in a few such misstatements, whether or not they are material to the outcome of the appeal, the court will begin to doubt whether anything counsel says can be counted on without full and independent verification. An attorney in that position has lost credibility both as an officer of the court and as an advocate.

\textsuperscript{115}It can even subject counsel to sanctions. E.g., Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th. 92, 98-99: “As an officer of the court and member of the bar, the lawyer is obligated to use only such means as are consistent with truth: he may not seek to mislead a judge by artifice or suppress evidence he has a legal obligation to reveal. [(Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.3.)] In the final analysis, we cannot accept the notion that a selective recitation of facts satisfies the rules: half the truth in this case is just as misleading as a complete fabrication.”
2. **Objectivity** [§ 5.86]

An advocate must of course sound persuaded in order to persuade. However, credibility in a legal setting demands an adequate distance from the subject matter and personalities of the case. The attorney cannot be effective if coming across as a personally interested or emotionally involved participant, rather than a professional. The goal is to sound persuaded by the merits of the position, so that the court can relate to and ultimately share the attorney’s sense of conviction.

3. **Reasonableness and sound judgment** [§ 5.87]

One can hardly persuade a critical professional audience such as a panel of appellate justices by pressing unreasonable positions. Credibility requires critical judgment, the ability to perceive the weaknesses in one’s own positions, and the good sense to weed out points that cannot be legally or logically defended.

The exercise of critical judgment may require an occasional concession or withdrawal of a point fully refuted. While counsel should give a great deal of thought to such an action before taking it, the willingness to do so when necessary ultimately enhances the attorney’s credibility – and the remaining positions in the client’s case.

Far better than withdrawing an argument, of course, is exercising critical judgment in the first place when preparing the opening brief. Counsel should always go through the discipline of ruthlessly asking how opposing counsel could counter each argument and how the counter-argument could be rebutted. If there would be no reasonable way to refute a likely counter-argument, the point probably should be discarded as frivolous.

Reasonableness includes a sense of proportion. The client is often best served when technically arguable but relatively weak or trivial arguments are left out, to avoid detracting from the strong ones. (See *Jones v. Barnes* (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 751-754 [appellate counsel has no constitutional duty to raise non-frivolous issues desired by the client].)

4. **Professionalism** [§ 5.88]

It is always tempting to “get personal” when personally attacked or when faced with what appears to be a totally unreasonable position on the part of opposing counsel or the court. The natural reaction is anger, resentment, or frustration, and it can be very difficult to avoid expressing that feeling in a responsive pleading such as a reply brief or petition for rehearing. Nevertheless, “venting” invariably comes across as unprofessional,
impairing the attorney’s credibility and focusing the case on the personality of the attorney rather than the merits of the issues.

Venting against opposing counsel. It should go without saying that cases cannot be won by assailing the opponent’s attorney. But they can be lost that way – and it occasionally happens if the behavior gets too far out of bounds. It is far better to stay above the mud-slinging fray, leaving the low road to the opposition. The court will notice the difference in approaches, and the client whose attorney has maintained consistent professionalism will gain a tactical benefit.

Venting against the court. Even more evidently, one would think, cases cannot be won by showing disrespect to the court. What rational advocate would try to win over a court by insulting the judges? Does any attorney really think the justices will slap their collective foreheads and say, “Of course! Now that you point it out, we really are incompetent, biased, and corrupt. We’ll rule in your favor!”? Yet attorneys have occasionally succumbed to the temptation to lash out at the court for making what appears to be a significant error.¹¹⁶

Persuasive advocacy requires a vigorous but respectful presentation – one entirely on the merits. When faced with a serious mistake by the court, counsel can act most effectively by appealing to the court’s best sense of duty. Counsel can convey (subtly, of course, to avoid sounding manipulative) a message such as this:

The decision is in error, and here is why . . . . My client’s vital interests will be gravely and unjustly impaired by the ruling. We know the court is dedicated to reaching the right result and will correct the error.

This approach forcefully attacks the ruling, not the court or the judges personally, and at the same time affirms the attorney’s respect for the dignity and integrity of the court.

¹¹⁶In In re Koven (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 262, 264, 276-277, the court held in contempt an appellate counsel who, in a petition for rehearing, accused the court of “deliberate judicial dishonesty” and other misconduct. (See also In re S.C. v. Kelly E. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396 [referral to State Bar in lieu of contempt for unreasonably impugning integrity of trial court].)
B. Forceful and Effective Use of the Written Word  

Mastery of written advocacy is of dominant importance in appellate practice. In a brief, counsel cannot gesture or change the inflection of the voice to help convey the message. Skillful use of words – rhetorical proficiency – must do the written equivalent. Keys to rhetorical effectiveness include the following:

1. Simplicity – to a point  

A cardinal rule for persuasiveness is to keep the argument concise and easy to understand. It must convey with unmistakable clarity the reasons the client should win. That means keeping these basic precepts in mind:

- The point should be made in the *best* way, not all possible ways; a one-two punch carries more impact than a series of feeble jabs.

- Collateral details and digressions distract far more than they persuade.

- Cumbersome, convoluted sentences that lose the reader in a maze of subordinate clauses, participles, prepositional phrases, parenthetical insertions, footnotes, and the like may lose the reader *period*.

- Self-conscious erudition, legalisms, archaic and foreign phrases, and “$100 words” that require a dictionary usually reflect negatively on the attorney as a showoff and detract from the merits.

Simplicity is occasionally carried to an extreme, with omission of critical points and facts. Counsel needs to gear the sophistication of the presentation to the intrinsic complexity of the issues. Failure to recognize and address the genuine and unavoidable subtleties of an issue can be even more fatal to persuasiveness than burying the big points in a morass of trivia. While counsel should not patronize the court and pedantically spell


118 Even as to style, simplicity can be overdone. An unbroken, staccato-like series of very short sentences can be wearisome and undercut sophisticated analysis. Structural variety, consistent with the ultimate goal of clarity, will command attention most effectively.
out obvious matters, making the court do crucial parts of the analysis in a complicated case is a risky practice.

2. **Knowledge of the audience(s) [§ 5.91]**

All effective writing, not just legal writing, speaks to its intended audience. In appellate practice, the primary audience is the court – the justices and their research attorneys. As noted above (see § 5.36, *ante*), counsel must assess the likely level of legal knowledge and sophistication these readers will bring to the case. In courts such as the Fourth Appellate District, with a large number of justices and many possible combinations of panels, that task can be extremely challenging. The brief will need to inform the court of the legal authorities, principles, and points essential to the argument without boring or insulting it with overly elementary matters. An effective balance might be achieved by an approach that employs a respectful tone, in acknowledgment of the audience’s professional stature, but carefully leads the discussion through the applicable law and logic.

The opposing party and its counsel are another part of the audience. While counsel is not exactly writing for their “benefit,” it is important the brief make sure they understand exactly what the appellant is arguing and why. Careful delineation of the issues and skillful use of analysis and authority will promote discussion of the issues on the appellant’s chosen terms. Counsel does not want to be blind-sided by a respondent’s brief, much less an opinion, redefining the case in such a way that the opening brief loses its dominant position as the director of the discussion.

The client is still another part of the audience. A vital role for an appellant’s counsel is convincing the client he or she is getting a fair day in court and is represented by a strong advocate who truly cares about the case and the client. Vigorous advocacy, not dry, academic discussion, is essential to persuading the client, as well as the court. (As noted in § 5.86, *ante*, however, counsel must not lose the objectivity and professional distance crucial to credibility.) Although counsel need not and should not raise every point the client wants if that is against counsel’s best judgment (see *Jones v. Barnes* (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 751-754), counsel should explain such decisions respectfully to the client in non-technical language the client can understand.
3. **Re-re-revision** [§ 5.92]

As once famously observed, good writing is essentially rewriting.\(^{119}\) Editing and revision are absolute requirements for effective writing. In this area, written advocacy has an advantage over other forms, since counsel has the luxury of making a point over and over in various ways, until the exact wording needed to nail the point has been achieved. (ADI is aware, of course, of the constraints of compensation guidelines and court filing deadlines. The ideal suggested here always must be balanced against practical realities.)

It is a good practice to ask someone else to read a brief.\(^{120}\) Another lawyer can provide expert criticism before the respondent or the court has a chance to do so. A layperson can offer invaluable feedback on whether the goal of clear communication has been achieved.

4. **Confidence** [§ 5.93]

Counsel must sound persuaded in order to persuade. A passive, tentative tone that limply suggests the court might want to consider a given position is not going to have much impact on a court that is trying to process hundreds of “routine” cases and is predisposed to think this one, too, is destined for assembly-line disposition. The attorney’s job is to make the case “special” – to convince the court that the case needs close attention and that the client deserves and expects to win.

To use examples from the Appellate Court Committee, San Diego County Bar Association, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001), unassertive language such as “appellant respectfully submits the instruction was wrong” or “appellant beseeches this Honorable Court to find the instruction was wrong” suggests a hope for a favor, rather than a call for and expectation of justice. The point should be stated unequivocally – “the instruction was wrong” – in order to communicate the message that relief is compelled by justice and the law. (Id. at § 6.66, p. 212.)\(^{121}\)

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\(^{119}\) The observation is variously attributed to Roald Dahl or James Thurber. In any case, appellate counsel should make it their own motto.

\(^{120}\) One should not, however, have another person read a nonpublic juvenile dependency brief containing confidential facts. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.401(b)(1))

\(^{121}\) This handbook is no longer published and has not been updated since 2001, but may be available in libraries and appellate offices. While some content is obsolete, it does offer excellent guidance for appellate practitioners.
5. **Using the tools of the language for maximum impact**  [§ 5.94]

A skillful writer must cultivate an intimate acquaintance with the nuances of the language and the ways word choice and use affect communication. In addition to that venerable tool, the dictionary, a good resource for this purpose is the classic English language guide, Strunk et al., *The Elements of Style* (4th ed. 2000). Rudman also offers a number of pointers specifically geared to appellate advocacy. (Rudman, *Effective Argumentation*, Appellate Advocacy College (2000) at pp. 16-23.) While the principles covered in these authorities cannot be reviewed in their entirety here, certain fundamentals deserve specific attention.

a. **Strong, vivid language**  [§ 5.95]

The careful use of words and grammatical constructs for maximum impact is vital for effective appellate brief writing.

Conscious choice of words becomes second nature to the appellate practitioner . . . . Consider Bertrand Russell’s description of a game he called “conjugating irregular comparatives.” A sample round goes, “I am firm, you are stubborn, she is pigheaded.”

(Rudman, *Effective Argumentation*, Appellate Advocacy College (2000) at p. 20.)

As Russell’s game illustrates, strong, evocative words carry more punch than relatively neutral ones. For example, *vital* is more compelling than *important*, and *ignored* or *neglected* is stronger than *omitted*. Concrete words that call to mind a lively image (*the gunman raced to the getaway car*) carry more immediacy and elicit a stronger response than more abstract, removed words (*the subject with the weapon was observed proceeding to the vehicle operated by the second subject*). The active voice (*the burglar broke in through the window screen*) speaks more dramatically than the passive (*entry was made through the window screen*).

On the other hand, writing needs pace and variety to deliver ultimate impact and to give the most important points their due. Counsel should heed such caveats as:


• Credibility is impaired if an image is overdrawn or a point is overstated.

• The ultimate punch line can be swallowed up if the entire brief, even on the most collateral detail, “screams.”

• Precision is often more important than drama in legal analysis.

• Counsel should be wary of addressing the court as if it were a jury. The court might feel manipulated, and counsel might inadvertently send an undesired message: “I’m an appellate amateur.”

• Understatement can be an effective rhetorical tool in its own right and can sometimes capture the audience better than a “hard sell.”

b. Use of emphasis  [§ 5.96]

The judicious use of emphasis can clarify meaning and hammer a point home. It can also highlight especially relevant segments from long passages or quotations.

Explicit emphasis is so easily overused, however, that appellate writers should employ a strong, though not irrebuttable, presumption against it. Usually the intended emphasis is discernible from the context, and supplying it explicitly may tend to patronize the reader. (It is not necessary to emphasize every “not” in one’s sentences, for example.) Letting the reader collaborate in the argument and ultimately acquire ownership of the desired conclusion is often an extremely effective tool of persuasion. In addition, overused emphasis tends to be a visual and mental distraction; pages filled with a variety of underscorings, italics, bold fonts, and capital letters are bewildering, wearying, and repelling – just the opposite of the intended goals of clarifying and persuading.

A closely related technique is attempting to strengthen a point by cloaking it with such rhetorical boosters as clearly and it is clear that. Here the presumption against use should be virtually absolute. Those words at best are superfluous (if the proposition is clear, it will speak for itself) and at worst send a red flag that counsel has little confidence in the point and is trying to prop it up with labels.

c. Effective transitions  [§ 5.97]

An aid to readability can be a segue, or transition, which helps move the argument from one point to another and clarify the relationship between them. Transitions might be words or phrases such as however, therefore, consequently, alternatively, for example, or
in any event, or even complete sentences or paragraphs. (See Rudman, Effective Argumentation, Appellate Advocacy College (2000) at pp. 17-18.)

As with emphasis, the writer needs to be conscious of the easy temptation to overuse transitions. A series of sentences laden with such words as however or moreover or the ubiquitous (and often misused) thus can be tedious, distracting, and even slightly insulting, suggesting the reader is unable to identify contrasts or logical consequences without aid. Often the relationship of one point to another is obvious. Why not let the reader make the transition and be drawn into the argument as a participant rather than spectator?

C.Technical Proficiency  [§ 5.98]

Effective use of language includes technical as well as rhetorical mastery. Small lapses of grammar, syntax, and diction that would slip by in an oral presentation are fixed forever in the unforgiving glare of the written word. “Formal” matters such as capitalization, spelling, and punctuation are elevated to the realm of the essential. Meticulous editing becomes an absolute, not just a nice touch. Strunk et al., The Elements of Style (4th ed. 2000) is commended to counsel as a classic resource on the formal and practical necessities of good writing. The California Style Manual (4th ed. 2000) has a section on style mechanics (§ 4.1 et seq.), which sets forth the rules the court itself uses.

The importance of these matters is magnified in legal writing, where professional credibility can perish with a single elementary mistake. It is virtually a law of nature (and a categorical certainty of appellate practice) that justices will notice such lapses. The Appellate Court Committee, San Diego County Bar Association, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001), advises bluntly: “Do not impair the professionalism of your work by displays of carelessness and illiteracy.” (Id. at p. 212.) At the extremes, poor writing can even lead to professional discipline. (See Stanard v. Nygren (7th Cir. 2011) 658 F.3d 792, 793-794 [writing “incomprehensible and riddled with errors”; “woefully deficient, raising serious concerns about [counsel’s] competence to practice before this court”; ordering hearing on counsel’s possible suspension from court’s bar and sending copy of opinion to state lawyer discipline authority].)


This handbook is no longer published and has not been updated since 2001, but may be available in libraries and appellate offices. While some content is obsolete, it does offer excellent guidance for appellate practitioners.
Some common problem areas to watch include the following:

1. **Proofreading** [§ 5.99]

   The review of the written page needs to be exhaustive and uncompromising – in a word, perfect. Reliance on a simple spell-check program is reckless. One suggestion is to set the brief aside for a day or so and then review a hard copy (not just the computer screen). Mistakes previously elided in the brain may suddenly jump out. Better still, have someone else (perhaps a non-attorney) proofread the work.

2. **Compliance with court rules** [§ 5.100]

   Basic professional competence for a criminal appellate lawyer requires knowledge of the California Rules of Court as they apply to this area of practice. As ADI’s founding executive director, the Honorable J. Perry Langford (now retired judge of the superior court), used to tell his attorneys:

   It is impossible to know all of the criminal law or all of criminal procedure. But at least you should know the rules.

   It is inadvisable indeed to play fast and loose with formal rule requirements. The court may forgive lapses – or it may not. Briefs that do not conform with rules may be refused for filing or stricken. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(e).) Assuming permission to refile is granted, the new deadline may be highly awkward for counsel, if not outright unmanageable. Even if the court relents, ADI’s reviewing attorneys probably will not when preparing their evaluations, and the time spent on fixing the problem likely will not be compensable. (See ADI *Compensation Claim Manual*,127 “Filings Due to Attorney Error.”)

3. **Conscientious conformity to good style** [§ 5.101]

   Since it is impossible to do a comprehensive review of the rules of grammar, punctuation, style, capitalization, and the like here, counsel are referred to Strunk et al., *The Elements of Style* (4th ed. 2000), the California Style Manual (4th ed. 2000), and other authorities. This section will highlight a few of the most common appellate brief transgressions, some of which are among the pet peeves of justices, research attorneys, and ADI attorneys.

a. Run-on sentences [§ 5.102]

Run-on sentences have independent clauses separated by inadequate punctuation or conjunctions. They are very serious grammatical transgressions and in the classroom might be considered cause for an automatic “F” on any paper. Basic principles include the following.

First, a comma by itself is an inadequate separator between independent clauses (those that can stand alone as a sentence). There must be an authorized “linking” word such as and, but, or, nor, and yet. Use of a semicolon [;] or separation into two sentences is also proper.

Incorrect: The police failed to administer Miranda warnings, the confession should be dismissed. (Comma by itself.)

Correct: (1) The police failed to administer Miranda warnings, and the confession should be dismissed. (2) The police failed to administer Miranda warnings; the confession should be dismissed. (3) The police failed to administer Miranda warnings. The confession should be dismissed.

Second, mere transitional words such as however, nevertheless, therefore, moreover, and thus are not authorized linking words and cannot be teamed with a comma to separate independent clauses. They require a semicolon; alternatively, the two clauses should be written as two separate sentences. Use of an authorized coordinating conjunction is also proper.

Incorrect: The police administered Miranda warnings, however, they failed to cease questioning when the defendant invoked the right to silence.

Correct: (1) The police administered Miranda warnings; however, they failed to cease questioning when the defendant invoked the right to silence. (2) The police administered Miranda warnings. But they failed to cease questioning when the defendant invoked the right to silence. (3) The police administered Miranda warnings, but they failed to cease questioning when the defendant invoked the right to silence.
b. **Non-parallel sentence structure**  [§ 5.103]

Two or more elements of a compound structure (joined with *and* or *or*) within a sentence should be of the same grammatical form. This produces balance and preserves the syntactical logic. For example:

*Incorrect:* The robber told the victims to hand over their wallets and that they must lie down on the floor.

The robber gave a two-fold order – (a) hand over the wallets and (b) lie down on the floor. In the illustrated sentence these two elements are of different grammatical forms: first an infinitive phrase (“to hand over”) and then a subordinate clause (“they must lie down”). Parallelism requires the same form. Both could be infinitive phrases or both could be subordinate clauses:

*Correct:* (1) The robber told the victims to hand over their wallets and to lie down on the floor. (2) The robber told the victims that they must hand over their wallets and that they must lie down on the floor.

c. **Random commas**  [§ 5.104]

A number of writers apparently think commas are to be inserted on an entirely discretionary (“whenever”) basis. For instance, if a reader giving an oral rendition would pause for dramatic effect, if there is a slight change of thought, or even (seemingly) if the writer can’t think of what to say next, a comma is the answer. On the other hand, if the thought seems to be progressing smoothly, punctuation should not intrude. This purely intuitive approach overlooks the fact there are objective rules governing punctuation, including the ill-treated comma. The rules cannot be detailed here, but a few might be singled out for special reminders in legal writing.

First, ordinarily a single comma may not separate the subject and predicate of a sentence. There should be either two or more, or none.

*Incorrect:* Equal protection, rather than due process would seem to be the applicable theory. (A single comma).

*Correct:* (1) Equal protection rather than due process would seem to be the applicable theory. (2) Equal protection, rather than due process, would seem to be the applicable theory.
The rule against a single comma also applies when the predicate has several components:

*Incorrect:* The officer saw the car, and sped after it. (A single comma between *officer* and *sped*.)

*Correct:* The officer saw the car and sped after it.

Second, commas joined with an authorized linking word (*and, but, or, nor, yet*) should be used to separate independent clauses (those that could be separated into two complete sentences), unless they are very short:

The federal Constitution guarantees the right to a trial by jury in criminal cases, and the state Constitution goes even further by requiring the defendant’s personal jury waiver.

Commas should be used to set off the year in a date if both month and day are also given: *On July 1, 2001, the court decided the case.* If only the month and year are given, no comma at all is needed: *In July 2001 the court decided the case.*

A comma separates the components of a series. If the component items have commas within them, a stronger separator – the semicolon – will help avoid confusion. Although a comma before *and ___ [last item of the series]* is grammatically optional, this Manual strongly recommends using it. The comma indicates that the item before it is separate and not paired with the final item to create a single component. Thus:

*Unclear:* This case concerns the murder of a notorious drug dealer, a cocaine addict and a swindler.

Were three persons murdered – a drug dealer, an addict, and a swindler? Or only a drug dealer, who was also an addict and a swindler? If the former, a comma after *addict* would make that clear.

d. **Abused apostrophes**  [§ 5.105]

Even more maltreated than the unfortunate comma is the apostrophe, which often is omitted or inserted in a way exactly the *opposite* of its proper usage. Indeed, the

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Apostrophe Protection Society has been formed to police and eradicate abuses. A few rules govern this area:

Apostrophes are used before an “s” to show singular possession:

Incorrect: The court turned down the defendants efforts to get a new trial.

Correct: The court turned down the defendant’s efforts to get a new trial.

An apostrophe is used after a plural word ending in “s” to show possession, but must be followed by an “s” if the plural word has another ending:

Incorrect: The witnesses stories were conflicting.

Correct: The witnesses’ stories were conflicting.

Incorrect: The Childrens’ Advocacy Group.

Correct: The Children’s Advocacy Group.

Apostrophes are not used in simple plurals. Although this principle seems self-evident, sometimes attorneys trying to be mindful not to omit apostrophes insert them inappropriately:

Incorrect: The justices’ affirmed the judgment.

Correct: The justices affirmed the judgment.

Apostrophes are used to show the missing letters in a contraction (such as can’t, we’ll, they’ve, you’re, he’s):

Incorrect: Lets assume the denial of the motion is an appealable order.

Correct: Let’s assume the denial of the motion is an appealable order.

Possessive pronouns do not take an apostrophe (his, hers, yours, its, etc.). (Its is especially baffling. See special caveat below.)

Incorrect: The burden of proof is your’s.

Correct: The burden of proof is yours.
Care must be used to distinguish sound-alike words (*whose* and *who’s*, *your* and *you’re*, *their* and *there* and *they’re*, etc.).

**Incorrect:** The plaintiff who’s house burned down has won a $1 million verdict.

**Correct:** The plaintiff whose house burned down has won a $1 million verdict.

**Incorrect:** I know your disappointed by the affirmance.

**Correct:** I know you’re disappointed by the affirmance.

**Special caveat:** The difference between *its* and *it’s* tends to wreak havoc. The latter looks exactly as if it should be the possessive of *it*. But it’s not: it is a contraction for *it is* – and never anything else. The possessive of *it* is *its*.

**Correct:** It’s very clear that the statute of limitations ran its course at least 10 months ago.

Attorneys should commit these rules to memory – or at least look them up whenever they have the slightest doubt. It is far better to earn membership in the Apostrophe Protection Society than to have an excerpt from your brief used among its “Examples”!

e. **Errant diction**  [§ 5.106]

Words that seem similar cause chronic confusion. Errors are particularly common in choosing between *infer* and *imply*, *effect* and *affect*, *lie* and *lay*, *principle* and *principal*, *disinterested* and *uninterested*, *tenant* and *tenet*, *duplicative* and *duplicitous*, etc. Writers who are unable to articulate the exact distinction between the words in any of these or other confusing couplets need to memorize the rules or check them *every time* the occasion arises. A single misstep is a major embarrassment.

f. **Misplaced and misused modifiers**  [§ 5.107]

Modifiers such as adjectives and participles can be tricky occasionally. Placing a modifier in an inappropriate part of a sentence may be a source of potential misunderstanding – or at least amusement. Examples might be:
On June 17, 2000, appellant testified he was accosted by the police. Probably what is meant is that the accosting took place on June 17, 2000, but the structure of the sentence suggests that was the date of the testimony.

The drugs were seized after arresting the alleged manufacturers. This undoubtedly means the police (rather than the drugs) arrested the alleged manufacturers; it should say so.

From a real brief (with names changed): Detective Holmes collected shorts and a T-shirt worn by Ms. Baskerville that evening along with I.D. Technician Watson, as well as various other items. We invite the reader to unscramble that one.

Use of adjectives or adjective phrases to describe something other a noun is another hazard. All should be familiar with this example from grade (grammar?) school:

Incorrect: We were tardy due to a flat tire on our school bus.

Correct (but awkward): Our tardiness was due to a flat tire.

Better: We were tardy because of a flat tire. (Due to is an adjective phrase that should describe a noun, not a verb.)

Legal writing abounds with dubious constructions of the same sort as the due to infraction. Indeed, lawyers are so accustomed to it that many readers reviewing the following examples will say, “What’s wrong with that? I use it all the time.”

Lawyers love to insert “based” in their sentences when they mean “on the basis of”:

Dubious: The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment based on a new decision by the Supreme Court.

Correct (but awkward): The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment on the basis of a new decision by the Supreme Court.

Better: The Court of Appeal based the reversal of the judgment on a new decision by the Supreme Court.

Another word that abounds is legal documents is “prior” used as a preposition rather than an adjective:
Dubious: Prior to entering the house the officers announced their purpose.

Correct (but awkward): The announcement was prior to the entry of the house.

Better: Before entering the house the officers announced their purpose.

The “pursuant” is used ubiquitously as a preposition instead of an adjective. How often have readers seen this?

Dubious: The court stayed the sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 654.

Correct (but awkward): The stay of sentence was pursuant to Penal Code section 654.

Better: The court stayed the sentence under Penal Code section 654.

To be fair, common usage may in time legitimate a formerly proscribed construction. Some of those listed above are sanctioned in some dictionaries, but not in others. But there is little to commend such suspect constructions when there are incontestable (and more readable) alternatives. It is not as if any are highly effective rhetorical devices; indeed, they tend to be stodgy and legalistic.

g. Mismatches in number (singular vs. plural)  [§ 5.108]

Most attorneys have no difficulty with the elementary rule of grammar requiring the agreement of subject and predicate, at least when the sentences are straightforward, but a few situations are tricky.

The word there precedes a verb:

Problem: The court stated there [is/are] abundant factors in aggravation to justify the upper term. Answer: Are. The verb agrees with its subject, which is not there but factors.

A subject and its complement are different in number:

Problem: Three extensions of time to file a brief [is/are] a virtually unknown occurrence in that court. Answer: Are. The verb always agrees with the subject – here, extensions.
The subject has two elements joined by the word *or*, one of which is singular and the other plural:

*Problem:* Either the defense attorneys or the Attorney General [go/goes] first in oral argument. *Answer: Goes.* The verb should agree with the one located closer to it in the sentence. The flip side of this example would be: Either the Attorney General or the defense attorneys *go* first in oral argument.

An occasional problem is making the noun and pronoun agree:

*Incorrect:* An attorney must file their brief on unlined paper to comply with the rules. *Correct:* (1) An attorney must file his or her brief on unlined paper. (2) Attorneys must file their briefs on unlined paper.

h. **Wrong case (I vs. me)** [§ 5.109]

Every once in a while, a writer intending to be very correct stumbles in a compound construction. A beguiling trap tends to be the word *I*. We are sensitized to the trickiness of saying something like *It was I*. But often a writer will transfer that caution to inappropriate settings: *between you and I* or *the court gave both the Attorney General and I part of what we had requested*. One would never say *between I* or *the court gave I*. The pronoun remains the object of the preposition or verb, whether or not there are other objects.

Another problem handled more often incorrectly than correctly is selecting case in a sentence such as:

The court authorized the bailiff to expel [whoever/whomever] he believed was acting obstreperously during the trial.

The correct choice is *whoever*, because it is the subject of the verb *was acting*. The entire clause *whoever he believed was acting obstreperously during the trial* is the object of the verb *expel*. The words *he believed* qualify and are merely parenthetical to the main thought – indeed, mentally putting commas or parentheses around the words helps to clarify their relationship to the rest of the sentence.
I. **Overuse of that**  [§ 5.110]

Many readers are taught to shun use of the word *that* as a conjunction introducing a subordinate clause.

*People v. Henderson* held that the state constitutional principle against double jeopardy prohibits . . . .

This rule of thumb is a virtual obsession with some readers. If some justices in the particular court are notoriously among those, counsel is well advised to heed the taboo. Otherwise, common sense is a good guide. A sentence should not be cluttered when the meaning is evident without *that*, but the word should be used if it makes the thought more readily intelligible. Some sentences have to be read several times to discern their meaning for lack of *that* in appropriate places. Unless the readers are among the “obsessed,” such sentences are just poor writing.

j. **Careless capitalization**  [§ 5.111]

Briefs should conform to recognized conventions in deciding whether to capitalize words. The California Style Manual (4th ed. 2000) section 4.1 et seq. offers considerable guidance on this matter. For words not covered in that authority, standard English practice is to capitalize proper nouns (the name of a specific person, place, or thing – Dolley Madison, Washington, White House) and not to capitalize common nouns (generic labels – woman, city, home).

The Style Manual capitalizes appellate but not trial tribunals (Court of Appeal, Supreme Court, superior court) and state but not local officials (Attorney General, district attorney), unless a specific name is used (Superior Court of San Diego County, Office of the Riverside District Attorney). The word “court” is not capitalized when it stands alone, including a court being addressed: “On January 5, this court ordered supplemental briefing on *Blakely v. Washington*.”

Some attorneys capitalize every pleading or part thereof and party – Information, Count 10, Declaration, Respondent’s Brief, Appellant. This practice is not consistent with standard English and tends to look contrived and self-conscious. The modern convention is to streamline writing by confining capitalization to its natural role as a name, not a label.
VIII. CONCLUSION  [§ 5.112]

This chapter has reviewed a variety of topics on effective brief writing. The subjects range from the great rhetorical arts of eloquence and persuasion to the nitty-gritty of grammar, citation style, and the Rules of Court. A single chapter obviously cannot accommodate so immense a subject. It is hoped that the ideas discussed here will promote further study of the topic and further thought. A superb advocate does not spring from the earth or receive talents as a jolt of lightning from the sky. Counsel must patiently and assiduously build the necessary skills by learning about the craft, reflecting on its fundamental principles, refining them to suit the attorney’s individual aptitudes, and then applying them thoughtfully and creatively to each situation.
- Chapter Six -

Effective Use of the Spoken Word on Appeal:

Oral Argument
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EFFECTIVE USE OF THE SPOKEN WORD ON APPEAL:
ORAL ARGUMENT

I. INTRODUCTION  [§ 6.0]

This chapter is intended to help counsel use oral argument more effectively. It is not a comprehensive treatment, but rather a basic guide to oral argument practice in the California courts.

A Views of Oral Argument  [§ 6.1]

Oral argument is, to many attorneys and judges, the highlight of an appeal. It is the time to step out of cloistered offices and libraries and into the spotlight, to engage one another in dialogue and debate, and to work toward the correct resolution of the case. At its best it is interactive, challenging, lively, and enlightening.

To some attorneys and judges, on the other hand, it is the most dreaded part of appellate work. Many attorneys far prefer the bookishness of brief writing and feel inadequate working “on their feet.” They fear they will be tongue-tied, unable to answer questions properly, backed into corners from which there is no escape, and, ultimately, humiliated. Many judges think oral argument is a necessary evil – a waste of time, a boring exercise in futility, a time to think about anything but the case at hand. (A few – fulfilling the more timid attorneys’ nightmares – amuse themselves by putting attorneys on the spot for the sheer fun of it.)

Whatever one’s personal predilections, oral argument plays an important role in the appellate process. While secondary to briefing in most courts, especially intermediate appellate courts, it can and occasionally does make a difference in the result. Appellate judges have often offered anecdotal evidence of how oral argument has changed some decisions. The potential for influencing the outcome is empirically observable in Division Two of the Fourth Appellate District, which provides tentative opinions before oral argument (see § 6.10 et seq., post); on occasion the final opinion has held the exact reverse of the tentative opinion because of oral argument.
B. Functions of Oral Argument  [§ 6.2]

Oral argument is counsel’s last opportunity to persuade the court before it makes a final decision. It is, ideally, a conversation with the court. It is not a speech or a rehash of the briefs. It is an opportunity to answer the court’s questions, the one chance in an appeal when counsel can look the court in the eye, assess its reactions to the issues, make midstream adjustments, dispel doubts, and “nail” crucial points.

Oral argument is valuable in establishing a human connection between the bench and bar. It is the only opportunity for a dialogue between counsel and the justices and may provide understanding in a manner that cannot be matched by written communication . . . . [It] provides a fluid and expeditious method of getting at the essential issues.

(San Diego County Bar Association, Appellate Court Committee, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001) § 7.12, p. 274.)

II. LAW GOVERNING ORAL ARGUMENT  [§ 6.3]

Oral argument in California is governed by the state Constitution, statutes, and the California Rules of Court, as well as case law interpreting this authority. Local practices vary widely within the basic legal framework and can significantly affect the role of oral argument in the decision-making process. (Id. at § 7.13, p. 275.) It also provides a forum for discussing new appellate decisions filed after the completion of briefing, presenting a fresh slant to the case, or highlighting a “theme” for the appeal.

1Caveat: This handbook is no longer published and has not been updated since 2001, but may be available in libraries and appellate offices. While some content is obsolete, it does offer excellent guidance for appellate practitioners.

2Each court’s processes are described in the Internal Operating Practices and Procedures (IOPP’s), published by the various courts and revised periodically.
A. Right to Oral Argument  [§ 6.4]

The California Constitution gives parties on appeal the right to oral argument on the merits in both the California Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. (Cal. Const., art. VI, §§ 2, 3; Moles v. Regents of University of California (1982) 32 Cal.3d 867, 872; People v. Brigham (1979) 25 Cal.3d 283, 287-288; see People v. Peña (2004) 32 Cal.4th 389, 398.) Penal Code section 1254 implements this right for criminal cases.

Although it is a legal right, oral argument can be waived. As Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 899, fn. 3, stated: “We stress that it is the opportunity for oral argument that is important, not necessarily the actual argument. Oral argument may be, and often is, waived for varied and legitimate reasons.” (See also People v. Brigham, supra, 25 Cal.3d 283, 288; Philbrook v. Newman (1905) 148 Cal. 172, 176-179; see People v. Lang (1974) 11 Cal.3d 134, 143, dis. opn. of Clark, J. [waiver of oral argument and submission on the briefs would not per se constitute lack of diligence; “[t]o the contrary, last year two-thirds of the criminal cases in the division considering defendant’s appeal were submitted without oral argument”].

An appeal may be decided only by the concurrence of a majority of the justices who heard the oral argument, although the parties may stipulate to the participation of an absent justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, §§ 2, 3; Moles v. Regents of University of California (1982) 32 Cal.3d 867, 874.) Oral arguments are taped, and the practice is for absent justices to listen later to the recording.4

Original proceedings for extraordinary relief (writs) do not require oral argument unless an alternative writ or order to show cause is issued. If the petition is summarily denied or the court issues a peremptory writ in the first instance, there is no right to oral argument.5 (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1237.) Similarly,

3More contemporaneous data covering 1999-2008, compiled by ADI (from whose district Lang arose), confirms this basic pattern is stable and enduring.

4Practice tip: If an oral argument is boring live, then it will probably be even more boring recorded. An attorney arguing orally when a justice is absent should take this into account in developing an approach to the presentation.

5A grant is in the “first instance” when the court orders a peremptory writ – one giving ultimate relief – without prior issuance of an alternative writ or order to show cause. It is available in mandate or prohibition proceedings, as long as the respondent has an
interlocutory motions during the pendency of an appeal and petitions for rehearing or review do not require oral argument. However, a court may place a motion on calendar at the request of a party or on its own motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.54(b).)

B. Rules Governing Oral Argument  [§ 6.5]

The procedures for oral argument are prescribed by rule 8.256 of the California Rules of Court for the Court of Appeal and rule 8.524 for non-capital cases in the Supreme Court. These rules apply to criminal and juvenile appeals. (Rules 8.366, 8.368, 8.470, 8.472.)

1. Argument in the Court of Appeal  [§ 6.6]

Rule 8.256 of the California Rules of Court governs oral argument in the Court of Appeal. (See also rules 8.366, 8.470.) The Court of Appeal clerk must notify the parties of the setting of oral argument at least 20 days before the date, unless there is good cause for shortening the time. (Rule 8.256(b).) Under rule 8.256(c), the appellant has the right to open the argument. Each side has 30 minutes, unless local rules or orders provide otherwise (see discussion below on Fourth District practices). (See § 6.22, post.) Only one counsel may argue for each separately represented party. Argument by multiple parties and/or amicus curiae is governed by rule 8.256(c)(2).

opportunity to file informal opposition. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.487(a)(4).) In contrast, a writ of habeas corpus granting ultimate relief may not be issued without giving the respondent an opportunity to file a formal return. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740-745.) This topic is covered in §§ 8.42 and 8.80, chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies.”

This chapter does not cover the special rules and practices that apply to death penalty cases.

Counsel of course must keep track of the deadline for requesting argument and the date of oral argument itself. In criminal cases counsel can check those dates (and also confirm filings such as briefs, the opinion, and post-opinion petitions) on the court website at http://www.courts.ca.gov/appellate-case-info.htm. Counsel should also register for automatic e-mail notification of major developments and visit the site periodically for notifications not automatically sent by e-mail.
2. **Argument in the California Supreme Court** [§ 6.7]

California Rules of Court, rule 8.524 governs non-capital cases in the California Supreme Court. (See also rules 8.368, 8.472.) The Supreme Court clerk must notify the parties at least 20 days before the date of oral argument unless the Chief Justice orders otherwise. (Rule 8.524(c).) The petitioner opens and closes, and each side has 30 minutes. Unlike the Court of Appeal, only one counsel per side – regardless of the number of parties on the side – may argue, unless the court orders otherwise upon a request to divide argument among multiple parties and/or amicus curiae. (Rule 8.524(d)–(g).)

III. **COURT PROCEDURES AS PART OF THE DYNAMICS OF ORAL ARGUMENT** [§ 6.8]

Particular court operating procedures (as well as individual personalities and predilections) may significantly affect the value and uses of oral argument.\(^8\) In a jurisdiction where only a small percentage of cases are argued,\(^9\) oral argument may be extremely influential. Where it is a matter of right and calendars are crowded, arguments may often have minimal value.

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\(^8\) Each California appellate court’s processes are described in its Internal Operating Practices and Procedures (IOPP’s). The IOPP’s are published in conjunction with the California Rules of Court. Many also are on the court website:

Supreme Court:

Individual Court of Appeal web pages may be accessed through:
[http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm](http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm).

\(^9\) For example, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, rule 34(a)(2) (28 U.S.C.) states, “Oral argument must be allowed in every case unless a panel of three judges who have examined the briefs and record unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary . . . .” Oral argument may not be necessary if, for example, “the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.” (Rule 34(a)(2)(C).) “Any party may file . . . a statement explaining why oral argument should, or need not, be permitted.” (Rule 34(a)(1).)
Because of differences in internal procedure and “culture,” the role of oral argument varies considerably among courts. It tends to play a prominent role in the Supreme Court.\(^\text{10}\) The role varies among the districts and divisions of the Court of Appeal. The differences among the divisions of the Fourth District will be discussed here.

A. Traditional Procedures  [§ 6.9]

The typical process for most divisions of the California Court of Appeal\(^\text{11}\) is that after the reply brief has been filed or the time to file it has passed, the clerk of the appellate court sends a notice to the parties asking whether any party requests oral argument. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.256(b).)

The assigned justice prepares a memorandum opinion, which is distributed with the case file to the other two members of the panel in preparation for oral argument. After argument, the three panel members confer. If none has any reservations about the memorandum opinion and nothing in oral argument has changed their view, the memorandum opinion will become the final opinion. If any differences emerge, further conferencing and drafts may be necessary.

\(^{10}\)See ADI’s web page on Supreme Court practice. http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/supreme_court_pract.asp

\(^{11}\)Court processes are described in the courts’ Internal Operating Practices and Procedures (IOPP’s), which are published in conjunction with the California Rules of Court. In the Fourth Appellate District, for example:

Division One oral argument is covered in section II-B-3 at page 4 of its IOPP’s: http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/IOP_District4_division1.pdf .

Division Two’s internal processes are described in section VII of its Internal Operating Practices and Procedures (IOPP’s), which are published with the California Rules of Court but are not posted on the court’s website.

B. **Tentative Opinion**  [§ 6.10]

Division Two of the Fourth Appellate District has a unique pre-oral argument procedure.\(^\text{12}\) The court provides counsel with a tentative opinion that usually has the preliminary vote of at least two justices of the assigned panel. When it sends counsel a notice about requesting oral argument, the court includes the tentative opinion. The tentative opinion may indicate whether the panel is considering full or partial publication.

1. **Notice of oral argument opportunity**  [§ 6.11]

Division Two sends two types of oral argument notices – one saying oral argument is unlikely to be useful and one notifying counsel the court intends to calendar the case for argument.

   a. **“Argument is available but unlikely to be useful” notice**  [§ 6.12]

   The more common notice in Division Two states oral argument is unlikely to aid in the decision-making process, although counsel may nevertheless request it. (Cf. *People v. Peña* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 389, 400-404 [stating the importance of oral argument and criticizing the former version of this letter, which more actively discouraged it].) The letter sets a deadline for requesting argument, which is enforced strictly.

   On receiving such a notice accompanied by a tentative opinion unfavorable to the client, counsel should weigh whether there is a reasonable possibility oral argument will persuade the court to change its mind. Merely repeating the briefs will not help if the tentative opinion shows the court has understood the points made in the briefs and has analyzed them under the correct law. On the other hand, argument that spotlights the heart of the client’s case and places it in the most persuasive light, clears up confusion evidenced in the tentative opinion, or rebuts the analysis of the tentative opinion might change the result.

\(^\text{12}\)Division Two’s tentative opinion program is described at [http://www.courts.ca.gov/2519.htm#tab7902](http://www.courts.ca.gov/2519.htm#tab7902). Its internal processes are described in section VII of its Internal Operating Practices and Procedures (IOPP’s), which are published with the California Rules of Court but are not posted on the court’s website.
b. **“Argument will be set” notice**  [§ 6.13]

The other type of Division Two notice affirmatively “invites” counsel to argue and says counsel will be notified of the date. No request is necessary.

Counsel should treat the invitation as an *order* to appear. The court has suggested the outcome may be hanging in the balance. The tentative opinion may not have the concurrence of a majority of the justices, or the votes supporting it may not be “solid.” With this type of notice, counsel can anticipate active questioning by the court.

2. **Uses of tentative opinion**  [§ 6.14]

The tentative opinion can be useful to all sides. First, it gives counsel clues as to the value of orally arguing at all. If the court’s analysis is a reasonable application of settled law and suggests the issues are not troublesome or close in any way, counsel may conclude there is no significant chance of changing the court’s mind and make a reasoned decision to waive argument. If the opposite is true, counsel is alerted to the importance of further argument.

Second, the tentative is an invaluable guide to preparing for argument. It offers a way around the usual guessing game of where to concentrate the most effort. It helps counsel to avoid areas that do not concern the court and instead hone in on those most open to change. The tentative losing party knows the court’s exact reasoning and can target the most vulnerable points at oral argument. If the opinion rests on a particular case, for example, counsel may argue it can be distinguished or is inconsistent with other cases. Faulty logic, unforeseen repercussions, and inaccurate factual or legal premises can be pointed out. The tentative winning party, on the other hand, knows the crucial underpinnings of the decision and can seek to reinforce them.

IV. **REQUESTING AND WAIVING ORAL ARGUMENT.**  [§ 6.15]

After receiving the notice of an opportunity to request oral argument, counsel must consider how to respond.
A. “To Argue or Not To Argue” – That Is the First Question  [§ 6.16]

The first decision counsel faces, when given an opportunity to request argument, is whether to ask for it at all. Counsel must be prepared to use oral argument responsibly. If the case is unlikely to benefit from argument, counsel should not seek it just to have a moment in the spotlight or to get some “practice.” On the other hand, if the case is likely to benefit materially, the attorney has the responsibility to argue orally, no matter how uncomfortable it seems (and it does get easier with practice).

The decision may be influenced by the court’s procedures – whether only orally argued cases are discussed in conference or whether argument will delay the case. The court’s or individual justices’ reputation for receptivity to oral argument is an intangible but significant consideration. Secondary factors may be the length of the sentence and the client’s wishes. Counsel may find it helpful to discuss such matters with the assigned staff attorney or other experienced appellate counsel.

If the client is anxious and heavily involved, and especially if he or she has specifically expressed interest in oral argument, it is highly advisable to advise the client before waiving. Although the decision is reserved to counsel as “captain of the ship,” and the client has no right to interfere (see In re Barnett (2003) 31 Cal.4th 466, 472), counsel’s duties do include keeping the client informed of significant developments in the case. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (m).)

1. Factors suggesting the need for argument  [§ 6.17]

Argument is most effective when the case is complex, or difficult, or novel – whenever the correct resolution is less than obvious and requires exploration. The court may well have questions in such cases. Oral argument gives counsel a chance to assess the court’s grasp of the issues and provide additional support for the position urged. Signals from the court, such as requested supplemental briefing or the tentative opinion from Division Two, may suggest the court is wavering and needs further input.

13Oral argument is expected as matter of routine in the California Supreme Court.

14Incarcerated criminal defendants have no legal right to argue their own appeal or even to be present at the argument. (Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist. (2000) 528 U.S. 152; People v. Scott (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 550, 562-563; In re Walker (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 225, 228; Pen. Code, § 1255 [defendant need not be personally present in appellate court].)
In such a case, the briefs may provide inadequate assistance to the court, because they do not offer the give-and-take of conversation. Counsel should not pass up the opportunity to protect the client’s interests when they have such a case; doing so could be an abdication of counsel’s basic responsibilities.

Needless to say, if the court has asked for oral argument, counsel must not waive. Even if the court permits the waiver in spite of its previous request, the attorney has failed to provide the kind of advocacy ADI expects.

2. Responsible waiver of oral argument [§ 6.18]

Oral argument should not be requested in all cases. Counsel should make a professional, reasoned decision.15

The reasons for waiver are many, but among the most common are: If briefing is thorough and an interpersonal exchange with the justices seems unlikely to develop their understanding of the issues further, there may be little reason to seek oral argument. California courts’ internal operating procedures tends to emphasize written submissions and diminish the role of oral argument in the decisional process, because by the time of oral argument there is usually a tentative decision, and it is harder to “unpersuade” afterward than to persuade before the court has invested effort in a written product. If counsel has filed a reply brief, as ADI strongly encourages, then the client has had the last word; oral argument gives the opponent a chance to rebut it and snatch away the momentum created by the reply. Indeed, if counsel’s own briefing is complete and effective and the opponent’s is not, oral argument may help the other side more. It may also delay the case – an important consideration in time-sensitive situations.

Oral argument is not a vehicle for counsel merely to ask whether the court has any questions. Using it for this purpose does not benefit the client, consumes public resources in the form of the court’s time and both attorneys’ time and, often, travel, and greatly irritates the court.

15 ADI’s informational memo for clients before appointment of counsel, Understanding Your Appeal, states at page 3: “Oral argument is not held in every case. Your lawyer will ask for it only if he or she believes something needs to be said that was not already said in the briefs.” http://www.adi-sandiego.com/pdf_forms/Understanding_your_appeal.pdf
3. **When in doubt**  [§ 6.19]

A rule of thumb is that, if in doubt, counsel should request oral argument. While some justices may wince at this advice, there are reasons for it. First, once requested, oral argument may be waived later,\(^{16}\) whereas the converse is not true. Second, as discussed above, placing a matter on an oral argument track may result in a different treatment of the case.

Above all, oral argument is a vital tool of appellate practice, and failure to use it when counsel reasonably concludes it will help the client is a failure to fulfill the duty of zealous advocacy. Indeed, waiver of oral argument, combined with defective briefing leaving factual or legal issues unresolved, may constitute ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. \((People \text{ v.} Lang\ (1974) \ 11\text{ Cal.3d} \ 134, \ 138-139,)\) For all of these reasons, if there is reasonable doubt as to the value of oral argument, the doubt should probably be resolved – for the client’s benefit – in favor of the argument.

**B. Requesting Argument**  [§ 6.20]

The notice from the court of an opportunity to request argument usually requires an affirmative response by a specified date. In such a situation, the failure to file a timely request is deemed a waiver of oral argument.\(^{17}\) In Division Two of the Fourth Appellate District, the court may sometimes indicate in its notice letter that the case will be set for argument; it is unnecessary to submit a request in such a situation.

1. **General thrust of argument**  [§ 6.21]

Some courts’ notices not only ask whether oral argument is requested but also ask counsel to state “the general thrust” of the argument if requested. Whether the “general

\(^{16}\) Counsel should notify the court and other counsel of a decision to waive well in advance of the argument date. A last-minute cancellation is frowned upon – it is discourteous and may cause unnecessary preparation and/or travel.

\(^{17}\) If counsel for some reason does not receive the notice or fails to meet the deadline, counsel can file a late request seeking oral argument. But a caveat: some courts strictly apply the stated deadlines for requesting argument, and so counsel should not count on having any latitude. Promptness in seeking relief from default is essential; a request made a few days beyond the deadline is more likely to be granted than one submitted just before the opinion is to be filed.
thrust” description affects the argument probably varies with the membership of the three-justice panel; since it may have some effect, counsel should prepare the summary thoughtfully.

2. **Time estimate** [§ 6.22]

   The court’s notice may also ask counsel to provide a time estimate for oral argument. (See also § 6.35, post.) Rule 8.256 allows 30 minutes per side, “[u]nless the court provides otherwise by local rule or order.” Some presiding justices will hold counsel to the written time estimate provided in the request, whereas others will go by the one given at the time of oral argument. Because the time allotted may be consumed in varying degrees by questions from the bench, and because counsel will always be allowed to revise their estimates downward but not necessarily upward, reasonable estimates on the higher side may be advisable. However, to maintain credibility counsel should not give an inordinately long estimate merely for the sake of having some leeway. Conversely, counsel should not state an unreasonably short time in order to have the case called early on the calendar.

   If the issue(s) are especially complex or multiple, and counsel reasonably believes that more than the normally allowed time will be necessary to protect the client’s interests, counsel should request it. Be prepared to make a strong showing of good cause and acknowledge that other parties in the case should have their time extended by the same amount. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rules 8.256, 8.366, 8.470, 8.472.)

3. **Remote argument** [§ 6.23]

   To reduce the time and expenses of travel to oral argument, some courts permit argument from a remote location. In some districts, this is done by telephone or televised oral arguments, where counsel argue from a videoconferencing room in a remote location. If an argument is short with relatively simple issues, then a remote presentation may be quite adequate. However, neither telephone nor videoconferencing offers the same perception of the court as a live appearance, and it does affect the quality of the personal interaction. Care should therefore be exercised in choosing the method of argument.

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   18 A court’s notice of oral argument may state the court’s local time limit. Division One of the Fourth Appellate District normally limits oral argument to 15 minutes per side. (Ct.App., Fourth Dist., Div. One, *Internal Operating Practices and Proc.*, II-B-3, p. 4, Oral argument; Misc. order 021115.) Division Two of the Fourth issues an annual miscellaneous order limiting time to 15 minutes per party except for good cause.
In the Fourth District, only Division One offers remote argument. It is done by telephone. Although not an official limitation, the court’s expectation is that this option will be used primarily or exclusively in case of illness.

V. PREPARATION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT  

A month or so before oral argument, counsel will receive a copy of the oral argument calendar. (If counsel registers for e-mail notification of the progress of the appeal, as is highly recommended, counsel will receive an e-mail notification of the calendar.) In most cases, preparation for argument will probably begin in earnest somewhere between that time and the date of argument.

A. Approaches to Preparation  

1. Reviewing materials and selecting main focus

In preparing for argument counsel should review the briefs filed in the case and crucial parts of the record. Because the reply brief is often the most tightly focused brief and takes account of the respondent’s points, in many cases it will be the best vehicle on which to construct oral argument.

Counsel should plan to focus on the most important issues at oral argument. Addressing all of many issues will likely cause the justices’ eyes to glaze over, and they may lose interest in the argument altogether. Counsel should nevertheless be prepared to discuss any issue, in case the court takes off in unexpected directions.

“Important” is a variable notion. One issue may be important because it is of considerable general legal interest; another issue, because it may mean years off the client’s sentence; another, because it is the most likely to succeed. Of course, what the court will probably think is important must always be factored in, too. In Division Two of the Fourth Appellate District the tentative opinion will offer considerable insight into this question.

It is often very effective to plan a “theme” that runs through the important issues, ties them together, and gives a focal point to the presentation. This technique enables

19This section addresses oral argument in the Court of Appeal. In the Supreme Court, argument will usually be more prominent and require considerably more preparation.
counsel to construct a cumulative and persuasive case for a decision in the client’s favor. If the brief itself has such a theme, the oral presentation can reinforce it and enhance its impact.

2. Updating authorities  [§ 6.27]

It is a good idea to do last-minute research on the most important issues, both to refresh the memory and to determine whether there are relevant new legal developments, such as a recent decision, a grant of review on a case involving a related issue, or a change in the legal force of any case cited in the briefs. If there has been such a development, counsel should alert the court and the opponent as soon as counsel finds out about it (in writing, if time permits); the court frowns on “hiding the ball” until the day of the court appearance. In the rare situation where advance notice is not possible, counsel should bring the citation and a copies of the opinion to oral argument and provide both the opposing counsel and the court with them before argument begins.

If any of counsel’s own cases can no longer be cited, it is far better for counsel, rather than the opponent, to bring the court’s attention to the fact. If the opponent’s authority has been undermined, the opponent should be given the courtesy of an opportunity to notify the court, but if that is not practical or the opponent fails to do so promptly, counsel has the responsibility to bring up the matter himself or herself.

If an opponent cites authority for the first time at oral argument and counsel is not prepared to address it, counsel should request leave to submit a supplemental letter brief.

3. Outlining argument  [§ 6.28]

Counsel should never write an oral argument as a “speech” to be memorized. However, most counsel find it valuable to outline the salient points. Most importantly, whether writing an outline or just mentally preparing, counsel should assume the position of a skeptical cross-examiner and ask what the hardest questions are likely to be and how those questions might be followed up. Then counsel must develop appropriate responses. If counsel has prepared only to summarize the case or deliver an oration and not to

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20Depublication or a grant of rehearing or review eliminates the citability and any precessed value of the previously published case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115; see § 7.8 et seq. of chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision.”)
engage in a conversation with the court about the strengths and weaknesses of the issues, oral argument is probably going to be at best ineffectual and at worst disastrous.

4. **Rehearsing** [§ 6.29]

Counsel should rehearse the oral argument and the various ways it may play out. If possible, other attorneys or even lay persons should help. While the number of oral arguments precludes ADI staff attorneys from providing a moot court in every case, if counsel has not previously argued or if the case is especially important, counsel can request that staff attorneys help prepare for the argument. If counsel has never argued before the particular court, counsel might make an effort to attend an oral argument there beforehand, to get a feel for the process.

**B. Coordination with Other Counsel** [§ 6.30]

Oral argument may be complicated if the case involves a co-appellant or amicus. When the issues present no true conflict among parties on the defense side, the attorneys should devise a coordinated strategy, so as to present a complete argument without undue redundancy or fragmentation. If possible, one attorney should do the argument – a series of short presentations is confusing and often ineffective.

When a co-appellant has an actual conflict with one’s client, the attorney must argue individually. The co-appellant’s argument could undermine the client’s position, and therefore counsel should prepare to answer multiple opponents – not only the respondent, but the co-appellant, as well.

**C. Members of Panel Deciding the Case** [§ 6.31]

Knowing who is on the three-justice panel assigned to decide the case may help counsel develop an approach to the argument. Some courts’ calendars or websites may expressly name the panel, although the composition of the panel is subject to change before argument. Backgrounds of justices are online, as well.²¹

**D. Late Waiver of Argument** [§ 6.32]

If during the preparation period counsel concludes argument will not be advantageous, counsel should advise both the court and opposing counsel as soon as a

²¹Fourth Appellate District, for example: [http://www.courts.ca.gov/2524.htm](http://www.courts.ca.gov/2524.htm)
decision to waive has been made, not in the courtroom on the day of argument. (This is especially true as to opposing counsel. The court takes a dim view of causing the opponent to prepare for and travel to oral argument unnecessarily.)

VI. DELIVERY OF ORAL ARGUMENT  [§ 6.33]

To put first things first, counsel should plan to arrive early enough to find the courtroom, check in, and become oriented to the surroundings. Cutting the time close invites serious problems, if not outright disaster. Counsel should double-check the starting time (not all courts are the same) and allow time for court security measures.

A. Preliminary Mechanics  [§ 6.34]

In most courts, counsel will first check in with a deputy clerk, confirming or revising a time estimate. Rule 8.256(c) of the California Rules of Court provides 30 minutes per side for oral argument, unless the court provides otherwise by order or local rule; counsel should consult the assigned staff attorney for local practices. In any court, questioning from the bench can prolong argument considerably beyond putative limits.

1. Calendar formalities  [§ 6.35]

The presiding justice usually will order the oral argument calendar according to estimated time, with the shortest first. A lengthy estimate is almost guaranteed to be near the end of the calendar, unless counsel has a legitimate reason to seek preference. If the calendar is very long, counsel may ask to be excused until a time certain, so as not to have to sit in the courtroom.

22 The court will almost always accept a downward revision. Some presiding justices will permit an upward revision, but some will not.

23 A court’s notice of oral argument may state the court’s local time limit. Division One of the Fourth Appellate District normally limits oral argument to 15 minutes per side. (Ct.App., Fourth Dist., Div. One, Internal Operating Practices and Proc., II-B-3, p. 4, Oral argument; Misc. order 021115.) Division Two of the Fourth issues an annual miscellaneous order limiting time to 15 minutes per party except for good cause.
In Division Two of the Fourth Appellate District, the calendar order is determined before the day of argument and is posted for counsel. Repeat of time estimates is therefore obviated. Counsel should nevertheless check in to announce their presence.

The presiding justice will typically give the audience a brief statement indicating that the panel has read the briefs and is familiar with the cases and therefore counsel should not repeat what is in the briefs. (Counsel should heed this admonition, but not treat it as an absolute injunction against repeating core concepts necessary to help the court understand the case.) He or she will then call the first case on the calendar.

2. Formalities at the lectern  [§ 6.36]

When case is called, counsel should proceed to the lectern. Counsel should first state his or her name and the party represented. It is a good practice for the appellant’s counsel at this point expressly to reserve time for rebuttal; while brief rebuttal might be permitted regardless of whether time has been specifically reserved, some presiding justices may not permit rebuttal if the time estimate has been exceeded.

B. Tone  [§ 6.37]

Every attorney, like every person, has a different style and at argument should remain faithful to the attorney’s own personality. However, it is important to do so adaptively, taking account of the forum, its purpose and internal dynamics, and the expectations of decorum.

24Former United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson offered this advice on what not to say in opening remarks: “On your first appearance before the Court, do not waste your time or ours telling us so. We are likely to discover for ourselves that you are a novice but will think none the less of you for it. Every famous lawyer had his first day at our bar, and perhaps a sad one. It is not ingratiaing to tell us you think it is an overwhelming honor to appear, for we think of the case as the important thing before us, not the counsel. Some attorneys use time to thank us for granting the review, or for listening to their argument. Those are not intended as favors and it is good taste to accept them as routine performance of duty. Be respectful, of course, but also be self-respectful, and neither disparage yourself nor flatter the Justices. We think well enough of ourselves already.” (Advocacy before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case Presentations (1957) 37 Amer. Bar Assn. J. 801, 802.)
1. **Respect** [§ 6.38]

A court and its members carry the authority and dignity of government and must be treated with invariable respect. Counsel should maintain an attentive posture (avoiding slouching or leaning all over the lectern) and a respectful tone of voice. At the same time, counsel is an advocate and must be assertive; the message should be that the client is *entitled* as a matter of law to prevail, not that counsel is beseeching the court to grant a favor.

Opposing counsel should likewise be shown respect, even in the face of provocation. Taking the high road – resisting the impulse to answer in kind when opposing counsel has breached decorum or made a personal attack – is always right. The court will notice the contrast and appreciate the restraint, and both the client’s cause and counsel’s reputation will be enhanced.

2. **Conversation** [§ 6.39]

Oral argument is not a forum for making speeches. The point is to engage in dialogue, to understand where the court is and persuade it to go in the right direction. Justices are legally astute and do not want to be manipulated. A blatantly oratorical style, an overly emotional or strident delivery, or an argument that sounds like one for a jury is going to fall flat. Counsel should strive for a conversational tone, while still showing respect for the dignity of the proceedings.

3. **Humor** [§ 6.40]

Generally counsel do well to heed the advice, “Humor should be used sparingly if at all.” (San Diego County Bar Association, Appellate Court Committee, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001) § 7:47, p. 284.)

There are few absolute rules, however, and some levity might help dispel an emotionally tense situation or revitalize the court and counsel toward the end of a lengthy calendar. It is often more effective when spontaneous, rather than built into the presentation as “entertainment.” Sarcasm, put-downs of the opponent, and impertinence are never appropriate.

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25 This handbook is no longer published and has not been updated since 2001, but may be available in libraries and appellate offices. It does offer excellent guidance for appellate practitioners.
4. **Candor [§ 6.41]**

As to absolute rules of conduct, there is no exception to the rule of honesty and forthrightness. If counsel has made an error or does not know the answer to a question, a candid admission will do far more for the client and the attorney alike than an effort to cover up. Counsel need not be embarrassed about not knowing an answer; the justice apparently didn’t, either, or else he or she would not have asked the question.

C. **Dialogue with the Court [§ 6.42]**

Since the whole purpose of oral argument is to engage in conversation with the court, eliciting a response from the bench is a key objective. Counsel in turn must be prepared to deal with that response.

1. **Process of give and take [§ 6.43]**

The court’s response takes the form of questions to counsel. When a question is asked, counsel must be certain he or she has understood the question. If unsure, counsel should request clarification. Once the question is understood, counsel should answer it directly and immediately. Attempting to evade or delay it implies that a direct answer would be harmful. In the end, answering the court’s questions is more important to the success of oral argument than plowing through a prepared presentation.

Counsel must continuously observe and listen, as well as speak. Both the questions themselves and the justices’ body language may offer clues as to whether counsel should abbreviate – or prolong – a particular discussion or change the direction of the argument.

2. **“Softballs” [§ 6.44]**

Although of course counsel must be prepared for the hard questions, it is a mistake to assume that all questions are hostile or skeptical. Sometimes counsel may be used as a foil among the members of the panel. Although the questions are outwardly voiced to counsel, some may be aimed at another justice on the panel. Counsel should be alert to the possibility of “softball” questions – ones that back counsel’s position – and answer them supportively.
3. **Loaded questions** [§ 6.45]

Some questions, like leading questions in eliciting testimony, will include a foundational premise that counsel does not accept. The best way to approach such a question is: (1) state very briefly that the question contains a premise not conceded, (2) assume arguendo the existence of the premise and answer the question forthrightly, and (3) after answering the direct question, explain why the premise is wrong.

4. **“Off the wall” questions** [§ 6.46]

Among the hardest questions to answer (and virtually impossible to prepare for) are those that are “off the wall,” go in a completely tangential direction, contain logical fallacy, or betray the individual justice’s ignorance of the real issue or of basic applicable law. It may be hard to maintain a respectful attitude in dealing with it, but there is no alternative. A patient, tactful answer that shoulders the blame for any confusion (“I’m sorry my brief did not adequately explain this point”) may be the most effective response. The other justices will probably be aware of the questioner’s errors and be sympathetic to counsel’s predicament, unless counsel responds in a way that embarrasses their colleague.

5. **Concessions and other damaging answers** [§ 6.47]

Sometimes counsel will be put into a position where it is difficult to avoid making a concession or giving an otherwise damaging answer. There is no cardinal rule as to how to respond. If the response relates to a comparatively minor point, counsel may gain credibility simply by agreeing to it. Some answers could spell doom to the appeal and should be resisted strenuously. If counsel’s hand is forced into offering a potentially hurtful answer, counsel should control the damage by providing the best supporting explanation available.

This is the very kind of situation in which thorough preparation pays off. Getting blind-sided by a devastating point counsel failed to consider can fluster even the best oral advocate.

6. **Supplemental briefing** [§ 6.48]

If the court seems concerned about any point not fully briefed or any point counsel was unable to answer during oral argument, counsel can seek leave to submit
supplemental briefing before the case is taken under submission. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.200(a)(4) and (b), 8.256(d).)

D. Concluding Oral Argument [§ 6.49]

Counsel wants the court to incorporate the oral argument into the deliberating and decision-making process. To make a firm impression on the court, counsel should use the concluding part of it effectively and persuasively.

1. Watching the clock [§ 6.50]

Counsel must be conscious of the elapsed time and be prepared to end argument smoothly. Toward the end of the estimated time the presiding justice may ask whether counsel wants to stop and reserve the balance of the time. Some courts use color-coded lights to inform counsel when the time is nearing its end.

2. Cues that it is time to conclude [§ 6.51]

Counsel must be perceptive in gauging the court’s reaction to argument. If the court appears to be leaning in a favorable direction, it is wise to heed the old adage “quit while you’re ahead” and wind up promptly. Unnecessarily prolonging argument increases the chances the court will change its mind; it is indeed possible to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. If the court says it would like to hear from opposing counsel, that usually means trouble for the other side and is a definitive signal to sit down.

3. Strong ending [§ 6.52]

The argument should be concluded on a strong point. This is not to advise reserving the clinching “zinger” for the last word. Time may expire without an opportunity to make the point at all. However, the conclusion of the argument should relate to an important aspect of the case and not to a trivial or insignificant point.

E. Rebuttal [§ 6.53]

If rebuttal argument is offered, as generally it is, counsel should use the opportunity to rebut the opponent’s points and not rehash the opening argument. Unless there is to be supplemental briefing, rebuttal is the last opportunity to address the court and, most importantly, the only opportunity to correct any misstatements, factual or legal, by the opponent or the court (or oneself, if counsel has said something in error). It can
also be used to address concerns raised by the court during the opponent’s argument. Rebuttal should be concise and to the point, but not rushed or fragmentary.

A cautionary note: By the end of appellant’s and respondent’s arguments, the panel may be weary. Making every rebuttal point will risk losing their attention altogether and making no point at all. It may be advisable to confine remarks to a few emphatic points.
- CHAPTER SEVEN -

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I. INTRODUCTION  [§ 7.0]

This chapter discusses decisions by the reviewing courts and proceedings after decision. It addresses the requirements for appellate opinions in California. It gives an overview of the doctrine of stare decisis and the implications, as well as processes, of publication. The chapter also covers what happens after the Court of Appeal files its decision. It examines the rules governing finality of decisions and offers general guidance on seeking rehearing in the Court of Appeal and review in the California Supreme Court. It discusses basic procedures for handling cases in which the California Supreme Court has granted review. Finally, the chapter looks at the process of seeking certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.

II. REQUIREMENTS FOR REVIEWING-COURT OPINIONS  [§ 7.1]

Decisions by reviewing courts are rendered as opinions and orders. An opinion is the disposition of a cause, such as an appeal or a writ with an order to show cause, on the merits with a written statement of reasons. Orders include such decisions as summary denials of a writ, denials of a petition for review, rulings on motions and applications, dismissals, sanctions, and interlocutory orders. The focus here is primarily on opinions in appeals.

A. “In Writing with Reasons Stated”  [§ 7.2]

The California Constitution provides Supreme Court and Court of Appeal decisions that determine causes must be “in writing with reasons stated.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14.) That requirement does not apply to decisions such as writ denials and orders that do not determine causes on the merits. It “is designed to insure that the reviewing court gives careful thought and consideration to the case and that the statement of reasons indicates that appellant’s contentions have been reviewed and consciously, as distinguished from inadvertently, rejected.” (People v. Rojas (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 278, 288-289.)

Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1262, 1264, explains the written opinion requirement:
[A]n opinion sufficiently states “reasons” if it sets forth the “grounds” or “principles” upon which the justices concur in the judgment. . . . [¶] . . . The constitutional requirement is satisfied as long as the opinion sets forth those reasons upon which the decision is based; that requirement does not compel the court to discuss all its reasons for rejecting the various arguments of counsel.

In People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, counsel in the Court of Appeal filed a Wende brief and the defendant filed a pro per brief raising substantive issues. The Court of Appeal dealt with the pro per contentions by saying it had “read and considered defendant’s written argument.” The Supreme Court held this conclusory statement was inadequate to satisfy the constitutional requirement for opinions. At the least the Court of Appeal must set out the facts, procedural history, the convictions, and the sentence, and must describe the contentions, stating briefly why they are being rejected. (Id. at p. 124.) Such a decision serves a number of functions: it provides guidance to the parties and other courts in subsequent litigation; it promotes careful consideration of the case; it conserves judicial resources by making a record of what has been decided and, possibly, persuading the defendant of the futility of further litigation. (Id. at pp. 120-121.)

The Court of Appeal is not required to address an issue on the merits if it is frivolous. (People v. Rojas (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 278, 290 [“issues presented were ones which either were not raised in the trial court or lacked even a modicum of support in the record”].)

Standard 8.1 of the Standards of Judicial Administration suggests the use of a “memorandum opinion” if the cause “raise[s] no substantial issues of law or fact” – e.g.:

(1) An appeal that is determined by a controlling statute which is not challenged for unconstitutionality and does not present any substantial question of interpretation or application;

(2) An appeal that is determined by a controlling decision which does not require a reexamination or restatement of its principles or rules; or

1People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; see also Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. These cases deal with procedures when counsel is unable to find any issues on appeal.

(3) An appeal raising factual issues that are determined by the substantial evidence rule.

As explained in *People v. Garcia* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853:

Memorandum opinions may vary in style, from a stereotyped checklist or “fill in the blanks” form to a tailored summary of the critical facts and the applicable law. . . . The briefest formats are appropriate in cases . . . where the result is consistent with an intermediate federal or state appellate decision with which the court agrees, . . . cases decided by applying the authority of a companion case, cases in which the result is mandated by the United States Supreme Court, and cases where the appeal is not maintainable.

The difference between a short opinion and a memorandum opinion is unclear. In the absence of frivolous issues, concessions, or other factors permitting a summary disposition, any opinion presumably must meet the constitutional standard of written reasons. Many of the issues described in Standard 8.1 would appear to be frivolous. If there is controlling adverse authority and counsel offers no way of distinguishing or challenging it, raising the issue has no point. 3 If counsel has attempted to distinguish or challenge it, then a citation to the case in the opinion without more does not answer the contention and seems inadequate as a statement of reasons.

An exception may arise when the issue is being raised to preserve it for argument in another forum with power to re-examine the governing precedent.

B. Time Frame [§ 7.3]

No formal provision of the California Rules of Court sets out a specific deadline for filing an opinion. 4 The “practical” deadline for filing an opinion is 90 days after the

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3Counsel has a duty as an officer of the court not to pursue frivolous issues. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (c); ABA Model Rules, Canon 7, DR 7-10 [lawyer may not “[k]nowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law” unless it can be “supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal” of that law].) 

4California Rules of Court, rule 8.416 expresses a goal of deciding a juvenile fast-track appeal within 250 days after the notice of appeal is filed. (See rule 8.416(e)(1) and Advisory Committee comments to subds. (g) & (h).) There is no enforcement mechanism for this provision, however, beyond control over extensions of time.
case is submitted. This limit follows from the law that a justice must certify that no cause is before the justice has been undecided more than 90 days in order to receive a paycheck. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 19; Gov. Code, § 68210.)

The 90-day clock starts on the date of submission. Submission usually occurs when the court has heard oral argument or approved its waiver and the time for filing briefs and papers has passed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.256(d)(1), 8.366(a), 8.470, 8.524(h)(1).) Except for specialized areas such as certain juvenile dependency cases (e.g., rule 8.416(h)(2)), the rules do not specify a deadline for hearing oral argument or approving its waiver.

Vacating submission and resubmitting is allowed (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.256(e), 8.366(a), 8.470, 8.524(h)(2)), but is considered an exceptional step, not to be used routinely as a way of dealing with backlog.

III. STARE DECISIS, PUBLICATION, AND CITABILITY [§ 7.4]

The doctrine of stare decisis requires or encourages courts to apply the same legal principles as previous courts in a similar situation, in order to promote consistency, equality, and foreseeability. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455; see Montejo v. Louisiana (2009) 556 U.S. 778.) Publication determines the stare decisis effect and citability of California state opinions, as explained below, and so familiarity with its meaning and the processes affecting it is crucial to a grasp of case law authority.

A. Doctrine of Stare Decisis As It Applies in California [§ 7.5]

Stare decisis is the effect of a prior court decision on later court decisions in different cases. It can be both vertical (the authority of higher courts to bind lower ones) and horizontal (the duty of courts to follow the decisions of courts of equal rank). It can also be intra-jurisdictional – applying only to courts in the same geographical judicial hierarchy, or inter-jurisdictional – binding on courts in other areas as well.

Stare decisis can mean the binding effect of a decision on other courts, and that is how the following sections use it. It also may be used, however, to mean the general prudential principle that courts should take into account their own and other courts’ previous decisions in order to promote stability, predictability, equal treatment, and similar interests.
There are some uniformities throughout the country. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court on matters of federal law are binding on all courts in the country. The decisions of the highest court in each state are binding on all lower courts in that state. No state court is bound to follow, as stare decisis, the decisions of a court of another state or of lower federal courts.  

Beyond these basic principles, however, the various state and federal court systems in the United States have produced a mixture of doctrines.

1. **Vertical stare decisis**  [§ 7.6]

In California vertical stare decisis is statewide and inter-jurisdictional. A decision of a Court of Appeal is binding on every lower court in the state, not just those in its own appellate district, until another Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court contradicts it. (*Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [“all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction”].) If there are conflicting decisions, the trial court must choose between them (*id.* at p. 456) – presumably the one it considers the better reasoned (see *In re Alicia T.* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 869, 880). The court need not apply the decision of the Court of Appeal in its own appellate district, although for pragmatic reasons it usually does so.

In contrast, in the federal system, the decisions of a circuit court of appeals bind only the district courts in its own circuit. (*Jenkins v. United States* (2d Cir. 2004) 386 F.3d 415, 418-419.) Thus a district court in California is not required to follow the decisions of any circuit court other than the Ninth.

2. **Horizontal stare decisis**  [§ 7.7]

California has no horizontal stare decisis. The Supreme Court may overrule itself. (E.g., *People v. Anderson* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, overruling *Carlos v. Superior Court* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131.) Similarly, a single Court of Appeal cannot bind itself, but may

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For the sake of predictability, stability, consistency, and even-handedness, courts should give substantial weight to precedents and consider them for their persuasive value. For the most part, accordingly, they do honor stare decisis, especially in their own district, but they are not required to do so. (E.g., *Mega Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Superior Court* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1529.)

In the federal court system, the Supreme Court is not bound by horizontal stare decisis; it can overrule its own decisions and on a number of occasions has done so. (E.g., *Montejo v. Louisiana* (2009) 556 U.S. 778.) The circuits are free to disagree with other circuits. (*United States v. Carney* (6th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3d 436, 444; *Hart v. Massanari* (9th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 1155, 1170; *Garcia v. Miera* (10th Cir. 1987) 817 F.2d 650, 658; see *Hertz v. Woodman* (1910) 218 U.S. 205, 212.)

Unlike California, however, in a number of federal circuits, including the Ninth, horizontal stare decisis applies within the circuit, a doctrine known as “law of the circuit.” Under this doctrine a decision is binding on all later three-judge panels of the circuit until a higher authority – the circuit sitting en banc or the United States Supreme Court – overrules it. (*Miller v. Gammie* (9th Cir. 2003) 335 F.3d 889, 899-900; *Hart v. Massanari* (9th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 1155, 1171-1173; *Burns v. Gammon* (8th Cir. 1999) 173 F.3d 1089, 1090, fn.2; see generally *Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner* (1941) 314 U.S. 326, 335; *Bonner v. Prichard* (11th Cir. 1981) 661 F.2d 1206, 1209.)

The Supreme Court approved *Angelica V.* in *In re Sade C.* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, which held that in dependency cases the appellate court need not follow the no-merit procedures of *People v. Wende* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and *Anders v. California* (1967) 386 U.S. 738.

The Supreme Court resolved the conflict in *In re Sade C.* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 982, fn. 11, disapproving *Andrew B.*

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6 The Supreme Court approved *Angelica V.* in *In re Sade C.* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, which held that in dependency cases the appellate court need not follow the no-merit procedures of *People v. Wende* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and *Anders v. California* (1967) 386 U.S. 738.

7 The Supreme Court resolved the conflict in *In re Sade C.* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 982, fn. 11, disapproving *Andrew B.*
[A] decision of a division is the decision of the court . . . . One three-judge panel, therefore, does not have the authority to overrule another three-judge panel of the court.

*(LaShawn A. v. Barry (D.C. Cir. 1996) 87 F.3d 1389, 1395, internal quotation marks omitted.)* The doctrine is a prudential one – a matter of policy, not jurisdiction – and so allows the court to depart from its own precedents in certain unusual circumstances. *(Byrd v. Lewis (9th Cir. 2009) 566 F.3d 855, 866-867; Miller v. Gammie, at p. 900; LaShawn A. v. Barry, at p. 1395; North Carolina Utilities Com. v. Federal Communications Com. (4th Cir. 1977) 552 F.2d 1036, 1044-1045; see also Hertz v. Woodman (1910) 218 U.S. 205, 212.)*

3. **Holdings versus dicta**  [§ 7.7A]

Binding stare decisis applies only to the actual holdings of cases, not to dicta – language unnecessary to the decision. Dicta may have persuasive value, but other courts are not bound to observe them.

The discussion or determination of a point not necessary to the disposition of a question that is decisive of the appeal is generally regarded as obiter dictum and not as the law of the case. . . . The statement of a principle not necessary to the decision will not be regarded either as a part of the decision or as a precedent that is required by the rule of stare decisis to be followed . . . , no matter how often repeated. Expression of dictum is not binding on a court inferior to that which rendered the decision . . . .

*(People v. Squier (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 235, 240, internal quotation marks and citations omitted; see also People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 444 [“stare decisis requires no deference to . . . dicta”].)*

Decisions by a split court may pose a challenge: sometimes no rationale for a given result gains the assent of a majority of justices. In such situations there are no reasons of “the court.” As *Adoption of Kelsey S.* (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 829, explained: “[A]ny proposition or principle stated in an opinion is not to be taken as the opinion of the [California Supreme Court], unless it is agreed to by at least four of the justices.” *(See also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (1996) 517 U.S. 44, 66.)* Then the holding of the court is “that position taken by those [justices] who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” *(Marks v. United States (1977) 430 U.S. 188, 193.)*
4. Law of the case [§ 7.7B]

A doctrine related to but distinct from stare decisis is law of the case, which binds both reviewing and lower courts to follow the initial decision of the appellate court on a point of law in later phases of the same case. (Stare decisis, in contrast, focuses on the duty to follow a ruling of law in other cases.)

Where, upon an appeal, the [reviewing] court, in deciding the appeal, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal . . . , and this although in its subsequent consideration [the reviewing] court may be clearly of the opinion that the former decision is erroneous in that particular. The principle applies to criminal as well as civil matters . . . , and it applies to [the Supreme Court] even though the previous appeal was before a Court of Appeal (Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal 3d 425, 434).

(People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 786, internal quotation marks omitted [under law of case doctrine, Court of Appeal pretrial writ decision on merits of search and seizure issue will not be revisited by Supreme Court in later automatic appeal]; see also People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835; In re J.D. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1386.) For the doctrine to apply, the subsequent proceedings must involve the same facts, issues, and parties. (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 668-670 [no law of case if later proceeding reviews different decision and involves additional party]; cf. In re Ditsch (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 578, 582 [subsequent habeas corpus petition may raise law of case in attacking trial court’s revised sentence for failure to follow previous directions of appellate court, even though statute had changed; those directions were “determinative of the rights of the same parties in any subsequent proceeding in the same case”].)

The principal reason for the doctrine is judicial economy, to avoid repeated litigation of the same issues. The doctrine is a prudential one, a rule of procedure, and does not go to the jurisdiction of the court. It is not binding if its application would result in a substantial miscarriage of justice or the controlling law has been altered by an intervening decision.\(^8\) (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 787; In re Harris (1993)

\(^8\)As to the trial court, however, jurisdictional limits apply on remand: a trial court has no jurisdiction after remand from the Court of Appeal to do other than follow the directions of the remand order, even though a later decision of the Supreme Court
5 Cal.4th 813, 843; *In re Saldana* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 620, 627-627 [trial court properly granted habeas corpus and resentenced, despite previous appellate decision affirming judgment, when later Supreme Court decision, *People v. Superior Court (Romero)* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, established contrary rule of law].)

B. How Publication Status Affects Stare Decisis and Citability  § 7.8

In California, as in a number of other jurisdictions, some cases are published and others are not. A case’s publication status may affect its citability and its effect as both binding and persuasive precedent.

1. California cases cited to California courts  § 7.9

The California Rules of Court cover only cases cited to California courts. The law of other jurisdictions governs the citability of cases in those courts.

a. In general: rule 8.1115(a)  § 7.10

An opinion of a California court may be cited or relied on as precedent in the courts of the state only if it is published. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a).) Unpublished opinions9 are not binding precedent for purposes of stare decisis. The proscription on citation or reliance applies to unpublished orders of the Court of Appeal, as well as opinions. (*In re Sena* (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 836, 838-839.)

It may be a violation of professional ethics, subjecting an attorney to discipline, knowingly to cite as authority a decision that is not citable. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd.(d); Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.3.)

9Unpublished opinions include those never certified for publication and those depublished by court order or a grant of review or rehearing.

§ 7.43, post, on scope of proceedings after remittitur; see also *In re Ditsch* (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 578, 582 [habeas corpus petition may raise law of case in attacking trial court’s revised sentence for failure to follow previous directions of appellate court, even though law had changed; those directions were “determinative of the rights of the same parties in any subsequent proceeding in the same case”].)
b. **Exceptions: rule 8.1115(b) and similar situations**  [§ 7.11]

Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(b), unpublished cases may be cited when the opinion is relevant under the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel doctrine. Another exception is for cases relevant to a different criminal proceeding or a disciplinary proceeding affecting the same defendant or respondent.

In addition to the exceptions specifically enumerated in the rule, counsel have occasionally discussed unpublished cases – without protest from the court – when the use of the cases is consistent with the rationale underlying the general no-citation rule. A petition for review, for example, may point to unpublished cases to show conflicts among the courts on a particular issue, the frequency with which an issue arises, or the importance of an issue to litigants and society as a whole. A brief or petition may refer to the unpublished Court of Appeal opinion in a case pending before the California or United States Supreme Court in order to describe an issue in the pending case. These and similar uses are consistent with the general no-citation rule because they are referring to the unpublished cases, not as authority or precedent to persuade the court on the merits of an issue, but as evidence of some external fact.

When referring to unpublished cases for these purposes, counsel should avert possible criticism or misunderstanding by explicitly discussing California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a) and explaining why the references do not violate the rule. Counsel must also be scrupulous in confining the references to permitted purposes.

If a unpublished opinion is cited in a document, a copy of the opinion must be attached to the document. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(c).)

c. **Depublished cases**  [§ 7.12]

An opinion of the Court of Appeal that was certified for publication becomes instantly uncitable upon an order for depublication or the grant of a rehearing. Cases granted review before July 1, 2016, are not citable; those granted review later are citable but have no binding effects under *Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, pending review, unless the Supreme Court orders otherwise. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(e), 8.1115(e).) The fact that a depublished opinion continues to be printed in the advance sheets to permit tracking pending review does not make the opinion citable. (*Barber v. Superior Court* (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1076, 1082.)
Appellate counsel should always check the status of recent cases to see if they are still published and therefore citable. If the case becomes depublished, it is counsel’s obligation promptly to inform the court and opposing counsel. Providing this information demonstrates knowledge, skill, candor, and ethics. Even if a case has become uncitable, counsel can argue the rationale of the case without citing it.

d. Cases not yet final  [§ 7.13]

Clearing up previous confusion as to whether an opinion certified for publication could be cited immediately or had to await finality, California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(d), specifically provides “a published California opinion may be cited or relied on as soon as it is certified for publication or ordered published.” In fact, it may be ineffective assistance of counsel not to cite a helpful case even if it was decided just yesterday. When a recent case has been cited in a brief, appellate counsel of course should regularly check the status of the case to see if it is still published and thus citable.

The *stare decisis* effect of a case not yet final is a different matter from citability. ADI explored this matter in an October, 2015, memo responding to the Supreme Court’s invitation to comment on a proposed rule. The memo found the law inconclusive as to whether a not-final, published appellate decision is binding on lower courts under *Auto Equity Sales, Inc.* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, but concluded the weight of authority is that only a final opinion is binding. (E.g., *People v. Superior Court (Clark)* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1547-1548 [published case could not be relied on before it was final]; *Barber v. Superior Court* (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1076 [“our [earlier] decision never became final and is without any precedential value or binding force”]; *Rogers v. Detrich* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 90, 103 [“final decision” is binding]; see Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 1999) § 14:191 [“Once a published supreme court or appellate court decision becomes final, it is binding on lower courts under the doctrine of ‘stare decisis’”]; cf. *Jonathon M. v. Superior Court* (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1098 [trial court’s action in declining to follow Court of Appeal decision on ground it was not yet final “was brave but foolish . . . [and] also legally wrong”; but stating rule very narrowly as “a trial judge should follow an opinion of the Court of Appeal that speaks to conditions or practices in the judge’s courtroom” and noting its prior opinion was “laser-targeted” toward that specific trial judge]; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(d), superseding *Clark, supra*, to the extent it implied a published opinion could not be cited before it was final.)

2. Non-California opinions and proceedings cited to California courts

In prohibiting citation of an unpublished opinion, California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115 expressly refers to opinions of the “California Court of Appeal or superior court appellate division.” It applies only to proceedings in California courts. A unpublished opinion from another court, such as a federal court or the court of another state, may be cited and relied on in a California proceeding. (E.g., Moss v. Kroner (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 860, 874, fn. 6.) If a cited opinion is available only in a computer data base, a copy must be attached to the document in which it is cited. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(c).)

3. Unpublished California opinions cited to non-California courts

A unpublished California opinion may be cited in proceedings in another jurisdiction if the law of that jurisdiction permits.

4. Federal courts and other jurisdictions with selective publication

In a jurisdiction with selective publication, citation to or reliance on unpublished cases in the courts of the jurisdiction may be restricted.

For example, with some exceptions unpublished opinions of the Ninth Circuit decided before January 1, 2007, cannot be cited to the courts of the circuit, and those opinions are not precedent. (U.S. Cir. Ct. Rules11 (9th Cir.), rule 36-3(a) & (b).) By order of April 12, 2006, however, the United States Supreme Court directed that all unpublished decisions of the federal courts issued on or after January 1, 2007, may be cited to federal courts. (Fed. Rules App. Proc.,12 rule 32.1 [“Citing Judicial Dispositions”].)

12https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frap
C. What Gets Published and How [§ 7.17]

The California Constitution gives the Supreme Court authority to determine which decisions will be published. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14; Gov. Code, § 68902.) All opinions of the California Supreme Court are published in full. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(a).)

Opinions of the Court of Appeal and appellate division of the superior court are published if the rendering panel or the Supreme Court so orders.

1. Standards for publication of Court of Appeal opinions [§ 7.18]

An opinion of the Court of Appeal is published if a majority of the rendering panel certifies it for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(b).) The court considers whether the opinion meets the standards of rule 8.1105(c).

Rule 8.1105(c) and (d), California Rules of Court, creates a presumption in favor of publication if the opinion meets certain listed criteria. The rule also identifies factors that should not be considered in deciding whether to certify an opinion for publication, such as court workload or embarrassment to attorneys, litigants, judges or others. The provisions in rule 8.1105 include:

(c) Standards for certification

An opinion of a Court of Appeal or a superior court appellate division – whether it affirms or reverses a trial court order or judgment – should be certified for publication in the Official Reports if the opinion:

1. Establishes a new rule of law;
2. Applies an existing rule of law to a set of facts significantly different from those stated in published opinions;
3. Modifies, explains, or criticizes with reasons given, an existing rule of law;
4. Advances a new interpretation, clarification, criticism, or construction of a provision of a constitution, statute, ordinance, or court rule;
5. Addresses or creates an apparent conflict in the law;
6. Involves a legal issue of continuing public interest;
7. Makes a significant contribution to legal literature by reviewing either the development of a common law rule or the legislative or judicial history of a provision of a constitution, statute, or other written law;
8. Invokes a previously overlooked rule of law, or reaffirms a principle of law not applied in a recently reported decision; or
9. Is accompanied by a separate opinion concurring or dissenting on a legal issue, and publication of the majority and separate opinions would make a significant contribution to the development of the law.
Factors not to be considered

Factors such as the workload of the court, or the potential embarrassment of a litigant, lawyer, judge, or other person should not affect the determination of whether to publish an opinion.

Partial publication of those sections of opinions meeting these criteria may also be ordered. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1110.)

2. Publication of opinions not originally ordered published [§ 7.19]

An originally unpublished opinion may later be ordered published by court order, on a court’s own motion or on request of a party or other interested person. The order for publication makes it citable precedent. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(d).)

a. Court order [§ 7.20]

The Court of Appeal rendering the decision may order publication until the case becomes final as to that court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(b); see rules 8.366(b) and 8.470; see also § 7.29 et seq., post, on finality.)

The Supreme Court at any time may order publication of a Court of Appeal opinion that was not certified for publication by the Court of Appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(e)(2).) An order for publication does not mean the Supreme Court is expressing an opinion about the correctness of the result or law. (Rule 8.1120(d); see People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 592, fn. 8.)

b. Request for publication [§ 7.21]

Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a), any party or other interested person may request by letter that the Court of Appeal certify the opinion for publication. The request for publication must be made within 20 days after the opinion

13 It is conventional to address a letter to the court to the head clerk, asking him or her to forward it to the court, rather than writing to the justices personally.

14 Unpublished opinions are available online at:
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions-nonpub.htm
Published opinions are available on the court website at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions-slip.htm
is filed. (Rule 8.1120(a)(3).) It must state the person’s interest and the reason why the opinion meets a standard for publication. (Rule 8.1120(a)(2).) To be persuasive, it should cite policy reasons, as well. The request must be accompanied by a proof of service on each party in the Court of Appeal proceeding. (Rule 8.1120(a)(4).) An original and one copy must be filed in the Court of Appeal.15 (Rule 8.44(b)(6).)

The Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to act on such a request until the judgment becomes final as to that court – normally, 30 days after the date the opinion was filed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.264, 8.366(b), 8.470, and § 7.29 et seq., post, on finality.) If the court denies the request or has lost jurisdiction to act on it, it must forward the request, with its recommendation and reasons, to the Supreme Court, which will order or deny publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1120(b).)

D. What Gets Depublished and How  [§ 7.22]

1. California Supreme Court opinions  [§ 7.23]

A Supreme Court opinion is superseded and is not published if the Supreme Court grants rehearing. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(e)(1).)

An opinion of the California Supreme Court remains published even when the United States Supreme Court grants certiorari. The California Supreme Court opinion is binding on lower California courts pending the United States Supreme Court decision. (People v. Jaramillo (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 196, 197-198.) If the United States Supreme Court reverses, the California Supreme Court decision remains published and is binding precedent on any point not in conflict with the United States Supreme Court’s decision.

2. Court of Appeal opinions  [§ 7.24]

A Court of Appeal opinion originally published may lose its publication status and become uncitable in several ways.

Commercial computerized legal research resources also include unpublished opinions.

15Some courts may ask for additional copies of the request. It is a good idea to call the clerk’s office about local practice.
a. **Rehearing or review**  [§ 7.25]

A grant of rehearing prevents publication of the original opinion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(e)(1).) The new opinion on rehearing will supersedes the original opinion and will be published only if so certified.

For cases granted review before July 1, 2016, a grant of review by the Supreme Court supersedes the lower court opinion, and the opinion, if previously certified for publication, is decertified by the grant of review. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(e)(1).) For cases granted review on or after July 1, 2016, a published case remains published and citable, but has no binding effect under *Auto Equity Sales, Inc.* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450. Its review-granted status must be prominently noted. (California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(e)(1)(B), 8.1115(e); see ADI News Alerts on this rule – June 16, 2016, August 29, 2016.17)

The Supreme Court may order a lower court opinion to be published or depublished in whole or in part at any time after granting review (rule 8.1105(e)(2)).

b. **Order of Supreme Court**  [§ 7.26]

The Supreme Court may order depublication of a Court of Appeal or superior court appellate division opinion that was originally certified for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(e)(2).) It may do so on denial of review, at the request of a party or other interested person (see § 7.27, post), or on the court’s own motion. Depublication is not an expression by the Supreme Court about the correctness of the result or the law in the opinion. (Rule 8.1125(d); *People v. Saunders* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 592, fn. 8.) There is no time limit to the Supreme Court’s power to depublish; a case can be depublished years after it is otherwise final, although such late action is rarely taken.

c. **Request for depublication**  [§ 7.27]

Any person, whether or not a party, may request the Supreme Court to order depublication of a published opinion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1125(a)(1).) The request must not be part of a petition for review. Instead, it must be by a letter to the Supreme Court within 30 days after the case becomes final as to the Court of Appeal.


(Rule 8.1125(a)(2) & (4); see rules 8.264, 8.366(b), 8.470, and § 7.29 et seq., post, on finality.) The request must not exceed 10 pages and must state the nature of the person’s interest and the reasons the opinion should not be published. (Rule 8.1125(a)(2) & (3).) It must be accompanied by proof of service on the rendering court and on each party. (Rule 8.1125(a)(5).)

The letter may be submitted via TrueFiling or in paper form. (Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing, rules 3(a)(1)(G), 4(c).) If the letter is TrueFiled, an unbound paper copy must be submitted, as well. (SCRREF, rule 5(a).) If the letter is in paper form, rule 8.44(a)(6) requires an original and one copy to be filed in the Supreme Court, but in practice the court wants additional copies. It is a good idea to check with the Supreme Court clerk’s office about current expectations.

The Court of Appeal or any person may, within 10 days after the Supreme Court receives a depublication request, file a response either joining the request or giving reasons in opposition. A response submitted by anyone other than the rendering court must state the nature of the person’s interest. A response must be accompanied by proof of service on the Court of Appeal, each party, and each person requesting depublication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1125(b).)
IV. DISPOSITION AND POST-DECISION PROCESSES IN COURT OF APPEAL

[§ 7.28]

**CAVEAT:** The California appellate courts have made significant progress toward universal use of the TrueFiling system for attorney filings. Counsel and other users must always check with the project, court clerk’s office, or court website\(^\text{18}\) to determine whether TrueFiling is available or mandatory for a particular filing in a particular court.

**Courts of Appeal:** As of October 30, 2017, TrueFiling is mandatory for attorney filings in the Courts of Appeal.\(^\text{19}\) It is governed by rules 8.70 through 8.79\(^\text{20}\) of the California Rules of Court. These rules change procedures for filing with the court and also prescribe some formatting changes. Always check for any supplemental local requirements, which may affect pagination, bookmarks, security and safety of documents, signatures, number of copies, manner of filing and service, verification of filing, proof of service, etc. The Courts of Appeal have web pages\(^\text{21}\) spelling this out.

**Supreme Court:** The Supreme Court has issued its own rules for electronic filing of petitions for review and related filings,\(^\text{22}\) as well as capital proceedings. It requires a paper copy, as well. As of this revision of the Manual (Sept. 2017), TrueFiling in the Supreme Court does not yet cover filings in review-granted cases, non-capital original proceedings, or similar actions.

The ADI website has a “Summary of Filing and Service Requirements.”\(^\text{23}\) The electronic service\(^\text{24}\) web page and CHEAT SHEET\(^\text{25}\) provide additional information.

\(^\text{18}\) [http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm](http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm). Each Court of Appeal has a tab for “Electronic Filing” or “Electronic Filing / Submissions” that provides current guidance.

\(^\text{19}\) TrueFiling becomes mandatory in the Second District on October 30, 2017. It was the last district to adopt it.

\(^\text{20}\) [http://www.courts.ca.gov/rules.htm](http://www.courts.ca.gov/rules.htm)

\(^\text{21}\) [http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm](http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm)


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A. Disposition [§ 7.28A]

Penal Code section 1260 sets forth the authority of the reviewing court in ordering a disposition on appeal:

The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment or order appealed from, or reduce the degree of the offense or attempted offense or the punishment imposed, and may set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, such judgment or order, and may, if proper, order a new trial and may, if proper, remand the cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances.

The power to modify the judgment includes reducing the conviction to a lesser included offense if the evidence is insufficient as to the greater offense but sufficient as to the latter. (E.g., People v. Ruiz (1975) 14 Cal.3d 163, 165 [modifying conviction for possession of heroin for sale to simple possession of heroin]; People v. Noah (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 477 [modifying conviction for assault by a prisoner serving less than a life sentence to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury].) It does not include reducing the conviction to more than one lesser included offense. (People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668; cf. People v. Eid (2014) 59 Cal.4th 650.)

A reversal in a defendant’s appeal is deemed to be an order for a new trial unless the appellate court directs otherwise. (Pen. Code, § 1262.)


The filing of the opinion does not conclude the case legally: it is over only when no further appellate processes are available. The opinion may or may not conclude the case from a practical point of view: either party may decide to continue the litigation, or they both may decide further proceedings would be futile.

B. Finality of Decision as to Rendering Court  [§ 7.29]

This section discusses finality as it applies to decisions by the Court of Appeal as the rendering court. “Rendering court finality” means that the court making the decision has lost jurisdiction to modify or rehear it. “Finality” has different meanings in different contexts.26 (See In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593, 596.)

1. Time of finality  [§ 7.30]

Most Court of Appeal decisions become final as to the Court of Appeal 30 days after filing. At that point, the Court of Appeal loses jurisdiction to modify the opinion, grant rehearing, or order publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.264(b)(1) & (c), 8.268(a), 8.366(b)(1), 8.387(b)(1), 8.470, 8.490(b)(2), 8.1105(b).) Grants of a writ, denials of a writ after issuance of an alternative writ or order to show cause, and involuntary dismissals of an appeal, as well as appellate opinions on the merits, are among these decisions.27

26 For example, a judgment becomes final for purposes of a given court when the court loses jurisdiction. A judgment becomes final for California appellate review purposes as a whole when the time has passed for either the Court of Appeal or the California Supreme Court to review it under those courts’ appellate jurisdiction.

For purposes of starting the federal habeas corpus statute of limitations, the direct review process becomes final when no further appellate review is possible, including a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); see § 7.100, post; § 9.5 of chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”)


27 An interim order can be reconsidered sua sponte as long as the court has jurisdiction over the cause. (LaFrancois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094 [statute limiting power to reconsider interim rulings sua sponte would violate separation of powers]; Case v. Lazben Financial Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 172.) For purposes of petitioning for review from an interlocutory order, however, the order is “final” as to the Court of

20
Certain decisions are final immediately. The denial of a writ petition without the issuance of an alternative writ or order to show cause is usually final immediately (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.387(b)(2)(A), 8.490(b)(1)), except that the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus becomes final in 30 days if it is filed on the same day as the opinion in a related appeal (rule 8.387(b)(2)(B)). A voluntary dismissal under rule 8.366(c) or 8.411(b)(2) is also final immediately. (Rules 8.366(b)(2)(B), 8.470.)

2. Change in judgment or publication status  [§ 7.31]

When the court modifies the opinion after filing, the time for finality starts to run from the filing of the modification order if the modification changes the judgment. If the modification does not change the judgment, the original finality date applies. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.264(c)(2), 8.366(b)(4), 8.387(d)(2), 8.470, 8.490(b)(5).) The modification order must specify whether it changes the judgment.

If the court orders publication (whole or partial) after the opinion is filed, the finality period runs from the date of the order for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.264(b)(3), 8.366(b)(3), 8.470, 8.387(b)(3)(B), 8.490(b)(4).)

3. Modification of finality date  [§ 7.32]

The Court of Appeal may order early or immediate finality on its own motion when granting a peremptory writ petition or denying a writ petition after issuance of an alternative writ or order to show cause, “[i]f necessary to prevent mootness or frustration of the relief granted or to otherwise promote the interests of justice.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.387(b)(3)(A), 8.490(b)(3).) Such an order applies only to the Court of Appeal’s own jurisdiction; it does not make the case final for all appellate purposes, because the opposing party still has the right to petition for review and the Supreme Court retains power to grant review within rule time, either on a petition or on its own motion. (See Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 33-34 [Court of Appeal cannot issue actual writ until the case is final as to Supreme Court]; rule 8.512(b) & (c).)

The Court of Appeal has no direct power to extend rendering court finality. The court may accomplish that result indirectly by granting a rehearing. (See § 7.33 et seq., post.)

Apology in 30 days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(a)(1) & (e).)
C. Rehearing  [§ 7.33]

The Court of Appeal may grant rehearing on a petition or on its own motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.268(a), 8.366(a), 8.387(e), 8.470.) A petition for rehearing is generally a brief argument contending the Court of Appeal should reconsider its decision because of errors or omissions in its analysis of the facts, the issues, or the law.

See CAVEAT at § 7.28, ante, for possible electronic filing and service exceptions to the rules that follow.

1. Grounds for rehearing  [§ 7.34]

The grounds for granting rehearing are not defined by statutes or rules; some guiding principles emerge, however, from case precedent and established practice. The petition is most often needed to call the court’s attention to significant and material errors, such as a misstatement of fact, an error of law, an omission in the facts or law, or failure to consider an argument raised in the brief.

Reliance in the opinion on a theory not briefed by the parties is another ground. (Gov. Code, § 68081; see People v. Alice (2007) 41 Cal.4th 668, 677-679; In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 812; Adoption of Alexander S. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 857, 864; California Casualty Ins. Co. v. Appellate Department (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1149.) A petition for rehearing can be used when a strongly supportive case has just been decided, but that accident of timing is pretty rare. Occasionally a petition for rehearing might be tried to offer a new and especially compelling way of viewing a contention already raised, but the likelihood of persuading the court to go the other way at this point is remote. Such a use should not be routine.

A petition for rehearing generally is not appropriate merely to reargue the points made in briefs and rejected, if it appears the court properly understood the points and supporting authorities and simply disagreed with the conclusion being urged.

Generally, the petition should not address points that were not included in the briefs on appeal. (Blackman v. MacCoy (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 873, 881-882; but cf. In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 301, fn. 5.) An exception is jurisdictional issues, which may be raised at any time. (Sime v. Malouf (1950) 95 Cal.App.2d 82, 115-117.) Further exceptions might be made for issues based on new developments in the law or other good cause. (Mounts v. Uyeda (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 111, 120-121.)
Naturally, it is imperative to file a petition for rehearing if there are good grounds and correcting the problem in the opinion could materially affect the outcome of the case. Even if the correction would not affect the outcome, it is important the opinion accurately reflect the facts and issues “for the record,” in the event any aspect of the appeal ever becomes material in a later proceeding. (See, e.g., *People v. Woodell* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448 [appellate opinion in prior case considered as evidence of underlying fact stated in opinion].)

2. Rule 8.500(c): petition for rehearing required in order to raise errors or omissions in Court of Appeal opinion as grounds for petition for review [§ 7.35]

Although a petition for rehearing is not generally a prerequisite for a petition for review, it is required if review is sought on the ground the Court of Appeal opinion contained errors or omissions of issues or facts. Rule 8.500(c) of the California Rules of Court provides:

(1) As a policy matter, on petition for review the Supreme Court normally will not consider an issue that the petitioner failed to timely raise in the Court of Appeal.

(2) A party may petition for review without petitioning for rehearing in the Court of Appeal, but as a policy matter the Supreme Court normally will accept the Court of Appeal opinion’s statement of the issues and facts unless the party has called the Court of Appeal’s attention to any alleged omission or misstatement of an issue or fact in a petition for rehearing.

The purpose of rule 8.500(c)(2) is to make Supreme Court review unnecessary just to correct obvious oversights of fact or law by the Court of Appeal, which it would have corrected if the errors had been pointed out in a petition for rehearing.28 If the attorney does not intend to file a petition for review but the client wants to continue in pro per, the attorney should preserve it for the client by seeking to cure the error or omission; such a

28If a case is in Division Two of the Fourth Appellate District, which provides tentative opinions, counsel may call attention to an error or omission after receiving the tentative. (See § 6.10 et seq. of chapter 6, “Effective Use of the Spoken Word on Appeal: Oral Argument.”) If the court does not correct the problem in the final opinion, counsel should still file a petition for rehearing if a petition for review is contemplated, as a precaution against potential procedural default under rule 8.500(c)(2)
correction is a legitimate ground for rehearing, and as a practical matter, few clients would be able to prepare a petition for rehearing within rule time limits.\textsuperscript{29}

3. Formal requirements for petition for rehearing \textsuperscript{[§ 7.36]}

Information about filing and service requirements is summarized on ADI’s Filing and Service pages.\textsuperscript{30}

See CAVEAT at § 7.28, \textit{ante}, for electronic filing and service requirements.

Rule 8.268 of the California Rules of Court governs petitions for rehearing. (Rules 8.366-8.368, 8.470-8.472.) Rule 8.70 et seq. and requirements posted on the web page of each appellate district\textsuperscript{31} govern TrueFiling of petitions for rehearing.

a. Time limits \textsuperscript{[§ 7.37]}

The date of the appellate opinion’s filing is the controlling date in calculating time limitations. A petition for rehearing must be served and filed within 15 days after the filing of the decision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.268(b)(1); see also rule 8.25.) The presiding justice may grant leave to file a late petition for good cause if the opinion is not yet final. (Rule 8.268(b)(4).)

An order for publication made after the opinion is filed restarts the 15-day period, unless the party has already filed a petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.268(b)(1)(B).) A modification to the opinion changing the judgment also restarts the period.\textsuperscript{32} (Rule 8.268(b)(1)(C).)

\textsuperscript{29}Some courts take the position that clients represented by counsel have no standing to file in pro per and refuse to accept a petition for rehearing submitted by the client. A procedural way around that problem, if the client wants to file in pro per, would be for counsel to ask to be relieved right after the decision not to proceed further is made.

\textsuperscript{30}\url{http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/filing_service_chart.asp}

\textsuperscript{31}\url{http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm}

\textsuperscript{32}The Court of Appeal order modifying the opinion must state whether the judgment is being changed. (Rule 8.264(c)(2).)
b. Format  [§ 7.38]

Petitions for rehearing must conform to the provisions of California Rules of Court, rules 8.70 et seq., 8.204, 8.360, and 8.412(a), and requirements posted on the web page of each appellate district 33 governing TrueFiling of petitions for rehearing. 34 (Rules 8.268(b)(3).)

TrueFiling is optional for self-represented parties and those granted an excuse from electronic filing by court order. For paper filings, the cover is orange. (Rule 8.40(b)(1).)

c. Filing and service  [§ 7.39]

For petitions filed by an attorney, an original must be filed via TrueFiling in the Court of Appeal. The Sixth District requires an additional paper copy. (Check the web page of each appellate district 35 under Electronic Filing for special requirements and any changes.)

For petitions filed in paper form, an original and four copies must be submitted to the Court of Appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.44(b)(3).)

One copy must be served on each party represented by separate counsel and on opposing counsel. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.268, 8.25(a)(1).) By practice the superior court and, in criminal cases, the district attorney should also be served. A copy should be sent to the client unless he or she has requested otherwise. By policy, panel attorneys must also serve the appellate project.

4. Substantive content and tone  [§ 7.40]

Because the petition for rehearing contests the appellate opinion itself, the task of persuasion is a formidable one. The petition faces the obstacles of both institutional inertia (the court does not want to have to redo its work on the case) and, sometimes, personal psychological investment on the part of the justices (pride of authorship or resistance to acknowledging they were wrong).

33http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm

34TrueFiling becomes mandatory in the Second District on October 30, 2017.

35http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm
Counsel, too, may face emotional barriers when a decision is exceptionally disappointing. We sometimes suggest (semi-playfully) that, if the opinion seems outrageous, counsel may want to write a blistering petition for rehearing, which is then promptly put in a drawer for a cooling off period. In a short while counsel may then begin to draft the real petition for rehearing.

Counsel should strive to be compelling and concise and to explain exactly what the problem is and why it affects the client. At the same time, counsel must be sensitive to the court’s possible reactions and maintain an attitude of great respect. The tone should remain objective and avoid any intimation of personal criticism. Counsel should emphasize the importance of a correct decision and the injury to the client, not the court’s “foolishness” in making the error; it helps to use language critiquing the “opinion,” rather than the “court” or, surely, the author of the opinion.

A contemptuous or irate attitude is beneficial neither to the client’s interests nor to counsel’s stature before the court.36 Ideally counsel wants, not to target the court as an enemy or portray it unflatteringly, but to enlist the court as an ally, showing counsel’s confidence in and respect for the court’s desire to do justice and reach the right result, and its willingness to recognize and correct its own mistakes.

5. Answer [§ 7.41]

Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.268(b)(2), a party may not file an answer to a petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeal unless the court so requests; the rule indicates a petition for rehearing normally will not be granted unless the court has requested an answer. The answer should defend and reinforce the opinion of the court, conform to rules 8.70 et seq. and 8.204 and requirements posted on the web page of each appellate district37 governing TrueFiling.38 If filed in paper form by a self-represented party or one granted an excuse from TrueFiling by court order, the answer must have a blue cover. (Rules 8.268(b)(3), 8.40(b)(1).)

36In In re Koven (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 262, 264, 276-277, the court held in contempt an appellate counsel who, in a petition for rehearing, accused the court of “deliberate judicial dishonesty” and other misconduct.

37http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm

38TrueFiling becomes mandatory in the Second District on October 30, 2017. It was the last district to adopt it.
6. **Disposition**  [§ 7.42]

   A rehearing may be granted on a petition, or on the court’s own motion, before the decision becomes final. Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b), a decision of the Court of Appeal normally becomes final 30 days after filing, and thereafter the court loses jurisdiction over the cause. If the court fails to act on a petition while it has jurisdiction, then the petition is deemed denied. (Rules 8.268(c).)

   The court may deny the petition for rehearing, yet still modify the original opinion. If the order for modification does not change the judgment, the date of finality and the time to petition for review in the Supreme Court are not extended. However, if the order changes the judgment, then the clock begins to run anew from the date of the modification, for purposes of finality and petitioning for rehearing and review. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.264(c)(2), 8.268(b)(1)(C).) The order modifying the opinion must state whether the judgment is being changed. (Rule 8.264(c)(2).)

   An order for publication issued after the opinion is filed resets the date of finality. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b).)

D. **Remittitur**  [§ 7.43]

   The remittitur is the document sent by the reviewing court to the court or other tribunal whose judgment was reviewed. A remittitur is issued after an appeal or original proceeding, except on the summary denial of a writ petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.272(a)(2), 8.366(a)-8.368, 8.387(f), 8.470-8.472, 8.490(c), 8.540(a).)

   The remittitur functions as a transfer of jurisdiction from the appellate court to the lower court. (Gallenkamp v. Superior Court (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1, 8-10.) Policy considerations require that only one court have jurisdiction over a case at any given time. The filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction and vests it in the Court of Appeal. (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 554.) The remittitur revests it in the lower court.

   The essence of remittitur is the returning or revesting of jurisdiction in an inferior court by a reviewing court. The reviewing court loses jurisdiction at the time of remittitur and the inferior court regains jurisdiction.

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39For a discussion of finality, see § 7.29 et seq., ante.  
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(Gallenkamp, at p. 10.) Until the remittitur issues, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to retry a case or, with certain exceptions, make other orders. (People v. Sonoqui (1934) 1 Cal.2d 364, 365-367; People v. Saunoa (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 870.)

If further proceedings in the trial court are ordered, the scope of the trial court’s authority is limited by the terms of the remittitur. (Code Civ. Proc., § 43; Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701; Hampton v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 652, 656; Puritan Leasing Co. v. Superior Court (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 140, 147; cf. People v. Rosas (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 107 [authority to lower restitution order even if that issue not addressed on original appeal].) This is true even if a later decision of a higher court casts doubt on the correctness of the decision. (People v. Dutra (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1359.)

A remittitur from the Court of Appeal normally goes to the superior court. A Supreme Court remittitur goes to the Court of Appeal in a review-granted case and to the lower court or tribunal in other types of proceedings. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.540(b).)

1. Issuance  

   Court of Appeal remittiturs are governed by rule 8.272 of the California Rules of Court. They are issued when a case is final for state appellate purposes, i.e., no further appellate review within the California judicial system is available. (Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court or original post-conviction writ remedies may still be open.)

   If no review in the California Supreme Court is sought, the remittitur for a Court of Appeal opinion will be issued when the time for the Supreme Court to grant review expires – normally on the 61st day after the opinion’s filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(b)(1)(A).) The Supreme Court may extend that time when it is considering granting review on its own motion. (Rule 8.512(c)(1).)

   If review is sought, the remittitur will issue immediately upon a denial of the petition for review or dismissal of review. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(b)(1)(A).)

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40For example, the trial court retains authority to correct clerical error, correct custody credits or fines and fees (Pen. Code, §§ 1237.1, 1237.2), recall the sentence (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)), modify or revoke probation, and make orders in juvenile cases. It also has jurisdiction to issue writs related to the case not inconsistent with the appellate court’s jurisdiction over the underlying judgment.
If review is granted and the case is decided by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court will issue a remittitur to the Court of Appeal, which in turn will act on it. If it calls for further proceedings in the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal will follow the directions from the Supreme Court. If not, the Court of Appeal will immediately issue its remittitur to the superior court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.272(b)(2), 8.540.)

The Court of Appeal may order immediate issuance of a remittitur on stipulation of the parties or voluntary dismissal of the appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.272(c)(1), 8.316(b)(2), 8.366(a), 8.411(b)(2), 8.470; see also rule 8.244(b) & (c).) The court may stay issuance of the remittitur for a reasonable period. (Rules 8.272(c)(2).)

2. Recall [§ 7.45]

For good cause the court may recall the remittitur on its own or a party’s motion, thereby reinvesting jurisdiction over the case in the appellate court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(c)(2).) Good cause may consist of such grounds as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel or a change in the law abrogating the basis for the previous judgment. (E.g., People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 396-397; In re Smith (1970) 3 Cal.3d 192, 203-204; People v. Valenzuela (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 381, 388, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 484, 490, fn.12; People v. Lewis (2006) 139 Cal. App.4th 874, 879.) The recall order does not supersede the opinion or affect its publication status. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.272(c)(3).) As the court explained in In re Grunau (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 997, 1002:

By recalling the remittitur, an appellate court reasserts jurisdiction on the basis that the remittitur, or more often the judgment it transmitted, was procured by some improper or defective means. Technically the court does not reclaim a jurisdiction it has lost, but disregards a relinquishment of jurisdiction that is shown to have been vitiated.

In criminal cases, a petition for writ of habeas corpus may be the vehicle for requesting the remittitur be recalled. (People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 396-397; In re Smith (1970) 3 Cal.3d 192, 203-204; People v. Valenzuela (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 381, 388, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 484-490, fn. 12; see § 8.62 of chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies.”)
V. PETITIONS FOR REVIEW IN THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

[§ 7.46]

See CAVEAT at § 7.28, ante, for electronic filing and service modifications to the California Rules of Court on petitions for review.

If the case presents a new or important question of law or an issue on which districts or divisions of the Court of Appeal are in conflict, or if it is necessary to exhaust state remedies in order to preserve an argument for subsequent federal review, a petition for review in the California Supreme Court should be considered. A petition should be filed if it seems (a) appropriate given the criteria for petitions and (b) reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests. The fact the client or attorney disagrees with the Court of Appeal or is unhappy with its reasoning is usually not itself a sufficient reason for petitioning. The decision whether to seek review should be made soon after the Court of Appeal opinion is filed.

If counsel decides not to file a petition, the client must be notified promptly and provided with information on how to file a petition for review in pro per, including the date by which the petition must be filed and the address of the Supreme Court.

41Exhaustion of state remedies is a valid consideration if the client has a serious potential federal issue that has been raised adequately in the Court of Appeal. It is not appropriate to petition “just in case something should come up in the federal courts.” See § 7.70, post, on abbreviated petitions for review to exhaust state remedies. See also § 9.66 et seq. of chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus,” on steps to take to preserve federal issues.

42An occasional exception can occur when the Court of Appeal has obviously misapplied undisputed law or denied the appellant procedural due process during the appeal. In that situation the Supreme Court has occasionally granted review and transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with directions. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.500(b)(4), 8.528(d); e.g., People v. Thomas (March 16, 2005, No. S130587) 108 P.3d 860, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 301, 2005 Cal. Lexis 2771; see §§ 7.79 and 7.94, post.)

43Petition for review information forms for clients are on the forms and samples page of the ADI website: http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples.asp. Basic information is on the court website at http://www.courts.ca.gov/2962.htm. As to the latter, assure the client that some of the information (e.g., on filing fees) does not apply to criminal or juvenile cases.
If the outcome in the Court of Appeal was mixed – a victory in part and a loss in part – counsel should evaluate whether a petition for review on the losing issue(s) is called for and advise the client accordingly, but should leave it up to the client to decide whether to proceed, since doing so could risk losing the partial victory already in hand.44

A. Grounds for Review and Factors Relevant to the Discretionary Decision

[§ 7.47]

The grounds for review in the Supreme Court are found in California Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b).

Review by the Supreme Court of a decision of a Court of Appeal may be ordered when: (1) it appears necessary to secure uniformity of decision or to settle important questions of law, (2) the Court of Appeal was without jurisdiction, (3) because of disqualification or other reason the decision of the Court of Appeal lacked the concurrence of the required majority of the qualified judges, and (4) the Supreme Court determines further proceedings in the Court of Appeal are necessary.

The Supreme Court grants review in roughly two to five percent of the petitions for review filed.45 One of the reasons for this low percentage is that the dominant role of the Supreme Court is supervisory. It promotes justice, not necessarily by ensuring the correct result is reached in each individual case, but by maintaining uniformity in the decisional law and overseeing the development of the law.

The Supreme Court may, on its own motion, order review of the Court of Appeal decision (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(c)(1)). (E.g., Maas v. Superior Court (People), review granted March 25, 2015, S225109; People v. Buycks, review granted January 20, 2016, S231765.) During the pendency of a case in the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court may also order the case transferred to itself, on its own or a party’s motion. (Rule 8.552(a); e.g., People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1256.)

44Even if opposing counsel does not file a petition for review, rule 8.504(c) of the California Rules of Court allows him or her to file an answer to the client’s petition, raising additional issues to be considered in the event review is granted.

The court’s internal procedures for making these decisions are discussed in § 7.74 et seq., post.

1. Uniformity of decision [§ 7.48]

The likelihood that conflicting appellate authority will prompt the Supreme Court to grant review depends on a number of factors. These include the ages of the conflicting cases, the importance of the issue, the frequency with which it arises, and the extent to which other courts have questioned or followed the various conflicting cases.

2. Important questions of law [§ 7.49]

Among the factors relevant to the Supreme Court’s judgment that a legal question is an important one warranting review are issues of first impression; issues of broad or frequent applicability; differences between California law and the law of other states, treatises, or restatements; criticism of California law by other courts or commentators; the joinder of amicus curiae in the petition; statistics, reports, commentaries, and news articles suggesting the issues are likely to recur; and the impact of the issue on the judicial system. (See Appellate Court Committee, San Diego County Bar Association, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001) § 8.81, pp. 307-330; see also the Supreme Court Internal Operating Practices and Procedures, published in the Supreme Court Booklet. Another consideration may be the quantity of pending cases with the same issue.

The fact an opinion is published increases the likelihood review will be granted, as does the existence of concurring or dissenting opinions substantially at odds with the majority reasoning.

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46 This handbook is no longer published and has not been updated since 2001, but may be available in libraries and appellate offices. It does offer excellent guidance for appellate practitioners.

47 The Supreme Court of California (7th ed.): Containing Internal Operating Practices and Procedures of the California Supreme Court. The Internal Operating Practices and Procedures of the court begin at page 25 of this Booklet.
3. **Other grounds under rule 8.500(b) [§ 7.50]**

The second and third grounds for review under California Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b) (lack of jurisdiction in the Court of Appeal and lack of a majority) seldom arise. (Cf. *Pennix v. Winton* (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 761, 777.)

The Supreme Court does exercise with some regularity its power under the fourth ground to grant review and transfer a matter to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b)(4).) This procedure is used often when the Court of Appeal proceedings were improperly truncated (for example, by the summary denial of a writ petition or the dismissal of an appeal), when new law may affect the Court of Appeal decision, or when the Court of Appeal made a clear error that needs correction but not plenary Supreme Court review.\(^{48}\)

4. **Considerations apart from rule 8.500(b) listed grounds [§ 7.51]**

The Supreme Court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant review. On the one hand, the court may grant review even when grounds under California Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b) are technically absent – as when it sees a serious injustice or error in the individual case – although a grant of review for this reason is relatively infrequent.

On the other hand, very often the court does not grant review despite the presence of one or more conditions under California Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b). For example, in a case involving an extremely important issue of law, the Supreme Court may deny review because the Court of Appeal has settled the question in a manner that will adequately guide other courts. Similarly, the Supreme Court may decide not to intervene despite conflicting appellate court opinions because the issue is rare or its impact is minimal. Or the court may wish to defer consideration of an issue until it has been refined through repeated deliberations in the lower courts. Or the case may not be, for one reason or another, a good vehicle for deciding a particular issue.

\(^{48}\)In *People v. Thomas* (March 16, 2005, No. S130587) 108 P.3d 860, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 301, for example, the Court of Appeal had dismissed the appeal on the ground the notice of appeal was inadequate. The Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case to the Court of Appeal with directions to reinstate the appeal and deem the notice of appeal properly filed.
B. Formal Requirements for Petition [§ 7.52]

Information about filing and service requirements is summarized on ADI’s Filing and Service pages. See CAVEAT at § 7.28, ante, for possible electronic filing and service modifications to the California Rules of Court. The Supreme Court also has published Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing (SCRREF).

TrueFiling is mandatory for a petition for review filed by an attorney. (Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing, rule 3(a).) An unbound paper copy must also be submitted. (SCRREF, rule 5.)

Self-represented parties have a choice of using TrueFiling or filing in paper form. (Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing, rule 4.) The court may grant an excuse from TrueFiling under SCRREF, rule 6, for hardship, prejudice, or lack of technical feasibility.

1. Time limitation [§ 7.53]

A party seeking review must serve and file a petition for review within 10 days after the decision of the Court of Appeal becomes final. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(e)(1).)

An unbound paper copy of a petition for review submitted through TrueFiling must be delivered to a carrier or the court within two days of TrueFiling. If an immediate stay is requested, it must be received by the court on the day after TrueFiling. (Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing, rule 5.)

a. 30-day finality cases [§ 7.54]

Decisions of the Court of Appeal are usually final as to that court 30 days after filing of the decision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(1).) Grants of a writ, denials of a writ after issuance of an alternative writ or order to show cause, involuntary dismissals of an appeal, and interlocutory orders, as well as opinions in an appeal, are among these decisions. In most cases, therefore, a petition for review must be filed within the window period of 31-40 days after the filing of the Court of Appeal opinion.

49 http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/filing_service_chart.asp

50 An order for publication after the opinion is filed or a modification of the opinion changing the judgment restarts the period of finality. (Rule 8.264(b) & (c).)
As with other filing deadlines, if the 10th day falls on a non-business day, the due date is the next business day. (Code Civ. Proc., § 12a; Mauro B. v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 949, 955.)

Caveat re trap some attorneys have fallen into: If the day of finality is a non-business day, the 10-day period for filing a petition for review still starts on the non-business day. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(e)(1).) In other words, the “next business day” rule applies to the filing date, not to starting the clock on the petition for review.

b. Immediate finality cases  [§ 7.55]

Some decisions are final immediately and in those cases a petition for review must be filed within 10 days of the filing date of the decision denying or granting relief. For example, with the exception noted in § 7.56, post, the denial by the Court of Appeal of a petition for an original writ, when it has not issued an alternative writ or an order to show cause, is final immediately (i.e., on the date the denial is filed). (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.387(b)(2)(A), 8.490(b)(1); see also rules 8.452(i) and 8.456(h)(5) [finality in juvenile dependency statutory writs is governed by rule 8.490].) Other examples of immediately final decisions are denials of bail pending appeal, voluntary dismissals of an appeal, denials of a petition for writ of supersedeas, and denials of a transfer of a case within the appellate jurisdiction of the superior court. (Rules 8.264(b)(2), 8.366(b)(2), 8.470.)

Because of the tight time frame for immediate-finality cases, counsel must take care to monitor the Court of Appeal online docket closely and sign up for automatic e-mail notification on all writ cases, under both that case number and the number of any related appeal. (See chapter 1, “The ABC’s of Panel Membership: Basic Information for Appointed Counsel,” § 1.6.)

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51 See also Code of Civil Procedure section 12: “The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day, and including the last, unless the last day is a holiday, and then it is also excluded.”

52 To avoid confusion, the appellate courts have been advised to issue alternative writs or orders to show cause before setting writ matters for oral argument. (Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024-1025, fn.8.)
c. **Habeas corpus denial on same day as opinion in related appeal** [§ 7.56]

An exception to the rule of immediate finality for summary writ denials is that the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on the same day as a decision in a related appeal becomes final at the same time as the related appeal, even if no order to show cause has issued. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.387(b)(2)(B).) But *separate petitions for review are required* for the writ proceeding and the appeal if they were not consolidated in the Court of Appeal and no order to show cause was issued. (Rule 8.500(d).)

d. **Premature petition** [§ 7.57]

A petition for review submitted for filing before the Court of Appeal decision becomes final will be received and deemed filed the day after finality. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(e)(3).) (See October 2012 ADI caution about *routine early filing of petitions for review*. 53

e. **Extending time** [§ 7.58]

The time for filing a petition for review cannot be extended, but the Chief Justice may relieve a party from default from failure to file a timely petition if the time for the court to grant review on its own motion has not expired. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.500(e)(2), 8.512(c)(1).) In contrast, an extension of time to file an answer or reply may be granted. (Rules 8.500(e)(4) & (5), 8.60(b), and Advisory Committee comment to rule 8.500(e); see § 7.71, post.) No attorney should count on relief from default or an extension, however; the court can be parsimonious in granting such requests.

2. **Format** 54 [§ 7.59]

Except as otherwise provided in California Rules of Court, rule 8.504, a petition for review must comply with the provisions of rule 8.204, laying out the general rules for


54 See **CAVEAT** at § 7.28, *ante*, for possible electronic filing and service exceptions to these rules.
the form of appellate briefs. (Rule 8.504(a).) A petition filed by an attorney must also comply with the Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing.55

The original petition and each paper copy filed in the Supreme Court must contain or be accompanied by a copy of the opinion or order of the Court of Appeal for which review is sought and any order for modification or publication. (Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing,56 rule 10.) The service copies, however, do not require an attached opinion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.504(b)(4).) No other attachments are permitted except for an opinion required by rule 8.1115(c) [available only in computer-based source] or up to 10 pages of relevant lower court orders, exhibits, and citable regulations, rules, or other relatively non-accessible law. (Rule 8.504(e)(1) & (2).)

A petition submitted under TrueFiling must follow the formatting requirements of the Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing.SCRREF, rule 10(a), requires a text searchable PDF, pagination starting with the cover and running consecutively throughout the document (the attachments including the Court of Appeal opinion, need not be renumbered), and electronic bookmarks (only the first page of the opinion needs to be bookmarked, not internal headings). A file may not exceed 25 megabytes; if the petition exceeds that limit, it must be submitted as multiple files. (SCRREF, rule 10(b).)

The petition must follow California Rules of Court, rule 1.201 on excluding personal identifying information, as well as applicable provisions of rules 8.45-8.47 on sealed and confidential records. (Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing, rule 11.)

For paper filers, the cover of a petition for review is white. (Rule 8.40(b)(1).)

3. Length [§ 7.60]

If produced on a computer, a petition for review must not exceed 8,400 words including footnotes and must include a certificate by appellate counsel or an unrepresented party stating the number of words in the document. The certifying person may rely on the word count of the computer program used to prepare the document. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.504(d)(1).) Upon application, the Chief Justice may permit for


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good cause a petition greater than the specified length or the inclusion of more annexed material. (Rule 8.504(d)(4).)

4. **Filing and service**[^57]  [§ 7.61]

As mentioned in § 7.53, *ante*, TrueFiling is required for petitions filed by an attorney. (Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing, rule 3(a).) An unbound paper copy must be submitted, as well. (SCRREF, rule 5.)

Self-represented parties under Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing, rule 4(a), and those with an excuse granted by the court under SCRREF, rule 6, may file in paper form. Unless the petition is filed simply to exhaust state remedies under California Rules of Court, rule 8.508, an original and 13 copies of a paper petition for review or answer must be filed in the Supreme Court.[^58] (Rule 8.44(a)(4).)

A petition for review is filed when it has been received during business hours by the Supreme Court clerk’s office. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.25(b)(1).)

For paper filers: The petition is not filed on the date of mailing unless the provisions of California Rules of Court, rule 8.25(b)(3) are being used.[^59] The filer should provide an extra copy to be returned to him or her when conformed (file stamped by the court). In the rare instance when filed documents are lost, proof of filing within the time limit can be critical. The prison delivery rule applies: a petition filed by an incarcerated person is timely if the deadline had not expired when the petitioner delivered the petition to an appropriate prison official. (Rule 8.25(b)(5).)

If documents need immediate attention, they should prominently state the urgency on the cover. For instance, if the party seeks an immediate stay, the cover should state IMMEDIATE STAY REQUESTED. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.116(a).) In that

[^57]: See **CAVEAT** at § 7.28, *ante*, for possible electronic filing and service exceptions to these rules.

[^58]: An exhaustion-only paper petition under rule 8.508 requires only an original and eight copies. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.44(a)(4).)

[^59]: Under rule 8.25(b)(3) a petition for review (or other document) is timely “if the time to file it has not expired on the date of: (A) Its mailing by priority or express mail as shown on the postmark or the postal receipt; or (B) Its delivery to a common carrier promising overnight delivery as shown on the carrier’s receipt.”

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situation, the unbound paper copy required by Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing, rule 5, must be received by the next day after TrueFiling.

Service: One copy of the petition must be served on the superior court clerk and clerk of the Court of Appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(f)(1).) One copy must be served “on the attorney for each party separately represented, on each unrepresented party, and on any other person or entity when required by statute or rule.” (Rule 8.25(a)(1); see also rule 8.500(f).) Additionally, in appointed cases, by policy the applicable appellate project should be served. Some courts want the district attorney in criminal cases to be served. The client should also get a copy unless he or she has asked not to receive documents pertaining to the case.\footnote{Service copies do not require an attached opinion. (Rule 8.504(b)(4).)}

C. Purpose and Substantive Content \([\S 7.62]\)

1. Purpose of petition \([\S 7.63]\)

The objective of a petition for review (other than an exhaustion petition) is to obtain review, not reversal or affirmance. If the petition is granted, new briefs on the merits will be filed. Thus there is no reason to include extended merits briefing in the petition beyond what is required to ensure the court knows what the issues are and why further consideration of them is needed (for example, why the Court of Appeal’s treatment was inadequate or erroneous).

The critical function of a petition is to attract the interest of the Supreme Court and persuade it that review is necessary. Counsel’s persuasive skills should be focused on the message “Why you should hear this case,” not “Why my client should win.” Since the granting of petitions for review is completely discretionary and counsel is competing with numerous other briefs and petitions for the attention of the justices and their research attorneys, appellate counsel should make the petition as concise, interesting, and compelling as possible.

For this reason, the petition for review should not just repeat the arguments already rejected and try at length to persuade the Supreme Court on the merits. It should instead develop the theme of why review is necessary. Questions of law become more important when they have consequences beyond the individual case. It should point out any social or political concerns involved, any implications for the judicial system, and the frequency with which the issues arise. The petition should note any conflicts among the Courts of
Appeal and any dissenting or concurring opinions. The alleged incorrectness of the result reached in the Court of Appeal and injustice to the individual client would be factors to point out, but that will rarely suffice to differentiate the particular case from most others seeking review.

From this, it should go without saying that it is inappropriate simply to copy the briefs wholesale, stick on a new cover and an “Issues Presented” section, and file that as a petition for review. Such petitions are filed all the time, but they represent poor advocacy.

An exception might be when the sole purpose of the petition is to exhaust state remedies for federal purposes. See § 7.70, post. The objective of such a petition is not to persuade the Supreme Court of anything, but to present the issue in order to satisfy procedural requirements.

If a petition has a mix of merits issues and exhaustion issues, counsel should identify them clearly and present them in a manner appropriate to their purpose.

2. Content  [§ 7.64]

Rule 8.504(b) of the California Rules of Court prescribes the contents of a petition for review. It need not contain all of the elements of an opening brief, such as statement of appealability or of the facts and case, etc. Frequently counsel include such matters to help the court understand the issue, but they are not necessary and in some situations might be a distraction.

   a. Issues presented  [§ 7.65]

The body of the petition for review must begin with a concise, non-argumentative statement of the issues presented for review, framing them in terms of the facts of the case but without unnecessary detail, and the petition must explain how the case presents a

61 As discussed in § 7.11, ante, unpublished opinions may be useful in showing a conflict among courts, the frequency with which an issue arises, the general importance of the issue, and other facts relevant to granting review. When referring to unpublished cases for these purposes, counsel should avert possible criticism or misunderstanding by explicitly discussing California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), which prohibits reliance on a case not published, and by explaining why the references do not violate the rule. Counsel must also be scrupulous in confining the references to permitted purposes.
ground for review. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.504(b)(1) & (2); §§ 7.47 et seq. and 7.63, ante.) If rehearing was available, the petition must state whether it was sought and how the court ruled. (Rule 8.504(b)(3).)

b. **Required attachments** [§ 7.66]

The opinion or order sought to be reviewed, and any order modifying the opinion or directing its publication, are required attachments to a petition for review under California Rules of Court, rule 8.504(b)(4) and (5). No other attachments are permitted except an opinion required by rule 8.1115(c) [available only in computer-based source], and up to 10 pages of exhibits or orders of a trial court or Court of Appeal that the party considers unusually significant or relevant citable regulations, rules, or other relatively non-accessible law. (Rule 8.504(e)(1) & (2).) Incorporation by reference is prohibited, except for references to a petition, answer, or reply filed by another party in the same case or another case with the same or similar issues, in which a petition for review is pending or has been granted. (Rule 8.504(e)(3).)

c. **Argument** [§ 7.67]

The argument section of a petition for review should carry out the theme of why review is necessary – usually (1) to secure uniformity of decision or (2) to settle an important question of law. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b)(1); §§ 7.47 et seq. and 7.63, ante.) The argument should point out any social or political concerns implicated by the issues and any consequences beyond those related to the petitioner. It should alert the court to any other pending cases that raise identical or related issues and when appropriate may explain how the instant case highlights the issues more clearly than other pending cases.

d. **Depublication request** [§ 7.68]

In addition to or in lieu of review, a request for depublication may be made. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1125.) However, that measure offers no remedy to the individual client, and to the extent it suggests depublication is an adequate substitute for a grant of review, it may actually render a disservice to the client. Counsel therefore must be exceedingly cautious about making such a request and generally should eschew it. The

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62 Service copies do not require an attached opinion. (Rule 8.504(b)(4).)

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court can depublish on its own – and often does – without counsel’s request.\footnote{See § 7.27 for the formal requirements of a request for depublication.} (Rule 8.1105(e)(2).)

e. Alternative remedies \footnote{Often such a transfer will order reconsideration in light of a Supreme Court decision, but it may be based on Court of Appeal decisions, as well. (See, e.g., \textit{In re Henderson} (November 19, 2009, No. S177100) [petition for review granted an transferred to Court of Appeal “with instructions to vacate its opinion and reconsider its disposition in light of” two Court of Appeal decisions].)} [§ 7.69]

The petition for review may also suggest a disposition other than a full review and decision on the merits by the Supreme Court. An example would be a “grant and hold” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), when the issue is already pending in the Supreme Court. Another example would be a grant of review and transfer to the Court of Appeal with instructions (rules 8.500(b)(4), 8.528(d)); this might be appropriate when, for example, the Court of Appeal decision omits or misstates important matters, when a relevant new decision has been issued,\footnote{See \textbf{CAVEAT} at § 7.28, \textit{ante}, for possible electronic filing and service exceptions to these rules.} when the court has denied a writ petition summarily, or when the court has dismissed an appeal for improper reasons.

D. Abbreviated Petition To Exhaust State Remedies\footnote{See \textbf{CAVEAT} at § 7.28, \textit{ante}, for possible electronic filing and service exceptions to these rules.} [§ 7.70]

Rule 8.508 of the California Rules of Court permits an abbreviated petition for review when no grounds for review under rule 8.500(b) exist, but a petition for review is needed to exhaust state remedies for potential habeas corpus relief in federal court. The Supreme Court may still grant review if the case warrants it.
An exhaustion petition for review need not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.504(b)(1) and (2), which requires a non-exhaustion petition begin with a statement of the issues presented for review and explain how the case presents a ground for review under rule 8.500(b).66

The words “Petition for Review To Exhaust State Remedies” must appear prominently on the cover. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.508(b)(1).) The petition must comply with rule 8.504(b)(3) through (5). It must state it presents no grounds for review under rule 8.500(b) and is filed solely to exhaust state remedies for federal habeas corpus purposes. (Rule 8.508(b)(3)(A).)

An exhaustion petition for review must contain a brief statement of the underlying proceedings, including the conviction and punishment, and the factual and legal bases of the federal claims. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.508(b)(3)(B) & (C).) It is important for this statement to present the facts and issues sufficiently to exhaust state remedies under federal law. (For guidance on exhaustion, see § 9.66 et seq. of chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus,” and O’Connell, “Exhaustion” Petitions for Review Under Rule 8.508 (2004, rev. 2011).)67

E. Answer and Reply68 [§ 7.71]

Rule 8.500(a)(2) and (e)(4) of the California Rules of Court permits, but does not require, an answer to a petition for review. The answer is due within 20 days after the filing of the petition.69 A party may request an extension of time in which to file an

66Regular TrueFiling rules apply to an exhaustion petition. (Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing, rules 3, 5.) http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/supreme_court_of_california_rules_regarding_electronic_filing.pdf For a paper filer, only an original and eight copies need be filed in the Supreme Court – as opposed to an original and 13 for a non-exhaustion petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.44(a)(1) & (4).)


68See CAVEAT at § 7.28, ante, for possible electronic filing and service exceptions to these rules.

69Contrast Supreme Court rule with rules 8.268(b)(2), 8.366(a), and 8.470 (answer to petition for rehearing in Court of Appeal not permitted unless court so requests).
answer. (Rules 8.500(e)(4), 8.50(a), 8.60(b), and Advisory Committee comment to rule 8.500(e); contrast rule 8.500(e)(2), not permitting extensions to file petition for review.) An answer may ask the Supreme Court to address additional issues if the court grants review of any issue presented to the Court of Appeal but not mentioned in the petition for review. (Rule 8.500(a)(2).) When the Court of Appeal declined to reach important issues because it reversed on other grounds, an answer may be required to alert the Supreme Court to these issues. (See, e.g., In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 814, fn. 3.)

The answer should generally support the result reached in the Court of Appeal. (However, it may ask the Supreme Court to reconsider certain aspects of the Court of Appeal’s decision in the event review is granted.) It should point out any errors of fact or law in the petition for review. It may rebut the claimed need for the Supreme Court’s intervention, for example, by explaining why any decisional conflict is insignificant or disputing the importance of the issue being raised. If opposing counsel has failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2), which requires a petition for rehearing in certain cases, the answer should point out that omission.

The answer may not exceed 8,400 words including footnotes. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.504(d)(1).) Except as otherwise provided in rule 8.504, the answer must comply with the provisions of rule 8.204. (Rule 8.504(a).) Like the petition, TrueFiling is mandatory for an answer filed by an attorney, and an unbound paper copy must be submitted. (Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing, rules 3 and 5.)

For self-represented parties and those excused from electronic filing under Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing, rule 6, the rules for a paper petition apply, except that the cover of an answer is blue. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.40(b)(1).)

Within 10 days after the filing of the answer, the petitioner may serve and file a reply, not exceeding 4,200 words including footnotes. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.500(a)(3) & (e)(5), 8.504(d)(1).) A party may request an extension of time in which to file a reply. (Rules 8.500(e)(5), 8.50, 8.60(b); third paragraph of Advisory Committee Comment to rule 8.500(e).) The filing rules described above for the petition and answer apply.

F. Amicus Curiae [§ 7.72]

Amici curiae may file letters in support of or opposition to review (commonly called “me too” letters). They must comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.500(g). TrueFiling is optional. (Supreme Court Rules Regarding Electronic Filing, rule 3(a)(1)(G), 4(c).)
G. Disposition of Petition  [§ 7.73]

The Supreme Court must act within 60 days after the filing of a petition but may and often does extend the time to rule an additional 30 days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(b)(1).) The total time including extensions may not exceed 90 days after the filing of the last timely petition for review.70 (Ibid.)

Denials or dismissals of review and orders for transfer or retransfer are final immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.532(b)(2)(A) & (B).)

1. Preliminary screening process  [§ 7.74]

The processes for considering petitions for review are described in *The Supreme Court of California (7th ed.): Containing Internal Operating Practices and Procedures of the California Supreme Court*71 (the Booklet). The Internal Operating Practices and Procedures of the court begin at page 25 of the Booklet. The preliminary stage in the decision whether to grant review is staff screening of the petitions for review-worthiness. The Booklet describes the process:

- Staff attorneys at the Supreme Court assess petitions for review in non-capital criminal cases according to such criteria as significance, the likelihood of a grant, length, issues, and publication status. They prepare a memo and make a recommendation as to disposition. The recommendation set forth in a conference memorandum will generally be one of the following: (1) “grant,” (2) “grant and hold,” (3) “grant and transfer,” (4) “deny,” (5) “submitted,” meaning discussion warranted, (6) “denial submitted,” meaning deny but some issue could arguably justify a grant or warrants discussion by the court, or (7) “deny and depublish.” (Booklet, at p. 29.)

- Cases are assigned to either a “A” or the “B” list, according to the recommendation in the conference memorandum. Cases assigned to the A list include all those in which the recommendation is to grant or take affirmative action of some kind. They also include cases in which a dissenting opinion has

70 If no petition for review is filed by a party, the Supreme Court may order review on its own motion within 30 days of finality of the decision in the Court of Appeal. This time may be extended up to an additional 60 days. (Rule 8.512(c)(1).)

been filed in the Court of Appeal, or in which the memorandum recommends special attention. Cases assigned to the B list concern routine matters, or application of settled law, in which a simple denial is the recommended disposition. (Booklet, at p. 30.)

2. Decision  [§ 7.75]

The Supreme Court must rule within 60 days after the last petition for review is filed, although it may extend the time so that the total does not exceed 90 days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(b)(1).)

The justices meet approximately weekly to confer on pending matters. Matters on the “B” list will be denied. Matters on the “A” list are discussed and then voted on. Any justice may request that a case on either list be continued to a later conference for further consideration. (The Supreme Court of California (7th ed.): Containing Internal Operating Practices and Procedures of the California Supreme Court,72 at pp. 30-31.) A vote of at least four justices is required to grant review. (Rule 8.512(d)(1).)

a. Denial  [§ 7.76]

The Supreme Court most commonly denies petitions for review. A denial is final immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.532(b)(2)(A).)

b. Grant of full review  [§ 7.77]

The court may grant review by an order signed by at least four justices. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(1).)

Upon granting full review, the Supreme Court may and often does specify what issues are to be within the scope of the review. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.516(a)(1).) This order is not binding on the court, and it may later expand or contract review, as long as the parties are given an opportunity for argument. (Rule 8.516(a)(2).)

72http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/The_Supreme_Court_of_California_Booklet.pdf
c. **Grant and hold** [§ 7.78]

The Supreme Court may dispose of the petition other than by granting full review. In a “grant and hold” disposition, it grants the petition and holds the case pending decision in another case on which the court has granted review. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2).)

d. **Grant and transfer** [§ 7.79]

In a “grant and transfer” disposition, the court grants the petition and transfers the case back to the Court of Appeal, usually with instructions. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.500(b)(4), 8.528(d).) The court may choose this type of disposition when further action but not full Supreme Court review is needed – for example, when the Court of Appeal denied a writ petition summarily, when the opinion failed to consider substantial issues or authorities, or when a controlling decision was filed after the opinion. (See, e.g., *Davis v. Superior Court* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1272; *People v. Howard* (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 41, 45; *People v. Thomas* (March 16, 2005, No. S130587) 108 P.3d 860, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 301.)

A “grant and transfer” order is final immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.532(b)(2)(B).) Any supplemental briefing in the Court of Appeal after remand or transfer from the Supreme Court is governed by rule 8.200(b).73 (Rule 8.528(f).)

e. **Order affecting publication status** [§ 7.80]

The court may also deny the petition but publish or depublish the Court of Appeal opinion. Depublication leaves the opinion as the law of the case but prevents it from being cited as precedent in future cases. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a).) Neither publication nor depublication expresses the Supreme Court’s views about the correctness of the opinion. (Rules 8.1120(d), 8.1125(d).) See § 7.8 et seq., *ante*, for further discussion of publication.

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73 Rule 8.200(b)(1) imposes a short deadline of 15 days after the finality of the Supreme Court decision to file a supplemental brief, with 15 days for opposing counsel to respond. The brief is limited to matters arising after the previous Court of Appeal decision, unless the presiding justice permits other briefing. (Rule 8.200(b)(2).)
f. **Dismissal of review** [§ 7.81]

A grant of review can later be dismissed for any reason without Supreme Court decision. The court might do so, for example, if it no longer wishes to consider the issues, if the case was on a “grant and hold” and after the lead case has been decided the Supreme Court believes the Court of Appeal decision was substantially correct, or if the case becomes moot. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(b.).)

g. **Retransfer** [§ 7.82]

If the case had been transferred to the Supreme Court under California Rules of Court, rule 8.552 while pending in the Court of Appeal, it may be retransferred without decision. (Rule 8.528(e.).)

VI. **PROCEEDINGS IN REVIEW-GRANTED CASES** [§ 7.83]

This section deals with non-capital criminal cases in which the California Supreme Court has granted review. (Death penalty cases are governed by separate rules. Civil cases in the Supreme Court are for the most part governed by the same rules as non-capital criminal cases.)

**As of the date of this revision of the Manual (June 2018), TrueFiling is not yet available for filings in the Supreme Court in review-granted cases.**

A. **Appointment of Counsel** [§ 7.84]

If review is granted on at least one requested issue, counsel’s appearance in the Supreme Court on an appointed case will be made under a new appointment by the Supreme Court, with a recommendation by the appellate project. Often counsel who represented appellant in the Court of Appeal is appointed by the Supreme Court, but sometimes for one reason or another a change is made. All appointments in the Supreme Court are designated *assisted*, by policy of the court and the appellate projects. (See §§ 1.3 and 1.4 of chapter 1, “The ABC’s of Panel Membership: Basic Information for Appointed Counsel,” for further information on assisted and independent cases.)
B. Briefing on the Merits\textsuperscript{74} [§ 7.85]

Briefing is governed by rule 8.520 of the California Rules of Court. Unless otherwise ordered, briefs must be confined to the issues specified in the order granting review and others “fairly included” in them. (Rule 8.520(b)(3).) Extensions of time, permission to file an over-length brief, and other variations from the rules require the order of the Chief Justice. (Rule 8.520(a)(5) & (c)(4).)

Information about filing and service requirements is summarized on ADI’s Filing and Service pages.\textsuperscript{75}

1. Opening brief on the merits [§ 7.86]

Under rule 8.520(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court, after the court grants review, the petitioner\textsuperscript{76} must within 30 days of the order granting review file an opening brief on the merits.\textsuperscript{77} An original and 13 copies must be filed in the Supreme Court. (Rule 8.44(a)(1).) Unless otherwise ordered, an opening brief on the merits in non-capital cases may not exceed 14,000 words including footnotes.\textsuperscript{78} (Rule 8.520(c)(1).) The cover is white. (Rule 8.40(b)(1).) At the beginning of the body the brief must quote any Supreme Court orders specifying the issues or, if there is no such order, quote the issues stated in the petition for review and any additional ones from the answer. (Rule 8.520(b)(2)(A) & (B).) Attachments are governed by rule 8.520(h).

\begin{footnotes}
\item[74] See CAVEAT at § 7.28, ante, for possible electronic filing and service exceptions to these rules.
\item[75] http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/filing_service_chart.asp
\item[76] In some situations it is unclear which party is to be deemed petitioner – for example, if petitions from opposing sides were both granted, or if the court granted review on its own motion. In such cases the court may designate which party is deemed the petitioner or otherwise direct the sequence of briefing. (Rule 8.520(a)(6).)
\item[77] In lieu of a new brief on the merits, a party may file in the Supreme Court the appellant’s opening, respondent’s, and/or reply brief(s) filed in the Court of Appeal. (See rule 8.520(a)(1)-(4).) That practice is not preferred and is rare in criminal cases.
\item[78] A word-count certificate is required. (Rule 8.520(c)(1).)
\end{footnotes}
2. **Answer brief on the merits**  

   Within 30 days after the filing of the petitioner’s brief, the opposing party must file an answer brief on the merits. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.520(a)(2).) The answer brief may not exceed 14,000 words including footnotes, and the cover is blue. (Rules 8.520(c)(1), 8.40(b)(1).)

3. **Reply brief**  

   The petitioner may file a reply brief within 20 days after the filing of the opposing party’s brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.520(a)(3).) It may not exceed 8,400 words including footnotes. (Rule 8.520(c)(1).) The cover is white. (Rule 8.40(b)(1).)

4. **Supplemental brief**  

   A supplemental brief of no more 2,800 words including footnotes may be filed by either party no later than 10 days before oral argument and must be limited to new authorities, new legislation, or other matters not available in time to be included in the party’s brief on the merits. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.520(d).)

5. **Amicus curiae brief**  

   Amicus briefs may be filed with the court’s permission. Rule 8.520(f) of the California Rules of Court governs these briefs.

6. **Judicial notice**  

   Judicial notice under Evidence Code section 459 in the Supreme Court requires compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a). (Rule 8.520(g).)

C. **Oral Argument**  

   Unless the court permits more time, oral argument in non-capital cases is limited to 30 minutes per side. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.524(e).) The petitioner opens and closes; if there is more than one petitioner, the court sets the order. (Rule 8.524(d).)

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79 A word-count certificate is required. (Rule 8.520(c)(1).)

80 A word-count certificate is required. (Rule 8.520(c)(1).)
Under rule 8.524(f) of the California Rules of Court, in non-capital cases, only one counsel per side may argue – even if there is more than one party per side – unless the court orders otherwise.\(^{81}\) A request for more attorneys to argue must be filed no later than 10 days after the order setting oral argument. (Rule 8.524(f)(2).) Except for rebuttal, each attorney’s segment may be no less than 10 minutes. (Rule 8.534(f)(3).)

D. Decisions and Post-Decision Proceedings in the Supreme Court \([\S \ 7.93]\)

1. Disposition \([\S \ 7.94]\)

On a grant of review, the Supreme Court is reviewing the judgment of the Court of Appeal. It may order that the judgment wholly or partially be affirmed, reversed, or modified and may direct further actions or proceedings. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(a).) The court usually will decide all the issues on which review is granted, although it may decide only some and then transfer the case back to the Court of Appeal for decision on the remaining issues. (Rule 8.528(c).)

Alternatively, the Supreme Court may not decide any issues on the merits. It may dismiss review. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(b).) It may, without reaching a decision, transfer the cause with directions for further proceedings in the Court of Appeal. (Rule 8.528 (d).) If the case was transferred before decision in the Court of Appeal under rule 8.552, the Supreme Court may retransfer the case to the Court of Appeal. (Rule 8.528(e).)

The right to supplemental briefing after the transfer or retransfer is covered in chapter 5, “Effective Written Advocacy: Briefing,” \(\S\ \ 5.64C.\) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 200(b).)

2. Finality of decision \([\S \ 7.95]\)

With certain exceptions, a decision of the California Supreme Court becomes final as to that court 30 days after filing. The court may order earlier finality. The Supreme Court may also extend the period for finality up to an additional 60 days, as long as the order extending time is made within the original 30 days or any extension thereof. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.532(b)(1).)

\(^{81}\)The rule is different in the Court of Appeal, which allows one counsel “for each separately represented party.” (Rules 8.256(c)(3), 8.366(a), 8.470.)
Certain Supreme Court decisions are final immediately: denial of a petition for review, dismissal, transfer, retransfer, denial of a writ petition without an order to show cause or alternative writ; and denial of a supersedeas petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.532(b)(2).)

3. Rehearing  [§ 7.96]

The Supreme Court may order rehearing as provided in California Rules of Court, rule 8.268(a). (Rule 8.536(a).) Any petition for rehearing must be filed within 15 days of the decision. Any answer must be filed no later than eight days after the petition. Since rule 8.536(a) requires compliance only with subdivisions (1) and (3) of rule 8.268(b), the proscription of rule 8.268(b)(2) against the filing of an answer without request from the court is inapplicable. At least four justices must assent to grant rehearing. (Rule 8.536(d).)

4. Remittitur  [§ 7.97]

The remittitur is the document sent by the reviewing court to the court whose judgment was reviewed, which reinvests the lower tribunal court with jurisdiction over the case. If the Supreme Court decision reviews a Court of Appeal decision, the remittitur is to the Court of Appeal. A Supreme Court remittitur is governed by rule 8.540 of the California Rules of Court.

a. Issuance  [§ 7.98]

In a case before the court on a grant of review, the Supreme Court remittitur is addressed to the Court of Appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.540(b)(2).) It issues when the opinion is final at to the Supreme Court – normally on the 31st day after filing of the Supreme Court’s decision, absent a rehearing or order shortening or extending the time for finality. (Rules 8.532(b), 8.540(b)(1).) The there are further proceedings in the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal must follow the directions of the Supreme Court. If there are to be no further proceedings, the Court of Appeal must immediately issue its own remittitur to the lower court. (Rule 8.272(b)(2).)

If the case was not before the Supreme Court on a grant of review – e.g., an automatic appeal or transfer – the remittitur is sent to the applicable lower court or tribunal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.540(b)(3).) A remittitur is not issued on the summary denial of a writ petition. (Rule 8.540(a).)
The California Supreme Court may order immediate issuance of the remittitur. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.540(c)(1).) It may stay issuance of the remittitur for a reasonable period. (Rule 8.540(c)(2).)

b. Recall  [§ 7.99]

The court may recall the remittitur, on its own or on motion, for good cause and thereby reinvest jurisdiction over the case in the court. The recall order does not supersede the opinion or affect its publication status. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.540(c)(3).) In criminal cases, a petition for writ of habeas corpus may be the vehicle for requesting the remittitur be recalled. (People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 396-397; In re Smith (1970) 3 Cal.3d 192, 203-204; People v. Valenzuela (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 381, 388, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 484-490, fn.12.)

VII. CERTIORARI IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT  [§ 7.100]

If the California Supreme Court has denied review of a case with a federal constitutional issue or has granted review but decided the issue adversely, an option is a petition for writ of certiorari filed in the United States Supreme Court. The petition is part of the direct appellate process.

This section discusses only the basics of certiorari petitions in state criminal cases. It does not purport to be a comprehensive treatment. Further resources for Supreme Court practice include the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Court website, and Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice (10th ed. 2013).

82See postscript to this chapter on the potentially confusing numbering system used in the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States. The rules are available online: https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf.

83http://www.supremecourt.gov/
A. Uses of Certiorari  [§ 7.101]

1. Last step in direct appeal from state judgment  [§ 7.102]

A petition for certiorari is the last part of the direct appeal process for state cases. It is relatively uncommon for appointed counsel to file one, because of the long odds against success.

Unlike a petition for review to a state high court, a certiorari petition is not required to preserve issues for later collateral review. (Fay v. Noia (1963) 372 U.S. 391, 435-437, overruled on other grounds in Wainwright v. Sykes (1977) 433 U.S. 72, 84-85; cf. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel (1999) 526 U.S. 838, 845, 848 [to be preserved for future federal review, issue must be presented to state’s highest court in which review is available]; Roberts v. Arave (9th Cir. 1988) 847 F.2d 528, 530.) Its use is therefore primarily substantive – to obtain review of the issues after the state appellate processes have been exhausted – rather than procedural.84

2. Criteria for certiorari  [§ 7.103]

The primary concern of the United States Supreme Court is to decide cases presenting issues of importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved. Most often it accepts a case to resolve conflict or disagreement among lower courts and to determine an issue of broad social or legal importance.

Whether to file a petition for certiorari depends in part on whether there is a reasonable chance of getting certiorari granted. For the Supreme Court to consider the case, there must a strong, adequately preserved federal issue that has important societal implications. As the Supreme Court rules warn:

84 Occasionally certiorari may be used for procedural reasons. For example, if an issue that might result in a substantial favorable change in the law is pending before the United States Supreme Court, it may well be desirable to petition for certiorari in cases with similar issues in order to keep them in the direct appellate review process. For the most part changes in the law are retroactive only to cases still on direct appeal. (Teague v. Lane (1989) 489 U.S. 288, 295-296; People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 789, fn. 5; see Potentially Favorable Changes in the Law, Part Two, “General Principles of Retroactivity,” page 15 et seq.

A petition for writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.

(U.S. Supreme Ct. Rules, rule 10.) Only about 1 percent of the petitions filed are granted.⁸⁵

Because of the slim chance of success, only a few certiorari petitions are filed in appointed cases each year, and so it is seen as an exceptional step. For Fourth District cases, ADI should review the issue and give appointed counsel input as to whether the petition is worth filing. If counsel intends to seek compensation for the petition, ADI’s executive director must give pre-approval.

The discussion in §§ 7.47 et seq. and 7.63, ante, on factors affecting the decision of the California Supreme Court whether to grant review, is applicable in large part to certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, as well.

3. Federal habeas corpus as additional or alternative remedy  [§ 7.104]

In addition to or instead of certiorari, federal review after an unsuccessful state appeal may be sought through a petition for writ of habeas corpus.⁸⁶ (See chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”)

   a. Advantages of habeas corpus  [§ 7.105]

   In contrast to certiorari, which is unlikely to succeed if the issue is not one of considerable social significance, habeas corpus most often focuses on injustice in the individual case. Further, one has right to consideration on the merits in habeas corpus if foundational requirements are met, whereas certiorari review is a matter of discretion and is exercised very rarely. Thus in cases involving application of standard authority, certiorari is virtually unattainable, and habeas corpus is the remedy of choice.


⁸⁶From a practical viewpoint, appointed counsel will not receive compensation under their state appellate appointment for federal habeas corpus litigation, although payment may be available from the federal court. Certiorari is compensable under the appellate appointment, but only if reasonable under the criteria discussed here.
b. **Advantages of certiorari** [§ 7.106]

In federal courts habeas corpus is a highly restricted remedy, both procedurally and substantively. (See chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus,” for extended treatment of this topic.) Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.), for example, a federal court may not disturb a state judgment unless the state judgment was an unreasonable application of or contrary to established United States Supreme Court precedent. (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).)

Federal habeas corpus thus cannot be used to decide an issue not already resolved by the United States Supreme Court. Even if state court decision was contrary to established federal circuit court precedent, and therefore wrong or unreasonable under circuit law, habeas corpus relief is unavailable unless the state decision was also contrary to established or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. (See *Kane v. Espitia* (2005) 546 U.S. 9 (per curiam) [circuit court split on whether *Faretta v. California* (1975) 422 U.S. 806, requires pro per prisoner access to legal materials cannot be resolved in federal habeas corpus, when neither *Faretta* itself nor any other Supreme Court decision has addressed the topic]; *Mitchell v. Esparza* (2003) 540 U.S. 12, 17; *Lockyer v. Andrade* (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 71-73.)

Further, even if there is United States Supreme Court precedent, relief is barred unless the state court’s application of it was not only wrong, but also “unreasonable.” The test is whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. “[T]he most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” (*Williams v. Taylor* (2000) 529 U.S. 362, 410, italics original.)

If there is no established United States Supreme Court precedent, therefore, or if the state decision was wrong but not objectively unreasonable, certiorari may be the only federal remedy available. Similarly, if federal habeas corpus is barred because of a procedural problem not applicable to certiorari, the latter may be the only option. (See chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus,” for discussion of various procedural requirements for federal habeas corpus.)

c. **Use of both remedies** [§ 7.107]

If the case meets the applicable criteria, *both* certiorari and federal habeas corpus may be sought. Certiorari, as part of the regular appellate process, ordinarily should be
sought first. There is some question whether the habeas corpus petition may be filed until the time for certiorari has passed.

It is also possible to seek certiorari after federal habeas corpus review of a state judgment. Numerous decisions of the United States Supreme Court in this category are cited in chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”

B. Jurisdiction [§ 7.108]

It is not possible to review this subject in depth here. The discussion focuses on some of the most commonly encountered principles in criminal appeals.

1. Legal authority [§ 7.109]

The United States Supreme Court and the federal judiciary are established in article III of the United States Constitution. Section 2 describes federal judicial and Supreme Court authority over state criminal cases (in relevant part):

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States – to Controversies between . . . a State and Citizens . . . . In all Cases . . . in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

The one-year federal deadline for filing a habeas petition does not begin until the period for filing for certiorari has passed. (See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Bowen v. Roe (9th Cir. 1999) 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-1159; see also Clay v. United States (2003) 537 U.S. 522 [similar timing for 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion for relief from federal convictions]; cf. Lawrence v. Florida (2007) 549 U.S. 327; White v. Klitzkie (9th Cir. 2002) 281 F.3d 920, 924-925 [period for filing certiorari petition not counted as part of state collateral proceedings for purposes of tolling limitations period].)

See Kapral v. United States (3d Cir. 1999) 166 F.3d 565, 570, and Feldman v. Henman (9th Cir. 1987) 815 F.2d 1318, 1321 (federal court should not entertain habeas corpus petition when petition for certiorari from a federal appellate decision is pending); cf. Roper v. Weaver (2007) 550 U.S. 598 (per curiam) (defendant could have filed federal habeas corpus petition after state denied collateral relief, even though petition for certiorari was pending from the state decision). These cases do not necessarily answer the question whether a state prisoner must wait for the conclusion of the certiorari period on direct appeal to file the federal petition.
The specific jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court over state court judgments is governed by 28 United States Code section 1257(a):

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.

2. Exhaustion of state remedies  [§ 7.110]

Certiorari jurisdiction requires that state appellate review processes be exhausted. To be considered on certiorari, an issue must be raised and/or decided on appeal in the state’s highest court in which a decision could be had, and that court’s decision must be final. (28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); see O’Sullivan v. Boerckel (1999) 526 U.S. 838 [same in habeas corpus].)

For the purposes of non-capital criminal appellate practice, that means that in most California felony cases the issue must be raised squarely (1) as a federal constitutional issue, with reliance on federal authority such as an amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) successively in the superior court, in the Court of Appeal, and in a petition for review to the California Supreme Court.89 (See § 9.99 et seq. of chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus,” on steps to preserving a federal issue in state court.) If a petition for review is granted and the case decided on the merits, the issue must be raised appropriately in the brief on the merits.

If the state court failed to decide the federal issue, the petitioner must show the failure was not due to lack of proper presentation. (See Street v. New York (1969) 394 U.S. 576, 582 [“when . . . the highest state court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will be assumed that the omission was due to want of proper presentation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party in this Court can affirmatively show the contrary”].)

89 An issue need not have been raised in a lower court if failure to do so does not constitute a waiver or other form of procedural default preventing consideration at the next higher level – or if the court decides the issue even though not raised. (Francis v. Henderson (1976) 425 U.S. 536, 542, fn. 5; Sandgathe v. Maass (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3d 371, 376-377.)
3. Finality of state court decision [§ 7.111]

The state court decision must be final for the United States Supreme Court to review it. If further state proceedings are to take place, the court lacks jurisdiction. (28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); Florida v. Thomas (2001) 532 U.S. 774, 777.) The decision must be final in two senses: (1) no further review or correction is possible in any other state tribunal and (2) the decision determines the litigation, not merely interlocutory or intermediate parts of it. (Jefferson v. City of Tarrant (1997) 522 U.S. 75, 81.) “It must be the final word of a final court.” (Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of Cal. (1945) 324 U.S. 548, 551.)

In certain circumstances, the court has treated state judgments as final for jurisdictional purposes although further proceedings were to take place. (Florida v. Thomas (2001) 532 U.S. 774, 777; Flynt v. Ohio (1981) 451 U.S. 619, 620-621 (per curiam). Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (1975) 420 U.S. 469 divided cases of this kind into four categories: (1) the federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings preordained (id. at p. 479); (2) the federal issue will require decision regardless of the outcome of state proceedings (id. at p. 480); (3) the federal claim has been finally decided and cannot be reviewed after the further state proceedings (id. at p. 481); 90 and (4) the federal issue has been finally decided, the party seeking certiorari might prevail on nonfederal grounds in the later state proceedings, reversal of the state court on the federal issue would preclude further litigation on the relevant cause of action, and a refusal immediately to review the state decision might seriously erode federal policy (id. at pp. 482-483).

California state review is concluded when the decision of the California Supreme Court is final and no further review in state court is possible. If a petition for review is denied, the decision is final immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.532(b)(2)(A).) When a petition for review is granted and California Supreme Court decides the case on the merits, the decision is final in 30 days, with certain exceptions. (Rule 8.532(b)(1).)

90In Johnson v. California (2004) 541 U.S. 428 (per curiam), the California Supreme Court ruled adversely on federal constitutional grounds but remanded to the Court of Appeal for determination of other claims, which could independently support reversal. The United States Supreme Court found this circumstance did not come under the third Cox category. If the Court of Appeal were to affirm, the petitioner could once more seek review of his original federal claim in the California Supreme Court. A change of mind, although highly unlikely, would not be foreclosed.
The California Rules of Court should be consulted for other situations; see also § 7.29 et seq., § 7.73 et seq., and § 7.93 et seq., ante.

4. Dispositive federal issue  [§ 7.112]

The case must present a federal issue that affects the outcome of the case. As Herb v. Pitcairn (1945) 324 U.S. 117, 125-126, states: “Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions.”

The United States Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to interpret state law. If a state decision rests on independent and adequate state grounds, the United States Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review it, even though federal issues may be involved. (See Coleman v. Thompson (1991) 501 U.S. 722, 729; § 9.46 et seq. of chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”) If it is ambiguous whether the state court relied on an independent and adequate state ground, the court uses a test:

When a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.


C. Certiorari Petitions  [§ 7.113]

Petitions for certiorari are governed by the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States. Guidelines for the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari by an unrepresented indigent appellant are available at the website of the Supreme Court.

1. Counsel’s membership in the United States Supreme Court Bar  [§ 7.114]

Counsel must be admitted to the United States Supreme Court Bar in order to file documents in that court. (Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, rule 9.) The procedures for gaining membership are prescribed in rule 5 of the Supreme Court rules. Several ADI staff attorneys are members of the Supreme Court bar and can serve as sponsors for attorneys seeking admission.

2. Time for filing  [§ 7.115]

The petition must be filed within 90 days from the entry of the final judgment by the California Supreme Court or 90 days from the denial of a timely filed petition for rehearing. (Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, rule 13.) The final judgment may be the denial of review or the filing of an opinion. If rehearing is sought or the court suggests it is considering rehearing on its own, the final judgment is the denial of rehearing. (Ibid.; see Hibbs v. Winn (2004) 542 U.S. 88.)

The crucial date for starting the 90-day period is the filing of the state high court opinion or order regarding rehearing, not its finality under state law. Thus the issuance of

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95 See postscript to this chapter on the potentially confusing numbering system used in the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.

96 https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf

97 See postscript to this chapter on the potentially confusing numbering system used in the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.

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a remittitur has no bearing on the computation of time and does not extend the time for filing. (Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States,\textsuperscript{98} rule 13; see Shapiro et al. (10th ed. 2013).)

The state decision nevertheless must be final in order for the United States Supreme Court to have jurisdiction. (28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); see § 7.111, ante.) If timing permits, it may be most prudent for counsel to file a certiorari petition after the California Supreme Court decision is final but well before 90 days have elapsed since the filing of its original opinion. Regardless, it is always the safest course to file earlier rather than later – when counsel knows it is not too late.

“Filing” of a certiorari petition means actual receipt of the documents by the Supreme Court’s clerk, or postmarking of first class mail, or consignment to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within three calendar days. (Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States,\textsuperscript{99} rule 29.) Extensions of time may be granted by application to a justice but are disfavored. (Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States,\textsuperscript{100} rules 13, ¶ 5, 22 [application to individual justice]; see also rules 21 [motions and applications], 30 [computations and extensions of time], & 33, ¶ 2 [format].)

3. Procedures for filing in forma pauperis [§ 7.116]

Except for an unrepresented inmate confined in an institution, it is necessary to file, along with the petition for certiorari, an original and 10 copies of a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis with a supporting declaration in compliance with 18 United States Code section 3006A. (Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States,\textsuperscript{101} rules 21, 39.)\textsuperscript{102} The Supreme Court website gives a sample and instructions on how to complete the in forma pauperis documents.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{98}https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf
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\textsuperscript{102}See postscript to this chapter on the potentially confusing numbering system used in the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.
\textsuperscript{103}http://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/casehand.aspx, under Guide to Filing in Forma Pauperis Cases.
4. **Formal requirements for certiorari petition**  [§ 7.117]

Formatting requirements for certiorari petitions filed in forma pauperis are set out in rule 33, paragraph 2(a) of the Supreme Court rules; these include size of paper, spacing, binding, and signature. Rule 34, paragraph 1 prescribes what must appear on the cover; paragraph 2 specifies required tables; paragraph 3 governs identification of counsel of record. The petition may not exceed 40 pages. ([Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States](https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf), rule 33, ¶ 2(b); see rule 33, ¶ 1(d) for exceptions.) An original and 10 copies are required for in forma pauperis petitions, except in the case of unrepresented inmates who are confined. ([Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States](https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf), rules 12, ¶ 2, & 39, ¶ 2.) Rule 29 governs service and the proof of service. ([Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States](https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf), rule 29, ¶¶ 3 & 5.)

5. **Contents of certiorari petition**  [§ 7.118]

Rule 14 of the [Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States](https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf) prescribes the contents and arrangement of a petition for writ of certiorari. Shapiro’s Supreme Court Practice offers comprehensive guidance in preparing each of the component parts of the petition. ([Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice (10th ed. 2013).](https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf))

a. **Required sections**  [§ 7.119]

The typical petition must contain, in the indicated order, (1) the question presented for review; (2) a list of all parties (unless shown in the caption); (3) a table of contents and a table of authorities; (4) citation of the opinion and orders in the case; (5) a statement of Supreme Court jurisdiction, including the date of the judgment to be reviewed and any

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104See [postscript](https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf) to this chapter on the potentially confusing numbering system used in the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.

105[https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf](https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf)

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107[https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf](https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf)


109See [postscript](https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf) to this chapter on the potentially confusing numbering system used in the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.
order regarding rehearing, and the statutory basis for jurisdiction;\(^{110}\) (6) the constitutional, statutory, and other provisions related to the case, set out verbatim (lengthy provisions may be reserved for the appendix and merely cited at this point); (7) a concise statement of facts, including a description of how and when the federal issues were presented to the state courts and how they were ruled on, with quotations or summaries taken from the record and record citations; (8) an argument on the need for certiorari; and (9) an appendix.

The appendix must include, in the following order: the opinion of the state court (Court of Appeal or California Supreme Court) from which certiorari is sought; other relevant findings and orders such as the trial court decision; any order by the California Supreme Court denying review; and any order by the California Supreme Court denying rehearing.

b. **Argument** \([\S\ 7.120]\)

Although compliance with all requirements is essential, the argument on the need for certiorari is the pivotal section of the petition. The case must be presented in a way that will capture the court’s attention and distinguish it from the 99 percent for which certiorari will be denied. It is advisable to focus the discussion on conflicts among state high courts or federal courts or on the social and legal importance of the question of federal law presented, rather than on the injustice to the individual party or the mere incorrectness of the state court decision. ([Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States],\(^{111}\) rule 10.)\(^{112}\)

Shapiro offers insights into the court’s certiorari screening processes in chapter 4, “Factors Motivating the Exercise of the Court’s Certiorari Discretion.” (Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice (10th ed. 2013).

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\(^{110}\) For review of a state judgment, the statutory basis is 28 United State Code section 1257(a). In specialized situations, other statements on jurisdiction are required. (U.S. Supreme Ct. Rules, rule 14.)

\(^{111}\) [https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf](https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf)

\(^{112}\) See [postscript](https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf) to this chapter on the potentially confusing numbering system used in the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The discussion in this Manual on crafting a persuasive petition for review (§ 7.47 et seq. and § 7.63 et seq., ante) is also applicable in many respects to petitions for certiorari.

D. Other Filings  [§ 7.121]

1. Opposition and reply  [§ 7.122]

Opposition to the petition may be filed. (Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 113 rule 15, ¶ 1.)114 If requested, it is then mandatory. (Ibid.) In addition to addressing the issues raised in the petition, counsel filing an opposition has an obligation to point out, at this stage of the proceedings and not later, any perceived misstatements of law or fact in the petition, or the objection may be waived. (Id., ¶ 2.) The opposition is due 30 days after the case is placed on the docket. (Id., ¶ 3.) An indigent respondent filing an opposition may proceed in forma pauperis as specified in the rules. (Ibid.; see also (Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 116 rule 39.)

The petitioner may reply to the opposition if new points have been raised. The reply brief may be filed in forma pauperis if the petitioner has qualified for that status. (Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 117 rules 15 ¶ 6, 39.)118

113 https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf

114 See postscript to this chapter on the potentially confusing numbering system used in the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.

115 Frequently the Supreme Court will request opposition when the petition is filed by the Attorney General.


118 See postscript to this chapter on the potentially confusing numbering system used in the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Formal requirements for an opposition and reply filed in forma pauperis include format (Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States,\textsuperscript{119} rules 33, ¶ 2(a) & 34);\textsuperscript{120} page limits – 40 and 15 pages, respectively (rule 33, ¶ 2(b)); cover, tables, and identification of counsel (rule 34); and number of copies – original plus 10 (rules 12, ¶ 2 & 39).

2. Amicus curiae briefs in support of or in opposition to petition for certiorari \textsuperscript{[§ 7.123]}

Amicus curiae briefs relating to the grant or denial of a petition for certiorari are permitted by written consent of all parties or by leave of court. They are governed by rule 37, paragraph 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.\textsuperscript{121}

E. When Certiorari Is Granted . . . \textsuperscript{[§ 7.124]}

It is beyond the scope of this manual to deal with procedures in the United States Supreme Court past the petition for certiorari stage, but counsel are referred to the Shapiro treatise, which offers comprehensive guidance on Supreme Court practice. (Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice (10th ed. 2013).)

Payment for appointed counsel for appearances in the Supreme Court beyond the petition stage is very much an ad hoc matter, given the infrequency with which certiorari petitions are granted. ADI will actively consult with any attorney making an appearance before the Supreme Court in a Fourth Appellate District case, both on the matter of compensation and on the substance of the case.

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POSTSCRIPT ON U.S. SUPREME COURT RULE NUMBERING \textsuperscript{[§ 7.125]}

The Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States use a different form of numbering from that of the California Rules of Court. The Supreme Court rules refer to subdivisions or paragraphs by adding a period to the rule number and then the paragraph number.

\textsuperscript{119}https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf

\textsuperscript{120}See postscript to this chapter on the potentially confusing numbering system used in the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.

\textsuperscript{121}https://www.supremecourt.gov/filingandrules/2017RulesoftheCourt.pdf

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number – for example, rule 29, paragraph 3 is called “Rule 29.3” when another Supreme Court rule cross-references it.

This numbering system can be confusing to California practitioners, because in California periods are used in the number of the rule itself – for example, rule 8.300. For clarity, this manual uses paragraph symbols rather than periods in citing to subdivisions of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States. Attorneys are alerted to the problem so that in reading the text of the Supreme Court rules (or cases or texts referring to the rules) they will be able to find cross-referenced rules.
- CHAPTER EIGHT -

PUTTING ON THE WRITS:

CALIFORNIA EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES
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I. INTRODUCTION  [§ 8.0]

This chapter primarily addresses post-conviction writs of habeas corpus in non-capital criminal cases. It also briefly discusses other uses of state habeas corpus and other state writ remedies.

The writ of habeas corpus – the Great Writ – provides an avenue of relief from unlawful custody when direct appeal is inadequate. “[T]he Great Writ has been justifiably lauded as the safe-guard and the palladium of our liberties.” (*In re Sanders* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 697, 703-704, internal quotation marks deleted.)

Habeas corpus has been around a long time. (See Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Chas. II, ch. 2 – the forerunner of all habeas corpus acts.) The United States Constitution expressly protects it: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.” (Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.) The comparable state provisions are California Constitution, article I, section 11, and article VI, section 10. (See also Pen. Code, § 1473 et seq.)

A. Uses of Habeas Corpus Often Encountered in Criminal and Juvenile Appellate Practice  [§ 8.1]

A few hypotheticals illustrate when it might be necessary to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus:

Criminal context:

• At trial counsel’s advice (not as part of a plea bargain), the defendant admitted a prior serious felony, residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)). In fact the burglary was of a commercial building.

• Before trial, the defendant unsuccessfully contested several strong issues, including adequacy of the evidence under Penal Code section 995, speedy
In anticipation of getting a reversal on these issues, to avoid a time-consuming trial, counsel had the defendant plead guilty.

- After the defendant was sentenced, trial counsel received a call from a juror who, plagued by conscience, described how one juror swayed others by “evidence” the juror obtained outside the courtroom.

- After the appeal time elapsed, the statute under which the defendant was sentenced was amended and the applicable sentence was reduced.

Dependency context:

- A client claims her attorneys (1) failed to challenge the jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (g) and (2) waived appointment of a guardian ad litem on her behalf.

- Review of the record shows valid grounds for a motion based on a change in circumstances. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388.) Trial counsel, however, made no such motion and now admits having failed to consider making one.

- The child welfare agency never asked father whether he had Indian heritage. Father is a registered member of the Comanche Tribe.

Either context:

- The client claims a number of witnesses who could have testified favorably were either not interviewed by trial counsel or not called to testify. The potential witnesses corroborate this claim.

- In a previous appeal, counsel neglected to raise an issue that has come back to haunt the client. Prior appellate counsel admits never having considered the issue.

What do all of these examples have in common? Appeal is not an adequate remedy, either because the facts necessary to resolve the problems do not appear in the appellate record or because the time for appeal is past. The remedy is a petition for writ of

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habeas corpus. Habeas corpus allows a petitioner to bring in facts outside the record, if those facts support a claim cognizable in habeas corpus. It often has more relaxed, non-jurisdictional deadlines than an appeal. (See § 8.18, post.)

A number of the examples above describe possible ineffective assistance of counsel, trial or appellate. This is one of the most common uses of habeas corpus in both criminal and juvenile proceedings. For the most part, courts expect an allegation of IAC to be presented by habeas corpus and refer to evidence outside the record establishing lack of strategic purpose to counsel’s actions. (E.g., People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267-268.)

Other examples are specified in Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (b), which also provides these are not the exclusive uses of habeas corpus.²

A petition for writ of habeas corpus may serve purposes other than challenging a conviction on the basis of facts outside the record. (See § 8.53 et seq., post.)

B. ADI’s Expectations [§ 8.2]

1. Pursuit of Writs When Appropriate [§ 8.3]

As a matter of policy, ADI expects appointed counsel to be attentive to possible issues requiring habeas or other writ remedies and to pursue those reasonably necessary and reasonably within the scope of appellate responsibilities. Although the California

²Under section 1473, subdivision (b), a petition may allege, among other grounds:

(1) False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to his or her incarceration. [¶] (2) False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person. [¶] (3)(A) New evidence exists that is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not changed the outcome at trial. . . .

For purposes of section 1473, “‘new evidence’ means evidence that has been discovered after trial, that could not have been discovered prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence, and is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.” (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(3)(B).)
Supreme Court has stated that in a noncapital case counsel has no legal duty to conduct an investigation to discover facts outside the record, nevertheless if counsel learns of such facts in the course of representation, counsel may have an ethical obligation to advise the client of a course of action to obtain relief “or take other appropriate action.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 783-784, fn. 20.)

Regardless of legal duty, some appellate projects such as ADI, with the approval of their courts, hold counsel to higher expectations than the bare minimum. Counsel are expected to pursue remedies outside the four corners of the appeal, including habeas corpus, when reasonably necessary to represent the client appropriately. (See People v. Thurman (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 36, 47 [quoting Manual, part of preceding sentence].) In some appellate districts, however, the court imposes restrictions on the authority of counsel to pursue extraordinary remedies. Counsel must consult the applicable project.

2. Consultation with ADI Before Pursuing Writ Remedy [§ 8.4]

Counsel should consult with the assigned ADI staff attorney when considering a writ investigation or petition. Counsel must consider such questions as whether the available evidence and the current law or signs of potential changes support a petition; whether and how off-record claims should be investigated; whether, where, and when a petition should be filed; whether the client would benefit from the remedy; and whether the client might suffer adverse consequences by pursuing writ relief. Given the complexity of these matters, it is necessary for the attorney to heed the old adage “two heads are better than one” and consult with the assigned staff attorney. Thus counsel should consult with the assigned ADI staff attorney when in doubt about applying these expectations to their own case.

Another reason to seek ADI input is the recurring problem of how to approach trial counsel in investigating a possible ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Appellate counsel generally should avoid becoming a potential witness. Counsel also will want to elicit trial counsel’s cooperation; although in most instances prior counsel are cooperative in investigating ineffective assistance of counsel, some attorneys are not, perhaps because


4Resources on investigating ineffective assistance of counsel claims include 15 A.L.R.4th 582 (adequacy of counsel in proceedings seeking appellate and post-conviction remedies); 13 A.L.R.4th 533 (adequacy of counsel in proceedings seeking post-plea remedies); 3 A.L.R.4th 601 (effectiveness of trial counsel).
of embarrassment or concern about their professional status.\(^5\) ADI may be able to assist in these situations.\(^6\)

In appropriate cases appellate counsel may seek fees for expert assistance, such as an investigator, a physician, a psychiatric evaluation of the client or client’s records, or DNA testing. Travel, translation services, and other costs may be approved, as well. The assigned ADI staff attorney should be consulted; court preapproval may be necessary for some expenses.

II. BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR AND LIMITATIONS ON STATE HABEAS CORPUS TO CHALLENGE CRIMINAL CONVICTION\(^7\) [§ 8.5]

*People v. Duvall* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464 and *People v. Romero* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728 are especially useful in describing general state habeas corpus procedure, law, and theory in the context of challenging a criminal conviction. (See also *People v. Pacini* (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 877.) As noted above, this use of habeas corpus is the most commonly encountered use in appellate practice and is generally invoked when the basis for the challenge lies in facts outside the record.

Habeas corpus use has certain limitations. Among these are the requirement of custody and related mootness issues, the bar against repetitive petitions, the bar against use of habeas corpus when appeal is or would have been available, and the requirement of due diligence.

A. Custody and Mootness [§ 8.6]

The fundamental purpose of habeas corpus in most post-conviction contexts is to provide a remedy for the release of persons confined under the restraint of an illegal

\(^5\)See Business and Professions Code sections 6068, subdivision (o)(7) and 6086.7, which require the attorney and the court to notify the State Bar whenever a modification or reversal of a judgment in a judicial proceeding is based at least in part on ineffective assistance of counsel.

\(^6\)The requirement of consultation with ADI before raising an ineffective assistance of counsel issue is not confined to habeas corpus investigations, but also applies to raising that issue on direct appeal.

\(^7\)Dependency applications of habeas corpus are discussed in § 8.63, post.
judgment. This theoretical underpinning necessarily raises the question of whether the petitioner is under the restraint of the decision under attack – in other words, whether he is in custody. It also raises the related but distinct question of whether habeas corpus can offer meaningful relief – i.e., whether the case is moot.

1. **Custody requirement**  [§ 8.7]

A fundamental prerequisite for habeas corpus jurisdiction is that the petitioner be “in custody,” either actual or constructive, at the time the petition is filed.⁸ (See Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (a); **People v. Villa** (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063; **In re Azurin** (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 20, 26; **In re Wessley W.** (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 240, 246.) Constructive custody means the person is not physically incarcerated but is subject to the potential of incarceration – as when on probation, parole, bail, or own recognizance. (**Wessley W.**, at pp. 246-247; e.g., **In re Lira** (2013) 58 Cal.4th 573.)

The jurisdictional custody requirement applies at the time the petition is filed. If the petitioner is released or dies while the petition is pending, the requirement remains satisfied and the court continues to have jurisdiction. (See **In re King** (1970) 3 Cal.3d 226 [relief on habeas corpus granted, although defendant no longer in custody at time of decision]; **Ex parte Byrnes** (1945) 26 Cal.2d 824, 827 [habeas corpus relief granted although defendant no longer in custody]; **In re Sodersten** (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1217 [defendant died during pendency of habeas corpus proceeding; judgment of guilt vacated and proceedings permanently abated].)⁹ The remedy at that point will be something other than release from custody – such as removing the conviction from the petitioner’s record or correcting the record (**In re King**, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 237-238) or ordering an appeal from the conviction to go forward (**Ex parte Byrnes**, supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 828) or abating the proceedings (**In re Sodersten**, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1237-1238).

If the petition is filed after all actual or potential custody has expired, however, the court lacks habeas corpus jurisdiction, even though the petitioner is currently suffering

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⁸Federal habeas corpus has a similar rule. (**Spencer v. Kemna** (1998) 523 U.S. 1, 7 [“custody” satisfied; defendant incarcerated when petition filed, but released before adjudication of petition]; **Carafas v. LaVallee** (1968) 391 U.S. 234, 237-240; **Chaker v. Crogan** (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 1215, 1219 [enough that defendant be in custody when petition filed; subsequent release does not deprive court of jurisdiction]; see § 9.2 of chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”

⁹Mootness becomes a consideration at this point. (See § 8.8, post.)

2. Mootness issues [§ 8.8]

When a petitioner is released from all custody constraints, actual or constructive, an issue of mootness may arise. If the habeas corpus proceeding is attacking a criminal judgment, the case is ordinarily not moot, even after all potential for custody expires, because of the collateral consequences flowing from a felony conviction. (\textit{In re King} (1970) 3 Cal.3d 226, 229, fn. 2.; \textit{People v. Succop} (1967) 67 Cal.2d 785, 789-790; cf. \textit{In re Jackson} (1985) 39 Cal.3d 464, 468, fn. 3; \textit{In re Sodersten} (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1217 [death of defendant makes habeas corpus proceedings moot, although it may continue in court’s discretion].)

If the petition is attacking some other decision than a judgment of conviction, however – one that no longer affects the petitioner in any way – the case may be considered moot. Examples might be pretrial detention, custody credits after discharge from parole, and prison disciplinary decisions corrected or no longer correctable. In that situation the court will usually decline to entertain the petition.

\textsuperscript{10} Other remedies than habeas corpus may be available. (See § 8.9, post.)

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Picklesimer} specifically involved relief under the ruling of \textit{People v. Hofsheier} (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1207, which held mandatory lifetime sex offender registration for violations of Penal Code section 288a, subdivision (b)(1), voluntary oral copulation with a 16- or 17-year-old minor, violates equal protection. \textit{Hofsheier}’s equal protection holding was overruled in \textit{Johnson v. Department of Justice} (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871. \textit{Picklesimer} remains good law on the remedy.
Even if the case is moot, a California court may exercise discretion to decide the case if it involves issues of serious public concern that would otherwise elude resolution. \((In\ re\ Jackson\ (1985)\ 39\ Cal.3d\ \text{464, \text{468, fn. \text{3, and In re Sodersten}} (2007)\ \text{146 Cal.App.4th\ \text{1163, \text{1217 [death of defendant]; In re M.}} (1970)\ \text{3 Cal.3d\ \text{16, \text{23-25 [detention of juvenile before jurisdictional hearing]; In re Newbern}} (1961)\ \text{55 Cal.2d\ \text{500, \text{505 [contact with bondsman]; In re Fluery}} (1967)\ \text{67 Cal.2d\ \text{600, \text{601 [credits for time in jail].)}}}))))

In the federal system, in contrast, because of the “case or controversy” requirement of article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution, mootness as to the individual litigants defeats jurisdiction. \((United\ States\ v.\ Juvenile\ Male\ (2011)\ \text{564 U.S.\ 932 [“basic principle of Article III that a justiciable case or controversy must remain ‘extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed;’”]; § 9.3 of chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”})

3. Alternatives to habeas corpus if custody requirement is not met [§ 8.9]

Certain remedies may be available even if the custody requirement for habeas corpus is not met. Depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, for example, a petition for a writ of error coram nobis might be a possibility. \((See\ \text{In re Azurin}}\ (2001)\ \text{87 Cal.App.4th\ \text{20, \text{27, fn. \text{7; cf. People v. Ibanez}} (1999)\ \text{76 Cal.App.4th\ \text{537, \text{546, fn. \text{13 [coram nobis not appropriate if underlying claim is ineffective assistance of counsel]; see § 8.66 et seq., post.) A post-judgment motion under Penal Code section 1385 to dismiss previous convictions in the interests of justice is beyond the jurisdiction of the court. (People v. Chavez}} (2018)\ \text{4 Cal.5th\ \text{771.)}}}))

In certain specialized situations a person may have a statutory right to attack a judgment. For example, Penal Code section 1016.5 requires the trial court to advise of immigration consequences before accepting a guilty plea and allows the defendant to move to vacate the judgment if the trial court fails to comply with the requirement. \((See\ \text{People v. Totari}}\ (2002)\ \text{28 Cal.4th\ \text{876.) Penal Code section 1473.5 permits habeas corpus on the ground expert evidence on domestic battering and its effects was excluded. (See In re Walker}} (2007)\ \text{147 Cal.App.4th\ \text{533.}})

Another example is Penal Code section 1473.6, which allows a person no longer in physical or constructive custody to challenge the judgment by motion, if there is newly discovered evidence of fraud or perjury or misconduct by a government official. \((See\ \text{People v. Germany}}\ (2005)\ \text{133 Cal.App.4th\ \text{784.) Still another is section 1473.7, which allows a person no longer imprisoned or restrained to move to vacate a conviction or}})}"
sentence because of (a) error prejudicing the defendant’s understanding of immigration consequences of the plea or (b) newly discovered evidence of actual innocence. In contrast, Penal Code section 1385 is not available to dismiss an action after judgment is imposed and the defendant has served the sentence. (People v. Kim (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 117.)

B. Successive Petitions  [§ 8.10]

The general rule is that all claims must be presented in a single, timely petition; successive petitions will be summarily denied. Repeated presentation of the same issue may be considered an abuse of the writ and subject counsel or petitioner to sanctions. (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 512; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 769; In re White (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1479 [imposing sanctions].) An exception to this rule might be petitions alleging facts which, if proven, would establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the proceedings leading to a conviction or sentence. (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 796-797; see also In re Martinez (2009) 46 Cal.4th 945, 950, In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, and In re Gallego (1998) 18 Cal.4th 825; see Pen. Code, § 1475.)

A habeas corpus petition collaterally attacking a conviction is not a successive petition to an earlier Benoit petition used to gain the right to appeal after an untimely notice of appeal. The Benoit petition is not an attack on the judgment, but merely a vehicle for rescuing the right to appeal. (See Johnson v. United States (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3d 636, 638 [construing analogous federal provision].)

C. Availability of Appeal  [§ 8.11]

Habeas corpus cannot be used to raise issues that could have been but were not raised on appeal (In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759), nor to seek a second determination of issues raised on appeal and rejected (In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 911, 924 [successive petition denied].)

Sometimes a court may treat a post-conviction “motion” as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. If so, the movant/petitioner should be aware that cognizable issues not included in the motion/petition may be foreclosed from later consideration under the successive petitions rule. (Cf. Castro v. United States (2003) 540 U.S. 375, 383 [as a matter of federal judicial procedure, before re-characterizing a motion to review a federal conviction as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 federal habeas corpus petition, the district court must warn the defendant of the successive petitions rule].)

13 In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72.
In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225. (See also In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 683\[14\] [defendant who abandoned appeal after certificate of probable cause was denied and at that time failed to use proper remedy (mandate) to perfect appeal cannot use habeas corpus to attack denial of motion to withdraw plea].)

In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 829-841, discusses at some length the exceptions to this policy (called the Waltreus rule for convenience). They include “clear and fundamental constitutional error” that “strikes at the heart of the trial process” (Harris, at pp. 829-836),\[15\] lack of fundamental jurisdiction over the subject matter (Harris, at pp. 836-838; see People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 66), errors of sufficient magnitude that the trial court may be said to have acted in excess of jurisdiction (Harris at pp. 838-841;\[16\] In re Sands (1977) 18 Cal.3d 851, 856-857), excessive punishment (In re Nunez (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 709, 724), and a change in the law benefitting the petitioner (In re King (1970) 3 Cal.3d 226, 229, fn. 2; see “Potentially Favorable Changes in the Law,”\[17\] Part Two, on “General Principles of Retroactivity”). (See also People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267 [“rules generally prohibiting raising an issue on habeas corpus that was, or could have been, raised on appeal . . . would not bar an ineffective assistance claim on habeas corpus”]; see In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 814, fn. 34.) In addition, habeas corpus may be used when appeal is an inadequate remedy because prompt relief is required. (In re Quackenbush (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1305.)


\[15\]Harris found this exception considerably narrower than previous opinions had indicated and declined to “define the exact boundaries of any . . . surviving exception.” (In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 836.) In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199-200, held the exception to Waltreus for “fundamental” issues not raised on appeal does not apply to errors not objected to at trial.

\[16\]Harris limited this exception to cases where “a redetermination of the facts underlying the claim is unnecessary.” (In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 840-841.)

D. Timeliness  [§ 8.12]

Unlike appeals or federal habeas corpus proceedings, which have specific time limits, there is no prescribed, fixed time period in which to seek state habeas corpus relief in a noncapital criminal case.\(^{18}\) The general limitation is that habeas relief must be sought in a “timely fashion,” “reasonably promptly.” (In re Sanders (1999) 21 Cal.4th 697, 703; In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 304.) Unreasonable delay, or laches, is a ground for denial of relief. (In re Ronald E. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 315, 321-322; People v. Jackson (1973) 10 Cal.3d 265, 268.) A petitioner must point to particular circumstances sufficient to justify substantial delay.\(^{19}\) (In re Stankewitz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 391, 396, fn. 1.) Reasonable delay may be excused, within limits, particularly when the petition seeks to correct an erroneous sentence. (In re Nunez (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 709, 723-724; People v. Miller (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 873, 881; see In re Streeter (1967) 66 Cal.2d 47, 52.)

Delay in seeking habeas corpus or other collateral relief is measured from the time a petitioner becomes aware of the grounds for relief, which may be as early as the date of conviction. (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn. 5, and cases cited therein; In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236.)

III. HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES  [§ 8.13]

Habeas corpus, like other writs, has its own requirements and terminology that can seem arcane even to experienced practitioners. To help navigate the maze, § 8.84 et seq., appendix A, “Requirements for Habeas Corpus Petitions in California State Courts,” provides a step-by-step guide to preparing a petition. § 8.122 et seq., appendix B, “California Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus,” provides flow charts showing the typical progression of a habeas corpus case through the California courts. § 8.123, part I, deals with “Typical proceedings to initial decision.” § 8.124, part II, deals with “Proceedings to review initial decision.” These materials may be useful in clarifying the procedural requirements and visualizing the various steps in the process.

\(^{18}\)Dependency habeas corpus cases have tight time restrictions because of the need to avoid undue delay. (See § 8.63, post.)

\(^{19}\)To show diligence when a petition collateral to an appeal is contemplated, counsel should indicate by footnote in the brief that a petition is anticipated, and when appropriate explain why the petition is not being filed contemporaneously.
A. Where and When To File  [§ 8.14]

Filing a habeas corpus petition when an appeal is pending requires a decision as to both as to venue – the appropriate court in which to file the petition – and timing – whether to file it during or after the appeal.

1. Venue  [§ 8.15]

All superior and appellate courts have statewide habeas corpus jurisdiction. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 582; Griggs v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 341, 346; In re Van Heftin (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 131, 135.) However, practical and judicial policy considerations generally dictate that the court most closely associated with the case and most efficiently equipped to resolve the issues should decide the petition. Venue choice involves the “territorial” question of the area where the habeas corpus proceeding should take place and also the “vertical” question of which court – trial or appellate – within a given territory should hear the matter. The present discussion covers only challenges to the judgment or sentence; see § 8.53 et seq., post, for other uses of habeas corpus, such as remedying illegal prison conditions and parole denials.

a. “Territorial” question  [§ 8.16]

The appropriate venue for challenges to a conviction or sentence is normally the district or county where judgment was imposed. (In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 583; Griggs v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 341, 347.) If the petition is filed in the wrong appellate district, the Court of Appeal may deny it without prejudice and, if it does, must identify the appropriate court in its order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385(c).) If a petition is filed in the wrong superior court, the court may retain jurisdiction or transfer the case after making an initial determination that the petition states a prima facie case.20 (Rule 4.552(b)(2); Roberts, at p. 583; Griggs, at p. 347.)

20If the petition challenges a denial of parole or seeks relief on a Tenorio claim (People v Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89 [invalidating statute requiring consent of prosecutor to strike prior conviction]), the superior court normally should transfer the petition to the court that rendered the underlying judgment without making an initial determination of prima facie merit. (Rule 4.552(c); In re Roberts, supra, 36 Cal.4th 575, 593; In re Cortez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 78, 88-89, fn. 9; see also Griggs v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 347, fn. 5.)
b. “Vertical” question  [§ 8.17]

Normally as a matter of orderly procedure a habeas corpus petition should be filed in the superior court in the first instance.  

21 (People v. Hillery (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 293, 294 [an appellate court “has discretion to refuse to issue the writ as an exercise of original jurisdiction on the ground that application has not been made therefor in a lower court in the first instance”]; see also In re Ramirez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1312 [this policy not changed by trial court unification].) This is especially true when there are factual matters to be resolved (Hillery, at p. 294); an appellate court is not well equipped to conduct evidentiary hearings and make factual determinations (People v. Pena (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 414, 423, disapproved on another ground in People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 292).

Appellate courts nevertheless have authority to entertain habeas corpus petitions not previously filed in a lower court. They are more inclined to do so when the petition is closely related to an issue in a pending appeal and/or the issue is purely one of law. (See, e.g., In re Davis (1979) 25 Cal.3d 384, 389; In re Kler (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1399; People v. Pena (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 414, 423, disapproved on another ground in People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 292.) Thus, when a habeas corpus issue is directly linked to an appeal, it is preferable to file the petition in the appellate court.  

22 (See People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 151.) A common example is an appeal arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel as a matter of law and a related petition raising facts outside the record to support the showing of ineffectiveness.

2. Timing  [§ 8.18]

If the petition is to be filed in the Court of Appeal while an appeal is pending, it should be submitted promptly, so that the appeal and writ can be considered together.

21 Counsel should understand that, after the petition is filed, compensation for services in the superior court generally must be sought in that court, rather than under the appellate appointment.

22 The cover should prominently state that the petition is collateral to a pending appeal. It must be red if filed as a hard copy. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.44(b)(1).) But see CAVEAT for electronic filing, post, at § 8.19. A request to consolidate the appeal and the petition is usually a good idea. (See, e.g., rule 8.500(d) [separate petitions for review required if appeal and writ not consolidated and no order to show cause issued].) As with all motions, it should be filed as a separate document, not included in a brief or petition. (See rule 8.54.)
If an appeal is pending and the petition is to be filed in the superior court,\(^{23}\) the issue arises whether to file it before or after the appeal has concluded. The superior court has concurrent habeas corpus jurisdiction over the case on matters that are not and could not be raised in a contemporaneous appeal. (\textit{In re Carpenter} (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 646.) In some cases it may be important to file the petition during the appeal. Witness availability, for example, may be limited. In a criminal case, for a client who has a short sentence, meaningful relief may require an early decision. (See generally § 1.30 et seq. of \textbf{chapter 1}, “The ABC’s of Panel Membership: Basic Information for Appointed Counsel,” on protecting the client in time-sensitive cases.)

In a number of other situations, however, it may desirable to defer the filing. Two simultaneous attacks on the same judgment can be inefficient and generate confusion. The decision on appeal might moot the writ proceeding, and vice versa. A trial judge may be doubtful about, or reluctant to exercise, his or her authority to grant the petition, since such a decision could effectively preempt proceedings in the higher court.

Juvenile dependency habeas corpus proceedings are subject to much stricter time limits. (See § 8.63, \textit{post}.)

\section*{B. Petition \ ([§ 8.19])}

“The petition serves primarily to launch the judicial inquiry into the legality of the restraints on the petitioner’s personal liberty.” (\textit{People v. Romero} (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 738.) The petition also states the grounds for the claimed illegality of the petitioner’s liberty, so that the return can respond to the allegations and frame the issues for the proceedings.

§ 8.84 et seq., appendix A, “Requirements for Habeas Corpus Petitions in California State Courts,” provides a step-by-step guide to preparing a petition. (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.384.)

Information about filing and service requirements is summarized on \textbf{ADI’s Filing and Service pages}.\(^{24}\) This would be superseded if TrueFiling or other electronic filing is in place.

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\(^{23}\) When the petition challenges the ruling of a superior court judge, usually another judge must hear the case. (Pen. Code, § 859c; \textit{Fuller v. Superior Court} (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 623, 627.)

\(^{24}\) \texttt{http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/filing_service_chart.asp}
CAVEAT: All of the Courts of Appeal are moving, at different paces, toward wholly electronic filing. The rules and practices set forth below describe paper filings, but counsel must always check with the project, court clerk’s office, or court website to determine whether electronic filing is available or mandatory in the particular court. If so, that procedure would supersede the rules for paper filings.

TrueFiling changes procedures for filing with the court and also prescribes formatting changes for documents. Check with the district’s project and local rules. E.g., Local rule 5 of Fourth Appellate District.

ADI’s electronic service web page and the home page CHEAT SHEET provide information about the ADI email service program.

1. Purpose: establishing prima facie cause for relief [§ 8.20]

The purpose of a habeas corpus petition is to set forth facts and law sufficient to state a prima facie cause—i.e., if the facts stated are assumed true, the petitioner would be entitled to relief. Occasionally a petitioner may find it difficult to state a cause without discovery. The Catch 22 is that in the absence of a pending cause a California trial court lacks jurisdiction to order post-judgment discovery. (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1256.) There is a statutory exception for special circumstances cases. (Pen. Code, § 1054.9, which superseded Gonzales; see In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 691; Curl v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 310.)

Even after trial, however, the prosecution continues to have an ethical duty to disclose exculpatory information that casts doubt on conviction. (People v. Garcia (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1179; see also People v. Kasim (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1383-1384; see Thomas v. Goldsmith (9th Cir. 1992) 979 F.2d 746, 749-750 [state had “present duty to turn over exculpatory evidence” in federal habeas corpus proceeding].)
If the imprisonment is alleged to be illegal, the petition must . . . state in
what the alleged illegality consists. The petition should both (i) state fully
and with particularity the facts on which relief is sought, as well as (ii)
include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the
claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or
declarations. Conclusory allegations made without any explanation of the
basis for the allegations do not warrant relief, let alone an evidentiary
hearing.

(People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474, internal citations and quotation marks
omitted.)

The petition should be factually and legally adequate as filed. As the California
Supreme Court has warned:

The inclusion in a habeas corpus petition of a statement purporting to
reserve the right to supplement or amend the petition at a later date has no
effect. The court will determine the appropriate disposition of a petition for
writ of habeas corpus based on the allegations of the petition as originally
filed and any amended or supplemental petition for which leave to file has
been granted.

(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 781, fn. 16.)

2. Formal petition   [§ 8.21]

Although the entire document filed with the court is usually called a “petition” for
habeas corpus, it contains within it a formal pleading, also called a “petition,” that sets out
the facts and law necessary to state a prima facie cause of action. The formal pleading is
supplemented with points and authorities and evidentiary exhibits. The formal petition
must include a prayer for relief and be verified.

a. Format   [§ 8.22]

California Rules of Court rule 8.384 prescribes the requirements for a petition filed
by an attorney. A formal petition can be drafted using the format from a reliable source
book such as Fischer et al., Appeals and Writs in Criminal Cases (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.
2000), with updates. Another option is to use Judicial Council form MC-275, a copy of
which is available from the California courts’ or ADI’s website. This form is required for pro per petitions, unless the Court of Appeal has excused use of it. (Rule 8.380(a).) A petition filed by an attorney need not be on the form, but it should include all of the information specified on the form. (Rule 8.384(a)(1).) If TrueFiling is in place, the use of the form must be integrated with the district’s local rules for electronic document formatting. (See CAVEAT, § 8.19, ante.)

b. Facts and law  [§ 8.23]

The key elements in the formal petition are supporting facts and supporting cases, rules, or other authority. Although the facts and law in the formal petition need not and generally should not be extremely detailed, they must be sufficiently specific to constitute a cause of action, i.e., a prima facie case for relief. Amplifying detail and legal analysis can be included in the accompanying points and authorities. Technically, however, the petition must stand on its own without reference to anything else. (E.g., In re Gallego (1998) 18 Cal.4th 825, 837, fn. 12; In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 799, fn. 21.)

c. Conclusion and prayer for relief  [§ 8.24]

The petition should include a conclusion. It may summarize the main points made in the petition.

The prayer should specify the ultimate relief sought, such as an order to set aside the conviction, to vacate the sentence and return to court for resentencing, or to vacate the plea. It may also ask for such intermediate orders as issuance of an order to show cause or petition for writ of habeas corpus. (The Judicial Council form does not include a specific prayer for relief.)

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30 In doing so it should recognize that habeas corpus relief is given by an *order*, not a *writ*. (*People v. Romero* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 743.) A common mistake is to pray for a “writ of habeas corpus granting [the ultimate] relief.”
d. Verification [§ 8.25]

A petition must be verified under penalty of perjury. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1474, subd. 3 & 1475; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5.) Counsel may apply for habeas corpus relief on behalf of a client, and verification by counsel satisfies this requirement. (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 783, fn. 5.) Counsel should have sufficient personal knowledge of and confidence in the facts to sign under penalty of perjury. Otherwise, it is better practice to instruct the client to sign the verification.

3. Points and authorities [§ 8.26]

A memorandum of points and authorities should be attached to the formal petition to amplify the legal implications of the facts and address relevant authority. It must be in the proper format for the intended court, including a statement of case, statement of facts, argument, and conclusion. It must include references to the record, declaration, or exhibits. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)-(b), 8.384(a)(2).) Except in capital cases, the memorandum is subject to the length limit for civil briefs established in rule 8.204(c). (Rule 8.384(a)(2).) If TrueFiling is in place, it must comply with the applicable local rule provisions on pagination, etc. (See CAVEAT, § 8.19, ante.)

Because of the verification requirement, a petition is not “properly filed” in state court until a verification is filed, for purposes of tolling the federal habeas corpus statute of limitations. (Zepeda v. Walker (2009) 581 F.3d 1013.)

A verification on counsel’s “belief” in the truth of the allegations is insufficient. (People v. McCarthy (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 593, 597.) Factual allegations on which the petition is based must be “in such form that perjury may be assigned upon the allegations if they are false.” (Ex parte Walpole (1890) 84 Cal. 584.)
4. Declarations, exhibits, and other supporting documents  [§ 8.27]

Declarations and exhibits should be attached to the petition. Any reference to facts outside the record must be supported by adequate declarations or exhibits. If petitions in the same case have been filed previously, copies of the petitions (but no exhibits) must be included, unless the prior petition was filed in the same appellate court and the present petition so states and identifies the documents by case name and number. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.384(b)(1).) If the petition asserts a claim that was the subject of an evidentiary hearing, a certified copy of the transcript must be included. (Rule 8.384(b)(2).)

For hard copy petitions filed by an attorney, any supporting documents accompanying the formal pleading must be bound, tabbed, and preceded by a table of contents. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.384(b)(3), 8.486(c).) If TrueFiling is in place, the attorney should consult the applicable local rule on formatting, pagination, etc. (See CAVEAT, § 8.19, ante.)

If the case is time-sensitive, counsel may wish to consider the possibility of release pending decision on habeas corpus. (Pen. Code, § 1476.)

C. Initial Response by Court of Appeal to Petition  [§ 8.28]

This section addresses procedures after a petition is filed in the Court of Appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385 et seq.) Superior court procedures are discussed in § 8.45 et seq., post. Counsel should consult the published Internal Operating Practices and

33For Court of Appeal habeas corpus cases, four copies of the petition itself must be filed, but unless the court orders otherwise only one copy of the supporting documents is required. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.44(b)(3) & (5).) Different rules apply to Supreme Court writ filings. (Rule 8.44(a)(2) & (3).)

34Factual allegations on which the petition is based must be “in such form that perjury may be assigned upon the allegations if they are false.” (Ex parte Walpole (1890) 84 Cal. 584.) Hearsay statements in the petition or declarations thus may be insufficient. (See People v. Madaris (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 234, 242; cf. People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 484-485 [handling of factual allegations difficult or impossible to establish at pleading stage].)
Procedures of the Courts of Appeal, or call the appellate project or court clerk’s office for details about practices in a particular court. §8.123, appendix B, “California Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus,” part I, “Typical proceedings to initial decision,” part II, may help in visualizing the process.

The Court of Appeal may respond to a petition in a number of ways – most commonly, (a) summary denial, (b) denial without prejudice to refiling in superior court, (c) request for an informal response, or (d) issuance of a writ of habeas corpus or an order to show cause. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385.) The court may use (c) as a way of determining whether a prima facie case is stated, but after deciding the petition does establish a prima facie case warranting relief, the court must choose (d). (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740; see Pen. Code, § 1476, rule 8.385(d).) Summary relief on the basis of the petition alone is not authorized in habeas corpus cases. (Romero, at pp. 740-744.)

1. Summary denial  [§ 8.29]

If, assuming its factual allegations are true, the petition fails to state a cause for relief on its face, the Court of Appeal may deny the petition summarily. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 737.) Such a decision does not create a cause of action (id. at p. 740); it does not require oral argument or a written opinion (see Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1237); it does not create the law of the case (People v.

35Court processes are described in the courts’ Internal Operating Practices and Procedures (IOPP’s), which are published in conjunction with the California Rules of Court and also for some courts online at http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm. In the Fourth Appellate District, for example:
Division One IOPP’s:
Division Two’s internal processes are described in section VII of its Internal Operating Practices and Procedures (IOPP’s), which are published with the California Rules of Court but are not posted on the court’s website.
Division Three IOPP’s:

36The court may occasionally dismiss a petition for mootness, inappropriate venue, or other procedural reason.

37In mandate and other prerogative writ cases, in contrast, a peremptory writ in the first instance is possible.

If a summary denial is not filed on the same day as the decision in a related appeal, the decision is final immediately; no petition for rehearing may be filed, and any petition for review is due within 10 days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.268(a)(2), 8.387(b)(2)(A), 8.500(e)(1).) However, if the denial is filed on the same day as the decision on appeal, it becomes final at the same time as the appeal. Normally, that would be 30 days after filing, unless rehearing is granted, or the opinion is later certified for publication, or the judgment is modified, or some other event affecting finality occurs. (Rule 8.387(b)(2)(B); see chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision,” § 7.29 et seq., on finality.)

Summary denial is not authorized if the petition states a prima facie cause of action; in that case, the court is obligated by statute to issue a writ of habeas corpus or order to show cause. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 737-738; see Pen. Code, § 1476.)

2. Summary denial without prejudice to refile in superior court
[§ 8.30]

If no petition has yet been filed in the superior court, the Court of Appeal may dismiss the petition “without prejudice” to refile in the superior court. This disposition is not a decision on the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition, but is merely a determination the superior court is a more appropriate venue to hear the petition in the first instance. (E.g., In re Ramirez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1313; see In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 593-594; People v. Superior Court (Jiminez) (2002) 28 Cal.4th 798, 806, fn. 3.)

3. Request for informal response [§ 8.31]

Before determining the adequacy of the petition, the Court of Appeal often uses an “informal response” procedure, outlined in California Rules of Court, rule 8.385(b), which enables the court to assess the sufficiency of the petition without immediately issuing a writ or order to show cause. It streamlines the statutory procedures (Pen. Code, § 1473 et seq.), which were designed for the superior court and many of which date back

38In mandate and other prerogative writ cases, in contrast, issuance of an order to show cause or alternative writ is discretionary; the petition may be summarily denied.

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to the 1800’s. It permits the Court of Appeal to deny a petition without oral argument or a written opinion. The procedure is roughly (and imperfectly) analogous to demurrer in a civil action. *(People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 742, fn. 9.)*

California Rules of Court, rule 8.385(b) provides:

(b) Informal response

1. Before ruling on the petition, the court may request an informal written response from the respondent, the real party in interest, or an interested person. The court must send a copy of any request to the petitioner.

2. The response must be served and filed within 15 days or as the court specifies.

3. If a response is filed, the court must notify the petitioner that a reply may be served and filed within 15 days or as the court specifies. The court may not deny the petition until that time has expired. [*39*]

Upon considering the informal response and reply, the court may deny the petition, if it does not state a prima facie case for relief, or issue an order to show cause if it does. The informal procedure does not permit the Court of Appeal to order ultimate relief without issuing an order to show cause or providing an opportunity for a formal return. [*40*]

(Pen. Code, § 1476; *People v. Romero* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740-744.)

4. Issuance of writ of habeas corpus or order to show cause   [§ 8.32]

If the petition establishes a prima facie case warranting relief, the court *must* issue either a writ of habeas corpus requiring the presence of the petitioner or an order to show cause, which does not require the petitioner’s presence. *(People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740; Pen. Code, § 1476, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385(d).)* The issuance of the writ or order establishes a cause of action. *(Romero, at p. 740.)* It is a preliminary determination that the facts as alleged in the petition, if true, state a cause for relief. *(People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474-475; In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 882.)*

[*39*] This subdivision addresses the Supreme Court’s warning “due process may require that . . . habeas corpus petitioners be permitted to answer the response.” *(In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 283, fn. 2.)*

[*40*] The respondent may waive the requirement of an order to show cause by stipulating to the truth of the allegations and the right to relief. *(Romero, at p. 740, fn. 7; cf. In re Olson (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 790, 801-802 [failure to object to granting of relief without order to show cause is not waiver of requirement].)*
If the writ or order is issued only as to some of the claims alleged in the petition, it implicitly denies those not mentioned. *(In re Bolden (2009) 46 Cal.4th 216, 218.)* Neither the writ nor the order to show cause adjudicates the ultimate right to relief. *(Romero, at p. 738.)*

The writ of habeas corpus and order to show cause are functionally similar. A writ of habeas corpus is an order to produce “the body” – i.e., physically bring the petitioner before the court for proceedings on the petition. *(People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 738, fn. 4.)* The petition serves only a limited function: to institute formal proceedings and order the custodian to file a return. Appellate courts usually do not order the petitioner’s physical presence before them, because they are not equipped to handle prisoners, but instead issue an order to show cause, which requires the custodian to file a return. *(Id. at p. 738; see also People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1073.)*

Once the cause of action is established, several kinds of further proceedings are possible, depending on the issues and their relationship if any to an appeal. In its order to show cause, the Court of Appeal will direct which procedures will be followed. § 8.123 et seq., appendix B, “California Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus,” part I, “Typical proceedings to initial decision,” may help in visualizing the alternatives in this process.

a. **Legal pleadings without fact-finding**  [§ 8.33]

If there appear to be no contested factual matters, the Court of Appeal may order further pleadings without fact-finding.

b. **Return before superior court**  [§ 8.34]

The Court of Appeal may make the order to show cause returnable in the superior court, thus transferring jurisdiction to that court. (Pen. Code, § 1508; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385(e); *People v. Romero* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740; *In re Hochberg* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 875, fn. 4.) It frequently chooses that option when the case involves issues of fact requiring an evidentiary hearing. *(Romero, at p. 740.)* The respondent must then file a return before that court, the petitioner must have an opportunity to file a traverse, and the court must decide the case formally. The superior court may not summarily deny the petition or decline to decide the facts on the grounds habeas corpus is not a proper remedy. *(Hochberg, at pp. 875-876; Rose v. Superior Court (People) (2000) 81 *

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41 In recognition of this reality, California Rules of Court, rule 8.385(d) requires issuance of an order to show cause and does not mention the writ of habeas corpus alternative.
Cal.App.4th 564, 574-576 [mandate issued when superior court failed to hold evidentiary hearing or state reasons in response to Court of Appeal order to show cause].

c. **Reference to superior court**  [§ 8.35]

The appellate court, alternatively, may “refer” the matter to the superior court, i.e., retain jurisdiction but order a “‘’ (usually a superior court judge) to serve as a fact-finder and report the findings back to the Court of Appeal. (E.g., *In re Sakarias* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 140, 144; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.386(f).)

As discussed further in § 8.41 et seq., “Decision on the Merits,” *post*, upon receipt of the factual findings, the appellate court will resolve the issues raised by the petition and determine whether any relief should be granted. It must first permit an opportunity for oral argument. (*Rosato v. Superior Court* (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 190, 230; see *Kowis v. Howard* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894-895; *People v. Medina* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 484, 489-490; cf. *Lewis v. Superior Court* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1237, 1256-1261 [no right to oral argument if a peremptory writ of mandate is issued in the first instance].)

d. **Court of Appeal as trier of fact**  [§ 8.36]

On very rare occasions, the Court of Appeal may sit as a fact-finding tribunal in the first instance and directly receive evidence.

D. **Return**  [§ 8.37]

*People v. Duvall* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464 deals with the topic of habeas corpus returns in depth. Once the writ or order to show cause is issued, the return by the prosecution to the court’s order becomes the principal pleading, analogous to a complaint in a civil proceeding. (*People v. Romero* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 738-739.) While this analogy is far from complete, it does underscore one of the basic functions of the return: to “sharpen[] the issues that must be decided.” (*Duvall*, at p. 480.)

The return must be responsive to allegations of the petition and may not simply assert “the existence of a judgment of conviction and sentence.” (*People v. Duvall* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 476; see Pen. Code, § 1480.) A general denial is insufficient: the return must allege specific facts in support of the petitioner’s detention and recite the facts on which any denial of the petition’s allegations is based. (*Duvall*, at pp. 476, 479-480.) The return, “where appropriate, should provide such documentary evidence, affidavits, or other materials as will enable the court to determine which issues are truly disputed.”
The return is deemed to admit those material factual allegations it fails to dispute. (*In re Sixto* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1252.)

California Rules of Court, rule 8.386(b) and (c) governs the time, form, length, and content of the return.

**E. Traverse  [§ 8.38]**

The petitioner’s response to the return is a traverse.42 It is analogous to the answer in a civil lawsuit, and through the return and traverse the issues are joined. (*People v. Romero* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 739.) The factual allegations in the return will be deemed true unless the petitioner controverts them in the traverse. (*In re Lawler* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 190, 194.) Appellate counsel should keep these principles and analogies in mind and not be lulled into thinking a traverse is an “optional” pleading like a reply brief on appeal.

In the traverse the petitioner may reassert the allegations of the petition and may incorporate by reference material previously put forth in either the petition or the reply to an informal response. (*In re Lewallen* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 277.) The petitioner may also stipulate that the petition be treated as a traverse. (*People v. Duvall* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 477; see *In re Stafford* (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 110, 113.) If the factual allegations in the return are so inadequate that the petitioner cannot answer them, “the petitioner may ‘except to the sufficiency’ (Pen. Code, § 1484) of the return in his . . . traverse, thus raising questions of law in a procedure analogous to demurrer.” (*In re Saunders* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1033, 1048.)

The traverse may allege additional facts in support of the claim on which an order to show cause has issued, but it may not introduce additional claims or wholly different factual bases for those claims. It cannot “expand the scope of the proceeding which is limited to the claims which the court initially determined stated a prima facie case for relief.” (*In re Clark* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 781, fn. 16.) To bring additional claims before the court, petitioner must obtain leave to file a supplemental petition for writ of habeas corpus. (*Board of Prison Terms v. Superior Court* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1235; see also *In re Cox* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 974, 980-981; *People v. Green* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 43, fn. 28, overruled on other grounds in *People v. Hall* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3.)

California Rules of Court, rule 8.386(d) governs the time, form, length, and content of the traverse.

42For proceedings in the superior court, rule 4.551(e) calls this pleading by the petitioner a “denial.”
F. **Evidence Hearing** [§ 8.39]

If the return and traverse present no disputed material factual issue, the court may dispose of the petition without the necessity of an evidentiary hearing. (*People v. Romero* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 739, and cases cited therein.) If there are disputed facts and the petitioner’s right to relief may turn on the resolution of a factual matter, then a hearing is required.\(^{43}\) (*Id.* at pp. 739-740; see Pen. Code, § 1484; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.386(f)(1).)

Evidentiary hearings are normally conducted in the superior court before a judge of that court, even if the Court of Appeal has retained jurisdiction over the cause. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.386(f)(2).)

G. **Argument in the Court of Appeal** [§ 8.40]

If the Court of Appeal has retained jurisdiction and has issued a prior writ of habeas corpus or order to show cause, the court must permit oral argument. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 3; Pen. Code, § 1254; see *Kowis v. Howard* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894-895; *People v. Medina* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 484, 489-490; *Rosato v. Superior Court* (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 190, 230; cf. *Lewis v. Superior Court* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1237 [no right to oral argument if a peremptory writ of mandate is filed in the first instance].)

H. **Decision on the Merits** [§ 8.41]

California Rules of Court, rule 8.387 governs the filing, finality, and modification of the decision, rehearing, and remittitur in a habeas corpus proceeding.

1. **Effect of prior habeas corpus writ or order to show cause** [§ 8.42]

Without a prior writ of habeas corpus to produce the petitioner or an order to show cause, a proceeding initiated by a habeas corpus petition does not become a “cause.”\(^{44}\) Relief may not be granted in that situation (*People v. Romero* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740),

\(^{43}\)The hearing is governed by the rules of evidence. Hearsay is not admissible unless an exception applies. (See *In re Fields* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1070.)

\(^{44}\)In contrast, issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance without an alternative writ or order to show cause creates a cause. (*Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc.* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178, fn. 6.)
although it can be denied (id. at p. 737). If the proceeding is in the Court of Appeal, no written opinion is then required. (See Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1260, fn. 18.)

If a writ or order to show cause has issued and the case is in the Court of Appeal, a written opinion is necessary. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14 [“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated”]; see Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1241; Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894-895.)

2. Factual findings  [§ 8.43]

Factual findings by any referee the court may have appointed are not binding, but are entitled to great weight when supported by substantial evidence, especially findings that require resolution of testimonial conflicts and assessment of witnesses’ credibility because the referee has the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor. (In re Sakarias (2005) 35 Cal.4th 140, 151; In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296-297; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 201; In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 603.)

3. Burden of proof  [§ 8.43A]

The petitioner ordinarily bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts on which the claim depends. (In re Large (2008) 41 Cal.4th 538, 549.) Some claims, however, must meet other standards.

45 The respondent may waive the requirement of an order to show cause by stipulating to the truth of the allegations and the right to relief. (Romero, at p. 740, fn. 7; cf. In re Olson (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 790, 801-802 [failure to object to granting of relief without order to show cause is not waiver of requirement].)


47 When a petition alleges instructional error as to the elements of an offense, reversal is required unless the People can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury must have relied on a valid theory of guilt. (In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216.)
For example, the long-standing burden for a habeas corpus claim based on *newly discovered evidence* used to be that the evidence must “completely undermine the entire structure of the case upon which the prosecution was based.” (*In re Lawley* (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1239; *In re Clark* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 766.) But on January 1, 2017, subdivision (b)(3)(A) and (B) of Penal Code section 1473 became effective. Arguably, the express legislative purpose was to supersede the *Lawley* standard and change it to a “more likely than not” one.48 A motion to vacate a conviction because of newly discovered evidence, made under Penal Code section 1473.7, subdivision (e)(1), by a person no longer in custody, must also meet a preponderance standard.

In contrast, a claim of *false evidence* under Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (e) raises a question of “materiality” – whether the false evidence was of such significance as to create a reasonable probability it may have affected the outcome of the trial. (*In re Richards* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 291, 312.) This standard is the same as the one for *Watson* prejudice. (*Id.* at pp. 312-313, referring to *People v. Watson* (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) It is lower than the preponderance burden. (See *College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715 [under *Watson* a reasonable “‘probability’ . . . does not mean more likely than not, but merely a *reasonable chance*, more than an *abstract possibility*,” italics original]; see also *Watson*, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837.)49

4. Form of relief [§ 8.44]

If the court decides to grant relief, it issues an *order* (e.g., releasing the petitioner, altering the conditions of confinement, etc.), not a *writ*. The “writ” of habeas corpus has the limited function described in § 8.32, ante – to bring the petitioner brought before the court and require the respondent to file a return justifying the custody. This aspect of habeas corpus is in contrast to mandate, in which the relief is granted by issuance of a peremptory writ (either in the first instance or after issuance of an alternative writ or order to show cause). (*People v. Romero* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 743.)

The terms of the order are shaped to the individual situation, “as the justice of the case may require.” (Pen. Code, § 1484; *In re Crow* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 613, 619.) The nature of habeas corpus requires “the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriage

48 To document this point, counsel should investigate the legislative history. (Stats. 2016, c. 785, Sen. Bill No. 1134 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.).)

of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.” (Harris v. Nelson (1969) 394 U.S. 286, 291.)

I. Proceedings in Superior Court After Habeas Corpus Petition Is Filed

Habeas corpus proceedings in the superior court are governed by California Rules of Court, rule 4.550 et seq.50 (See also Pen. Code, § 1473 et seq.; see Maas v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 962 [habeas is a “special proceeding” and is subject to Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6 peremptory challenge to judge upon filing of petition].) The requirements and sequence are, for the most part, similar to those for Court of Appeal habeas corpus cases. Unlike Court of Appeal proceedings, however, the rules for superior court cases set forth procedural time lines. § 8.123, appendix B, “California Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus,” part I, “Typical proceedings to initial decision,” may help in visualizing the process.

1. Initial ruling on petition

The court must rule on the petition within 60 days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551(a)(3).) This means the court must make a preliminary determination whether the case is to go forward51 – that is, it must deny the petition, issue an order to show cause, or request an informal response. (Rule 4.551(a)(4).) In doing so, the court must assume the petitioner’s factual allegations are true and then decide whether they would, if proven, establish a right to relief. (Pen. Code, § 1476; rule 4.551(c)(1).) The court may deny the petition summarily if it fails to state a prima facie case for relief. It must issue an order to show cause if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. (Pen. Code, § 1476; rule 4.551(c)(1).)

2. Informal response

California Rules of Court, rule 4.551(b) provides for an informal response procedure to assist the superior court in assessing the sufficiency of the petition, similar to that in rule 8.385(b) for Court of Appeal proceedings. The informal response must be

50 Compensation for services in the superior court generally must be sought in that court, rather than under the appellate appointment. Counsel should contact the assigned ADI staff attorney about the particular situation.

51 The procedures for responding to a failure to rule are rather Byzantine. (See rule 4.551(a)(3)(B).)
filed within 15 days after the court requests it. (Rule 4.551(b)(2).) The petitioner must be
given an opportunity to file an informal reply (due 15 days after the response). (Rule
4.551(b)(2) & (3).) After allowing a time for a reply, the court must either deny the
petition or issue an order to show cause within 45 days from the filing of the informal
response. (Rule 4.551(a)(5).)

3. **Later proceedings** [§ 8.48]

If the court issues an order to show cause and the petitioner is indigent, it must
appoint counsel. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551(c)(2).) The respondent may file a return
within 30 days, and the petitioner may file a denial (i.e., traverse) within 30 days after
that. (Rule 4.551(d) & (e).) Within 30 days of the petitioner’s denial or expiration of the
time for filing one, the court must either grant or deny the relief sought or, if needed,
order an evidentiary hearing. (Rule 4.551(f).) An order denying the petition must include
a statement of reasons. (Rule 4.551(g).) The court may reconsider an order granting relief
within the 60 days the People have to appeal. (**Jackson v. Superior Court (People)** (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 1051.)

J. **Review of Habeas Corpus Decision** [§ 8.49]

1. **Filing in Court of Appeal after superior court decision** [§ 8.50]

The denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus by the superior court is not
appealable. (Pen. Code, § 1506; **In re Clark** (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767, fn. 7; see **People
v. Gallardo** (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 986.) The remedy is to file a new petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal.

Unlike a denial, the *grant* of a writ of habeas corpus is appealable. (Pen. Code,
§ 1506.) The standard of review when the People appeal a grant is the same as that on
appeal after a trial. The court applies the substantial evidence test to pure questions of fact
and the abuse of discretion standard to decisions within the lower court’s discretion, and
independently reviews questions of law. If there are mixed questions of law and fact, the
Court of Appeal’s review uses a substantial evidence standard when the decision is
predominantly factual and a de novo one when it is predominantly legal. (**People v.
Waidla** (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 730.)

2. **Factual findings** [§ 8.51]

When the Court of Appeal considers a habeas corpus petition filed after denial of a
petition in the superior court in the same case, the court is exercising its original as
opposed to appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal is thus acting as finder of fact and makes its own determination. Nevertheless, as when it considers the findings of a referee it has appointed, it gives the factual findings of the lower court “great weight,” particularly with respect to credibility determinations. (In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 230, 249; In re Wright (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 788, 801-802; § 8.43, ante.)

3. **Supreme Court review**  [§ 8.52]

Whether the Court of Appeal denies or grants the petition, relief may be sought from the California Supreme Court by a petition for review (Pen. Code, § 1506; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(a)(1)) or, if necessary, a new habeas corpus petition in the Supreme Court. Since the general rule is that writ relief will be denied if adequate appellate remedies are available, normally a petition for review should be sought. However, if it is necessary to present additional materials (for example, newly discovered information) or if time considerations make the appellate remedy (petition for review) inadequate, then a petition for habeas corpus would be appropriate.

A petition for review must be filed within 10 days after a decision denying habeas corpus relief becomes final as to the Court of Appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(e)(1).) A denial is final in 30 days if (1) it is filed on the same day as a related appeal or (2) an order to show cause was issued (rule 8.387(b)(1) & (2)(B)). Thus a petition for review is due in the 30 to 40-day window after decision. Otherwise, a denial is final immediately, and the petition for review is due 10 days after the decision. (Rule 8.387(b)(2)(A).) The Court of Appeal may order earlier finality as to that court for good cause. (Rule 8.387(b)(3)(A).)

If the Court of Appeal decided the habeas corpus petition without issuing an order to show cause and without consolidating it with a related appeal, separate petitions for review must be filed for the habeas corpus and appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(d).)

§ 8.124, appendix B, part II, “Proceedings to review initial decision,” a flow chart, may help in visualizing the review process.

### IV. OTHER APPLICATIONS OF STATE HABEAS CORPUS  [§ 8.53]

Habeas corpus has applications in other circumstances than a post-conviction challenge to the judgment under which the petitioner is constrained. While detailed
analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter, examples encountered in appellate practice include:

A. Late or Defective Notice of Appeal  [§ 8.54]

Although habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, it may be used to establish a constructive filing of a notice of appeal when the petitioner reasonably relied on counsel to file a timely notice of appeal and counsel failed to do so.\(^{52}\) \((\text{In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72; see also Rodriquez v. United States (1969) 395 U.S. 327.})\) Habeas corpus can also be used to establish constructive filing of a writ petition with a deadline. \((\text{In re Antilia (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 622; see In re Lambirth (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 915 [habeas corpus used to establish constructive filing of administrative appeal].})\); see also \§ 8.83, post.)

Habeas corpus may also be used to validate a late-filed appeal on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, when trial counsel failed to consult with the client about an appeal and a reasonable defendant might have wanted to appeal. \((\text{Roe v. Flores-Ortega (2000) 528 U.S. 470.})\) Another possible ineffective assistance of counsel issue would be based on failure to obtain timely a certificate of probable cause in a guilty plea appeal.

This subject is treated in § 2.115 et seq. of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started.”

B. Release Pending Appeal  [§ 8.55]

Before trial, a writ of habeas corpus may be used to review either a denial of release or the imposition of excessive bail. After judgment, the superior court’s denial of release pending appeal may be challenged by a habeas corpus petition or, more simply, an application under California Rules of Court, rule 8.312.\(^{53}\) \((\text{In re Pipinos (1982) 33 Cal.3d 189, 196-197; In re Podesta (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921; People v. McGuire (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 687, 700, fn. 14, citing People v. Lowery (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 902, 904.})\) See § 3.37 et seq. of chapter 3, “Pre-Briefing Responsibilities: Record Completion,

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\(^{52}\)Practice note: Courts vary in their handling of requests for late filing of a notice of appeal. A motion is used in some courts, while others require a formal petition for writ of habeas corpus. \((\text{See People v. Zarazua (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1054.})\) Counsel should consult with the project if the situation arises.

\(^{53}\)Before 2004, the provision for a bail application to the reviewing court was in rule 32 and before 2006, the provision for a bail application was in rule 30.2.
Extensions of Time, Release on Appeal,” for an extended discussion of release pending appeal.

C. In-Prison Conditions and Administrative Decisions, Parole, and Other Issues Arising After Judgment

Habeas corpus may be used to challenge in-prison conditions, administrative decisions such as credits and discipline, and similar matters. (E.g., In re Vicks (2013) 56 Cal.4th 274; In re Cabrera (2012) 55 Cal.4th 683; In re Arias (1986) 42 Cal.3d 667, 678; In re Gomez (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1082; In re Martinez (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1141; In re Villa (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 954; In re Fratus (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1339; see In re Lambirth (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 915 [habeas corpus used to establish constructive filing of administrative appeal].) A petition seeking to remedy unlawful custodial conditions or administrative decisions should be filed in the district or division in which the petitioner is in custody. (In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 583-584; Griggs v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 341, 347.) If the proceeding becomes moot as to the petitioner personally during litigation because the individual matter is resolved, but the inmate’s complaint is a matter of broad public concern or is a recurring issue for other prisoners and the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the court may permit it to proceed as a “class action” vehicle, figuratively speaking. (In re Carr (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 962, 964, fn. 1; In re Brindle (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 660, 670; see also In re Jackson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 501, 504, fn. 1; In re Davis (1979) 25 Cal.3d 384.)


Counsel are cautioned that an appellate appointment does not cover such proceedings. Counsel may seek compensation elsewhere or refer the client to a prisoner assistance organization. The ADI website maintains a partial list of prisoner assistance resources. http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/pract_resources.asp Counsel can also provide habeas corpus forms and instructions on filing them.

A finding by the Board of Parole Hearings that a prisoner is not suitable for parole is subject to state habeas corpus review.\(^{56}\) \textit{(In re Roberts} (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 584.) Similarly, habeas corpus may be used to contest the reasonableness of parole conditions. \textit{(In re David} (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 675.) A petition attacking denial of parole is not a challenge to the conditions of confinement and should be filed in the county in which judgment was imposed, rather than the county in which petitioner is incarcerated. \textit{(Id.} at p. 593.) The Board’s or Governor’s decision denying parole is subject to a limited judicial review by habeas corpus, to determine only whether the decision is supported by “some evidence.” \textit{(In re Rosenkrantz} (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 625; \textit{In re Scott} (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 573; \textit{In re Smith} (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 489; see \textit{In re Lira} (2013) 58 Cal.4th 573.)

D. Contempt \([\S \text{8.57}]\)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1209 et seq. and Penal Code section 166 set forth the statutory provisions covering contempt.

Direct contempt is conduct in the immediate presence of the judge, such as disruptive or disrespectful courtroom behavior. It may be dealt with summarily by the judge against whom and in whose court the offense was committed. (E.g., \textit{In re Buckley} (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 247, 256, 259 [in-court disparagement of trial judge]; \textit{In re Ciraolo} (1969) 70 Cal.2d 389, 393 [false declaration about statements made by judge].) A finding of direct contempt requires an order reciting the facts constituting the contempt, adjudging the person guilty, and prescribing the punishment. The facts as recited must show on their face a legal contempt. \textit{(Id.} at p. 394.)

Indirect contempt occurs outside the courtroom – for example, disobedience of a court order. (E.g., \textit{Kreling v. Superior Court} (1941) 18 Cal.2d 884, 887 [violation of injunction].) The accused is entitled to notice of the accusations, in the form of a declaration setting forth the facts constituting the alleged contempt, and an order to show

\(^{56}\)\textit{Federal} habeas corpus is available to review state parole decisions alleged to violate such provisions of the federal Constitution as due process or ex post facto. Federal review is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), at 28 United States Code section 2241 et seq. Section 2254 of AEDPA requires a deferential standard of review of these decisions. \textit{(Himes v. Thompson} (9th Cir. 2003) 336 F.3d 848, 852-854.) Section 2244(d) applies a one-year statute of limitations to filing for federal relief. \textit{(Redd v. McGrath} (9th Cir. 2003) 343 F.3d 1077; see also \textit{Shelby v. Bartlett} (9th Cir. 2004) 391 F.3d 1061). See \textit{chapter 9}, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”

1. Procedures for reviewing contempt order [§ 8.58]

Habeas corpus is available to review an adjudication of contempt imposing punitive (as opposed to remedial) sanctions, involving incarceration of the accused. (In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 247, 259 [in-court disparagement of trial judge]; Kreling v. Superior Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 884, 887 [violation of injunction alleged to be void].)

Certiorari is another remedy. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1222; Hawk v. Superior Court (1972) 42 Cal.App.3d 108, 115; see also § 8.75, post.)

A criminal contempt conviction under Penal Code section 166 is appealable as a misdemeanor. (In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 259.)

2. Jurisdiction [§ 8.59]

To make a finding of contempt, the trial court must have “jurisdiction,” in a specialized meaning of the term.

Jurisdiction to find a direct contempt committed in the immediate presence of the court requires an order reciting the facts, adjudging guilt, and prescribing the punishment. The facts recited must demonstrate on their face the commission of a legal contempt. (In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 247.)

Jurisdiction to find an indirect contempt, disobedience of a court order outside the presence of the court, requires specific factual findings:

The facts essential to jurisdiction for a contempt proceeding are (1) the making of the order; (2) knowledge of the order; (3) ability of the respondent to render compliance; (4) willful disobedience of the order. The record of the court must affirmatively show upon its face the facts upon which jurisdiction depends so that an appellate court can determine if a contempt has been committed.
(Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1736, internal citations and quotation marks omitted [violation of consent decree].)

3. Standards of review [§ 8.60]

In reviewing an adjudication of contempt, the reviewing court’s sole responsibility is to determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction to render the judgment. (In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 247.) “Jurisdiction” has the specialized meaning described in § 8.59, ante.

A contempt judgment is construed in favor of the accused – that is, the appellate court does not presume it is justified unless shown otherwise, but instead requires that each element of jurisdiction, in the specialized sense described in § 8.59, ante, be demonstrated affirmatively on the face of the record. (Mitchell v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1230, 1256; In re Liu (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 135, 146; see also In re Cassill (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087; Blake v. Municipal Court (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 131, 136.)

This principle does not mean, however, that the appellate court must take a view of the evidence least favorable to upholding the order. (City of Vernon v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 509, 517.) The standard is whether there was any substantial evidence before the trial court to sustain its jurisdiction, and the power to weigh the evidence rests with the trial court. (In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 247; City of Vernon, at p. 517; Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1737.) If punitive sanctions are imposed, the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt (Hicks v. Feiock (1988) 485 U.S. 624, 632, fn. 5; Mitchell v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1230, 1256), and therefore the appellate court must determine whether under the evidence the trial court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the accused was guilty of contempt.

E. Civil Commitments [§ 8.61]

Because civil commitments involve custody of the person, habeas corpus may be used to challenge the legality of the confinement when appellate remedies are unavailable or inadequate. For example, in proceedings under the Sexually Violent Predator Act, the appropriate remedy for challenging a probable cause finding is a habeas corpus petition, not a motion to dismiss under Penal Code section 995. (People v. Talhelm (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 400, 404-405.) Habeas corpus is also used for seeking dismissal of an SVP petition when the underlying judgment has been reversed on appeal. (In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251; In re Franklin (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 386.) Habeas corpus is used in Lanterman-Petris-Short conservatorship proceedings to challenge short-term detentions.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5275, 5353.) It is the appropriate procedure for testing the administrative placement of an mentally disordered offender and for raising a claim that the individual’s confinement in a prison facility violates his constitutional rights. (People v. Gram (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1125.)

F. Reinstatement of Appeal  [§ 8.62]

A petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in a reviewing court may be used after an appeal to challenge the appellate proceedings on such grounds as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. If the petition is successful, recall of the remittitur is an appropriate remedy. (People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 396-397; In re Smith (1970) 3 Cal.3d 192, 203-204; In re Grunau (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 997; People v. Valenzuela (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 381, 388, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 484, 490, fn. 12; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.272(c)(2), 8.366(a), 8.540(c)(2).) Alternatively, a motion to recall the remittitur may be used when the grounds do not depend on facts outside the record. (Mutch, at pp. 396-397 [fundamental change in law, altering elements of the offense, after original opinion]; People v. Lewis (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 874, 879.)

Habeas corpus may also be used to seek reinstatement of an appeal dismissed under California Rules of Court, rule 8.360(c)(5) for failure to file an opening brief. (In re Serrano (1995) 10 Cal.4th 447, 450.) A motion to reinstate is commonly used, as well.

G. Dependency and Family Law Applications  [§ 8.63]

Habeas corpus may be available in the juvenile dependency context, on the theory “custody” is involved. The remedy not only safeguards the parent’s fundamental rights but also ensures the correctness of the result. If the proceedings have resulted in an inappropriate termination of the parent-child relationship, the child may have an interest equal to that of the parent’s in its restoration. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1664; see also Kemper v. County of San Diego (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1093.)


Family law applications include non-dependency child custody issues (In re Richard M. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 783, 789) and adoption-related proceedings (see generally Adoption of Alexander S. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 857, 866-868).

Because of the time-sensitive nature of child-focused proceedings, juvenile dependency and family habeas corpus cases are held to a stricter time schedule than criminal cases. To protect the child’s welfare, the parent generally must file the petition within the time deadlines for filing an appeal from the particular juvenile court order or judgment. (Adoption of Alexander S. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 857, 866; Kemper v. County of San Diego (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1093; In re Carrie M. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 530 533-534.) The right to habeas corpus relief is limited to the dependency order to which the claimed ineffective assistance of counsel relates. (In re Carrie M., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 533-534.) It may not be used to challenge earlier orders. (Id. at p. 534.)

H. Other Applications § 8.64

Habeas corpus is occasionally used in other ways than those outlined above; this discussion does not purport to enumerate all such ways. Some of the most commonly encountered applications in criminal and juvenile appellate practice might be seeking habeas corpus in lieu of appeal when, because of extreme time pressures, appellate remedies are inadequate (In re Quackenbush (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1305; In re Duran (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d. 632, 635); securing immediate release of an inmate who has already served all the time legally authorized; challenging on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds the validity of a prior conviction used to enhance a sentence in a current proceeding (see Custis v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 485, 497; People v. Allen (1999))

57 Cody R. also says, more expansively: “[H]abeas corpus in dependency proceedings is limited to claims of wrongful withholding of custody of the child, including lack of jurisdiction, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Counsel should not be deterred by this language, arguably dictum, from considering use of habeas corpus when necessary. Habeas has been used in some ICWA situations, for example. Consult the project in this situation.
21 Cal.4th 424, 435; cf. Garcia v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 953, 964-966);\(^{58}\) and collaterally attacking an enhancement because of an ameliorative change in the law or providing “a vehicle to obtain relief limited to a new sentencing hearing in the original criminal action, which may result in a different sentence” (People v. Buycks, et al. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 895, quoting In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1052, fn. 9.)

V. \hspace{1em} OTHER EXTRAORDINARY WRITS IN CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE APPELLATE PRACTICE \hspace{1em} [§ 8.65]

Criminal and juvenile appellate practitioners seldom need to apply for writ relief other than habeas corpus, but very occasionally may have to consider use of coram nobis or coram vobis, supersedeas, mandate or prohibition, certiorari, or other common law or statutory writs. The writs most likely to be encountered in appellate practice are mentioned here, with a brief description of their typical uses and requirements. Other resources offer more comprehensive treatment. (E.g., Fischer et al., Appeals and Writs in Criminal Cases (Cont.Ed.Bar 2000, rev. 2006) § 2.1 et seq., p. 347 et seq.) Division One of the Fourth Appellate District has a handout\(^{59}\) on writs of mandate, prohibition, and supersedeas.

A. Writs of Error Coram Nobis and Error Coram Vobis \hspace{1em} [§ 8.66]

A petition for writ of error coram nobis in the criminal law context is filed in the superior court that rendered judgment and is the equivalent of a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea or a motion to vacate the judgment. If the judgment was previously appealed and affirmed, a petition for writ of error coram vobis is filed in the reviewing court. The writs also are available in the juvenile dependency context. (E.g., In re Rachel M. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1289; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 828.)

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\(^{58}\)A challenge to a prior conviction enhancement grounded on failure to comply with Boykin-Tahl requirements may, in contrast, be done by a motion to strike in the current proceeding. (Allen, at pp. 426-427; see Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.)

\(^{59}\)http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/writs_handout.pdf
1. **Coram nobis as motion to vacate judgment**  [§ 8.67]

In its function as a motion to vacate the judgment, a writ of error *coram nobis* may be granted when three requirements are met:

(1) [T]he petitioner has shown that some fact existed which, without fault of his own, was not presented to the court at the trial on the merits, and which if presented would have prevented the rendition of the judgment; (2) the petitioner has shown that the newly discovered evidence does not go to the merits of the issues tried; and (3) the petitioner has shown that the facts upon which he relies were not known to him and could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ.


2. **Coram nobis as motion to withdraw guilty plea**  [§ 8.68]

Without statutory authorization, no right exists to seek relief by a post-judgment motion to vacate a guilty plea. (*People v. Shokur* (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1398; see also

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60 In *Ibanez*, the alleged error was the failure of the trial court to admonish the defendant of the possibility of consequences under the Sexually Violent Predators Act before accepting the defendant’s plea of guilty. On the People’s appeal from the grant of the defendant’s *coram nobis* petition, the appellate court concluded that there was no error in the failure to advise and in any event *coram nobis* was unavailable because the alleged error was legal not factual. In footnote 13, the court also noted that ineffective assistance of counsel could not be raised by *coram nobis*. (*People v. Ibanez* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 537, 546, fn. 13.)
People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 337-338 [unless authorized by specific statute, motion made after judgment becomes final cannot be considered].) Coram nobis may be available, however. In a coram nobis petition seeking withdrawal of a guilty plea, the defendant must make a showing similar to the “good cause” showing required for withdrawal of a plea before judgment under Penal Code section 1018.

For example, coram nobis relief may be available when a defendant has entered a plea because of a misrepresentation by a responsible public official, duress, fraud, or other fact overreaching free will and judgment. In such situations, the defendant has improperly been deprived of the right to a trial on the merits. (People v. Goodrum (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 397, 400-401; cf. Mendez v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 791, 796 [coram nobis not available to challenge guilty plea induced by prospect that perjured testimony would be offered against defendant, if neither prosecuting authorities nor court had reason to know about the perjury at the time].)

If the misrepresentation or overreaching of will comes from counsel rather than a public official, habeas corpus rather than coram nobis is the appropriate remedy. (People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1104; People v. Gallardo (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 982-983; People v. Goodrum (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 397, 400-401.)

3. Appeal of coram nobis denial [§ 8.69]

Unlike the denial of a habeas corpus petition in the trial court, the denial of a coram nobis petition may be appealable to the Court of Appeal. As explained in People v. Gallardo (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 982:

Denial of a defendant’s request for coram nobis relief is appealable (People v. Allenthorp (1966) 64 Cal.2d 679, 683) unless the petition failed to state a prima facie case for relief (People v. Kraus (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 568, 575, fn. 4) or the petition merely duplicated issues which had or could have been resolved in other proceedings (People v. Vaitonis (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d

61 An exception to this general rule is when the court fails to advise a defendant of immigration consequences pursuant to Penal Code section 1016.5; rather than a common law writ, the correct remedy is a statutory motion. (People v. Carty (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1521, 1524-1526, 1531.)
Coram vobis is essentially the same as coram nobis, except that it is addressed to a higher court, while coram nobis is addressed to the court in which the petitioner was convicted. (People v. Welch (1964) 61 Cal.2d 786, 790; In re De La Roi (1946) 28 Cal.2d 264, 276.) It is necessary if the trial court has no jurisdiction to vacate the judgment. For example, when the judgment has been affirmed in a previous appeal, the appropriate remedy is a coram vobis petition filed in the court that affirmed the judgment – that is, the Court of Appeal (or Supreme Court, if review was granted). (Pen. Code, § 1265, subd. (a).) Similarly, if an appeal is pending when the error is discovered, coram vobis in the appellate court is necessary. (People v. Malveaux (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1435.)

B. Mandate, Prohibition, and Certiorari  

Writs of mandate, prohibition, and certiorari are “prerogative” writs. The theory and requirements of these writs are explained in several leading cases of the California Supreme Court. (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232; Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171; see also People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, and People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 877, 883-884 [distinguishing between habeas corpus and prerogative writs].)

If the trial court denies the petition and the decision is appealed, the Court of Appeal may treat the appeal as a petition for writ of error coram vobis. (People v. Forest (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1099.)
Writ proceedings in reviewing courts are governed by California Rules of Court, rule 8.485 et seq. Decisions in some writ proceedings filed in the superior court may be reviewed by appeal (see § 2.74, chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started”) or by a writ proceeding filed in the reviewing court (see Kinder v. Superior Court (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 574, 578, citing Robinson v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 379, 383-384).

Division One of the Fourth Appellate District has a handout on writs of mandate, prohibition, and supersedeas.

1. Basic purpose [§ 8.72]
   a. Mandate [§ 8.73]

A writ of mandate (mandamus) is an order from a higher court to a lower one, or to some other entity or individual, commanding that some act be performed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1084-1097.) Many applications in criminal cases are pretrial. A common use of mandate in criminal appellate practice is ordering the issuance of a certificate of probable cause, to permit an appeal contesting the validity of a guilty plea. (See People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1180; In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 683, dictum on another point disapproved in People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1097-1098 & fn. 7; People v. Warburton (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 815, 820, fn. 2; cf. Pen. Code, § 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b).) It is also available in the dependency context. (E.g., Karen P. v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 908.)

Mandate may be an alternative to appeal when required by statute. (E.g., § 8.83, post, on statutory writs.) Case law or the exigencies of a case may call for mandate. (E.g., Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1408 [dismissal of dependency petition at conclusion of detention hearing]; In re Mario C. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1308-1309 [deferred entry of judgment in delinquency case]; cf. People v. Mena (2012) 54 Cal.4th 146 [availability of writ review does not bar review by appeal].) It may also be an alternative to habeas corpus when the

63 Rule 8.486, petitions; 8.487, opposition; 8.488, certificate of interested parties; 8.489, notice to trial court; 8.490, decisions; 8.492, sanctions; 8.493, costs.

64 http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/writs_handout.pdf

65 Certificates of probable cause are covered in § 2.43 and § 2.105 et seq. of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started.”
person is no longer in actual or constructive custody (e.g., *People v. Picklesimer* (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 339 [mandamus is proper remedy to seek post-finality relief in cases where the defendant is no longer in custody];\(^{66}\) § 8.7, ante).

b. **Prohibition**  [§ 8.74]

A writ of prohibition is an order prohibiting a threatened act in excess of the jurisdiction of the court or other entity, such as a trial of a defendant once in jeopardy. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1102-1105; *Stone v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 509, fn. 1.)

For purposes of prohibition, the term “jurisdiction” is given a broad meaning, beyond the most fundamental sense – the presence or absence of power over the subject matter. Prohibition also applies to situations in which a court has authority to act only in a particular manner, or to give only certain kinds of relief, or to act only with the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites. (*Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal* (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288-289.)

c. **Certiorari**  [§ 8.75]

Certiorari, also known as a writ of review, is used when a tribunal has acted in excess of jurisdiction and an appeal is an unavailable or inadequate remedy – for example, review by the Supreme Court of a decision of the appellate division of the superior court, or review of a contempt judgment.\(^{67}\) (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1067-1077; see *Mitchell v. Superior Court* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1230; *Dvorin v. Appellate Dep’t of Superior Court* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 648; *In re Buckley* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 240, fn. 1, citing *John Breuner Co. v. Bryant* (1951) 36 Cal. 2d 877, 878; *Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 454-455.) As with prohibition, for purposes of certiorari the term “jurisdiction” is construed to mean considerably more than fundamental power to act

\(^{66}\) *Picklesimer* specifically involved relief under the ruling of *People v. Hofsheier* (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1207, which held mandatory lifetime sex offender registration for violations of Penal Code section 288a, subdivision (b)(1), voluntary oral copulation with a 16- or 17-year-old minor, violates equal protection. *Hofsheier*’s equal protection holding was overruled in *Johnson v. Department of Justice* (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871. *Picklesimer* remains good law on the remedy.

\(^{67}\) Habeas corpus is also an appropriate remedy for reviewing a contempt adjudication if the contemnor is incarcerated. (*In re Buckley* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 240, fn. 1; see § 8.57 et seq., ante.)
on the subject matter. (*Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal* (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288-289.)

2. **Petition and informal opposition, reply**  [§ 8.76]

A petition for a prerogative writ must comply with rule 8.486 of the California Rules of Court. (See also rules 8.204 as to form and length, 8.44(a) as to number of copies, and 8.25 as to service and filing.) It must explain any failure to seek relief in a lower court, must name the respondent and any real party in interest, must identify any related appeal, must be verified, and must include points and authorities. (Rule 8.486(a).) It must be accompanied by an adequate record and supporting documents. (Rule 8.486(b).) The form of supporting documents is governed by rule 8.486(c). Service is under rule 8.486(e).) Division One of the Fourth Appellate District has a **handout** giving guidance on these matters. If TrueFiling is in place, the attorney should consult the applicable local rule on formatting, pagination, etc. (See CAVEAT, § 8.19, ante.)

The respondent or real party in interest may file a preliminary opposition within 10 days stating legal and factual bases why the relief should not be granted. The petitioner may reply within 10 days. (Rule 8.487(a).)

3. **Court response and return or opposition, reply**  [§ 8.77]

When an appellate court considers a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition the court may: (1) deny the petition summarily; (2) issue an alternative writ or order to show cause; or (3) grant a peremptory writ in the first instance after giving the required notice and opportunity for opposition. (*Lewis v. Superior Court* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1239; *Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc.* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180, 181 [speaking of peremptory writs both with and without prior issuance of an alternative writ]; see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1087, 1088.)

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68If the petitioner is a corporation or other entity, a certificate of interested parties under rule 8.208 is required. (Rule 8.488(b).)


70A “peremptory” writ is an order for ultimate relief. It may be issued after an alternative writ or an order to show cause or “in the first instance,” without such a prior order. (E.g., *Albertson v. Superior Court* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 796 [alternative writ, followed by peremptory writ]; *Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union v. Davis* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 585 [order to show cause, followed by peremptory writ]; *Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc.* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180, 181 [speaking of peremptory writs both with and without prior issuance of an alternative writ]; see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1087, 1088.)
Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1088, 1105; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.487(a)(4).) It may also grant or deny a request for a temporary stay. (Rule 8.487(a)(4).)

a. Summary denial  [§ 8.78]

The court may deny a petition summarily, before or after receiving preliminary opposition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.487(a)(4).) A “summary denial” is one without an order to show cause or alternative writ and without a written opinion or opportunity for oral argument. (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 898 [summary denial with a brief statement of reasons does not establish law of the case, even if a decision on the merits is the sole possible ground; declaring “firm rule that a denial without an alternative writ and written opinion does not establish law of the case”]; cf. Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 [setting of case for oral argument and decision by full opinion is equivalent of order to show cause and means the decision is not “summary denial”; thus it becomes final 30 days after filing as to deciding court under current rule number 8.490(b)(2)]; Frisk v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 402, 413-417 [denial of writ after notice under Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, with full opinion, is law of the case and final as to deciding court in 30 days, in case where statute requires writ as the only available means of review]; see also People v. Medina (1972) 6 Cal.3d 484 [summary denial without opinion of pretrial writ challenging Penal Code section 1538.5 denial is not law of the case or res judicata on subsequent appeal].)

Oral argument and a written opinion are not required when a writ is resolved by a summary denial. (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.) The decision is final immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.490(b)(1), 8.532(b)(2)(C).) With a summary denial, the writ proceeding does not become a “cause,” and the denial does not establish law of the case. (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888.)

b. Alternative writ or order to show cause  [§ 8.79]

The court may issue an alternative writ or order to show cause, before or after receiving preliminary opposition. An alternative writ commands the respondent either to perform a specific act or to show cause why it has not done so. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1087.) An order to show cause invites further argument in support of the respondent’s position in a formal return, which may be by demurrer and/or a verified answer, filed within 30 days of the alternative writ or order to show cause. The petitioner may reply within 15 days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.487(b).)
If the respondent performs the act specified in an alternative writ, the matter does not become a “cause,” and the proceeding is moot. *(Lewis v. Superior Court* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.) If the respondent files a return instead or an order to show cause is issued, the matter is a cause. In that case, an opportunity for oral argument and a written decision, which becomes law of the case, are required. *(Ibid.; Kowis v. Howard* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894-895; *Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc.* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178, fns. 5 & 6; see Cal. Const., art. VI, §§ 2, 14.) The decision is final in 30 days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.490(b)(2), 8.532(b)(1).)

c.  **Peremptory writ in the first instance**  [§ 8.80]

The court may grant a peremptory writ in the first instance – that is, order ultimate relief without first issuing an alternative writ or order to show cause. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088.) If the court is considering such a remedy, it must notify the parties and provide an opportunity for opposition. *(Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc.* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178-180; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.487(a)(4) & (b)(1).) This accelerated procedure should be used only sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. (See *Lewis v. Superior Court* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1261; *Alexander v. Superior Court* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1222-1223; *Ng v. Superior Court* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35.)


d.  **Disposition**  [§ 8.81]

When the court has issued an alternative writ or order to show cause or is ordering peremptory relief in the first instance, the decision must be in the form of a written opinion with reasons stated. *(Lewis v. Superior Court* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.)

If the Court of Appeal grants ultimate relief, the opinion itself is not a peremptory writ. The writ cannot issue until the case is final as to the Supreme Court. *(Ng v. Superior

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This rule contrasts with habeas corpus, where the “writ” is an intermediate procedural step and the actual judgment is an “order.” (See § 8.44, ante; People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 743.)

C. Supersedeas  [§ 8.82]

Supersedeas is an order staying a judgment or order pending appeal. It is seldom encountered in criminal practice, but can be used to stay potential harm such as a custodial condition of probation. (In re Manuel P. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 48, 72-73; In re Batey (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 541, 542; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.112.) Division One of the Fourth Appellate District has a writs handout that includes discussion of supersedeas.

D. Statutory Writs  [§ 8.83]

1. General statutory writs  [§ 8.83A]

Sometimes a statute specifically permits or requires review by writ – usually to avoid the delay entailed in an appeal. Such a procedure, called a “statutory writ,” may be the exclusive remedy for review or may be an alternative to appeal.  

Many such provisions involve interlocutory orders in ongoing trial proceedings. (E.g., Code Civ. Proc. §§ 170.3, subd. (d), 170.6 [disqualification of trial judge]; Pen. Code, §§ 871.6 [delay in preliminary hearing], 999a [denial of motion to set aside information or indictment], 1511 [trial date], 1512 [severance or discovery], 1538.5, subs. (i) & (o) [denial of search and seizure suppression motion], 4011.8 [denial of application for voluntary mental health services by person in custody]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707 and Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.772(j) [fitness for juvenile delinquency proceedings], construed in People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, disapproved on another ground in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 33-35.)


73See San Diego County Bar Association, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001), chapter 5, sections 5.25 through 5.56, for a catalog of civil, criminal, and juvenile statutory writs. Caveat: This handbook is no longer published and has not been updated since 2001, but may be available in libraries and appellate offices. While some content is obsolete, it does offer excellent guidance for appellate practitioners.
Other statutory writs involve final judgments potentially affecting the immediate public welfare. (E.g., Pen. Code, § 1238, subd. (d) [review sought by People of order granting probation]; Health & Saf. Code, § 11488.4, subd. (h) [challenge to order declaring seized property not subject to forfeiture].) An appellate practitioner might encounter such a case on occasion.

Usually statutory writs are mandate, prohibition, or certiorari in form. They may, however, entail a specially prescribed procedure created by statute and/or rule. (E.g., Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, subd. (l) & 366.28; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450, 8.452, 8.454, 8.456 [review of order for permanency plan hearing or order for placement of child after termination of parental rights]; see § 8.83B, post.)

Most statutory writs have short, jurisdictional time limits. But the doctrine of constructive filing sometimes can be invoked to determine a writ petition was timely filed. (In re Antilia (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 622; see § 8.54, ante, and § 2.115 et seq. of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started.”)

2. Dependency writs under sections 366.26 and 366.28  [§ 8.83B]

An especially important limitation on appellate practice in dependency law is the provision in Welfare and Institutions Code sections 366.26 and 366.28 that referral orders for a permanent plan hearing (§ 366.26) or a post-termination child placement order (§ 366.28) cannot be appealed unless they have previously been the subject of a writ under California Rules of Court, rules 450 et seq. and the writ has been denied other than on the merits. (See In re Joyce G. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1501.)

The requirement of challenge by writ applies to the order setting a permanent plan hearing and other findings subsumed within that order, such as a decision to bypass or terminate reunification services or a finding services were adequate. This provision ensures that challenges to findings made at the time the hearing is set are resolved expeditiously and do not interfere with later proceedings. (In re A.L. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 628; see In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413.)

A dependency writ is functionally a hybrid of an appeal and a writ. It is intended to take the place of an appeal from these highly time-sensitive proceedings and replace it with a streamlined writ-like procedure. Like appeal, it is initiated by filing a notice in the trial court – in this situation, a notice of intent to file a writ petition.74 The notice of intent

74 See Judicial Council form notices of intent are JV-820 and JV-822.
is filed by trial counsel or the petitioner, under short time limits. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450(c), (e), 8.454(c), (e).) The superior court clerk mails notice of the filing to relevant parties and prepares a “normal record,” as in an appeal. (Rules 8.450(g)-(h), 8.454(g)-(h).)

The filing of the record in the Court of Appeal triggers a short, 10-day deadline for a writ petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(a)-(c), 8.456(a)-(c).) ADI has a sample petition on its dependency writs page, in a more traditional professional format. The Judicial Council has an alternative sample form petition, JV-825, in a fill-in-the-blanks style, which trial counsel or the petitioner in pro per may find more convenient. Counsel may file a no-issue letter (sample on ADI website) if no arguable issues are found. (See Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, 584.) Any response by the real party in interest is due within 10 days after the petition is filed, or 15 days if the service copy was mailed. (Rules 8.452(c)(2), 8.456(c)(2).) The record may be corrected or augmented. (Rules 8.452(e), 8.456(e).) Procedures in the Court of Appeal are governed by rules 8.452(g)-(i) and 8.456(g)-(i). A decision on the merits is required except in extraordinary circumstances. (Rules 8.452(c)(2), 8.456(h).)

ADI’s dependency writs page lists resources for counsel handling dependency writs.

76 http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/jv825.pdf
Habeas corpus proceedings are governed generally by Penal Code section 1473 et. seq. California Rules of Court, rule 8.384 governs petitions by an attorney filed in the Court of Appeal or California Supreme Court. Rule 8.380 deals with pro per petitions, and rule 4.550 et seq. governs petitions filed in the superior court. The following discussion applies to petitions filed by counsel in the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court.

I. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS  [§ 8.85]

Information about filing and service requirements is summarized on ADI’s Filing and Service pages.\(^79\)

**CAVEAT:** All of the Courts of Appeal are moving, at different paces, toward wholly electronic filing. The rules and practices set forth below describe paper filings, but counsel must always check with the project, court clerk’s office, or court website\(^80\) to determine whether electronic filing is available or mandatory in the particular court. If so, that procedure would supersede the rules for paper filings.

TrueFiling changes procedures for filing with the court and also prescribes formatting changes for documents. Check with the district’s project and local rules. E.g., Local rule 5 of Fourth Appellate District.

ADI’s electronic service\(^81\) web page and the home page CHEAT SHEET\(^82\) provide information about the ADI email service program.

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\(^80\) [http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm](http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm). Each Court of Appeal has a tab for “Electronic Filing” or “Electronic Filing / Submissions” that provides current guidance.


A. Form  [§ 8.86]

A petition filed by attorney in a reviewing court may be on Judicial Council form MC-275.³³ If it is not filed on the MC-275 form, the petition must include the information required by that form, and both the petition and any accompanying points and authorities must comply with rule 8.204(a) and (b) of the California Rules of Court. (Rule 8.384(a)(1) & (2).) If TrueFiling is in place, the use of the form must be integrated with the district’s local rules for electronic document formatting. (See CAVEAT, § 8.85, ante.)

B. Cover  [§ 8.87]

A cover is required for a petition filed by an attorney, even if the petition is on form MC-275. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.384(a)(1).) If a hard copy, the cover must be red. (Rule 8.40(b)(1).) It should identify the petitioner’s custodian⁴⁴ and comply, to the extent applicable, with rule 8.204(b)(10). (See CAVEAT, § 8.85, ante.)

C. Service   [§ 8.88]

Proof of service must be attached to the petition. (See Pen. Code, § 1475, ¶ 3.)

1. Persons to be served   [§ 8.89]

The rules do not specify service requirements, but counsel should err on the side of inclusiveness and serve those who reasonably may be affected or have an interest in the petition – for example, the Attorney General, district attorney, custodian of the petitioner, the superior court or Court of Appeal (unless filed there, of course), trial and/or appellate counsel, ADI, etc. – as dictated by the nature of the petition and issues.

³³ The form is available from the California court website: http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/mc275.pdf

⁴⁴ If the petitioner is in constructive rather than physical custody – for example, on probation, bail pending appeal, parole – the name of the custodian (such as the chief parole agent, chief probation officer, or superior court) should be used. (See generally 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Writs, § 16, pp. 619-621.)
Penal Code section 1475, third paragraph, specifically requires service on the district attorney “of the county wherein such person is held in custody or restraint” if the person is held under restraint by an officer of any court. That statute also has special service requirements when the person is in local custody for violation of an ordinance or when the petition is challenging a parole decision and an order to show cause has issued.

2. **Method of service** [§ 8.90]

Practices may vary as to whether the court will permit service by mail on the respondent. If it is filed in the Court of Appeal, proof of service by mail is usually adequate. When immediate relief is requested, personal service is advisable. Email service may be an adequate substitute for personal service. Counsel may check local rules, the appellate court clerk’s office, or the assigned ADI attorney for specific requirements.

D. **Filing Copies** [§ 8.91]

The number of copies is governed by California Rules of Court, rule 8.44(b). (Rule 8.384(c).) (See [CAVEAT, § 8.85, ante.](#))

The Court of Appeal requires an original and four copies of a petition filed by counsel and one set of any supporting documents for original proceedings. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.44(b)(3) & (5).)

The Supreme Court requires an original and 10 copies of the petition and an original and two copies of supporting documents. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.44(a)(2) & (3).)

*Note:* It is advisable to request a conformed copy. If a petition is being filed by mail, include an extra copy of the petition with a postage-paid, self-addressed return envelope.

E. **Other Requirements** [§ 8.92]

Specific requirements for the formal petition, points and authorities, etc., are covered below. (See [CAVEAT, § 8.85, ante.](#))

Local rules: Local rules should additionally be consulted since there are variances in procedure. (See, e.g., Ct. App., Fourth Dist., Local Rules, rule 53)
1, Request for an immediate stay or other immediate relief in writ proceedings, and rule 2, Covers on documents filed with the court.) Another source of information is the Internal Operating Practices and Procedures (IOPP’s) of the Courts of Appeal. Counsel may also consult the appellate project (e.g., ADI) or the court clerk’s office.\textsuperscript{85}

II. CONTENTS OF FORMAL PETITION [§ 8.93]

If counsel does not use form MC-275, the petition must contain all information requested on the form including:

A. Current Confinement [§ 8.94]

The petition must state the place of detention if the petitioner is in physical custody and the name of the prison warden or other custodian.\textsuperscript{86}

B. Underlying Proceedings [§ 8.95]

1. Court [§ 8.96]

The petition must state the name and location of the court under whose authority the person is confined (such as the superior court in which judgment was entered).

2. Identity of case [§ 8.97]

The petition must identify the kind of proceeding (such as criminal or juvenile delinquency) and the case number.

\textsuperscript{85}Caution: Some divisions may not have updated their rules, IOPP’s, or websites to reflect the most recent changes.

\textsuperscript{86}If the petitioner is in constructive rather than physical custody – for example, on probation, bail pending appeal, parole – the name of the custodian (such as the chief parole agent, chief probation officer, or superior court) should be used. (See generally 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4\textsuperscript{th} ed. 2012) Criminal Writs, § 16, pp. 619-621.)
3. **Offense**  [§ 8.98]

   The petition must include a description of the offense, including the code section.

4. **Proceedings**  [§ 8.99]

   The petition must indicate the plea entered, the type of trial (such as jury, court, or submission on preliminary hearing transcript), and all relevant dates, including the dates of conviction and judgment.

5. **Sentence**  [§ 8.100]

   The petition must state the sentence, with the expected date of release, if applicable.

6. **Previous review**  [§ 8.101]

   The petition must describe the review previously sought – such as appeal, Supreme Court, or habeas corpus— including the courts, case numbers, issues raised, any hearings held, the results, and all relevant dates. Even if the answer is “none,” the petition should so state. (See Pen. Code, § 1475, ¶ 2.) Copies of the petitions, excluding exhibits, must be attached; except that if the previous petition was in the Supreme Court or same Court of Appeal the current petition need only so state and identify the previous case by name and number. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.384(b)(1).)

7. **Administrative decision**  [§ 8.102]

   If from an administrative decision, the petition must include a description of that decision and what review of it was sought.

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87Under Penal Code section 1475, information about previous writ applications, any related proceedings, and the results must be included. Copies of the previous petitions and a certified transcript of any evidentiary hearing must be included. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.384(b)(1) & (2).)
C. **Counsel** [§ 8.103]

The petition must provide the name and address of the current attorney, trial counsel, and appellate, habeas corpus or other counsel if applicable.

D. **Possible Procedural Irregularities** [§ 8.104]

Counsel have an affirmative duty to address why applicable procedural bars do not preclude consideration of their claims. Failure to do so may be considered an abuse of the writ, subject to sanctions and grounds for denying the claims without consideration of the merits. (*In re Reno* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 453; *In re Clark* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 798, fn. 35.)

1. **Delay** [§ 8.105]

   The petition should explain any delay in filing it or in discovering the claimed ground for relief.

2. **Failure to raise on appeal** [§ 8.106]

   The petition should explain why the current issue was not raised on appeal (for example: “The issue is based on facts outside of the appellate record”).

3. **Failure to file in lower court** [§ 8.107]

   If it might have been filed in a lower court, the petition should explain why it was not.

4. **Failure to exhaust administrative remedies** [§ 8.108]

   If administrative remedies were arguably available but were not exhausted, the petition should explain why they were inadequate.

E. **Relief Sought** [§ 8.109]

The petition must identify the nature of the relief sought – such as “new trial,” “recall of remittitur,” “order deeming notice of appeal timely filed,” “immediate release from custody,” etc.
F. Grounds for Relief [§ 8.110]

The petition must include a summary of the grounds for relief, including all essential supporting facts and basic supporting law. These can be expanded in the points and authorities, but the formal petition should be self-contained, so as to state a cause of action on its face. References to matters in the supporting documents must include citations to the index tab and page. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.384(a)(3).)

G. Verification [§ 8.111]

1. Requirement for petition [§ 8.112]

Verification is required by Penal Code sections 1474, paragraph 3, and 1475, paragraph 2. 88

2. Verification by Counsel [§ 8.113]

Because counsel may apply for habeas corpus relief on behalf of a client, verification by counsel satisfies this requirement. (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 783, fn. 5; see Pen. Code, § 1474.) However, a verification based on information and belief may be found defective. (Star Motor Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 201, 204-205; Perlman v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 568, 574.)

88 A defectively verified petition may result in denial of relief. (Krueger v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 934, 939.)
Sample Verification by Counsel

I am an attorney admitted to practice before the courts of the State of California and have my office in (name of) County.

I represent the petitioner and am authorized to file this petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner is unable to make this verification because he is incarcerated at (place), California. I am filing this petition under the authority of Penal Code section 1474. I drafted this petition and know its contents.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

(Date and place of signing, signature, name, State Bar number, address, and other contact information.)

III. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES  [§ 8.114]

This section should expand on the legal points summarized in the formal petition. It resembles an appellate brief. In form it must comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)-(b). (Rule 8.384(a)(2).) References to matters in the supporting documents must include citations to the index tab and page. (Rule 8.384(a)(3).)

IV. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS  [§ 8.115]

California Rules of Court, rule 8.384(b)(1)-(3) covers the requirements for attachments and other supporting documents.

A. Required Attachments  [§ 8.116]

All relevant records, declarations, and other documents necessary to establish right to relief must be attached as exhibits or, if substantial (such
as transcripts), lodged with the court. A copy of any previous petition pertaining to the same judgment must accompany the petition, along with a certified copy of a transcript of any evidentiary hearing.

B. Form  [§ 8.117]

California Rules of Court, rule 8.486(c) governs the form of supporting documents if the petition is filed by counsel in a reviewing court. (See rule 8.384(b)(3).) Specifically, it requires attachments to be bound together at the end of the petition or in separate volumes, to be index-tabbed by number or letter, and to be consecutively paginated.

C. Number of Filing Copies  [§ 8.118]

The Court of Appeal requires one set of supporting documents if bound separately from the petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.44(b)(5).) The Supreme Court requires an original and two copies of separately bound supporting documents. (Rule 8.44(a)(3).) This is different from the number of copies of the petition. (See § 8.91, ante.)

V. PETITION FILED IN CONJUNCTION WITH APPEAL  [§ 8.119]

A. Cover  [§ 8.120]

The cover should state “Related Appeal Pending” and the name and number of the appeal. The petition and opening brief in the appeal must each be independent documents; neither should attempt to incorporate parts of the other by reference. (In re Ronald E. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 315, 322, fn. 3.)

B. Record  [§ 8.121]

References to a reporter’s or clerk’s transcript are often necessary in the petition and points and authorities. If the references are brief, it is best to attach the pertinent pages of the record to the petition, along with a declaration that they are true and correct copies. If the references are substantial, a request for judicial notice of the appellate transcripts would be

appropriate. Such a request should be made by motion filed separately from a brief or petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.252(a)(1), 8.386(e).)
– APPENDIX B  [§ 8.122] –

CALIFORNIA POST-CONVICTION HABEAS CORPUS

(FLOW CHARTS)

PART I. TYPICAL PROCEEDINGS TO INITIAL DECISION  [§ 8.123]

PART II. PROCEEDINGS TO REVIEW INITIAL DECISION  [§ 8.124]
Part I. TYPICAL PROCEEDINGS TO INITIAL DECISION

PETITION
Filed in either Court of Appeal or superior court.

COURT RESPONSE

SUMMARY DENIAL
Even if facts alleged in petition are true, no right to relief.

REQUEST FOR INFORMAL RESPONSE
Possible that petition has merit. State asked to justify custody.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Petition states prima facie case. State must show legality of custody.

STATE’S INFORMAL RESPONSE
State presents reasons why petition should not be granted.

INFORMAL REPLY BY PETITIONER
Petitioner answers points made in informal response.

COURT RESPONSE

SUMMARY DENIAL
Informal pleadings establish lack of right to relief.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Petition states prima facie case. State must show legality of custody.

FORMAL RETURN BY STATE
State provides facts or law responding to specific allegations in petition.

TRAVERSE BY PETITIONER
Petitioner responds to return and formally adopts allegations of petition.

EVIDentiARY HEARING
Ordered by court if there are issues of fact.

Referee, if appointed, reports to Court of Appeal; parties may respond to findings. Court must permit oral argument.

DECISION

Court of Appeal petition: Court may transfer case to superior court, appoint referee to report back, or conduct proceedings itself.
Part II. PROCEEDINGS TO REVIEW INITIAL DECISION  [§ 8.124]

- **INITIAL DECISION BY SUPERIOR COURT:**
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  - **NEW HABEAS CORPUS PETITION IN COURT OF APPEAL**
    - No right to appeal; petitioner must file new habeas corpus petition in Court of Appeal.
  - **WRIT PROCESS IN COURT OF APPEAL**
    - Same proceedings as above: summary denial, or informal process and/or formal process

- **INITIAL DECISION BY SUPERIOR COURT:**
  - **GRANT OF PETITION**
  - **APPEAL BY STATE**
    - If petition granted by trial court, state can appeal to Court of Appeal.
  - **APPEAL PROCESS**
    - Regular appellate proceedings

- **INITIAL DECISION BY COURT OF APPEAL, RATHER THAN SUPERIOR COURT**

- **PETITION FOR REVIEW IN CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT**
  - Either party may petition for review after decision in the Court of Appeal.*

*See text for discussion of habeas petition in lieu of petition for review.
~ CHAPTER NINE ~

THE COURTHOUSE ACROSS THE STREET:

FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
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I. INTRODUCTION  [§ 9.0]

This chapter provides basic information about federal habeas corpus law and procedure. (Comprehensive coverage can be found in Hertz and Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure (5th ed. 2005 & 2006 supp.) The focus here is on post-appeal review of noncapital California state convictions – a remedy of last resort for those who have failed to achieve relief in state courts. The discussion addresses custody and mootness issues, time limitations, grounds, exhaustion of state remedies and procedural default, successive petitions, and basic habeas corpus procedures in federal court.

Although an appointment to a California appeal does not cover federal habeas corpus petitions or appearances, the appointed attorney nevertheless has a responsibility to be familiar with the law governing those proceedings. One reason is that the attorney must properly preserve federal issues throughout the state appellate process; failure to do so likely means loss of the remedy. Further, counsel will need to advise the client about

1Federal habeas corpus may also be used to challenge state pretrial proceedings, extradition orders, and other proceedings that implicate federal constitutional rights. (E.g., Arevalo v. Hennessey (9th Cir. 2018) 882 F.3d 763 [bail hearing]; Stow v. Murashige (9th Cir. 2004) 389 F.3d 880 [pretrial]; Shelby v. Bartlett (9th Cir. 2004) 391 F.3d 1061 [prison discipline]; see Skinner v. Switzer (2011) 562 U.S. 521 and authorities cited [comparing federal habeas corpus with other remedies, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, for various post-conviction actions, such as a motion for DNA testing]; cf. Brown v. Ahern (9th Cir. 2012) 676 F.3d 899 [absent extraordinary circumstances, principles of federalism and comity prohibit federal district court from entertaining pre-conviction habeas petition that raises speedy trial claim as affirmative defense to state prosecution]; Carden v. Montana (9th Cir. 1980) 626 F.2d 82.) Decisions such as parole denials that involve a right under state law may be reviewed only for compliance with federal procedural due process requirements, such as notice and opportunity to be heard. (Swarthout v. Cooke (2011) 562 U.S. 216.)

Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state convictions by means of coram nobis. (Finkelstein v. Spitzer (2d Cir. 2006) 455 F.3d 131, 133-134.)

1
pursuing federal habeas corpus in pro per, if the client shows interest in it or there is a reasonable chance the federal court would grant relief. This requires solid understanding of such fundamentals as federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, time limitations, grounds for relief, and procedural requirements. Finally, many state appellate practitioners will at some time or another find themselves in federal court on a habeas corpus matter, and in that case thorough familiarity with the governing law is essential.

Habeas corpus is explicitly recognized in the federal Constitution. (U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2.) The statute governing federal habeas corpus review of state convictions is the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), at Title 28 United States Code section 2241 et seq.

II. CUSTODY AND MOOTNESS  [§ 9.1]

Federal habeas corpus jurisdiction requires both that the petitioner be in “custody” (28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)) – in other words, be under the present constraint of the criminal judgment challenged – and that the proceedings be a “case or controversy” (U.S. Const., art. III, § 2) – in other words, not moot.2

A. Custody Requirements  [§ 9.2]

For federal habeas proceedings reviewing a state judgment under Title 28 United States Code section 2254(a), the petitioner must be “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” The custody requirement is satisfied by actual custody or constructive custody, such as release on parole. (Jones v. Cunningham (1963) 371 U.S. 236.) It is also satisfied when the petitioner is currently serving another sentence but is facing future incarceration on the challenged one (Maleng v. Cook (1989) 490 U.S. 488 [state had lodged detainer against petitioner while in custody of another sovereign]) or seeks to prevent retrial on prior jeopardy grounds (Wilson v. Belleque (9th Cir. 2009) 554 F.3d 816, 824 [28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition].) Federal habeas corpus review does not cover a “fine only” state sentence. (Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang (9th Cir. 1975) 509 F.2d 39, 41; see also Bailey v. Hill (9th Cir. 2010) 599 F.3d 976 [restitution fine issue does not challenge lawfulness of custody]; United States v. Metts (9th Cir. 1995) 65 F.3d 1531, 1533.)

2California has similar requirements for state habeas corpus. (See § 8.6 et seq. of chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies.”)
The filing date of the petition determines whether the custody requirement is met. If the petitioner was constrained, actually or constructively, under the challenged conviction or other state decision when the petition was filed, the requirement is satisfied even though he is released during the habeas corpus proceedings.\(^3\) *(Spencer v. Kemna (1998) 523 U.S. 1, 7 [petitioner in custody under challenged parole revocation when petition filed, but released before adjudication of petition]; Carafas v. LaVallee (1968) 391 U.S. 234, 237.)*

If at the time the petition is filed the petitioner presently is neither incarcerated nor subject to incarceration under the conviction, the conviction is fully “expired,” and so the custody requirement is not met. This rule applies even though the petitioner may continue to suffer collateral consequences from the conviction. Thus the fact the expired conviction is (or may be) used to enhance a later sentence does not make the petitioner in custody on it for purposes of attacking the expired conviction directly.\(^4\) *(Maleng v. Cook (1989) 490 U.S. 488, 492-493.)*

\(^3\) Although the *custody* requirement is satisfied when the petitioner was in custody when the petition was filed, there may be a *mootness* issue if the petitioner is suffering no current consequences of the challenged decision at the time habeas corpus relief might be ordered. (See § 9.3, post.)

\(^4\) If the petitioner challenges a *later* sentence on the ground it is enhanced with the invalid expired conviction, the custody requirement is technically satisfied because the petitioner is under the constraint of the *presently challenged* sentence (the later, enhanced one). However, to promote finality of judgments and ease of administration, an older conviction no longer subject to collateral attack in its own right is conclusively presumed valid in an attack on a later sentence. *(Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss (2001) 532 U.S. 394, 403-404; cf. Dubrin v. People (9th Cir. 2013) 720 F.3d 1095 [defendant may challenge expired prior used to enhance sentence when, despite reasonable diligence, he did not receive fair opportunity to obtain state review because state courts denied habeas on erroneous ground – that he was not in custody, even though he was on parole]; Zichko v. Idaho (9th Cir. 2001) 247 F.3d 1015, 1019-1020 [habeas petitioner may challenge underlying, expired rape conviction while in custody for failing to comply with sex offender registration law].)*
B. Mootness Questions  [§ 9.3]

Federal courts have jurisdiction only over a “case or controversy” under article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution and may not decide moot cases that have no consequences for the litigants.\(^5\) \((United States v. Juvenile Male (2011) 564 U.S. 932 [applying “basic principle of Article III that a justiciable case or controversy must remain ‘extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed’”]; United States v. Strong (2007) 489 F.3d 1055, 1059 [“‘[T]he inexorable command’ of the Constitution . . . [is that] a live case or controversy must be ‘extant at all stages of review’”].) Even if a petitioner is in custody when a petition is filed, therefore, the court may not entertain it if the petitioner no longer suffers any consequences from it.\(^6\)

In habeas corpus proceedings attacking a criminal conviction, the case or controversy requirement normally is satisfied, even after all potential custody has expired. Collateral consequences from a state judgment or order may be used to establish that the case is not moot. \((Carafas v. LaVallee (1968) 391 U.S. 234, 237-238 [defendant released while habeas corpus petition pending; not moot because defendant still suffering civil disabilities such as ineligibility to vote or hold certain positions]; Zal v. Steppe (9th Cir. 1992) 968 F.2d 924, 926 [contempt citations could result in State Bar discipline against petitioner]; see also Moore v. Ogilvie (1969) 394 U.S. 814, 816 [election issue likely to recur and affect the parties in future].)\)

\(^5\)California state courts do have discretion to consider cases that are moot as to the litigants but raise an issue of continuing and serious public interest. (See § 8.8 of chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies.”)

\(^6\)“[F]ederal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies. To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. . . . This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate. To sustain our jurisdiction in the present case, it is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed, or when review was obtained in the Court of Appeals. The parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome. . . .” \((Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp. (1990) 494 U.S. 472, 477-478, citations and interior quotation marks omitted.)\)
Continuing collateral consequences from a criminal conviction ordinarily may be presumed. (*Sibron v. New York* (1968) 392 U.S. 40, 55-56.) For other types of cases, however, such consequences must be “specifically identified, . . . concrete disadvantages or disabilities that had in fact occurred, that were imminently threatened, or that were imposed as a matter of law (such as deprivation of the right to vote, to hold office, to serve on a jury, or to engage in certain businesses).” (*Spencer v. Kemna* (1998) 523 U.S. 1, 8; see also *Lane v. Williams* (1982) 455 U.S. 624, 632-633 [no presumption of collateral consequences from parole revocation; thus no case or controversy exists after defendant released], followed in *Spencer v. Kemna*, at pp. 11-12.

III. TIME LIMITS FOR FILING FEDERAL PETITION  [§ 9.4]

AEDPA\(^7\) imposes a one-year statute of limitations after the state appeal process is complete in which a federal habeas corpus petition must be filed (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)):

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;\(^8\)

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.\(^9\)

\(^7\)Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. (28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.)

\(^8\)Cf. *Bryant v. Arizona* (9th Cir. 2007) 499 F.3d 1056.

\(^9\)See *Ford v. Gonzalez* (9th Cir. 2012) 683 F.3d 1230; *Hasan v. Galaza* (9th Cir. 2001) 254 F.3d 1150.
A. Starting the Clock   [§ 9.5]

The most common trigger for starting the limitations clock is the conclusion of
direct review or expiration of the time for seeking it.10 (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).) As
applied to California, the state direct review process includes time for petitioning for
review in the California Supreme Court and for certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court. The state appeal process is final at the end of the 90-day period in which to file a
certiorari petition after the denial of review or, if certiorari is sought, at the time the court
510 U.S. 383, 390; Bowen v. Roe (9th Cir. 1999) 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-1159; see also
§ 2255 motion for relief from federal convictions];12 caveat: see Lawrence v. Florida
(2007) 549 U.S. 327 and White v. Klitzkie (9th Cir. 2002) 281 F.3d 920, 924-925 [in

10 In habeas corpus cases challenging state administrative decisions, the one-year
limitation period begins when the state administrative proceedings are final. The period is
tolled during any state habeas corpus proceedings attacking the decision. (E.g., Shelby v.
Bartlett (9th Cir. 2004) 391 F.3d 1061, 1065-1066 [prison discipline].)

11 It is unclear whether a state defendant may file a federal habeas corpus petition when
the state courts no longer have appellate jurisdiction, even if the certiorari period is not
over. (See Kapral v. United States (3d Cir. 1999) 166 F.3d 565, 570, and Feldman v.
Henman (9th Cir. 1987) 815 F.2d 1318, 1321 [federal court should not entertain habeas
corpus petition when petition for certiorari from a federal appellate decision is pending];
cf. Roper v. Weaver (2007) 550 U.S. 598 (per curiam) [defendant could have filed federal
habeas corpus petition after state denied collateral relief, even though petition for
certiorari was pending from the state decision].) These cases do not necessarily answer
the question whether a state prisoner must wait for the conclusion of the certiorari period
on direct appeal to file the federal petition.

12 United States v. Plascencia (5th Cir. 2008) 537 F.3d 385 [when a federal prisoner
fails to file an effective notice of appeal, the prisoner’s conviction becomes “final,” for
purposes of calculating the one-year period for seeking collateral review, upon expiration
of period for filing direct appeal, and prisoner not entitled to 90-day period for
certiorari].)
contrast to rule applicable to appeal, certiorari from denial of state habeas petition is not part of state collateral proceedings.\textsuperscript{13}

If there are further trial court proceedings, such as resentencing after a remand on appeal, the AEDPA period begins after appellate finality of the later proceedings. (See \textit{Burton v. Stewart} (2007) 549 U.S. 147; \textit{Ferreira v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections} (11th Cir. 2007) 494 F.3d 1286; \textit{Robbins v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections} (11th Cir. 2007) 483 F.3d 737.) If the state permits the filing of a late appeal, the AEDPA clock starts at the conclusion of the belated appeal period, not the original period. (\textit{Jimenez v. Quarterman} (2009) 555 U.S. 113; see also \textit{Thompson v. Lea} (9th Cir. 2012) 681 F.3d 1093 [after original appeal and later U.S. Supreme Court decision, California Supreme Court granted review from denial of remittitur recall, then held case pending resolution of lead case; AEDPA time from finality of later proceeding].)

If a timely state appeal or petition for review is not filed, the statute of limitations begins to run when the time for such a filing expires. (\textit{Gonzalez v. Thaler} (2012) 565 U.S. 266; \textit{Roberts v. Marshall} (9th Cir. 2010) 627 F.3d 768, 771.)

If the petition is based on a newly recognized constitutional right, then under subdivision (C) of Title 28 United States Code section 2254(d)(1), the clock starts on the date the right is recognized, not the date of a decision expressly finding it retroactive to cases on collateral review. (\textit{Dodd v. United States} (2005) 545 U.S. 353 [interpreting analogous provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2255].)\textsuperscript{14}

\noalign{\hline}
\textsuperscript{13}One circuit has held that the 90-day certiorari period is allowed even when no federal issue was presented in the lower state appellate court. (\textit{Nix v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections} (11th Cir. 2004) 393 F.3d 1235, 1237.) The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have not addressed this issue.

\textsuperscript{14}Section 2244(d)(1)(C) on the statute of limitations requires the rule to have been “newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” In contrast, section 2244(b)(2)(A) on successive petitions requires the new rule to have been “made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court.” (See § 9.85 et seq., post; \textit{Tyler v. Cain} (2001) 533 U.S. 656, 662-663.)

The majority opinion in \textit{Dodd v. United States}, supra, 545 U.S. 353 assumes without deciding that a decision of a lower federal court on retroactivity would be sufficient in the statute of limitations context. \textit{Ashley v. United States} (7th Cir. 2001) 266 F.3d 671, 674-675, and \textit{United States v. Lopez} (5th Cir. 2001) 248 F.3d 427, 431-432, so
If the petition is based on the recent discovery of the factual predicate of the claim, the clock starts when that fact could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. This standard does not require the defendant to use the maximum diligence possible, but only due or reasonable diligence. (*Ford v. Gonzalez* (9th Cir. 2012) 683 F.3d 1230.)

If no petition for review is filed, the clock starts 40 days after the appellate court files its opinion (the time within which review could have been sought). (*Smith v. Duncan* (9th Cir. 2002) 297 F.3d 809.)

B. **Time of Filing** [§ 9.6]

Ordinarily, amendments to a federal pleading “relate back” to the filing date of the original pleading – in other words, are considered to have been filed at the same time as the petition – if they arise from the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence.” (Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule 15(c)(2), 28 U.S.C.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2242 [rules of civil procedure apply when amending habeas corpus petition]; *Anthony v. Cambra* (9th Cir. 2000) 236 F.3d 568, 576 [district court acted properly in dating subsequent petition nunc pro tunc as of previous filing that was mistakenly dismissed]; cf. *Rasberry v. Garcia* (9th Cir. 2006) 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 [relation back does not apply when first petition dismissed because it contained unexhausted claims].)

An amendment to a petition asserting a new ground for relief supported by facts different in both time and type from those in the original petition, however, does not relate back to the original time for purposes of determining compliance with the limitations period. (*Mayle v. Felix* (2005) 545 U.S. 644, 650; see *Stancle v. Clay* (9th Cir. 2012) 692 F.3d 948; *Schneider v. McDaniel* (9th Cir. 2012) 674 F.3d 1144; *Hebner v. McGrath* (9th Cir. 2008) 543 F.3d 1133.) Relation back requires the claims in the original and amended petitions be “tied to a common core of operative facts.” (*Mayle*, at p. 664).\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{15}\)A different rule may apply when determining compliance with the AEDPA successive petitions rule. (See § 9.84B, post, and *Woods v. Carey* (9th Cir. 2008) 525 F.3d 886.)
The federal courts recognize the “mail box filing,” or “prison delivery,” rule. A prisoner who delivers the petition to the prison mail system before the one year has expired has timely filed it. (*Campbell v. Henry* (9th Cir. 2010) 614 F.3d 1056, 1058-1059; *Taylor v. Williams* (11th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d 847; *Huizar v. Carey* (9th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 1220.) This rule applies to filings in state as well as federal courts. (*Anthony v. Cambra* (9th Cir. 2000) 236 F.3d 568, 575.)

C. **Tolling** [§ 9.7]

The one-year AEDPA limitations period can be tolled both on statutory grounds and under special judicially recognized doctrines. Probably the most frequently applied statutory ground is the pendency of state habeas corpus proceedings reviewing the conviction. Tolling based on case-specific equitable factors is occasionally available, and a claim that a fundamental miscarriage of justice caused the conviction of a factually innocent person may overcome late filing in certain, very rare situations.

1. **State collateral proceedings** [§ 9.8]

The limitations clock is tolled by statute during the pendency of state habeas corpus proceedings. Title 28 United States Code section 2244(d)(2) provides:

\[
\text{The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.}
\]

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16 The “mail box filing” rule does not apply when a prisoner is assisted by counsel (*Stillman v. LaMarque* (9th Cir.2003) 319 F.3d 1199, 1202), when the prisoner delivers a filing to the prison authorities for mailing to someone other than the clerk of court (*ibid.; Paige v. United States* (8th Cir.1999) 171 F.3d 559, 560–561), and to cases in which a prisoner gives a petition to a third party who is not confined in prison for filing through regular channels (*Cook v. Stegall* (6th Cir.2002) 295 F.3d 517, 521; cf. *Hernandez v. Spearman* (9th Cir.2014) 764 F.3d 1071 [prison mailbox rule applies when a prisoner other than petitioner delivers the petition to prison authorities for mailing to the clerk of court]).


18 The statute of limitations is not tolled during the pendency of a federal petition. (*Duncan v. Walker* (2001) 533 U.S. 167, 181-182.)
A properly filed state petition as to one claim tolls the running of the time as to all claims. *(Campbell v. Henry* (9th Cir. 2010) 614 F.3d 1056.)

State “collateral review” includes, not only habeas corpus, but other forms of judicial post-conviction review that are not part of the direct review, or appeal, process. *(Wall v. Kholi* (2011) 562 U.S. 545.) A petition that challenges the underlying judgment constitutes a collateral attack for purposes of tolling, no matter how the state denominates the proceeding. *(Id.* at pp. 555-560 [post-conviction motion to reduce sentence]; *Moore v. Cain* (5th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3d 361 [mandate petition]; see also *Hutson v. Quarterman* (5th Cir. 2007) 508 F.3d 236 [motion for DNA testing].)

The state collateral proceeding must be made “with respect to the pertinent judgment” under section 2244(d)(2), not to some other matter, such as a prison administrative decision. *(Collins v. Ercole* (2d Cir. 2012) 667 F.3d 247.)

a. Properly filed state petition  [§ 9.9]

Tolling applies if the petition is properly “filed,” even though the state court finds that the underlying claim is procedurally barred. *(Artuz v. Bennett* (2000) 531 U.S. 4, 8-11 [claims allegedly violating state procedural bars against raising claims that had been, or could have been, raised on appeal do not prevent tolling for properly filed application containing those claims: “[o]nly individual claims, and not the application containing those claims, can be procedurally defaulted under state law”], emphasis original; see also *Smith v. Duncan* (9th Cir. 2002) 297 F.3d 809, 812.)

A petition is properly filed if there are no unfulfilled conditions for filing (in contrast to conditions necessary for relief). The Supreme Court explained in *Artuz v. Bennett* (2000) 531 U.S. 4, 8 footnote omitted:

> An application is “filed,” as that term is commonly understood, when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record. [Citations.] . . . And an application is “properly

In California death penalty cases, because of the chronic shortage of counsel, the California Supreme Court will accept an initial skeletal petition, raising only one claim and attaching no supporting documents, and will permit later supplementation once counsel is appointed. *(In re Jimenez* (2010) 50 Cal.4th 951; *In re Morgan* (2010) 50 Cal.4th 932.)
“filed” when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings. These usually prescribe, for example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee.

Although *Artuz* mentioned “the court and office” prescribed for filing, *Cross v. Sisto* (9th Cir. 2012) 676 F.3d 1172, without discussion, allowed the time from the filing of a habeas corpus petition in the state Court of Appeal, which denied it without prejudice to refiling in the trial court, to its filing in the superior court to toll the statute.²⁰

The primary ground for finding a petition not properly filed is untimeliness. If a petition in the state court was untimely, the petition will not toll the statute. (*Pace v. DiGuglielmo* (2005) 544 U.S. 408, 412-414; see also *Lakey v. Hickman* (9th Cir. 2011) 633 F.3d 782 [where state court denied habeas corpus relief and state supreme court rejected claims as untimely, statutory tolling for intervening time is unavailable since supreme court petition was not properly filed]; *Waldrip v. Hall* (9th Cir. 2008) 548 F.3d 729 [unjustified delay of more than six months between denial of habeas corpus relief and filing of subsequent petition in higher court]; *Bonner v. Carey* (9th Cir. 2005) 425 F.3d 1145, 1148-1149; cf. *Curiel v. Miller* (9th Cir. 2016) 830 F.3d 864 (en banc) [citation of only cases on lack of specificity in pleading suggests non-reliance on timeliness bar]; *Trigueros v. Adams* (9th Cir. 2011) 658 F.3d 983, 989 [California Supreme Court’s request for informal response on merits was a finding of timeliness under circumstances of case].)²¹

A petition is not properly filed until it is verified, if required under state law. (*Zepeda v. Walker* (9th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3d 1013 [date of filing verification, not

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²⁰The state Court of Appeal in *Cross* had subject matter jurisdiction and *could* have entertained the petition, even though California policy is generally to require filing in the trial court first. (See *In re Kler* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1399.)

²¹Since the state court may take a long time to address the petition, the defendant faces a risk the AEDPA statute of limitations will expire before the state court determines the petition was not timely filed. *Pace v. DiGuglielmo* (2005) 544 U.S. 408, 416, suggested a prisoner might avoid this risk by filing a timely “protective” petition in federal court and asking the federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted.
submitting unverified petition to California Supreme Court, was relevant filing date under AEDPA.\(^{22}\)]

**b. Pendency of petition  [§ 9.10]**

A petition for reconsideration of the state Supreme Court’s denial of a motion for leave to appeal, in a post-appeal review proceeding, tolls the statute of limitations. (*Sherwood v. Prelesnik* (6th Cir. 2009) 579 F.3d 581.)

The word “pending” includes the time between a lower state court’s habeas corpus decision and the filing for subsequent relief in a higher state court, as long as the interval between court filings is “reasonable” within the meaning of state procedural requirements.\(^{23}\) (*Carey v. Saffold* (2002) 536 U.S. 214, 216-227; see *Stewart v. Cate* (9th Cir. 2014) 757 F.3d 929 [100-day gap between Court of Appeal and state Supreme Court filings not timely unless good cause shown]; *Noble v. Adams* (9th Cir. 2012) 676 F.3d 1180; *Lakey v. Hickman* (9th Cir. 2011) 633 F.3d 782 [where state court denied habeas corpus relief and state supreme court rejected claims as untimely, statutory tolling for intervening time is unavailable since supreme court petition was not properly filed].) If it is unclear whether the state court found the interval unreasonable, the federal court must decide whether the filing was made within what the state would consider a “reasonable time.” (*Evans v. Chavis* (2006) 546 U.S. 189, 199; see *Velasquez v. Kirkland* (9th Cir. 2011) 639 F.3d 964 [multiple delays between state filings; petitioner not entitled to either statutory or equitable tolling]; *Maxwell v. Roe* (9th Cir. 2010) 628 F.3d 486 [14-month period between denial in lower court and filing in higher court was reasonable when latter addressed merits without citing to untimeliness and unusual nature of case showed good cause]; *Chaffer v. Prosper* (9th Cir. 2010) 592 F.3d 1046; *Waldrip v. Hall* (9th Cir. 2008) 548 F.3d 729; *Gaston v. Palmer* (9th Cir. 2006) 447 F.3d 1165.)

If a second petition is filed purporting to correct problems with the first, the defendant is entitled to “gap (or interval) tolling” between the two petitions only if the second is limited merely to curing deficiencies in the first or elaborating on those claims. If the new petition goes beyond that, it is not considered to be part of the same proceedings, and the interval does not toll the clock. (*Stancle v. Clay* (9th Cir.2012) 692

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\(^{22}\)Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. (28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.)

\(^{23}\)Time is not tolled in the period between a final decision on direct state appeal and the filing of the first state collateral challenge.
F.3d 948, 951; Banjo v. Ayers (9th Cir. 2010) 614 F.3d 964, 969-970; Hemmerle v. Arizona (9th Cir. 2007) 495 F.3d 1069; King v. Roe (9th Cir. 2003) 340 F.3d 821, 823.

c. End of tolling period  [§ 9.11]

The tolling ends when the last state decision becomes final. (Bunney v. Mitchell (9th Cir. 2001) 262 F.3d 973.) The 90-day time during which a petition for certiorari is pending or may be filed at the conclusion of state collateral proceedings does not toll the statute. (Lawrence v. Florida (2007) 549 U.S. 327; see also White v. Klitzkie (9th Cir. 2002) 281 F.3d 920, 924-925.)

At the end of the tolling period, the clock restarts where it left off; it does not start all over again. A petitioner who needs to seek state habeas corpus in order to exhaust state remedies should therefore file the state petition sufficiently early to ensure that, once exhausted, the claims can be presented in federal court before expiration of the federal one-year limitations period.

2. Equitable tolling  [§ 9.12]

Equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations occasionally can be invoked when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim. (Holland v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 631; see Grant v. Swarthout (9th Cir. 2017) 862 F.3d 914 [“diligence” does not require working on case

24At the time of Bunney, former rule 24 of the California Rules of Court contained language suggesting denial of a petition for habeas corpus by the California Supreme Court is final in 30 days. (Bunney, at p. 974.) The state rules have since been amended; now a denial without issuance of an alternative writ or order to show cause is final immediately. (Rule 8.532(b)(2)(C).) An order denying a petition for review from a Court of Appeal decision denying a habeas corpus petition is also final immediately. (Rule 8.532(b)(2)(A).)

25See § 9.44 et seq., post, on exhaustion of state remedies and procedural default.


27In Holland the United States Supreme Court for the first time expressly recognized the applicability of equitable tolling to AEDPA. However, as the following discussion shows, the Ninth Circuit has applied equitable tolling in a number of AEDPA cases.
throughout the entire one-year statute of limitations].) The prerequisites for equitable tolling include (1) the petitioner diligently pursued his rights and (2) extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. (See *Pace v. DiGuglielmo* (2005) 544 U.S. 408, 418.)

One example might be the failure of prison officials to handle the petition properly. (See *Miles v. Prunty* (9th Cir. 1999) 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 [acting with due diligence, petitioner depended on prison authorities to prepare check for filing fee and to mail petition]; see also *Stillman v. Lamarque* (9th Cir. 2003) 319 F.3d 1199, 1202-1203 [prison delays in handling petition].) Lack of access to legal papers or legal resources for reasons beyond the petitioner’s control might also result in equitable tolling. (*Roy v. Lampert* (9th Cir. 2006) 455 F.3d 945 [prison library “consisted of only three outdated legal books, which contained no information about AEDPA”]; *Mendoza v. Carey* (9th Cir. 2006) 449 F.3d 1065 [lack of assistance to Spanish-speaking inmates]; *Lott v. Mueller* (9th Cir. 2002) 304 F.3d 918, 924-925, and *Espinoza-Matthews v. California* (9th Cir. 2005) 432 F.3d 1021, 1026-1028 [no access to legal papers while in administrative segregation]; *Whalem/Hunt v. Early* (9th Cir. 2000) 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 [AEDPA not in prison library].)

Another possible ground may be district court error. (*Sossa v. Diaz* (9th Cir. 2013) 729 F.3d 1225 [extension of time to file petition took it past AEDPA period]; *United States v. Buckles* (9th Cir. 2011) 647 F.3d 883, 891-893 [inaccurate advice from district court clerk may entitle defendant to equitable tolling]; *Corjasso v. Ayers* (9th Cir. 2002) 278 F.3d 874.) The petitioner’s reliance on then-valid law later overruled may toll the statute. (*Nedds v. Calderon* (9th Cir. 2012) 678 F.3d 777; *Harris v. Carter* (9th Cir. 2008) 515 F.3d 1051.)

The defendant’s mental illness or incompetence may establish tolling. (*Forbess v. Franke* (9th Cir. 2014) 749 F.3d 837; *Bills v. Clark* (9th Cir. 2010) 628 F.3d 1092; *Laws v. Lamarque* (9th Cir. 2003) 351 F.3d 919, 922-923; cf. *Stancle v. Clay* (9th Cir. 2012) 692 F.3d 948, 958-959, *Roberts v. Marshall* (9th Cir. 2010) 627 F.3d 768, and *Gaston v. Palmer* (9th Cir. 2005) 417 F.3d 1030 [physical and mental disabilities not amounting to incompetence].) Another ground may be a prisoner’s lack of knowledge that the state courts have reached a final resolution of his case. (*Ramirez v. Yates* (9th Cir. 2009) 571 F.3d 993, 997-998.)

Counsel’s egregious misconduct may be cause for equitable tolling. (*Holland v. Florida* (2010) 560 U.S. 631 [gross negligence of counsel]; *Gibbs v. Legrand* (9th Cir. 2014) 767 F.3d 879 [counsel repeatedly failed to tell petitioner of state denial]; *Doe v. Busby* (9th Cir. 2011) 661 F.3d 1001 [prior counsel’s actions were egregious and
petitioner used reasonable diligence; petitioner not responsible for counsel’s affirmative misrepresentations]; *Spitsyn v. Moore* (9th Cir. 2003) 345 F.3d 796, 801 [attorney’s failure to file habeas corpus petition and refusal to return client file].)

However, equitable tolling does not extend to “garden variety” claims of excusable neglect. Examples might be lateness caused by counsel’s absence from the office (*Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs* (1990) 498 U.S. 89, 96), counsel’s miscalculation of the statute of limitations (*Frye v. Hickman* (9th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 1144), delay in a district court’s dismissal of an unexhausted petition, when the petitioner was on notice he had to return to state court and failed to do so in a timely way (*Guillory v. Roe* (9th Cir. 2003) 329 F.3d 1015, 1017; *Fail v. Hubbard* (9th Cir. 2002) 315 F.3d 1059, 1062), the petitioner’s lack of legal knowledge (*Rasberry v. Garcia* (9th Cir. 2006) 448 F.3d 1150), the petitioner’s physical and mental disabilities not amounting to incompetence (*Roberts v. Marshall* (9th Cir. 2010) 627 F.3d 768; *Gaston v. Palmer* (9th Cir. 2005) 417 F.3d 1030), or the petitioner’s alleged belief his state petition would be treated as timely filed and so entitle him to statutory tolling (*Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke* (9th Cir. 2009) 556 F.3d 1008). The petitioner must have acted diligently, for his own part.

3. **Fundamental miscarriage of justice**  [§ 9.13]

*McQuiggin v. Perkins* (2013) ___ U.S. ___ [133 S.Ct. 1924, 185 L.Ed.2d 1019], resolving a conflict among the circuits, held that actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass upon expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations. A federal habeas court, faced with an actual-innocence gateway claim, should count unjustifiable delay on a habeas petitioner’s part, not as an absolute barrier to relief, but as a factor in determining whether actual innocence has been reliably shown. (See also *Lee v. Lampert* (9th Cir. 2011) 653 F.3d 929 (en banc) [actual innocence excuse applies to failure to comply with AEDPA time limit]; see *Larsen v. Soto* (9th Cir. 2013) 742 F.3d 1083.) The *Schlup* doctrine creates a “gateway” into federal court, allowing a federal court to consider otherwise procedurally barred claims if the petitioner can show “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (*Schlup*, at p. 327.) (See § 9.55, post, for a further discussion of this principle.)

D. Assertion of Statute of Limitations by State  [§ 9.14]

A statute of limitations defense is not jurisdictional and may be waived. (Holland v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 631.) An appellate court abuses its discretion by using a timeliness bar when the state is aware of a limitations defense and intelligently chooses not to rely on it in the court of first instance; in the absence of exceptional circumstances, a court is not at liberty to bypass, override, or excuse a deliberate waiver of a limitations defense. (Wood v. Milyard (2012) 566 U.S. 463; see also Nardi v. Stewart (9th Cir. 2004) 354 F.3d 1134, 1135-1136, 1141-1142 [statute of limitations is affirmative defense; state waived it by failing to assert it, although expressly invited to do so in court’s order to file answer]; see Day v. McDonough (2006) 547 U.S. 198, 202 [“we would count it an abuse of discretion to override a State’s deliberate waiver of a limitations defense” (dictum)].) However, a federal district court has discretion sua sponte to dismiss a petition for untimeliness, even if the state has not asserted the statute of limitations as a defense, if the state’s failure is evidently due to an inadvertent miscalculation of dates. (Id. at p. 209.)

The state must assert the defense in its first responsive pleading, meaning its answer to the petition, not preliminary pleadings. (Randle v. Crawford (9th Cir. 2009) 578 F.3d 1177, 1182.)

IV. GROUNDS FOR FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF  [§ 9.15]

AEDPA29 limits the grounds for federal habeas corpus relief for persons convicted in a state court. Title 28 United States Code section 2254(d) provides relief can be granted only if the state decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Section 2254(e) establishes a presumption that a state factual determination was correct, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence. This standard of review is non-waivable, binding on the court whether or not the state invokes it. (Hernandez v. Holland (9th Cir. 2014) 750 F.3d 843, 856.)

A. General Standards for Reviewing State Court Decision  [§ 9.16]

As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, AEDPA “dictates a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, . . . which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” (Bell v. Cone (2005) 543 U.S. 447, 455 (per curiam), internal quotation marks omitted; Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 362, 403; Woodford v. Viscotti (2002) 537 U.S. 19, 24 (per curiam); Lindh v. Murphy (1997) 521 U.S. 320, 333, fn. 7.)

This means the state court decision is presumed to be valid. It can be overturned only under exacting standards that give the benefit of the doubt to the decision in terms of interpreting its grounds and reviewing its conclusions of law and fact. As to matters of law, these standards require that the state court decision on the applicable law have been both wrong and unreasonable in light of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).) As to matters of fact, the state decision must have been unreasonable (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)) and rebutted by clear and convincing evidence (28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)).

1. State decision to be reviewed  [§ 9.17]

In applying AEDPA, the federal courts examine the state court’s last reasoned decision, such as an opinion of the California Supreme Court or Court of Appeal, not simple orders such as a “postcard denial” of a petition for review by the Supreme Court. (Ylst v. Nunnemaker (1991) 501 U.S. 797, 803; Benn v. Lambert (9th Cir. 2002) 283 F.3d 1040, 1052, fn. 7.) See § 9.63, post, for a fuller discussion of this matter.

30 The clear and convincing evidence standard applies only to the proof needed to rebut a state finding of fact. It does not apply to the showing needed to prove unreasonableness. (Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 341.)


32 The federal court reviews only one final state court decision. The federal court should review the dispositive decision in isolation and not in combination with decisions by other state courts. (Barker v. Fleming (9th Cir. 2005) 423 F.3d 1085, 1092-1093.)

The clear and convincing evidence standard applies only to the proof needed to rebut a state finding of fact. It does not apply to the showing needed to prove unreasonableness. (Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 341.)


The federal court reviews only one final state court decision. The federal court should review the dispositive decision in isolation and not in combination with decisions by other state courts. (Barker v. Fleming (9th Cir. 2005) 423 F.3d 1085, 1092-1093.)
2. Deference to state decisions on matters of law  [§ 9.18]

AEDPA calls for federal courts to defer to state court decisions on matters of federal law except under tightly restricted conditions. (Burt v. Titlow (2013) 571 U.S. 12 [federal courts review state prisoner claim of ineffective of counsel using “doubly deferential” standard giving both state court and defense counsel benefit of the doubt]; Bell v. Cone (2005) 543 U.S. 447, 455 (per curiam).)

a. AEDPA standards for relief  [§ 9.19]

Ordinarily a federal court may grant relief only if the state court decision on the applicable law is both wrong and unreasonable in light of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).) § 9.24 et seq., post, analyzes this provision in detail.

b. Exceptions to AEDPA standards  [§ 9.20]

AEDPA’s highly deferential standard of review does not apply under all circumstances. For it to apply, the federal claim must be (1) adjudicated (2) on the merits (3) in a state proceeding (4) that resulted in a decision. (Greene v. Lambert (9th Cir. 2002) 288 F.3d 1081, 1089.)

When it is clear that a state court has not reached the merits of a properly raised issue, there is no state decision to defer to. The federal court must decide the issue de novo. (Pirtle v. Morgan (9th Cir. 2002) 313 F.3d 1160, 1167; see Green v. Lamarque (9th Cir. 2008) 532 F.3d 1028 [state court never fulfilled affirmative duty to determine whether defendant had established purposeful discrimination in jury selection; federal court must conduct analysis de novo, rather than remanding for state court to do so]; Frantz v. Hazey (9th Cir. 2008) 513 F.3d 1002 [state decision on prejudice invalid as “contrary to” established federal law because failed to apply reversible per se standard; de novo federal review on issue of whether there was constitutional error, because state never decided that question]; Medley v. Runnels (9th Cir. 2007) 506 F.3d 857, 863, fn. 3.)

When a state court issues an order that summarily rejects without discussion all the claims raised by a defendant, however, including a claim subsequently raised in a federal habeas proceeding, the federal court must presume (subject to rebuttal) that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86.) The same presumption applies when the state court addresses some of the claims raised by a
defendant but not a claim that is later raised in a federal habeas proceeding. (*Johnson v. Williams* (2013) 568 U.S. 289.)

If the state decision was on the merits but without stated reasons or analysis (as often happens in a *Wende* situation), AEDPA still applies. (*Harrington v. Richter* (2011) 562 U.S. 86.) In such a situation the Ninth Circuit has used a “relaxed” deference standard:

> [A]lthough we cannot undertake our review by analyzing the basis for the state court’s decision, we can view it through the “objectively reasonable” lens ground by *Williams* [v. *Taylor* (2000) 529 U.S. 362] . . . . Federal habeas review is not *de novo* when the state court does not supply reasoning for its decision, but an independent review of the record is required to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal law . . . . Only by that examination may we determine whether the state court’s decision was objectively reasonable.

(*Delgado v. Lewis* (9th Cir. 2000) 223 F.3d 976, 982; see also *Medley v. Runnels* (9th Cir. 2007) 506 F.3d 857, 863, fn. 3; *Pirtle v. Morgan* (9th Cir. 2002) 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 [“although we independently review the record, we still defer to the state court’s ultimate decision”]; see *Bell v. Jarvis* (4th Cir. 2000) 236 F.3d 149, 158-163; cf. *Nasby v. McDaniel* (9th Cir. 2017) 853 F.3d 1049 [for federal court to review finding of fact deferentially, it must have adequate record of trial; state appellate court decision will not suffice].)

Interpretation of ambiguous or unexplained state decisions in the context of procedural default issues is treated in detail in § 9.57 et seq., post.

c. Interpretation of state decision [§ 9.21]

The state court decision must be given the benefit of the doubt. If it can reasonably be interpreted so as to uphold it, the federal court must do so. In *Bell v. Cone* (2005) 543 U.S. 447 (*per curiam*), the federal circuit court found the state court had failed to apply the state court’s own earlier decision narrowing the meaning of a capital aggravating factor that, without the narrowing interpretation, was unconstitutionally vague. This ruling was based on the lack of explicit reference in the state’s opinion to its earlier

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33 *People v. Wende* (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (no-merit briefs).
decision. The Supreme Court held the circuit court had failed to give sufficient deference to the state court’s conclusions:

We do not think that a federal court can presume so lightly that a state court failed to apply its own law . . . . Federal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation.

(Id. at 455; Holland v. Jackson (2004) 542 U.S. 649, 655 (per curiam); Woodford v. Visciotti (2002) 537 U.S. 19, 24 [“readiness to attribute error is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law”].)

d. Meaning of state law  [§ 9.22]


3. Deference to state decisions on matters of fact  [§ 9.23]

The AEDPA standards for federal habeas corpus relief require considerable federal deference to state court decisions:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue

34There are a very few exceptions. “On rare occasions the Court has re-examined a state-court interpretation of state law when it appears to be an ‘obvious subterfuge to evade consideration of a federal issue.’ (Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 129 (1945). See Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); Terre Haute & I.R. Co. v. Indiana ex rel. Ketcham, 194 U.S. 579 (1904).” (Mullaney v. Wilbur, at p. 691, fn. 11; see also Bush v. Gore (2000) 531 U.S. 98, 112-115 (conc. opinion. of Rehnquist, C.J.).)

35Pretrial cases are not subject to the deferential standard of review required by 28 United States Code section 2254 for post-conviction cases. (Stow v. Murashige (9th Cir. 2004) 389 F.3d 880 [de novo rather review under U.S.C. § 2241 applies in pretrial habeas corpus to bar state proceeding as violation of double jeopardy].)
made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence . . . .

(28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).)

State court findings of fact are to be presumed correct unless the petitioner shows the findings were unreasonable and rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing evidence. (28 U.S.C. § 2554(d)(2), (e)(1); Miller–El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 240; Pollard v. Galaza (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1030, 1033.) The clear and convincing evidence standard applies only to the proof needed to rebut a state court finding of fact. It does not apply to the showing needed to prove unreasonableness. (Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 341.)

For the federal court to review a finding of fact using the deferential standard of AEDPA, it must have an adequate record of the trial. A state appellate court decision will not suffice. (Nasby v. McDaniel (9th Cir. 2017) 853 F.3d 1049.)

In the absence of any factual determinations, there is no finding entitled to deference. (Weaver v. Thompson (9th Cir. 1999) 197 F.3d 359, 363.) Also, deficiencies in the state court fact-finding process or misapprehension of material facts or correct legal standards may constitute an unreasonable determination of facts. (Taylor v. Maddox (9th Cir. 2004) 366 F.3d 992, 1000-1001.) This subject is discussed further in § 9.35 et seq., post.

B. Grounds for Relief Enumerated in AEDPA [§ 9.24]

AEDPA limits the substantive grounds for granting federal habeas corpus relief to a person convicted by a state court decision. Section 2254 provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

The United States Supreme Court explained these grounds in Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 362. For AEDPA purposes, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, Part II, is the opinion of the court. (See also Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685.)


Claims based on the federal Constitution generally are cognizable on federal habeas corpus. (Wilson v. Corcoran (2010) 562 U.S. 1 (per curiam) [federal courts may not issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners whose confinement does not violate federal law].) An exception is search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, assuming “the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation” of the claims. (Stone v. Powell (1976) 428 U.S. 465, 494; cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 375-377 [Stone v. Powell does not bar review of ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to file timely suppression motion].)

2. “Clearly established” federal law [§ 9.26]

The phrase “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)) means (1) holdings, as opposed to dicta, (2) by the United States Supreme Court, not lower federal courts, (3) that are well developed and not in substantial conflict with other Supreme Court precedent and (4) that were established at the time of the state court decision being challenged. (Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 362, 412.)

a. Holdings [§ 9.27]

b. Decisions by United States Supreme Court  [§ 9.28]

Given the requirement that the federal law be “determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)), the only judicial precedents that can determine federal law under AEDPA are decisions by the United States Supreme Court. Constitutional jurisprudence developed by lower federal courts but not adopted by the Supreme Court is not binding precedent under section 2254(d). (Kane v. Espitia (2005) 546 U.S. 9 (per curiam) [circuit court split on whether Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 requires pro per prisoner access to legal materials cannot be resolved in federal habeas corpus, when neither Faretta itself nor any other Supreme Court decision has addressed the topic]; Boyd v. Newland (9th Cir. 2006) 455 F.3d 897, 909-910 [bar on use of juvenile adjudication as prior not clearly established under Supreme Court precedents]; Duhaime v. DuCharme (9th Cir. 2000) 200 F.3d 597, 600-601; see also Moore v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1997) 108 F.3d 261, 264.)

However, circuit court precedent can be a guide in interpreting Supreme Court law and in determining whether a rule is clearly established. (Duhaime v. DuCharme (9th Cir. 2000) 200 F.3d 597, 600.)

c. Well developed and unconflicting precedents  [§ 9.29]

Most cases interpreting the phrase “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)) focus on whether a particular rule is “clearly established.”

The Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 362, 412, suggested that, at the least, “whatever would qualify as an old rule under our Teague jurisprudence will constitute ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ under § 2254(d)(1).” The court was referring to Teague v. Lane (1989) 489 U.S. 288, 301, which, in laying down principles for applications of “new rules of law,” pointed out that a decision dictated by, and not changing or extending, an

established rule is not “new law” at all.\(^{38}\) (See also \textit{Saffle v. Parks} (1990) 494 U.S. 484, 487-488.)

“AEDPA does not ‘require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied.’” (\textit{Panetti v. Quarterman} (2007) 551 U.S. 930, 953.)\(^{39}\) However, if there is no Supreme Court precedent that dictates a particular result, the state court’s decision usually cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. (\textit{Knowles v. Mirzayance} (2009) 556 U.S. 111 [federal court may not use invoke new test for ineffective assistance of counsel – nothing to lose standard – to find state decision unreasonable]; \textit{Kane v. Espitia} (2005) 546 U.S. 9 (\textit{per curiam}) [issue whether \textit{Faretta v. California} (1975) 422 U.S. 806, requires pro per prisoner access to legal materials cannot be basis for federal habeas corpus relief when neither \textit{Faretta} itself nor any other Supreme Court decision has addressed the topic]; \textit{Mitchell v. Esparza} (2003) 540 U.S. 12, 17 [federal court erred in saying state court may not apply harmless error test for lack of jury instruction or finding on whether defendant was the “principal offender” provision of capital statute, when crime was committed by only one person; a “federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from this Court is, at best, ambiguous”]; \textit{Murdoch v. Castro} (9th Cir. 2010) 609 F.3d 983 (en banc) [because supremacy of 6th Amend. over attorney-client privilege is not clearly established by Supreme Court holding, petitioner not entitled to federal habeas relief]; \textit{Moses v. Payne} (9th Cir. 2009) 555 F.3d 742 [whether court’s exercise of discretion to exclude expert testimony violates federal right to present relevant evidence is not clearly established]; \textit{Boyd v. Newland} (9th Cir. 2006) 455 F.3d 897, 909-910 [bar on use of juvenile

\(^{38}\)“Old law” under \textit{Teague} and “clearly established law” under AEDPA are related concepts. (See \textit{Smith v. Robbins} (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 302, dis. opn. of Souter, J. [when applicable standards have already been articulated, habeas corpus petitioner is not seeking “new” rule; “the same point, of course, would answer any objection under the AEDPA’’]); \textit{Butler v. Curry} (9th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d 624 [when result in \textit{Cunningham v. California} (2007) 549 U.S. 270 was dictated by precedent under \textit{Teague}, state court decision was contrary to clearly established law under AEDPA]; \textit{Schardt v. Payne} (9th Cir. 2005) 414 F.3d 1025, 1036-1037 [stating inverse of \textit{Williams v. Taylor}: “if a case creates a new rule under \textit{Teague}, then it is not a clearly established rule under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)’’]; \textit{Vasquez v. Strack} (2d Cir. 2000) 228 F.3d 143, 149-150 [same conclusion as \textit{Schardt}; noting \textit{Teague} establishes “some guidance” as to whether rule is clearly established].)

adjudication as prior not clearly established under Supreme Court precedents]; Brewer v. Hall (9th Cir. 2004) 378 F.3d 952, 955-956; see Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 71-73 [divergent Supreme Court decisions on cruel and unusual punishment].)

   d. Established at the time of the state court decision  [§ 9.29A]

   For a state court decision to be an unreasonable application of federal law, as interpreted by Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 362, the law must have been in existence at the time of the state court decision. (Id. at pp. 390, 412; Shoop v. Hill (2019) ___ U.S. ___ [139 S.Ct. 504, 202 L.Ed.2d 461]; Greene v. Fisher (2011) 565 U.S. 34 [“AEDPA’s backward-looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”]; see Ponce v. Felker (9th Cir. 2010) 606 F.3d 596, 604-606 [when cases were in conflict at time of state decision and issue was not resolved until later, in Giles v. California (2008) 554 U.S. 353, state decision not unreasonable application of clearly established federal law].) The Williams v. Taylor decision left uncertainty as to the time of the state court decision, variously phrasing it: “as of the time of the relevant state-court decision” (id. at p. 412, O’Connor, J., for the court) and when the “state-court conviction became final” (id. at p. 390, Stevens, J., for the court).

   (Ambiguity noted but not resolved in Smith v. Spisak (2010) 558 U.S. 139.)

   3. “Contrary to” federal law  [§ 9.30]

   Under AEDPA,40 federal habeas corpus relief may be granted if a state court decision was “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” As Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 362, 412-413, explained:

   Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.

   A state court decision is contrary to federal law when the state court applies a rule that contradicts a legal test established by the United States Supreme Court or adds, deletes, or alters a factor in such a test. (Early v. Packer (2002) 537 U.S. 3, 8; Sessoms v. Runnels (9th Cir. 2011) 650 F.3d 1276; Frantz v. Hazey (9th Cir. 2008) 513 F.3d 1002;

   ______

A decision is also contrary to federal law if the state court fails to apply controlling authority from the United States Supreme Court or to use the correct analysis required by this authority. (Butler v. Curry (9th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d 624 [when result in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 was dictated by precedent, state court decision was contrary to clearly established law]; Van Lynn v. Farmon (9th Cir. 2003) 347 F.3d 735, 737, 741-742 [state court used test for allowing self-representation explicitly rejected by Supreme Court]; Avila v. Galaza (9th Cir. 2002) 297 F.3d 911, 918 [state referee did not apply any law, much less Strickland’s two-prong test, in deciding ineffective assistance of counsel petition].)

“AEDPA does not ‘require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied.’” (Panetti v. Quarterman (2007) 551 U.S. 930, 953.) However, if Supreme Court precedents have reached different results depending on the fact situation, and the state case falls in the “twilight zone” between the Supreme Court cases, a state court decision cannot be said to have “‘confront[ed] a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrive[ed] at a result different from our precedent.’” (Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 74, quoting Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 362, 406.)

In determining whether the state decision was contrary to federal law, the federal court must give the state court the benefit of the doubt as to possibly ambiguous language in its decision. (See McDaniel v. Brown (2010) 558 U.S. 120, fn. 4 (per curiam) [use of term “reasonable jury” instead of “rational jury” in state court decision of no moment]; Bell v. Cone (2005) 543 U.S. 447, 455 (per curiam); Holland v. Jackson (2004) 542 U.S. 649, 655 (per curiam) [“‘readiness to attribute error is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law’”]; see § 9.21, ante.)

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41In Van Lynn v. Farmon, supra, 347 F.3d 735, 737, the state court used an incorrect legal test in denying right to self-representation – namely, defendant’s lack of legal skills. The federal court rejected the argument that the motion could appropriately have been denied if the state court had relied on the fact it was made in mid-trial.

4. “Unreasonable application” of federal law  [$9.31$]

The AEDPA\textsuperscript{43} grounds for federal habeas corpus relief include a state court decision that “involved an unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).) Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 362, 413, explained:

Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

(See also Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370; Renico v. Lett (2010) 559 U.S. 766; Wood v. Allen (2010) 558 U.S. 290; Waddington v. Sarasad (2009) 555 U.S. 179; Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510; Sessoms v. Runnels (9th Cir. 2011) 650 F.3d 1276, 1286-1289; Cudjo v. Ayers (9th Cir. 2012) 698 F.3d 752, 768 [ if the state court's harmless error holding is contrary to Supreme Court precedent or objectively unreasonable, no deference is owed and federal court reverts to independent harmless error analysis as if there had been no state court holding].)

A state court’s decision must be assessed for reasonableness only in light of the record properly before the state court, not external evidence outside the record. (Cullen v. Pinholster (2011) 563 U.S. 170; Holland v. Jackson (2004) 542 U.S. 649, 655; see also McDaniel v. Brown (2010) 558 U.S. 120 (per curiam); cf. Gonzalez v. Wong (9th Cir. 2011) 667 F.3d 965 [new evidence may be reason to stay federal proceedings to give petitioner opportunity to return to state court].)

a. “Objectively unreasonable” test  [$9.32$]

The test under the “unreasonable application” provision (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)) is whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. “[T]he most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” (Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 362, 410, italics original;

\textsuperscript{43}Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. (28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.)
see also Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 8644; see Rompilla v. Beard (2005) 545 U.S. 374, 389 [objectively unreasonable not to find ineffective assistance of capital counsel in failure to review court file on key prior conviction]; cf. Edwards v. LaMarque (9th Cir. 2007) 475 F.3d 1121.) Thus, even if the federal court disagrees with the state court’s conclusion and determines it applied federal law incorrectly, relief is appropriate only if the state court decision was also objectively unreasonable. (Wood v. Allen (2010) 558 U.S. 290; Rice v. Collins (2006) 546 U.S. 333; Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 73-76; Penry v. Johnson (2001) 532 U.S. 782, 793; see see also Mann v. Ryan (9th Cir. 2016) 828 F.3d 1143 (en banc) [state court’s invocation of the Strickland prejudice standard was ambiguous but was not clearly incorrect; federal court must apply AEDPA deference and may grant habeas relief only if no fairminded jurist could conclude that the adjudication was consistent with clearly established Supreme Court precedent]; Cudjo v. Ayers (9th Cir. 2012) 698 F.3d 752, 768-769 [applying Watson prejudice test to constitutional error is objectively unreasonable]; see also Premo v. Moore (2011) 562 U.S. 115 [with ineffective assistance of counsel claim, deference is “double”: deference to trial counsel’s judgment and then to state court’s judgment about trial counsel]; cf. Mahrt v. Beard (9th Cir. 2017) 849 F.3d 1164 [counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress before entry of plea, but habeas is not warranted because on the merits it would not have been unreasonable for state court to uphold the search].)

A federal court will not consider a claim of constitutional error predating a plea of guilty. (Tollett v. Henderson (1973) 411 U.S. 258.) This rule does not apply when trial counsel’s ineffectiveness materially led to the plea. (See United States v. Broce (1989) 488 U.S. 563, 573-574, and other cases cited in Mahrt v. Beard (9th Cir. 2017) 849 F.3d 1164 [counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress before entry of plea, but habeas is not warranted because on the merits it would not have been unreasonable for state court to uphold the search].)

b. Application of precedent to new factual situation  § 9.33

An unreasonable application of federal law (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)) occurs when the state court fails to apply established Supreme Court authority to a new set of facts

44Often federal habeas corpus claims involve ineffective assistance of counsel issues. Harrington cautions that the question for the federal court under § 2254(d) is not whether counsel acted unreasonably within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668: “The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” (Harrington, 562 U.S. at p. 105.)

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within the logical scope of the authority, if the factual differences do not weaken the force of the authority. (Weighall v. Middle (9th Cir. 2000) 215 F.3d 1058, 1062, fn. 7.) It includes the unreasonable refusal to apply the governing legal principle to a context in which the principle unquestionably should have controlled. (Ramdass v. Angelone (2000) 530 U.S. 156, 166.)

An application of Supreme Court precedent to new facts, even if incorrect, does not establish grounds for habeas corpus relief when it is not unreasonable. (Brown v. Payton (2005) 544 U.S. 133, 143, 147; see also Smith v. Spisak (2010) 558 U.S. 139.) In Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004) 541 U.S. 652, 664, the court wrote:

[T]he range of reasonable judgment can depend in part on the nature of the relevant rule. If a legal rule is specific, the range may be narrow. Applications of the rule may be plainly correct or incorrect. Other rules are more general, and their meaning must emerge in application over the course of time. Applying a general standard to a specific case can demand a substantial element of judgment. As a result, evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case by case determinations.

White v. Woodall (2014) 572 U.S. 415 explained the unreasonableness test requires the conclusion be “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” (134 S.Ct. at p. 1703.)

c. Unresolved legal issues [§ 9.34]

In determining whether the state court decision involved an unreasonable application of federal law (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)), a federal court may not go beyond Supreme Court precedent and resolve issues not previously decided, or resolve differences among Supreme Court precedents if the state court reasonably applied those precedents. (See Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 70-71; Alvarado v. Hill (9th Cir. 2001) 252 F.3d 1066, 1068-1069.)
5. Unreasonable determination of facts [§ 9.35]

AEDPA\textsuperscript{45} permits habeas corpus relief if the state court decision was based on “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).)

a. Presumption of correctness [§ 9.36]

The “unreasonable determination of the facts” provision of section 2254(d)(2) is subject to the general rule of deference to state court findings and a presumption of their correctness:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

(28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see § 9.23, ante.\textsuperscript{46})

The Supreme Court explained this provision in \textit{Miller-El v. Cockrell} (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 340:

Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding, § 2254(d)(2); see also Williams \textit{v. Taylor} (2000) 529 U.S. 362, 399 (opinion of O’Connor, J.).

Thus, for example, on a sufficiency of the evidence claim, a federal court must determine whether the state court could reasonably have found sufficient evidence upon viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution. (\textit{McDaniel v. Brown} (2010) 558 U.S. 120 (\textit{per curiam}).)

\textsuperscript{45}Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. (28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.)

\textsuperscript{46}The clear and convincing evidence standard applies only to the proof needed to rebut a state finding of fact. It does not apply to the showing needed to prove unreasonableness. (\textit{Miller-El v. Cockrell} (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 341.)
Deference to the state means relief under section 2254(d)(1) may not be ordered on the basis of evidence developed at a federal habeas corpus hearing if the evidence was not before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. *(Cullen v. Pinholster (2011) 563 U.S. 170; cf. Gonzalez v. Wong (9th Cir. 2011) 667 F.3d 965 [new evidence may be reason to stay federal proceedings to give petitioner opportunity to return to state court].)*

b. **Unreasonableness**  

The presumption that state court findings of fact are correct is not unlimited. As the Supreme Court cautioned:

> Even in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review. Deference does not by definition preclude relief. A federal court can disagree with a state court’s credibility determination and, when guided by AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence. *(Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 340.)*

An unreasonable determination of fact may be found when the state court failed to make a necessary finding, used the wrong legal standard in making findings, mistook or overlooked critical facts, or failed to provide an adequate opportunity for presentation. *(Ali v. Hickman (9th Cir. 2009) 571 F.3d 902; Taylor v. Maddox (9th Cir. 2004) 366 F.3d 992, 1000-1001 [state court disregarded uncontradicted evidence supporting petitioner].)*

c. **Absence of factual showing in state court**  

When the factual basis for a claim was not developed in state court, the federal court ordinarily cannot make its own findings of fact. Section 2254(e)(2) of Title 28 United States Code provides:

> If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that –

(A) the claim relies on –

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.


Failure to develop the factual basis of a claim is not established unless there is lack of diligence or a greater fault on the part of the prisoner or his counsel. (Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 420, 431-437 [rejecting state’s “no fault” interpretation]; see Schad v. Ryan (9th Cir. 2009, amended 2010) 606 F.3d 1022 [proper standard for due diligence as prerequisite for evidentiary hearing is reasonableness of efforts to develop record in state court, not lack of success in developing record].)

Exceptions to the limitation of section 2254(e)(2) include new and retroactively applicable law (see Reyes-Requena v. United States (5th Cir.2001) 243 F.3d 893, 904-906), newly discovered evidence (see Noel v. Norris (E.D. Ark. 2002) 194 F.Supp.2d 893, 915), or a claim that the facts prove defendant would have been acquitted if the constitutional error had not occurred (see Griffin v. Johnson (9th Cir. 2003) 350 F.3d 956, 966).

C. Prejudicial Error Standard [§ 9.39]

1. AEDPA standards and Brecht test [§§ 9.40-9.42]

Before AEDPA, the federal habeas corpus test for prejudice was that of Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S. 619, 623, 637: whether the federal constitutional error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the jury’s verdict – a standard less onerous for the

47 Original §§ 9.40, 9.41, and 9.42 have been consolidated.

state than *Chapman*, the test used on direct appeal.\(^{49}\) Under the *Brecht* test, if the habeas corpus judge has a “grave doubt” as to whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the outcome, the error is prejudicial. (*O’Neal v. McAninch* (1995) 513 U.S. 432, 435 [“grave doubt” means the matter is so evenly balanced that in the judge’s mind it is in “virtual equipoise” as to prejudice].)

In *Mitchell v. Esparza* (2003) 540 U.S. 12, the court held that, under AEDPA, a federal court must not upset a state court’s application of the prejudicial error standard unless the state court’s decision was both wrong and unreasonable. “We may not grant respondent’s habeas petition . . . if the state court simply erred in concluding that the State’s errors were harmless; rather, habeas relief is appropriate only if the Ohio Court of Appeals applied harmless-error review in an ‘objectively unreasonable’ manner.” (*Id.* at p. 18; see *Davis v. Ayala* (2015) ___ U.S. ___ [135 S.Ct. 2187, 192 L.Ed.2d 323].)

In *Fry v. Pliler* (2007) 551 U.S. 112, the Supreme Court analyzed the interplay between the *Brecht* analysis and AEDPA and resolved conflicting interpretations among the federal circuits as to what standard applies when the state court did not engage in a prejudicial error analysis.\(^{50}\) The state court found no error and said, vaguely, “no possible prejudice” could have occurred. The lower federal courts determined the state court’s finding of no error was objectively unreasonable under AEDPA; they nevertheless denied relief, concluding that, although there was a possibility of prejudice, the *Brecht* test for prejudicial error was not met. The Supreme Court agreed, holding the *Brecht* test “actual prejudice” test was not superseded by AEDPA’s “unreasonable application of *Chapman*” test and must be applied. It also found that *Brecht* includes the AEDPA standard and thus “it certainly makes no sense to require formal application of both tests.” *Brecht* is the test, regardless of whether the state court engaged in a prejudicial error analysis. (See *Deck v. Jenkins* (9th Cir. 2014) 768 F.3d 1015 [applying *Brecht*, court left with “grave doubt” whether prosecutor’s closing argument misstatements on the law of attempt were harmless].)

\(^{49}\) *Chapman v. California* (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (federal constitutional error is reversible unless the state has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not affect the outcome).

\(^{50}\) See *Inthavong v. LaMarque* (9th Cir. 2005) 420 F.3d 1055, 1059; *Gutierrez v. McGinnis* (2d Cir. 2004) 389 F.3d 300, 305, footnote 3; *Medina v. Hornung* (9th Cir. 2004) 386 F.3d 872, 877; *Cargle v. Mullin* (10th Cir. 2003) 317 F.3d 1196, 1220; *Bains v. Cambra* (9th Cir. 2000) 204 F.3d 964, 976-977.
2. **Prejudicial per se error**  [§ 9.43]

   Certain kinds of errors are not susceptible to harmless error analysis at all. Structural error is an example.\(^{51}\) Failure to exercise discretion in making some decisions may also fall into that category.\(^{52}\) *(Williams v. Roe* (9th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3d 883, 887-888 [when ex post facto use of wrong sentencing standard may have eliminated opportunity for court to use discretion to impose lesser sentence, error requires habeas corpus relief without determination of prejudice]; see § 4.51 of chapter 4, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection.”)

3. **Cumulative error**  [§ 9.43A]

   Cumulative error may be grounds for federal habeas corpus relief, even when any single error would not. *(Parle v. Runnels* (9th Cir. 2007) 505 F.3d 922, 927-929, citing *Chambers v. Mississippi* (1973) 410 U.S. 284.)

V. **PROPER PRESENTATION TO STATE COURTS: EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT**  [§ 9.44]

   This section discusses two separate but closely related doctrines affecting the availability of federal habeas corpus – exhaustion of state remedies and procedural default. Broadly speaking, these doctrines require a defendant seeking federal habeas corpus relief first to take advantage of available state remedies and to give the state courts a fair opportunity to consider the federal issue.\(^{53}\) Both are based on the principles of comity and federalism and are intended to ensure the federal courts respect the

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\(^{51}\) See *Hedgpeth v. Pulido* (2008) 555 U.S. 57 [instructing on improper theory of criminal liability is not structural error; “reviewing court finding such error should ask whether the flaw in the instructions ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict’”].


\(^{53}\) Pro se petitions may be held to a less stringent standard. *(Sanders v. Ryder* (9th Cir.2003) 342 F.3d 991, 999, citing *Peterson v. Lampert* (9th Cir.2003) 319 F.3d 1153, 1159 (en banc); see also *Slack v. McDaniel* (2000) 529 U.S. 473, 487.)
authority of the state courts and their interest “in correcting their own mistakes.”

Both requirements predate AEDPA. (See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes (1977) 433 U.S. 72, 80; Francis v. Henderson (1976) 425 U.S. 536, 538-539; Ex parte Royall (1886) 117 U.S. 241, 250-253.) Before AEDPA the Supreme Court had mandated the exhaustion doctrine be strictly applied. (Rose v. Lundy (1982) 455 U.S. 509, 518, 520.) In 1948 and again with the enactment of AEDPA, Congress codified the exhaustion doctrine in Title 28 United States Code section 2254(b) and (c):

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that –

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or

(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.

(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.

54 Similar principles prevent federal intervention in pretrial claims such as speedy trial. (Carden v. Montana (9th Cir. 1980) 626 F.2d 82.)

A. **Some Definitions**  [§ 9.45]

The terms “exhaustion” and “procedural default” are often confused.

- **Exhaustion:** Technically and historically, the exhaustion doctrine looks at the present situation and asks whether there are available state remedies *at the time of the federal petition.* If the defendant currently has an available state mechanism to raise claims, a federal court will abstain from intervening.\(^56\) (*Engle v. Isaac* (1982) 456 U.S. 107, 125, fn. 28.)

- **Procedural default:** This doctrine looks at the past and asks whether the defendant *waived* the federal claims by failing to assert them properly in the state court and thus give the court a fair opportunity to decide them. If the defendant did not seek a state remedy when it was available or failed to observe state procedural requirements in seeking a remedy, the issue may have been waived, or procedurally defaulted, for federal purposes. (See generally *Coleman v. Thompson* (1991) 501 U.S. 722, 732.)

Despite these distinctions, courts often merge the concepts linguistically under “exhaustion”: they ask whether the petitioner has “exhausted” state remedies, when the real issue is whether and in what manner the defendant asserted the claim in the state courts. In the exchange between the majority and dissent in *O’Sullivan v. Boerckel* (1999) 526 U.S. 838, for example, the dissent took the majority opinion to task for saying that, in failing to petition the state supreme court, the defendant had not exhausted state remedies, although he indisputably had no current state remedies; the majority should have analyzed the issue as one of procedural default. (*Id.* at pp. 850-856 (dis. opinion. of Stevens, J.).) The *O’Sullivan* majority opinion agreed with the dissent’s general description of the terms, then unrepentantly added: “[W]e ask not only whether a prisoner has exhausted state remedies, but also whether he has properly exhausted those remedies, i.e., whether he has fairly presented his claims to the state courts.” (*Id.* at p. 848, italics original.)

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\(^{56}\)Formal exhaustion is not required when recourse to state remedies would be futile; federal courts must assess the likelihood that a state court will provide a hearing on the merits of the claim. (*Harris v. Reed* (1989) 489 U.S. 255, 263, fn. 9; *id.* at pp. 268-269 (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.); *Phillips v. Woodford* (9th Cir. 2001) 267 F.3d 966, 974 [state had already denied a number of defendant’s petitions].)
In death penalty litigation, which typically involves both state and federal habeas corpus proceedings, exhaustion in its “pure” sense of current availability of state remedies is usually a key issue. In many noncapital post-appeal cases, however, federal habeas corpus is sought on issues reviewable on appeal. In such cases, the lack of presently available state remedies is uncontested, and any “exhaustion” question is whether the defendant properly presented the issue to the state courts.

In many cases, the semantic label is immaterial, as long as the issue is analyzed correctly under applicable law. For convenience and in recognition of the terminology used in many cases – and with the preceding discussion as a caveat – this analysis frequently refers to “exhaustion” in the looser meaning of fully and properly presenting an issue to the state courts in order to preserve it for federal review.

B. Independent and Adequate State Grounds [§ 9.46]

The procedural default doctrine is a corollary of the general rule that federal courts have no jurisdiction over a state case if the state court decision rests on adequate and independent state grounds:

[A federal court] will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.


58 A defendant who has failed to obtain relief in state court may be precluded from obtaining federal habeas relief. State habeas corpus is considered “unavailable” if the federal issue was decided on direct appeal. (Brown v. Allen (1953) 344 U.S. 443, 447.) That is a realistic presumption in California in light of the Waltreus-Dixon doctrine discussed in § 8.11 of chapter 8, “Putting on the Writs: California Extraordinary Remedies.”(In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225; In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759; see also In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 829-841.)

58 The independent and adequate state grounds doctrine applies to substantive as well as procedural grounds and to the certiorari jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court as well as federal habeas corpus. (Coleman v. Thompson, at pp. 729-732; Harris v. Reed, at pp. 261-262.) The present discussion deals with procedural default in the habeas

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state court on a federal issue because he did not follow state procedural requirements has been denied relief under state law and is considered to have waived the issue for purposes of federal relief.\(^{59}\) \(\text{Gray v. Netherland (1996) 518 U.S. 152, 161-162.}\) For example, rejection by a state high court on grounds of waiver, untimeliness, or lack of due diligence is an independent and adequate state ground that will preclude federal habeas relief. \(\text{(Bennett v. Mueller (9th Cir. 2003) 322 F.3d 573, 580.)}\)

Federal review is not barred every time a state court invokes a procedural rule. In \(\text{Cone v. Bell (2009) 556 U.S. 449,}\) for example, the state court erroneously denied post-conviction relief on the reason the issue had been already been raised and decided, when in fact it had not; the Supreme Court declined to find this ruling a barrier to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. In addition, waiver was not a bar because the state court had not found the issue waived: “we have no . . . duty to apply state procedural bars where state courts have themselves declined to do so.” \(\text{(Id. at p. 1782.)}\)

1. Independence of state ground [§ 9.47]

To be “independent” of federal law, a state procedural rule must stand on state law only. If its application requires interpretation of federal law, the state rule is interwoven with federal law, and a state court’s invocation of the rule does not bar federal review. An example of an independent state ground would be a rule on the timeliness of filing petitions. \(\text{(Bennett v. Mueller (9th Cir. 2003) 322 F.3d 573, 581-582; see also In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 811-812.)}\) An example of a state ground intertwined with federal law would be a procedural rule that failure to object waives an error unless it involves a fundamental federal constitutional right. \(\text{(Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 74-75; see Florida v. Powell (2010) 559 U.S. 50; Park v. California (9th Cir. 2000) 202 F.3d 1146, 1152; see also Robbins, at p. 812, fn. 32.)}\)

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If a defendant has failed to raise the issue in the state courts at all, there is no state decision, and the federal courts look at state law to determine whether the issue is procedurally defaulted. \(\text{(Harris v. Reed (1989) 489 U.S. 255, 269-270 (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.).}\)
2. Adequacy of state ground  [§ 9.48]

For the procedural default doctrine to bar federal relief, the state rule must be consistently applied and must be clear and well established. (Johnson v. Mississippi (1988) 486 U.S. 578, 587; James v. Kentucky (1984) 466 U.S. 341, 348-349.)

a. Consistently applied and established rule  [§ 9.49]

Rules too inconsistently or arbitrarily applied to be adequate include “(1) rules that have been selectively applied to bar the claims of certain litigants . . . and (2) rules that are so unsettled due to ambiguous or changing state authority that applying them to bar a litigant’s claim is unfair.” (Scott v. Schriro (9th Cir.2009) 567 F.3d 573, 580-582; Wood v. Hall (9th Cir. 1997) 130 F.3d 373, 377; cf. Johnson v. Lee (2016) (per curiam) ___ U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct. 1802] [finding bar to federal habeas corpus when California Supreme Court relied on Dixon rule, prohibiting writ relief where issue could have been but was not raised on appeal]; High v. Ignacio (9th Cir. 2005) 408 F.3d 585, 590 [in absence of authority showing inconsistent application of state rule, federal court must presume rule is adequate]; cf. Lambright v. Stewart (9th Cir. 2001) 241 F.3d 1201, 1203-1204 [ineffective assistance of counsel issue usually not cognizable on appeal because based on off-record facts].)

The fact that a rule is flexible or discretionary or that occasional exceptions are made does not necessarily mean it is inadequate to serve as a procedural bar, if the rule is applied in the vast majority of cases. (Walker v. Martin (2011) 562 U.S. 307; Beard v. Kindler (2009) 558 U.S. 53; Dugger v. Adams (1989) 489 U.S. 401, 410, fn. 6; Byrd v. Collins (6th Cir. 2000) 209 F.3d 486, 521.)

California’s habeas corpus timeliness rule – providing that a claim substantially delayed without justification may be denied as untimely – is sufficiently well established and consistently applied to qualify as an independent state ground adequate to bar habeas corpus relief in federal court. (Walker v. Martin (2011) 562 U.S. 307.)

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60 In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759. See also In re Waltreus (1954) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225 (rule prohibiting use of habeas corpus to relitigate issues raised and decided on appeal).
b. **Determination of adequacy**  [§ 9.50]

To determine whether a rule is firmly and consistently applied, the court may review an array of cases both enforcing and declining to enforce it. (*James v. Kentucky* (1984) 466 U.S. 341, 345-348; *Barr v. City of Columbia* (1964) 378 U.S. 146, 149-150; see also *Powell v. Lambert* (9th Cir. 2004) 357 F.3d 871, 872, 879 [determination of state practice requires examination of unpublished as well as published state cases].) The fact a law is relatively new may suggest it is not yet well-established. (*Collier v. Bayer* (9th Cir. 2005) 408 F.3d 1279, 1284-1286, but see *id.* at p. 1288 et seq. (dis. opinion. of Bea, J.).)

The state has the burden of pleading and ultimately proving the adequacy of an asserted bar to federal review. As *Bennett v. Mueller* (9th Cir. 2003) 322 F.3d 573, 586, explained:

> Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule. Once having done so... the ultimate burden is the state’s.

(See also *Insyxiengmay v. Morgan* (2005) 403 F.3d 657, 666-667 [Washington law as to filing date of petition sent from prison not firmly established]; *Lee v. Vasquez* (9th Cir. 2015) 788 F.3d 1124. Codification in a statute or rule creates at least a presumption that a procedural policy is strictly enforced. (*Wenglikowski v. Jones* (E.D. Mich. 2004) 306 F.Supp.2d 688, 698.)

California’s habeas corpus timeliness rule – providing that a claim substantially delayed without justification may be denied as untimely – is sufficiently well established and consistently applied to qualify as an independent state ground adequate to bar habeas corpus relief in federal court. (*Walker v. Martin* (2011) 562 U.S. 307.)

**C. Excuse from Procedural Default**  [§ 9.51]

A defendant may be excused from state procedural default under the equitable doctrine of “cause and prejudice” – good cause for the default and actual prejudice from it

In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

(Coleman v. Thompson, at p. 750.)

1. **Cause** [§ 9.52]

The petitioner must demonstrate that some factor external to the defendant frustrated his ability to comply with state procedural requirements. For the most part, defense counsel’s decisions and actions are attributable to the defendant personally, and so the mere fact counsel’s choices resulted in the default does not create good cause.

An exception is constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. (Martinez v. Ryan (2012) 566 U.S. 1 [when state law required any ineffective assistance of trial counsel issue to be reviewed only in collateral proceedings, ineffectiveness of counsel handling collateral proceedings may constitute cause for a prisoner’s procedural default in form of failure to present claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel to state court]; see also Trevino v. Thaler (2013) 569 U.S. 413 [Martinez also applies when state’s procedural system does not offer most defendants meaningful opportunity to present claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal]; Maples v. Thomas (2012) 565 U.S. 266 [abandonment by attorneys during appeal period without petitioner’s knowledge was cause excusing procedural default]; Edwards v. Carpenter (2000) 529 U.S. 446, 451-452; Engle v. Isaac (1982) 456 U.S. 107, 133-134; Wainwright v. Sykes (1977) 433 U.S. 72, 91, fn. 14; Murray v. Carrier (1986) 477 U.S. 478, 488; but see Davila v. Davis (2017) ___ U.S. ___ [137 S.Ct. 2058, 198 L.Ed.2d 603] [Martinez does not extend to failure to extend a claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness]; Towery v. Ryan (9th Cir. 2012) 673 F.3d 933 [counsel did not engage in “egregious” professional misconduct or leave petitioner “without any functioning attorney of record”].)

Given the policy of comity underlying the exhaustion rule, ineffective assistance of counsel generally must be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it
may be used as cause for a default. \textit{(Murray v. Carrier (1986) 477 U.S. 478, 489.)} The

An example of an objective, external factor would be that the factual basis for the claim was not reasonably knowable to counsel. Another would be that the constitutional claim was so novel its arguability was not reasonably foreseeable. \textit{(Reed v. Ross (1984) 468 U.S. 1, 16.)} Others would be actions attributable to the state that interfered with or prevented the defendant’s observance of the state procedural rule – such as prosecutorial suppression of evidence \textit{(Banks v. Dretke (2004) 540 U.S. 668, 694-696; Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 283, fn. 24), a prison ban on sending mail \textit{(Dow v. United States (1951) 340 U.S. 206, 207), a stipulation that led petitioner to conclude it was unnecessary to pursue the state procedure \textit{(Robinson v. Ignacio (9th Cir. 2004) 360 F.3d 1044, 1050-1053), or failure to notify petitioner of the state court decision \textit{(Fue v. Biter (9th Cir. (2016) 842 F.3d 650 (en banc)). The prisoner’s own mental condition cannot serve as cause for a procedural default, if the petitioner remains “able to apply for post-conviction relief to a state court.” \textit{(Schneider v. McDaniel (9th Cir. 2012) 674 F.3d 1144; Tacho v. Martinez (9th Cir. 1988) 862 F.2d 1376; Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Correction (9th Cir. 1986) 800 F.2d 905.)}

2. \textbf{Prejudice [§ 9.53]}

The second prong of the cause-and-prejudice test requires a showing, “not merely that the errors at . . . trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” \textit{(Murray v. Carrier (1986) 477 U.S. 478, 494, italics original.)} This burden is “significantly greater” than the plain error test used on direct review. \textit{\textit{(Id. at pp. 493-494; see also United States v. Frady (1982) 456 U.S. 152, 166; Henderson v. Kibbe (1977) 431 U.S. 145, 154.)}

In cases involving prosecutorial suppression of evidence, the test is whether it is “reasonably probable” that a different and more favorable result would have occurred if the suppressed evidence had been disclosed. It asks whether the defendant “received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” \textit{(Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 289-290; see also Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 435-436.)}

If the cause of procedural default is ineffective assistance of counsel, then the
prejudice standard is *Strickland’s* – “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” (*Strickland v. Washington* (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694; *Robinson v. Ignacio* (9th Cir. 2004) 360 F.3d 1044, 1054-1055; *Karis v. Calderon* (9th Cir. 2002) 283 F.3d 1117, 1133.)

3. **Fundamental miscarriage of justice** [§ 9.54]

A defendant may be excused from procedural default on a showing that a fundamental miscarriage of justice was perpetrated.

a. **Actual innocence: Schlup gateway** [§ 9.55]

A federal court may consider otherwise procedurally barred claims under the doctrine of *Schlup v. Delo* (1995) 513 U.S. 298, which creates a procedural “gateway” into federal court for certain cases involving a claim of actual innocence. (*House v. Bell* (2006) 547 U.S. 518; *Murray v. Carrier* (1986) 477 U.S. 478, 496.; see *Carriger v. Stewart* (9th Cir. 1997) 132 F.3d 463, 478 (en banc).) It applies where the defendant shows constitutional errors probably resulted in the conviction of a person who is actually innocent, so that a federal court’s refusal to hear the defaulted claims would be a manifest injustice. (*Schlup*, at pp. 326-327.)

To meet the *Schlup* standard, the petitioner must produce reliable new evidence and show “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence” presented in the habeas corpus petition. (*House v. Bell* (2006) 547 U.S. 518, 537; *Calderon v. Thompson* (1998) 523 U.S. 538, 559; see also *Jaramillo v. Stewart* (9th Cir. 2003) 340 F.3d 877, 881.) The federal court must evaluate the petitioner’s claim of innocence “in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial.” (*Schlup v. Delo* (1995) 513 U.S. 298, 327-328, internal quotation marks omitted.)

The *Schlup* gateway doctrine is distinct from a free-standing claim of innocence used as an independent and substantive basis for habeas corpus relief, apart from any showing of errors that might have produced the original conviction. Such a showing requires an “extraordinarily high standard of review.” (*Herrera v. Collins* (1993) 506 U.S. 390, 426; *Schlup v. Delo* (1995) 513 U.S. 298, 313-316.) The United States Supreme Court has not yet decided whether federal courts may grant relief on the ground of convincing proof of actual innocence, even though the trial was error-free. (*House v. Bell* (2006) 547 U.S. 518, 554-555.)
b. Constitutional error in imposing death penalty  [§ 9.56]

In a capital case, constitutional error in the sentencing process may qualify as a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Here the test is more stringent than the “more likely than not” one used in factual innocence cases: the defendant must produce “clear and convincing evidence” that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law. (Sawyer v. Whitley (1992) 505 U.S. 333, 336; see also Calderon v. Thompson (1998) 523 U.S. 538, 559-560; cf. Dretke v. Haley (2004) 541 U.S. 386, 393 [declining to decide whether to extend the Sawyer doctrine to non-capital sentencing error].)

D. Interpreting Ambiguous and Unexplained State Decisions  [§ 9.57]

A recurring problem has been applying the procedural default doctrine to state court decisions that do not explicitly and exclusively rely on state procedural grounds. A state court may resolve the federal issue and also mention a state procedural bar. Or the court may provide no reason at all, as is typical of the California Supreme Court in denying review. (See § 9.20, ante, on standards of review in absence of explained state court ruling.)

1. Standards when state court resolves federal issue and also refers to state procedural default  [§ 9.58]

In cases where the state court both resolved the federal issue and referred to a state procedural bar, the federal courts use a presumption in interpreting the state court decision:

[F]ederal courts . . . will presume that there is no independent and adequate state ground for a state court decision when the decision “fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.”

(Coleman v. Thompson (1991) 501 U.S. 722, 734-735, explaining the holding of Harris v. Reed (1989) 489 U.S. 255; see also Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-1041 [same rule for certiorari review].) Under this test, a federal issue sufficient to dispose of the case will be presumed necessary, unless the state court expressly states its decision is alternatively based on an adequate and independent state procedural ground.

The Harris v. Reed presumption means, conversely, that a claim is deemed defaulted
when the state court expressly relies on state procedural failure to deny relief, even if the court alternatively resolves the federal issue on the merits. (Harris v. Reed (1989) 489 U.S. 255, 264, fn. 10; Bennett v. Mueller (9th Cir. 2003) 322 F.3d 573, 580.)

An example of a state ground “interwoven with federal law” would be a state procedural rule that failure to object waives an error unless it involves a fundamental federal constitutional right. (Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 74-75; see Park v. California (9th Cir. 2000) 202 F.3d 1146, 1151.)

If a state court fails to specify which claims are barred for which reasons, the state court will not have clearly and expressly relied upon an independent and adequate state ground. (Valerio v. Crawford (9th Cir. 2002) 306 F.3d 742, 775; see also Koernar v. Grigas (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3d 1039, 1049.)

2. Standards when state court does not resolve federal issue   [§ 9.59]

The presumption of Harris v. Reed (1989) 489 U.S. 255 – that the state decision rests on the merits of a federal issue in the absence of explicit state court reliance on procedural default – applies “only when it fairly appears that a state court judgment rested primarily on federal law or was interwoven with federal law, that is, in those cases where a federal court has good reason to question whether there is an independent and adequate state ground for the decision.” (Coleman v. Thompson (1991) 501 U.S. 722, 739.) The presumption does not arise when this factual premise is absent – that is, when the state court decision does not appear to rest primarily on federal ground. (See Hunter v. Aispuro (9th Cir. 1992) 982 F.2d 344, 346-347.)

a. Properly presented issues   [§ 9.60]

If the federal issue was properly presented but was not decided in any of the state decisions, the issue is preserved for federal review. A state court may not evade federal review by ignoring a federal issue. (Smith v. Digmon (1978) 434 U.S. 332, 333; see also Dye v. Hofbauer (2005) 546 U.S. 1 (per curiam).)

b. Evidence of procedural default in presenting issue   [§ 9.61]

When the state court does not expressly resolve the federal issue on the merits and there is evidence of procedural default in presenting the issue, the issue is not preserved for federal review. Compliance with state procedural requirements is part of “proper presentation,” and the federal court must ascertain such compliance for itself. (Coleman v.
In *Coleman*, after denial of a habeas corpus petition in a Virginia lower court, the petitioner filed an appeal in the state supreme court. The appeal was several days late. After briefing on the merits and on the untimeliness issue, the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without explanation. The United States Supreme Court declined to apply the *Harris v. Reed* presumption that a state decision rested on the merits of the federal issue in the absence of explicit state court reliance on procedural default. The factual predicate for that presumption – the state decision appears to have rested primarily on federal grounds – was absent, and so “it is simply not true that the ‘most reasonable explanation’ is that the state judgment rested on federal grounds.” (*Coleman v. Thompson* (1991) 501 U.S. 722, 737; see also *Teague v. Lane* (1989) 489 U.S. 288, 298-299.)

3. **State court decision to be reviewed for resolution of federal issue [§ 9.62]**

A federal issue must always be presented to the state’s highest court in which review is available. (*O’Sullivan v. Boerckel* (1999) 526 U.S. 838.) If that court denies review summarily, without explanation, the question becomes how to interpret that denial.

   a. **“Look through” doctrine [§ 9.63]**

   A federal court normally looks to the last explained decision of the state courts. Thus, if the California Supreme Court denies a petition for review summarily, the federal court will review the opinion of the Court of Appeal deciding the federal issue, and the California Supreme Court’s denial will be presumed to be on the same basis. (*Ylst v. Nunnemaker* (1991) 501 U.S. 797, 803 [*“look through” doctrine*]; see also *Wilson v. Sellers* (2018) ___ U.S. ___ [138 S.Ct. 1188, 200 L.Ed.2d 530]; *Casey v. Moore* (9th Cir. 2004) 386 F.3d 896, 918, fn. 23; *Benn v. Lambert* (9th Cir. 2002) 283 F.3d 1040, 1052, fn. 7.)

   If, for example, the Court of Appeal relies on procedural default and the California Supreme Court denies review summarily, the federal court will consider the claim procedurally defaulted. (*Ylst v. Nunnemaker* (1991) 501 U.S. 797, 803; *McQuown v. McCartney* (9th Cir. 1986) 795 F.2d 807, 809.) Conversely, if the Court of Appeal does not rely on procedural default, federal review is not barred even though there is evidence of procedural default the Court of Appeal might have invoked. Summary denial of review by

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the California Supreme Court then is presumed to be on the merits. (*Lambright v. Stewart* (9th Cir. 2001) 241 F.3d 1201, 1205; *Thompson v. Procurier* (9th Cir. 1976) 539 F.2d 26, 28; cf. *Trigueros v. Adams* (9th Cir. 2011) 658 F.3d 983, 989 [California Supreme Court’s request for informal response on merits was finding of timeliness under circumstances of case, even though superior court had found petition untimely].)

b. Procedural default in presenting issue to state high court

[§ 9.64]

As *Coleman v. Thompson* (1991) 501 U.S.722, 736, illustrates, the inquiry does not always end at the intermediate appellate court stage. Even if the issue is properly presented to the lower appellate court and that court does not rely on procedural default, a proper petition to the high court is an additional requirement. Failure to comply with procedural requirements for such review can create procedural default after the intermediate court decision. In *Coleman* the default was untimely filing of the petition to the state high court.

Proper presentation to the California Supreme Court includes compliance with rules requiring presentation of issues to the Court of Appeal as a prerequisite for review in the Supreme Court. Raising a federal issue for the first time in a petition for discretionary review to a state high court is not sufficient to preserve it. (*Castille v. Peoples* (1989) 489 U.S. 346, 351; *Casey v. Moore* (9th Cir. 2004) 386 F.3d 896, 917; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(1) [Supreme Court will ordinarily refuse to consider issue not raised in Court of Appeal]; cf. *Chambers v. McDaniel* (9th Cir. 2008) 549 F.3d 1191 [this bar does not apply if state court denial offers comment indicating it considered merits]; *Harris v. Superior Court* (9th Cir. 1974) 500 F.2d 1124 [if state court has practice of identifying procedural defects when that is basis for denial of habeas corpus, simple “postcard denial” is considered to be on merits].) Additionally, in California, if the Court of Appeal omits an issue in its opinion, the Supreme Court normally will decline to review it unless the omission is called to attention of the Court of Appeal in a petition for rehearing. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).) To avoid possible procedural default, it is therefore advisable to file a petition for rehearing.  

62 To be preserved for future federal review, an issue must be presented to the state’s highest court in which review is available. (*O’Sullivan v. Boerckel* (1999) 526 U.S. 838.)

63 An extensive analysis of this matter is available to criminal appellate defense attorneys on request. Staff attorney Cindi Mishkin or executive director Elaine Alexander can provide a copy.
E. Assertion of Exhaustion or Procedural Default Defense by State  [§ 9.65]

The state does not waive failure to exhaust by failure to plead it unless the waiver is express. (28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3).) In contrast, a procedural default defense is an affirmative defense and may implicitly be waived if the state fails to assert it in a pleading to the district court. (Scott v. Schriro (9th Cir. 2009) 567 F.3d 573, 580.) Its failure to assert it in a motion to dismiss does not constitute waiver. (Morrison v. Mahoney (9th Cir. 2005) 399 F.3d 1042, 1046-1047; Vang v. Nevada (9th Cir. 2003) 329 F.3d 1069, 1073 [waiver found when state briefing did not explain failure to assert procedural default defense or argue why its failure should be excused].)

F. Steps to Preserving a Federal Issue in California State Court  [§ 9.66]

An issue must be presented to the state courts in proper sequence and proper form in order to ensure a federal court will consider it on the merits.

1. Raising issue in each state court  [§ 9.67]

To exhaust state remedies and protect against procedural default, the defendant must raise a federal issue in each state court where it can reasonably be asserted.64

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, thereby giving the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights. To provide the State with the necessary opportunity, the prisoner must fairly present his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.

(Baldwin v. Reese (2004) 541 U.S. 27, 29, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)

In the typical progression of a California appeal, the federal issue should be raised in the trial court, Court of Appeal, and California Supreme Court.

64 The exhaustion restriction does not require a defendant who has already exhausted state remedies to return to state court in light of an intervening state court decision. (Roberts v. LaVallee (1967) 389 U.S. 40, 42–43; see also Francisco v. Gathright (1974) 419 U.S. 59, 62-64; Briggs v. Raines (9th Cir.1981) 652 F.2d 862, 864-865.)
a. **Trial court**  [§ 9.68]

When state law requires the defendant to have made a timely objection in the trial court in order to secure appellate review on an issue and the defendant has failed to do so, federal habeas corpus is generally foreclosed. (E.g., *Francis v. Henderson* (1976) 425 U.S. 536, 540-541; *Wainwright v. Sykes* (1977) 433 U.S. 72, 86-91.) California has such a requirement. (See § 4.39 of **chapter 4**, “On the Hunt: Issue Spotting and Selection,” and § 5.27 of **chapter 5**, “Effective Written Advocacy: Briefing.”)

This matter is of course beyond appellate counsel’s control. However, there may be ways around the waiver problem – e.g., lack of necessity for objection, substantial compliance, futility, fundamental due process, and ineffective assistance of counsel. (See § 5.27 of **chapter 5**, “Effective Written Advocacy: Briefing.”)

If appellate counsel succeeds in persuading the Court of Appeal (or Supreme Court) to consider the issue on the merits, then the procedural defect at trial is no longer a barrier to federal review, unless the state court in addition expressly relies on the defect as an independent ground. (*Francis v. Henderson* (1976) 425 U.S. 536, 542, fn. 5; *Sandgathe v. Maass* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3d 371, 376-377; *Greene v. Lambert* (9th Cir. 2002) 288 F.3d 1081, 1088.)

b. **Court of Appeal**  [§ 9.69]

A federal issue should be raised on the first appeal as of right – meaning, with respect to California noncapital cases, on appeal in the Court of Appeal. Raising an issue for the first time in a petition for discretionary review to the California Supreme Court is not sufficient to preserve it. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(1) [Supreme Court will ordinarily refuse to consider issue not raised in Court of Appeal].) Exhaustion is not satisfied “where the claim has been presented for the first and only time in a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered unless ‘there are special and important reasons therefor.’” (*Castille v. Peoples* (1989) 489 U.S. 346, 351; *Casey v. Moore* (9th Cir. 2004) 386 F.3d 896, 917; *Taylor v. Ayers* (N.D. Cal. 2002, No. C99-5435) 2002 U.S.Dist. Lexis 14615, *4*, unpublished\(^{65}\) [federal issues not exhausted when mentioned only in pro

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\(^{65}\) An unpublished case decided by a court in the Ninth Circuit before January 1, 2007, may not be cited to the courts of that circuit. It is citable in California courts and in other courts, depending on the law of the jurisdiction. (See § 7.8 et seq. of **chapter 7**, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision.”)
per brief, which Court of Appeal refused to file because defendant had counsel, and California Supreme Court denied review without comment; under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c) “it is fair to assume that the Supreme Court considered itself procedurally barred from reviewing the issues presented in the pro se supplemental brief”).

Additionally, in California, if the Court of Appeal omits an issue in its opinion, the Supreme Court normally will decline to review it unless the omission is called to the attention of the Court of Appeal in a petition for rehearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).) To avoid possible procedural default, it is therefore advisable to file a petition for rehearing. 66

c. California Supreme Court  [§ 9.70]

To be preserved for future federal review, an issue must be presented to the state’s highest court in which review is available. (O’Sullivan v. Boerckel (1999) 526 U.S. 838, 845, 848.) Thus in California a petition for review raising the issue must be filed in the Supreme Court. 67 (Roberts v. Arave (9th Cir. 1988) 847 F.2d 528, 530.) Some states have adopted an explicit policy stating it is unnecessary to petition the state high court. 68

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66 Attorneys Clifford Gardner and Richard Neuhoff raised contrary considerations in Exhaustion of State Remedies and Petitions for Rehearing (Jan. 30, 2005), originally on the California Appellate Defense Counsel website. ADI continues to adhere to the position stated here. We have researched this issue extensively and prepared an analysis, which is available to criminal appellate defense attorneys on request, so that they can make an informed decision. Staff attorney Cindi Mishkin or executive director Elaine Alexander can provide a copy.

67 In Scott v. Schriro (9th Cir. 2009) 567 F.3d 573, 582, held that including the federal claims in an appendix in a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court satisfied the fair presentation requirement.

68 Federal courts including the Ninth Circuit have recognized such rules as adequate to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. (Swoopes v. Sublett (9th Cir. 1999) 196 F.3d 1008, 1010-1011; see O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, supra, 526 U.S. 838, 849 (conc. opn. of Souter, J.).) California has elected not to do so, but the Rules of Court do provide for an abbreviated petition for review when the primary intention is to exhaust state remedies rather than seek review. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.508.)
Presentation of the issue to the California Supreme Court also must be procedurally proper. The petition for review must be timely (Coleman v. Thompson (1991) 501 U.S.722, 736) and, as noted in § 9.69, normally must be based on issues properly presented to the Court of Appeal.69

2. Briefing the issue  [§ 9.71]

Although federalizing an issue need not be time-consuming or elaborate, the issue needs to be sufficiently highlighted and well developed to give the state court notice it is being raised as a separate ground for relief.

a. Mention of federal issue in heading or subheading  [§ 9.72]

It is important to state the federal claim in a heading or subheading of the argument. This will forestall any later contention the issue was a “throw-away,” hidden somewhere in the text of a non-federal issue, and not adequately flagged for the state court. It will also preclude any claim of procedural default for failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), which requires each brief to “state each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point.”70

b. Operative facts supporting federal issue  [§ 9.73]

The argument must set forth the factual basis for the federal issue in sufficient detail to permit the court to understand and evaluate the issue in the particular case. Asserting a violation of a federal constitutional right is inadequate in a factual vacuum. “A thorough description of the operative facts” is a prerequisite to preservation. (Kelly v. Small (9th Cir. 2003) 315 F.3d 1063, 1069; see Davis v. Silva (9th Cir. 2008) 511 F.3d 1005, 1011 [petitioner provided state with all facts “necessary to state a claim for relief”).)

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69To avoid any question of the adequacy of exhaustion, the issues should be presented unambiguously and at the first opportunity. (But see Styers v. Schriro (9th Cir. 2008) 547 F.3d 1026 [issue presented to state’s highest court in motion for reconsideration adequately informed court of factual and legal basis of claim].)

70The state court may disregard a point not mentioned in a heading or subheading. (People v. Schnabel (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 83, 84, fn. 1.)

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The argument must state the specific federal legal basis for the claim. This includes citation of the federal constitutional provisions relied on. *(Gray v. Netherland* (1996) 518 U.S. 152, 162-163 [claim must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as statement of facts entitling petitioner to relief]; *Picard v. Connor* (1971) 404 U.S. 270, 278.)*

Making vague references to “due process” or a “fair trial” or “the right to present a defense” does not apprise the state court of the federal nature of a claim and does not satisfy the fair-presentation requirement. *(Anderson v. Harless* (1982) 459 U.S. 4, 7; *Shumway v. Payne* (9th Cir. 2000) 223 F.3d 982, 987; compare *Wilcox v. McGee* (9th Cir. 2001) 241 F.3d 1242, 1244.)*

Citation to state cases that merely cite cases that in turn discuss or apply federal law is likewise inadequate. *(Casey v. Moore* (9th Cir. 2004) 386 F.3d 896, 912, fn. 12 [“we decline to conclude that state supreme court justices may be charged with reading all cases that are cited in the cases on which a petitioner relies, and instead the burden must be on the petitioner to be explicit in asserting a federal constitutional right”].)

d. **Argument linking operative facts to legal theory** [§ 9.75]

Merely citing a provision of the federal Constitution is insufficient unless the citation is linked to a theory of federal law connecting the operative facts of the case to the constitutional provision and explaining why the facts amount to a violation of that provision.

In *Castillo v. McFadden* (9th Cir. 2005) 399 F.3d 993, the defendant challenged a videotape of his interrogation on state evidentiary grounds in the trial court. On appeal the last sentence of his brief asserted “the gross violations of Appellant’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights requires [sic] that his convictions and sentences be reversed and that he be granted a new trial consistent with due process of law.” The Ninth Circuit found this “conclusory, scattershot citation of federal constitutional provisions” inadequate *(id. at pp. 1002-1003):*

> Castillo . . . left the Arizona Court of Appeals to puzzle over how the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments might relate to his three foregoing claims . . . . Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of an underlying federal legal theory.
Thus the brief should not only assert that the facts amounted to a particular federal constitutional violation, but also should argue that point. Ideally, of course, the argument should analyze relevant federal case law, especially decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Again, it is also strongly advisable to refer to the federal nature of the issue in a heading and not to bury it in a section labeled as something else.

3. Petitioning for review  [§ 9.76]

The petition for review itself must be sufficient – that is, include explicit reference to federal constitutional provisions and other federal authorities and a description of all the operative facts giving rise to the federal claim. It should not incorporate by reference any material facts or law argued in other documents, or rely on the California Supreme Court’s opportunity to read the record or Court of Appeal opinion. (See Baldwin v. Reese (2004) 541 U.S. 27, 31-32;71 Gatlin v. Madding (9th Cir. 1999) 189 F.3d 882, 887-889 [state rules (now California Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(B), 8.504(a)) require each issue be raised specifically in petition for review and supported by argument and authority; rule (now 8.504(e)(3)) forbids incorporation by reference]; Kibler v. Walters (9th Cir. 2000) 220 F.3d 1151, 1153.) The petition should indicate how the issue was raised and resolved in the Court of Appeal and should comply strictly with the requirements of rules 8.500 and 8.504 of the California Rules of Court or with rule 8.508 if an abbreviated petition is filed.

4. Later proceedings  [§ 9.77]

It is not necessary to file a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies before filing a federal habeas petition. (Fay v. Noia (1963) 372 U.S. 391, 435-437, overruled on other grounds in Wainwright v. Sykes (1977) 433 U.S. 72, 84-85.)

71“[O]rdinarily a state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” (Baldwin v. Reese, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 32; see also Gentry v. Sinclair (9th Cir. 2012) 705 F.3d 884, 897-898 [motions and declarations filed with state habeas petition, such as request for discovery funds, were sufficient to exhaust state remedies because they gave state court opportunity to remedy any ineffective assistance of counsel].)
Similarly, a state habeas corpus petition is unnecessary if the federal issue was exhausted on direct appeal. (*Brown v. Allen* (1953) 344 U.S. 443, 447.) State habeas corpus would be necessary to exhaust issues not within the scope of the appeal, such as those based on facts outside the record.

G. **Mixed Petitions with Both Exhausted and Unexhausted Claims**  

If a petition contains at least one unexhausted claim, the district court is required to dismiss the petition without prejudice, leaving the petitioner with the option of amending the petition to delete the unexhausted claim or returning to state court to exhaust the unexhausted claim.  


The *Rose v. Lundy* policy was articulated before AEDPA imposed a statute of limitations on federal habeas corpus filings, and the federal courts have made some accommodations. In limited circumstances, a “stay and abeyance” procedure is available. Under one form of this procedure, a mixed petition is filed (thus complying with the federal statute of limitations), but then stayed while the unexhausted issues are taken to state court. (*Rhines v. Weber* (2005) 544 U.S. 269, 273-276.) The stay procedure requires the petitioner to demonstrate the potential merit of the unexhausted claims and show good cause for the previous failure to go to state court; there must be no indication the petitioner is engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. (*Id.* at p. 277; see *Blake v. Baker* (9th Cir. 2014) 745 F.3d 977 [ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can be good cause for *Rhines* stay; *Rhines* standard not more demanding than that of *Martinez v. Ryan*, discussed in § 9.52, ante]; *Wooten v. Kirkland* (9th Cir. 2008) 540 F.3d 1019 [motion to stay mixed petition properly denied; petitioner’s “impression” that his counsel had exhausted claim did not constitute good cause for failure to do so].)

In providing the petitioner the option of dismissing the mixed petition or pursuing it with only exhausted claims, the district court need not warn about such consequences as the statute of limitations. (*Pliler v. Ford* (2004) 542 U.S. 225, 231.) The court need not consider, sua sponte, the option of staying and abeying the petition in the absence of a request. (*Robbins v. Carey* (9th Cir. 2007) 481 F.3d 1143.)


*The state may not take an interlocutory appeal from an order staying proceedings to allow the petitioner to exhaust state claims. (*Thompson v. Frank* (9th Cir. 2010) 599 F.3d 1088.)*
Another stay-and-abeyance procedure, sanctioned by the Ninth Circuit, involves withdrawal of the unexhausted claims and stay of the remaining petition to permit the petitioner to exhaust the withdrawn claims and then add them back to the stayed petition. (*Kelly v. Small* (9th Cir. 2003) 315 F.3d 1063; *Calderon v. United States Dist. Court* (9th Cir. 1998) 134 F.3d 981, 985-986.) This procedure increases the risk of missing the AEDPA statute of limitations on the refiled claims, especially in light of *Mayle v. Felix* (2005) 545 U.S. 644, 650, which held an amendment to a petition asserting claims based on different operative facts from those in the original petition does not relate back to the first filing date. (See § 9.6, ante.) The *Kelly-Calderon* procedure was adopted before *Rhines v. Weber*, which held *Rose v. Lundy* permits stay of a mixed petition. The *Rhines v. Weber* approach eliminates the need for the middle step of dismissing the unexhausted claims. However, it requires a finding of good cause for staying the unexhausted petition, whereas the *Kelly-Calderon* procedure does not. (*King v. Ryan* (9th Cir. 2009) 564 F.3d 1133, 1140-1141.)

VI. SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS  [§ 9.79]

Generally, a petitioner must include all available claims in a single petition. Later petitions asserting new claims or reasserting the previous ones will not be considered. This rule is codified in AEDPA, sup75 Title 28 United States Code section 2244(b):

(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.

(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless –

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.


A. Meaning of “Successive Petition”  [§ 9.80]

Not every application presented to a federal court related to the same state conviction that was the subject of a prior application is a successive petition subject to AEDPA limitations. “The phrase ‘second or successive petition’ is a term of art given substance in our prior habeas corpus cases.” (*Slack v. McDaniel* (2000) 529 U.S. 473, 477; *Magwood v. Patterson* (2010) 561 U.S. 320 [first petition alleged ineffective assistance of counsel because of failure to file timely notice of appeal; second application challenging new judgment for the first time was not “second or successive”]; *Wentzell v. Neven* (9th Cir. 2012) 674 F.3d 1124, 1126-1128 [first petition after an amended judgment is not “successive” to petition filed before amended judgment].) In a capital habeas matter, the Eleventh Circuit’s reversal of a grant of petitioner’s petition was reversed where, because petitioner’s habeas application challenged a new judgment for the first time, it was not “second or successive” under 28 U.S.C. section 2244(b). *Aaron v. United States* (2d Cir. 2010) 607 F.3d 318 [petition following earlier petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file timely notice of appeal not successive].

1. Types of applications treated as successive petition  [§ 9.81]

Examples of a successive petition might be one that seeks to raise a new claim (*Gage v. Chappell* (2015) 793 F.3d 1159), that reasserts the same claim, or that alleges the prior decision resolved the merits incorrectly. (*Gonzalez v. Crosby* (2005) 545 U.S. 524, 532.) An application that seeks to reconsider the same matters already resolved on the merits in a habeas corpus proceeding is a successive petition, even though cast in some other procedural form. (E.g., *Rodwell v. Pepe* (1st Cir. 2003) 324 F.3d 66, 71-72 [motion to vacate previous habeas corpus decision]; *Vanlitsenborgh v. United States* (10th Cir. 2006)


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Denial of the first petition on the grounds of state procedural default is considered a denial on the merits for purposes of the successive petition doctrine. *(Henderson v. Lampert* (9th Cir. 2005) 396 F.3d 1049, 1053.)

2 Subsequent applications considered not to be successive petition

[§ 9.82]

Some types of subsequent applications are not treated as a successive petition subject to AEDPA limitations. If the original claim was not resolved on the merits but was dismissed on procedural grounds, for example, under some circumstances the petitioner may reassert it in a new petition or seek to reopen the original proceedings without having to meet AEDPA successive petition requirements. Lack of ripeness of the subsequent claim at the time of the original petition is another consideration.

a. First petition dismissed for lack of exhaustion  [§ 9.83]

A habeas corpus petition filed after the initial one was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies is not a successive petition within the meaning of AEDPA. *(Slack v. McDaniel* (2000) 529 U.S. 473, 478.)

b. Federal procedural defect  [§ 9.84]

The successive petitions rule also may not be implicated when the later application alleges there was “some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding.” *(Gonzalez v. Crosby* (2005) 545 U.S. 524, 532.) In *Gonzalez* the district court erroneously dismissed the prior petition as untimely. The Supreme Court held a motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b) to reopen the case is not successive when it asserts, not entitlement to ultimate habeas corpus relief, but procedural error by the federal court in failing to consider the merits. *(Id. at p. 534; see also Phelps v. Alameda* (9th Cir. 2009)

77The rules of some circuits prohibit citation of an unpublished circuit case decided before January 1, 2007, to the courts of that circuit. An unpublished federal opinion is citable in California courts and in other courts, depending on the law of the jurisdiction. (See § 7.8 et seq. of chapter 7, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision.”)
569 F.3d 1120 [motion based on subsequent clarification of underlying law]; *Ortiz-Sandoval v. Clarke* (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3d 1165, 1168-1169; cf. *Rodwell v. Pepe* (1st Cir. 2003) 324 F.3d 66, 72, cited with approval in *Gonzalez*, at p. 531 [rule 60(b) motion to reopen case, alleging discovery of new evidence impeaching prosecution case, is successive petition as “paradigmatic habeas claim”].) The petitioner may not rely on the exception for federal procedural defect unless the original petition as asserted the claim distinctly. (*Cooper v. Calderon* (9th Cir. 2001) 274 F.3d 1270, 1273). A rule 59(e) motion to amend a judgment is a successive petition if it raises a new claim, presents newly discovered evidence, or seeks relief based on a subsequent change in the law. (*Rishor v. Ferguson* (9th Cir. 2016) 822 F.3d 482; *Phelps v. Alameida* (9th Cir. 2009) 569 F.3d 1120.)

c. **Claim not ripe at time of original petition**  [§ 9.84A]

A subsequent petition is not successive when it reasserts a claim that was dismissed as premature in the first proceeding. (*Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal* (1998) 523 U.S. 637, 643-644 [execution of insane person, in violation of *Ford v. Wainwright* (1986) 477 U.S. 399].) Similarly, AEDPA does not bar a claim as successive if at the time of the original petition it was not raised because it would have been premature. (*Panetti v. Quarterman* (2007) 551 U.S. 930 [also *Ford v. Wainwright* claim]; cf. *Brown v. Muniz* (9th Cir. 2018) 889 F.3d 661 [claim was ripe at time of original petition].)78

d. **Successive filing construed as motion to amend when original petition not yet adjudicated**  [§ 9.84B]

If a new pro per petition is filed before the adjudication of a prior petition is complete, the new petition is construed as a motion to amend the pending petition rather

78In *United States v. Lopez* (9th Cir. 2009) 577 F.3d 1053, the Ninth Circuit considered whether claims of prosecutorial suppression of evidence under *Brady v. Maryland* (1963) 373 U.S. 83, where the evidence was discovered after the first post-conviction petition, are exempt (under a *Panetti* rationale) from AEDPA’s requirements for successive petitions based on newly discovered evidence. (See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1); cf. 2244(b)(2)(B).) It held that not all such claims are exempt, including the claim in that case. The petitioner was unable to establish the materiality of the evidence and thus would have been barred under pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ law. The court had no occasion to determine whether an exemption might apply if the petitioner could establish a right to the writ under pre-AEDPA law.
than as a successive application. *Woods v. Carey* (9th Cir. 2008) 525 F.3d 886; see also *Grullon v. Ashcroft* (2d Cir. 2004) 374 F.3d 137, 138 (*per curiam*); *Ching v. United States* (2d Cir. 2002) 298 F.3d 174, 177; see *Goodrum v. Busby* (9th Cir. 2016) 824 F.3d 1188.)

**e. Motion for reconsideration  [§ 9.84C]**

A motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b) for reconsideration because of an intervening change in the law may be warranted if the reliance on prior law deprived the defendant of a fundamental right. (E.g., *Phelps v. Alameida* (9th Cir. 2009) 569 F.3d 1120.)

**B. New Rule of Law Retroactively Applicable to Cases on Collateral Review  [§ 9.85]**

The first ground on which AEDPA permits a successive petition is that the petition relies on a new constitutional rule that the Supreme Court has declared retroactive to cases on collateral review. (28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).) As the court explained in *Tyler v. Cain* (2001) 533 U.S. 656, 662: “This provision establishes three prerequisites to obtaining relief in a second or successive petition: First, the rule on which the claim relies must be a ‘new rule’ of constitutional law; second, the rule must have been ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court’; and third, the claim must have been ‘previously unavailable.’”

1. **“New” rule  [§ 9.86]**

*Teague v. Lane* (1989) 489 U.S. 288 governs the determination of whether a case announces a “new rule” of law:

79A different rule may apply when determining compliance with the AEDPA statute of limitations. (See § 9.6, ante, and *Mayle v. Felix* (2005) 545 U.S. 644, 650 “relation back” doctrine].)


81The general topic of retroactivity is addressed in a memo on the ADI website at [http://www.adi-sandiego.com/PDFs/Favorable%20changes%2011-08.pdf](http://www.adi-sandiego.com/PDFs/Favorable%20changes%2011-08.pdf)
[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. . . . To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.


A state can waive the claim a case creates new law by failure to raise it. (Buck v. Davis (2017) ___ U.S. ___ [137 S.Ct. 759, 197 L.Ed.2d 1].

2. Supreme Court determination of retroactivity [§ 9.87]

The requirement that the United States Supreme Court have “made” the new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review means the court must explicitly have held that.82

The only way the Supreme Court can, by itself, “lay out and construct” a rule’s retroactive effect, or “cause” that effect “to exist, occur, or appear,” is through a holding. The Supreme Court does not “make” a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. In such an event, any legal conclusion that is derived from the principles is developed by the lower court (or perhaps by a combination of courts), not by the Supreme Court.

82 Section 2244(b)(2)(A) on successive petitions requires the new rule to have been “made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court.” This language differs from that of section 2244(d)(1)(C) on the statute of limitations, which requires the right to have been “newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” While the requirement of a Supreme Court ruling on retroactivity in the successive petitions context is unambiguous, the statute of limitations provision has been the subject of differing interpretation. (See § 9.5, ante, fn. 10).
(Tyler v. Cain (2001) 533 U.S. 656, 663; see In re Holladay (11th Cir. 2003) 331 F.3d 1169, 1172-1173; cf. In re Rutherford (11th Cir. 2006) 437 F.3d 1125, 1128; Green v. United States (2d Cir. 2005) 397 F.3d 101, 102-103 [Blakely\textsuperscript{83} claim may not be subject of successive petition when Supreme Court has not made it retroactive].)

The Supreme Court can make the retroactivity holding before it declares the substantive rule. On the question of whether execution of the mentally ill constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, for instance, In re Holladay (11th Cir. 2003) 331 F.3d 1169 found Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302 had determined any decision the Supreme Court made on the subject would be retroactive. Penry was a habeas corpus case, and generally, under Teague v. Lane (1989) 489 U.S. 288, a new rule of law – as this would have been – cannot be created on collateral review. The Penry court nevertheless determined the issue came under Teague’s “substantive law” exception to the general rule:

[If we held, as a substantive matter, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons such as Penry regardless of the procedures followed, such a rule would fall under the first exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity and would be applicable to defendants on collateral review. Accordingly, we address the merits of Penry’s claim.

(Penry, at p. 330, emphasis added.) In Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304, the court overruled Penry on the substantive merits, but had no occasion to re-examine the retroactivity decision.

C. New Factual Predicate [§ 9.88]

The second ground for a successive petition under AEDPA\textsuperscript{84} is newly discovered evidence. Two requirements must be met: 1) the petitioner must show the evidence could not have been discovered before by the exercise of due diligence and 2) the new facts must establish by clear and convincing evidence that in the absence of constitutional error no reasonable factfinder would have convicted him. To put it another way, the petitioner must make a prima facie showing of both cause and prejudice: excusable cause for failure to discover the evidence in a timely manner and prejudice in that the new evidence would


\textsuperscript{84}Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. (28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.)
sufficiently undermine confidence in the judgment. (Evans v. Smith (4th Cir. 2000) 220 F.3d 306, 323; see § 9.51 et seq., ante.)

Although similar to the Schlup v. Delo (1995) 513 U.S. 298 “gateway” for excusing procedural default (see § 9.55, ante), the AEDPA successive petitions “new factual predicate” rule is stricter in two ways:

First, § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) requires that “the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.” There is no requirement under Schlup that the factual claim was not discoverable through the exercise of due diligence. Second, § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) requires that “the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” (Emphasis added.) Schlup requires only that an applicant show that it is “more likely than not” that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty.

(Cooper v. Woodford (9th Cir. 2004) 358 F.3d 1117, 1119; see also Calderon v. Thompson (1998) 523 U.S. 538, 558.)

1. Due diligence [§ 9.89]

As one prong of the “new factual predicate” standard for a successive petition, section 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) requires that the new evidence “could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.” This provision creates an objective standard as measured by the availability of the evidence, not a more personal one based on fault on the part of the individual petitioner or his counsel. (Bible v. Schriro (9th Cir. 2011) 651 F.3d 1060, 1064; Johnson v. Dretke (5th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 901, 908.)

To establish due diligence, the petitioner must show he or his attorney did not know or could not have known about the evidence, or would not have been able to get

85 The Schlup actual innocence gateway for excusing procedural default is not a way of bypassing the section 2244(b)(2)(B) rule, which puts constraints such as the requirement of due diligence on that gateway. (Gage v. Chappell (2015) 793 F.3d 1159; see McQuiggin v. Perkins (2013) 569 U.S. 383.)
access to it. (E.g., Gage v. Chappell (2015) 793 F.3d 1159 [factual predicate known to defendant long before first petition]; Johnson v. Dretke (5th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 901 [petitioner knew about potential exculpatory evidence before trial]; Morales v. Ornoski (9th Cir. 2006) 439 F.3d 529, 533 [petitioner had known about problems with witness’ testimony for years]; see also Williams v. Taylor (2000) 529 U.S. 420, 442 [interpreting similar language of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); trial record contains no evidence that would have put reasonable attorney on notice of juror bias or prosecutorial misconduct].)

2. Clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found applicant guilty of the underlying offense [§ 9.90]

This prong of the “new factual predicate” ground establishes a higher hurdle for the petitioner to clear than “more likely than not.” (In re Rutherford (11th Cir. 2006) 437 F.3d 1125, 1127; Cooper v. Woodford (9th Cir. 2004) 358 F.3d 1117, 1119; see also Calderon v. Thompson (1998) 523 U.S. 538, 560 [in death penalty case, petitioner must show “no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for the death penalty in light of the new evidence,” citing Sawyer v. Whitley (1992) 505 U.S. 333, 348].)

The standard cannot be met if the evidence at trial was strong and the new evidence only marginally undermines it (Bible v. Schriro (9th Cir. 2011) 651 F.3d 1060, 1064-1066; Evans v. Smith (4th Cir. 2000) 220 F.3d 306, 323-324), or if the petitioner is alleging legal insufficiency of the evidence as opposed to factual innocence (see Bousley v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 614, 623; Johnson v. Dretke (5th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 901, 911; Morales v. Ornoski (9th Cir. 2006) 439 F.3d 529, 533). (See § 9.55, ante, on the Schlup v. Delo (1995) 513 U.S. 298 “gateway” for excusing procedural default.)

D. Procedures for Filing Successive Petition [§ 9.91]

The procedures to file a successive federal petition under AEDPA are somewhat circuitous. The petitioner must first obtain permission from a court of appeals to file the petition, by making a prima facie showing the statutory grounds for a successive petition can be met. He then must demonstrate to the district court that the grounds actually are met. Thus a petitioner “must get through two gates before the merits of the motion can be considered.” (Bennett v. United States (7th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 468, 469-470.)

Title 28 United States Code section 2244(b)(3) and (4) provides:

(3) (A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.

(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive application shall be determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals.

(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.

(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion.

(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.

(4) A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of this section.

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

1. Authorization by court of appeals to file petition  [§ 9.92]

The petitioner must first obtain authorization from the circuit court of appeals to file the petition. The standard is whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that at least one of the two statutory grounds for successive petitions – new rule of law or new factual predicate – can be met. (28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C).)

“Prima facie showing” is a lenient standard. It means showing a reasonable likelihood of possible merit, sufficient to warrant a fuller exploration by the district court. This requires sufficient allegations of fact together with some documentation. (In re Lott
If in light of the documents submitted with the application it appears reasonably likely that the application satisfies the stringent requirements for the filing of a second or successive petition, we shall grant the application.

*(Bennett v. United States (7th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 468, 469-470.)*

If the application makes a prima facie showing as to one of the claims, the court authorizes the filing of the entire successive petition. (See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4); *Woratzeck v. Stewart* (9th Cir. 1997) 118 F.3d 648, 650; *Nevius v. McDaniel* (9th Cir. 1996) 104 F.3d 1120, 1121.)

The emphasis is on a fast resolution: the decision of the court of appeals must be made in 30 days and cannot be reconsidered or reviewed. (28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D) & (E); see *In re Lott* (6th Cir. 2004) 366 F.3d 431, 433; *Bennett v. United States* (7th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 468, 469.)

2. **Determination by district court whether statutory grounds for successive petition have been met** [§ 9.93]

If the appellate court authorizes the filing of the successive petition, the district court then determines whether the petition in fact satisfies either statutory ground. (28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4).) The district court must conduct a thorough review of all allegations and evidence. The court may rule summarily when the record is conclusive as to whether the successive petition requirements are met, but otherwise should order a response from the government and hold an evidentiary hearing. (*United States v. Villa-Gonzalez* (9th Cir. 2000) 208 F.3d 1160, 1165.)

If the district court concludes at least one ground permitting a successive petition has been met, it may consider the petition on the merits. If the district court concludes that the petitioner has failed to satisfy any ground, the district court must dismiss the petition without reaching the merits. (28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).)

The petitioner may seek review of an order dismissing a petition as successive for failure to meet the statutory requirements. The court of appeals reviews the ruling de novo, as a legal conclusion, and reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear
error. (See *LaFevers v. Gibson* (10th Cir. 2001) 238 F.3d 1263, 1266; *United States v. Villa-Gonzalez* (9th Cir. 2000) 208 F.3d 1160, 1165.)

VII. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES  [§ 9.94]

Federal habeas corpus proceedings reviewing state court judgments in the federal district court are regulated by the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Appeals from denial of a petition are governed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

A. Petition  [§ 9.95]

1. Counsel  [§ 9.96]

State appellate counsel who file a federal petition should do so with the understanding their efforts will be pro bono unless they are appointed by the federal court; this service is not within the scope of the state appellate appointment. If the petition seeks federal review of a matter of pure law, the petitioner is not entitled to counsel appointed by the federal court. If a question of fact requires resolution in an evidentiary hearing in the district court, then counsel will be appointed. The counsel appointed for this purpose need not be the attorney who initially filed the petition.

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87 A de minimis amount of time might be compensated for helping a client fill out and file a pro per federal habeas corpus petition. Counsel should consult with the assigned ADI staff attorney before spending time on this function.
2. **Filing formalities**  [§ 9.97]

   a. **District**  [§ 9.98]

      A federal habeas corpus petition should be filed in the district in which the defendant was convicted and sentenced, although it may be filed in the district of incarceration. (See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d).) The federal districts have preprinted habeas corpus forms for state prisoners to help petitioners meet these requirements.

   b. **Respondent**  [§ 9.99]

      The petition should name the warden or other state officer having custody of the petitioner as respondent. The absence of a named individual custodian deprives the court of personal jurisdiction, but failure of the state to object waives this defect. (*Smith v. Idaho* (9th Cir. 2004) 392 F.3d 350, 354-356; see also *Dubrin v. People* (9th Cir. 2013) 720 F.3d 1095 [although petitioner named “the People” as respondent rather than warden, petitioner promptly sought to amend petition when defect was brought to his attention].)

   c. **Fees**  [§ 9.100]

      Filing fees are waived if the petition is filed in forma pauperis, as prescribed in rule 3(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and Title 28 United States Code section 1915.

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88Section 2241(d) provides:

(d) Where an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in custody under the judgment and sentence of a State court of a State which contains two or more Federal judicial districts, the application may be filed in the district court for the district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district within which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him and each of such district courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the application. The district court for the district wherein such an application is filed in the exercise of its discretion and in furtherance of justice may transfer the application to the other district court for hearing and determination.
3. Content [§ 9.101]

Forms for federal habeas corpus petitions are available. All known grounds for relief and must be set forth a to avoid successive petitions problems. (Rules Gov. § 2254 Cases, rule 2(a) & (c); see § 9.79 et seq., ante.)

B. Process in District Court [§ 9.102]

Once the petition is filed in the district court, it is assigned to a district court judge and, in many federal district courts, a magistrate judge. (See 28 U.S.C. § 636; Rules Gov. § 2254 Cases, rule 8(b).)

Counsel may be appointed for the habeas corpus proceedings, if the court or magistrate judge determines “the interests of justice so require.” (18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B).)

1. Summary denial [§ 9.103]

If it appears from the face of the petition and its attachments that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the judge may summarily dismiss it after notifying the petitioner of the court’s intention and giving the petitioner an opportunity to respond.91

2. Post-petition pleadings and discovery [§ 9.104]

If a prima facie claim has been made, the judge must order the respondent to file an answer. (Rules Gov. § 2254 Cases, rule 4.) The answer must address the allegations of the petition, state whether the petitioner has exhausted state remedies, and provide the pertinent parts of the transcript, the Court of Appeal briefs and opinion, and “dispositive

89Links to forms for the central and southern districts of California are available on the ADI website at http://www.adi-sandiego.com/practice/forms_samples.asp .

90The same standard governs motions to substitute counsel. (Martel v. Clair (2012) 565 U.S. 648.)

91The district court may not sua sponte dismiss a petition as untimely without giving adequate notice and an opportunity for the petitioner to respond to the court’s inclination to dismiss. (Herbst v. Cook (9th Cir. 2001) 260 F.3d 1039, 1043.)

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orders,” such as the California Supreme Court’s denial of review.\(^9^2\) (Rules Gov. § 2254 Cases, rule 5; see also rule 7 on expansion of the record.)

The petitioner may file a reply (i.e., a traverse) if the judge’s order for an answer permits it. (Rules Gov. § 2254 Cases, rule 5(e).)

A party may request the court to permit discovery that might be available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rules Gov. § 2254 Cases, rule 6.)

3. **Evidentiary hearing** [§ 9.105]

AEDPA\(^9^3\) restricts the power of the district court to grant an evidentiary hearing. Section 2254(e)(2) of Title 28 United States Code provides:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that –

(A) the claim relies on –

   (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

   (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

The court may order an evidentiary hearing if, after review of the pleadings and record, it appears to be required. (Rules Gov. § 2254 Cases, rule 8(a); see Schriro v. Landrigan (2007) 550 U.S. 465 [federal court must consider whether hearing could enable applicant to prove factual allegations which if true would require relief and in doing so must take AEDPA standards into account]; West v. Ryan (9th Cir. 2010) 608

\(^9^2\)Rule 5(d)(3) states: “These provisions are intended to ensure that the court is provided with additional information that may assist it in resolving the issues raised, or not raised, in the petition.”

F.3d 477 [no colorable claim under Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668; hence, no abuse of discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing]; see also Orthel v. Yates (2015) 795 F.3d 935.) Baja v. Ducharme (9th Cir. 1999) 187 F.3d 1075, 1078, laid out the procedure for determining whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary:

[A] district court presented with a request for an evidentiary hearing, as in this case, must determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support the petitioner's claim. If it does not, and an evidentiary hearing might be appropriate, the court’s first task in determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing is to ascertain whether the petitioner has “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court.” If so, the court must deny a hearing unless the applicant establishes one of the two narrow exceptions set forth in § 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B). If, on the other hand, the applicant has not “failed to develop” the facts in state court, the district court may proceed to consider whether a hearing is appropriate, or required under [Townsend v. Sain (1963) 372 U.S. 293].

(See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at p. 473; Wood v. Ryan (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3d 1104; Insyxiengmay v. Morgan (9th Cir. 2005) 403 F.3d 657, 669-670.)

Relief under section 2254(d)(1) may not be ordered on the basis of evidence developed at a federal habeas corpus hearing if the evidence was not before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. (Cullen v. Pinholster (2011) 563 U.S. 170; cf. Gonzalez v. Wong (9th Cir. 2011) 667 F.3d 967 [new evidence may be reason to stay federal proceedings to give petitioner opportunity to return to state court].)

An evidentiary hearing may be appropriate to determine procedural matters such as defendant’s competence to file a timely state petition (Laws v. Lamarque (9th Cir. 2003) 351 F.3d 919, 922-923; cf. Roberts v. Marshall (9th Cir. 2010) 627 F.3d 768 [not required when record amply developed]) or the bases for filing a successive petition (United States v. Villa-Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2000) 208 F.3d 1160, 1165).

If an evidentiary hearing is ordered, the court must appoint qualified counsel for a petitioner who is indigent. (Rules Gov. § 2254 Cases, rule 8(c) referring to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A; see Martel v. Clair (2012) 565 U.S. 648.)

The judge often refers the petition to a magistrate judge to conduct the hearing. (Rules Gov. § 2254 Cases, rule 8(b).) The judge (or magistrate judge) must conduct the
hearing as soon as practicable after giving the attorneys adequate time to investigate and prepare. (Rules Gov. § 2254 Cases, rule 8(c).)

4. Decision [§ 9.106]

If a magistrate has been conducting the hearings, the magistrate must file proposed findings of law and recommendations. (Rules Gov. § 2254 Cases, rule 8(b).) Within 10 days a party may file objections as provided by local rule. (Ibid.)

The district court judge must review de novo any findings or recommendations to which objection has been made. The judge may adopt, reject, or modify the magistrate’s recommendation in whole or part in granting or denying the petition. (Rules Gov. § 2254 Cases, rule 8(b).)

If the district court renders a favorable ruling, it often will be a “conditional writ,” such as, “release or re-try the petitioner [or modify the judgment]” within a certain time.” (See Hilton v. Braunskill (1987) 481 U.S. 770, 775.) The court has broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting habeas corpus relief “as law and justice require.” (Ibid.; see Stanley v. Cullen (9th Cir. 2011) 633 F.3d 852, 864-865.) The remedies should put the defendant back in same position as if the constitutional violation never occurred. (Nunes v. Mueller (9th Cir. 2003) 350 F.3d 1045, 1057; cf Chioino v. Kernan (9th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3d 1182 [district court erred in modifying sentence instead of allowing state court to resentence].)

C. Appeal [§ 9.107]

If the district court denies a habeas corpus petition, the petitioner may appeal to the circuit court of appeals. The requirements for prosecuting an appeal in the federal appellate courts are set out in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

1. Filing requirements [§ 9.108]

To appeal the denial, the petitioner must file in the district court: (1) a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of judgment denying the petition (Fed. Rules App. Proc.,

94 For local rules, see http://www.adi-sandiego.com/legal_rules.html.

rule 4(a)(1)); (2) a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, if the petitioner is indigent (Fed. Rules App. Proc., rule 24(b)); and (3) a request for a certificate of appealability (28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. Rules App. Proc., rule 22).

The 30-day time limit is jurisdictional and may not be extended except as Congress has provided. There is no equitable exception to the rule. (Bowles v. Russell (2007) 551 U.S. 205; cf. Washington v. Ryan (9th Cir. 2016) 833 F.3d 1087 (en banc) [authority to vacate and reenter judgment includes the authority to do so for the purpose of restoring the opportunity to appeal]; Mackey v. Hoffman (9th Cir. 2012) 682 F.3d 1247 [district court may grant petitioner relief from judgment if attorney’s abandonment causes failure to file timely notice of appeal].)

2. Certificate of appealability [§ 9.109]

A certificate of appealability is required for a habeas corpus petition under Title 28, United State Code section 2241, as well as one under section 2254. (Wilson v. Belleque (9th Cir. 2009) 554 F.3d 816, 824-825; cf. Harbison v. Bell (2009) 556 U.S. 180 [certificate not needed to appeal denial of motion that federal counsel represent petitioner in state clemency proceedings, since requirement applies only to decisions dealing with challenge to underlying conviction].) A notice of appeal may be construed as a request for a certificate of appealability if there is no separate request. (United States v. Asrar (9th Cir. 1997) 116 F.3d 1268, 1270.)

a. Standards for granting [§ 9.110]

The standard for granting a certificate of appealability is a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” (28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).) This means reasonable judges could disagree with the district court’s decision or conclude the issue merits further

9628 United States Code section 2253(c) provides:

(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from –
   (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or
   (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.
(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

b. **Application to circuit judge**  [§ 9.111]

If the district court denies the certificate of appealability, the petitioner may apply to a circuit judge. (See Fed. Rules App. Proc., rule 22, and Notes of Advisory Com. on 1998 amend. for subd. (b)(1); see *Hanson v. Mahoney* (9th Cir. 2006) 433 F.3d 1107, 1112; *Tiedeman v. Benson* (8th Cir. 1997) 122 F.3d 518, 522.)

c. **Scope of appellate review**  [§ 9.112]

On appeals under AEDPA, 97 issues are preserved on an issue-by-issue basis – that is, appellate review is restricted to the issues specified in the certificate of appealability. 98 (28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3); *Hiivala v. Wood* (9th Cir. 1999) 195 F.3d 1098, 1103; see also *Cockett v. Ray* (9th Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 938, 941.) However, the requirement that a certificate of appealability specify the particular issues is not a jurisdictional one; a judge’s failure to “indicate” the requisite constitutional issue in the certificate does not deprive the appellate court of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal. (*Gonzalez v. Thaler* (2012) 565 U.S. 134.) It is sufficient if the issue briefed is fairly encompassed within the issue for which the certificate was issued. (*Jorss v. Gomez* (9th Cir. 2002) 311 F.3d 1189, 1192-1193.)

To brief an issue not included in a certificate, the petitioner must first brief all certified issues under the heading, “Certified Issues,” and then, in the same brief, discuss any uncertified issues under the heading, “Uncertified Issues.” The inclusion of uncertified issues in this way will be construed as a motion to expand the certificate; the court will consider those issues as it deems appropriate. (U.S. Cir. Ct. Rules (9th Cir.), rule 22-1(e).)


98 In contrast, under California procedure, appellate issues are not limited to the issues for which a certificate of probable cause has been granted. (*People v. Hoffard* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1176-1177; see § 2.106 of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started.”)
The requirement of a certificate of appealability does not preclude a defendant from defending a grant of habeas corpus on appeal by arguing a theory on which he had lost in the trial court. (*Jennings v. Stephens* (2015) ___U.S.___ [135 S.Ct. 793]; cf. *Andrews v. Davis* (9th Cir. 2015) 798 F.3d 759 [petitioner who prevailed re resentencing must file cross-appeal and obtain certificate to raise claim that would result in new trial]; see Manual, § 2.88, *chapter 2*, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started” [California law on scope of issues respondent may raise to support affirmance].)

3. Procedures on review [§ 9.113]

On appeal, legal questions are reviewed de novo. (*Dubria v. Smith* (9th Cir. 2000) 224 F.3d 995, 1000 (en banc).) The district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. (*Lopez v. Thompson* (9th Cir. 2000) 202 F.3d 1110, 1116.) The district court’s refusal to order an evidentiary hearing to resolve issues of fact is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (*Davis v. Woodford* (9th Cir. 2003) 384 F.3d 628, 637-638; *Caro v. Calderon* (9th Cir. 1999) 165 F.3d 1223, 1225-1226.)

The appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record, even if it differs from the rationale of the district court. (*Bonin v. Calderon* (9th Cir. 1995) 59 F.3d 815, 823.) It may also address issues the district court did not resolve on the merits. (*Styers v. Schriro* (9th Cir. 2008) 547 F.3d 1026.)

Under Circuit Rule 4-1, *Anders v. California* (1967) 386 U.S. 738, on no-issue appeals, applies to appeals from habeas corpus denial if the district court has granted a certificate of appealability, thus requiring appointment of counsel on appeal. (*Graves v. McEwen* (9th Cir. 2013) 731 F.3d 87.)

4. Certiorari [§ 9.114]

The non-prevailing party may petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The decision of that court normally concludes the process, unless the court remands for further proceedings. Certiorari is covered in § 7.100 et seq. of *chapter 7*, “The End Game: Decisions by Reviewing Courts and Processes After Decision.”
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