- Chapter Eight -

Putting on the Wrists: California Extraordinary Remedies
I. **INTRODUCTION**  

This chapter primarily addresses post-conviction writs of habeas corpus in non-capital criminal cases. It also briefly discusses other uses of state habeas corpus and other state writ remedies.

The writ of habeas corpus – the Great Writ – provides an avenue of relief from unlawful custody when direct appeal is inadequate. “[T]he Great Writ has been justifiably lauded as the safe-guard and the palladium of our liberties.” (*In re Sanders* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 697, 703-704, internal quotation marks deleted.)

Habeas corpus has been around a long time. (See Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Chas. II, ch. 2 – the forerunner of all habeas corpus acts.) The United States Constitution expressly protects it: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.” (Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.) The comparable state provisions are California Constitution, article I, section 11, and article VI, section 10.

A. **Uses of Habeas Corpus Often Encountered in Criminal Appellate Practice**  

A few hypotheticals illustrate when it might be necessary to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus:

- At trial counsel’s advice (not as part of a plea bargain), the defendant admitted a prior serious felony, residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)). In fact the burglary was of a commercial building.

- Before trial, the defendant unsuccessfully contested several strong issues, including adequacy of the evidence under Penal Code section 995, speedy trial, and *Miranda*. In anticipation of getting a reversal on these issues, to avoid a time-consuming trial, counsel had the defendant plead guilty.

• Review of the record shows valid grounds for a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. Trial counsel, however, made no motion to suppress and now admits having failed to consider making one.

• The client claims a number of witnesses who could have testified favorably were either not interviewed by trial defense counsel or not called to testify. The potential witnesses corroborate this claim.

• In a previous appeal, counsel neglected to raise an issue that has come back to haunt the defendant. Prior appellate counsel admits never having considered the issue.

• After the defendant was sentenced, trial counsel received a call from a juror who, plagued by conscience, described how one juror swayed others by “evidence” the juror obtained outside the courtroom.

• After the appeal time elapsed, the statute under which the defendant was sentenced was amended and the applicable sentence was reduced.

• After the appeal time elapsed, the law under which the defendant was convicted or sentenced was declared unconstitutional.

What do all of these examples have in common? Appeal is not an adequate remedy, either because the facts necessary to resolve the problems do not appear in the appellate record or because the time for appeal is past. The remedy is a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus allows a petitioner to bring in facts outside the record, if those facts support a claim cognizable in habeas corpus, and it has no specific jurisdictional deadline.

In the examples above, all but the last three describe possible ineffective assistance of counsel, trial or appellate. This is one of the most common uses of habeas corpus.

A petition for writ of habeas corpus may serve purposes other than challenging a conviction on the basis of facts outside the record. (See § 8.53 et seq., post.)
B. ADI’s Expectations  [§ 8.2]

1. Pursuit of Writs When Appropriate  [§ 8.3]

As a matter of policy, ADI expects appointed counsel to be attentive to possible issues requiring habeas or other writ remedies and to pursue those reasonably necessary and reasonably within the scope of appellate responsibilities. Although the California Supreme Court has stated that in a noncapital case counsel has no legal duty to conduct an investigation to discover facts outside the record, nevertheless if counsel learns of such facts in the course of representation, counsel may have an ethical obligation to advise the client of a course of action to obtain relief “or take other appropriate action.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 783-784, fn. 20; cf. In re Sanders (1999) 21 Cal.4th 697, 707, and In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 781, 791-793 [duty in capital cases, under Cal. Supreme Ct., Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgments of Death, policy 3].)

Regardless of legal duty, appellate projects such as ADI, with the approval of their courts, hold counsel to higher expectations than the bare minimum. Counsel are expected to pursue remedies outside the four corners of the appeal, including habeas corpus, when reasonably necessary to represent the client appropriately. (See People v. Thurman (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 36, 47 [quoting Manual, part of preceding sentence].)

2. Consultation with ADI Before Pursuing Writ Remedy  [§ 8.4]

Counsel should consult with the assigned ADI staff attorney when considering a writ investigation or petition. Counsel must consider such questions as whether the available evidence and the current law or signs of potential changes support a petition; whether and how off-record claims should be investigated; whether, where, and when a petition should be filed; whether the client would benefit from the remedy; and whether the client might suffer adverse consequences by pursuing writ relief. Given the complexity of these matters, it is necessary for the attorney to heed the old adage “two heads are better than one” and consult with the assigned staff attorney. Thus counsel should consult with the assigned ADI staff attorney when in doubt about applying these expectations to their own case.

Another reason to seek ADI input is the recurring problem of how to approach trial counsel in investigating a possible ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Appellate counsel generally should avoid becoming a potential witness. Counsel also will want to elicit trial counsel’s cooperation; although in most instances prior counsel are cooperative in investigating ineffective assistance of counsel, some attorneys are not, perhaps because of embarrassment or concern about their professional status. ADI may be able to assist in these situations.

In appropriate cases appellate counsel may seek fees for expert assistance, such as an investigator, a physician, a psychiatric evaluation of the client or client’s records, or DNA testing. Travel, translation services, and other costs may be approved, as well. The assigned ADI staff attorney should be consulted; court preapproval may be necessary for some expenses.

II. BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR AND LIMITATIONS ON STATE HABEAS CORPUS TO CHALLENGE CONVICTION

People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464 and People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728 are especially useful in describing general state habeas corpus procedure, law, and theory in the context of challenging a criminal conviction. (See also People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 877.) As noted above, this use of habeas corpus is the most commonly encountered use in appellate practice and is generally invoked when the basis for the challenge lies in facts outside the record.

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3 Resources on investigating ineffective assistance of counsel claims include 15 A.L.R.4th 582 (adequacy of counsel in proceedings seeking appellate and post-conviction remedies); 13 A.L.R.4th 533 (adequacy of counsel in proceedings seeking post-plea remedies); 3 A.L.R.4th 601 (effectiveness of trial counsel).

4 See Business and Professions Code sections 6068, subdivision (o)(7) and 6086.7, which require the attorney and the court to notify the State Bar whenever a modification or reversal of a judgment in a judicial proceeding is based at least in part on ineffective assistance of counsel.

5 The requirement of consultation with ADI before raising an ineffective assistance of counsel issue is not confined to habeas corpus investigations, but also applies to raising that issue on direct appeal.
Habeas corpus use has certain limitations. Among these are the requirement of custody and related mootness issues, the bar against repetitive petitions, the bar against use of habeas corpus when appeal is or would have been available, and the requirement of due diligence.

A. Custody and Mootness [§ 8.6]

The fundamental purpose of habeas corpus in most post-conviction contexts is to provide a remedy for the release of persons confined under the restraint of an illegal judgment. This theoretical underpinning necessarily raises the question of whether the petitioner is under the restraint of the decision under attack – in other words, whether he is in custody. It also raises the related but distinct question of whether habeas corpus can offer meaningful relief – i.e., whether the case is moot.

1. Custody requirement [§ 8.7]

A fundamental prerequisite for habeas corpus jurisdiction is that the petitioner be “in custody,” either actual or constructive, at the time the petition is filed. (See Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (a); People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063; In re Azurin (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 20, 26; In re Wessley W. (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 240, 246.) Constructive custody means the person is not physically incarcerated but is subject to the potential of incarceration – as when on probation, parole, bail, or own recognizance. (Wessley W., at pp. 246-247.)

The jurisdictional custody requirement applies at the time the petition is filed. If the petitioner is released or dies while the petition is pending, the requirement remains satisfied and the court continues to have jurisdiction. (See In re King (1970) 3 Cal.3d 226 [relief on habeas corpus granted, although defendant no longer in custody at time of decision]; Ex parte Byrnes (1945) 26 Cal.2d 824, 827 [habeas corpus relief granted although defendant no longer in custody]; In re Sodersten (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1217 [defendant died during pendency of habeas corpus proceeding; judgment of guilt

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6Federal habeas corpus has a similar rule. (Spencer v. Kemna (1998) 523 U.S. 1, 7 [“custody” satisfied; defendant incarcerated when petition filed, but released before adjudication of petition]; Carafas v. LaVallee (1968) 391 U.S. 234, 237-240; Chaker v. Crogan (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 1215, 1219 [enough that defendant be in custody when petition filed; subsequent release does not deprive court of jurisdiction]; see § 9.2 of chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”
vacated and proceedings permanently abated].) The remedy at that point will be something other than release from custody – such as removing the conviction from the petitioner’s record or correcting the record (In re King, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 237-238) or ordering an appeal from the conviction to go forward (Ex parte Byrnes, supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 828) or abating the proceedings (In re Soderblom, supra, at pp. 1237-1238).

If the petition is filed after all actual or potential custody has expired, however, the court lacks habeas corpus jurisdiction, even though the petitioner is currently suffering collateral consequences of the conviction. (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 339 [mandamus is proper remedy to seek post-finality Hofsheier9 relief for persons no longer in custody]; In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236; In re Azurin (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 20, 26 [no habeas corpus jurisdiction because petition filed long after state custody expired, even though petitioner in federal custody pending deportation because of state conviction]; In re Wessley W. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 240, 246 [court lacked power to order sealing of criminal records for which petitioner no longer in custody, despite collateral consequences from records]; see also In re Stier (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 63 [prospective loss of medical license and speculative risk of future custody if defendant fails to register as sex offender do not prove constructive custody].) Detention by federal immigration officials pending deportation because of a state conviction is not itself “custody” for state habeas corpus purposes, if all actual or potential custody is past. (People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063; People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078; People v. Azurin, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.)

2. **Mootness issues** [§ 8.8]

When a petitioner is released from all custody constraints, actual or constructive, an issue of mootness may arise. If the habeas corpus proceeding is attacking a criminal judgment, the case is ordinarily not moot, even after all potential for custody expires, because of the collateral consequences flowing from a felony conviction. (In re King (1970) 3 Cal.3d 226, 229, fn. 2.; People v. Succop (1967) 67 Cal.2d 785, 789-790.)

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7Mootness becomes a consideration at this point. (See § 8.8, post.)

8Other remedies than habeas corpus may be available. (See § 8.9, post.)

9People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1207 [mandatory lifetime sex offender registration for violations of Penal Code section 288a, subdivision (b)(1), voluntary oral copulation with a 16- or 17-year-old minor, violates equal protection].)
If the petition is attacking some other decision than a judgment of conviction, however – one that no longer affects the petitioner in any way – the case may be considered moot. Examples might be pretrial detention, custody credits after discharge from parole, and prison disciplinary decisions corrected or no longer correctable. In that situation the court will usually decline to entertain the petition.

Even if the case is moot, a California court may exercise discretion to decide the case if it involves issues of serious public concern that would otherwise elude resolution. (In re M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23-25 [detention of juvenile before jurisdictional hearing]; In re Newbern (1961) 55 Cal.2d 500, 505 [contact with bondsman]; In re Fluery (1967) 67 Cal.2d 600, 601 [credits for time in jail].) In the federal system, in contrast, because of the “case or controversy” requirement of article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution, mootness as to the individual litigants defeats jurisdiction. (See § 9.3 of chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”)

3. Alternatives to habeas corpus if custody requirement is not met [§ 8.9]

Certain remedies may be available even if the custody requirement for habeas corpus is not met. Depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, for example, a petition for a writ of error coram nobis might be a possibility. (See In re Azurin (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 20, 27, fn. 7; cf. People v. Ibanez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 537, 546, fn. 13 [coram nobis not appropriate if underlying claim is ineffective assistance of counsel]; see § 8.66 et seq., post.)

In certain specialized situations a person may have a statutory right to attack a judgment. For example, Penal Code section 1016.5 requires the trial court to advise of immigration consequences before accepting a guilty plea and allows the defendant to move to vacate the judgment if the trial court fails to comply with the requirement. (See People v. Totari (2002) 28 Cal.4th 876.) Penal Code section 1473.5 permits habeas corpus on the ground expert evidence on domestic battering and its effects was excluded. (See In re Walker (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 533.) Another example is Penal Code section 1473.6, which allows a person no longer in physical or constructive custody to challenge the judgment, if there is newly discovered evidence of fraud or perjury or misconduct by a government official. (See People v. Germany (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 784.)
B. **Successive Petitions**  [§ 8.10]
The general rule is that all claims must be presented in a single, timely petition; successive petitions will be summarily denied. Repeated presentation of the same issue may be considered an abuse of the writ and subject counsel or petitioner to sanctions. (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 769; In re White (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1479 [imposing sanctions].) An exception to this rule might be petitions alleging facts which, if proven, would establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the proceedings leading to a conviction or sentence. (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 796-797; see also In re Martinez (2009) 46 Cal.4th 945, 950, In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, and In re Gallego (1998) 18 Cal.4th 825; see Pen. Code, § 1475.)

A habeas corpus petition collaterally attacking a conviction is not a successive petition to an earlier Benoit petition used to gain the right to appeal after an untimely notice of appeal. The Benoit petition is not an attack on the judgment, but merely a vehicle for rescuing the right to appeal. (See Johnson v. United States (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3d 636, 638 [construing analogous federal provision].)

C. Availability of Appeal [§ 8.11]

Habeas corpus cannot be used to raise issues that could have been but were not raised on appeal (In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759), nor to seek a second determination of issues raised on appeal and rejected (In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930; In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225). (See also In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 683 [defendant who abandoned appeal after certificate of probable cause was denied and at that time failed to use proper remedy (mandate) to perfect appeal cannot use habeas corpus to attack denial of motion to withdraw plea].)

10 Sometimes a court may treat a post-conviction “motion” as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. If so, the movant/petitioner should be aware that cognizable issues not included in the motion/petition may be foreclosed from later consideration under the successive petitions rule. (Cf. Castro v. United States (2003) 540 U.S. 375, 383 [as a matter of federal judicial procedure, before re-characterizing a motion to review a federal conviction as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 federal habeas corpus petition, the district court must warn the defendant of the successive petitions rule].)

11 In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72.

In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 829-841, discusses at some length the exceptions to this policy (called the Waltreus rule for convenience). They include “clear and fundamental constitutional error” that “strikes at the heart of the trial process” (Harris, at pp. 829-836), lack of fundamental jurisdiction over the subject matter (Harris, at pp. 836-838; see People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 66), errors of sufficient magnitude that the trial court may be said to have acted in excess of jurisdiction (Harris at pp. 838-841; In re Sands (1977) 18 Cal.3d 851, 856-857), excessive punishment (In re Nunez (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 709, 724), and a change in the law benefitting the petitioner (In re King (1970) 3 Cal.3d 226, 229, fn. 2; for general guidance, see ADI website article, Measures Appellate Counsel Can Take in Responding to Changes in the Law Potentially Beneficial to Their Clients, append. on “General Principles of Retroactivity”). (See also People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267 [“rules generally prohibiting raising an issue on habeas corpus that was, or could have been, raised on appeal . . . would not bar an ineffective assistance claim on habeas corpus”]; see In re Robbins (1998)18 Cal.4th 770, 814, fn. 34.) In addition, habeas corpus may be used when appeal is an inadequate remedy because prompt relief is required. (In re Quackenbush (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1305.)

D. Timeliness [§ 8.12]

Unlike appeals or federal habeas corpus proceedings, which have specific time limits, there is no prescribed, fixed time period in which to seek state habeas corpus relief in a noncapital case. The general limitation is that habeas relief must be sought in a “timely fashion,” “reasonably promptly.” (In re Sanders (1999) 21 Cal.4th 697, 703; In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 304.) Unreasonable delay, or laches, is a ground for denial of relief. (In re Ronald E. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 315, 321-322; People v. Jackson (1973) 10 Cal.3d 265, 268.) A petitioner must point to particular circumstances sufficient

13Harris found this exception considerably narrower than previous opinions had indicated and declined to “define the exact boundaries of any . . . surviving exception.” (In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 836.) In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199-200, held the exception to Waltreus for “fundamental” issues not raised on appeal does not apply to errors not objected to at trial.

14Harris limited this exception to cases where “a redetermination of the facts underlying the claim is unnecessary.” (In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 840-841.)

15http://www.adi-sandiego.com/PDFs/Favorable%20changes%2011-08.pdf
to justify substantial delay.\(^\text{16}\) *(In re Stanekowitz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 391, 396, fn. 1.)*
Reasonable delay may be excused, within limits, particularly when the petition seeks to correct an erroneous sentence. *(In re Nunez (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 709, 723-724; People v. Miller (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 873, 881; see In re Streeter (1967) 66 Cal.2d 47, 52.)*

Delay in seeking habeas corpus or other collateral relief is measured from the time a petitioner becomes aware of the grounds for relief, which may be as early as the date of conviction. *(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 765, fn. 5, and cases cited therein; In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236.)*

III. **HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES**  [§ 8.13]

Habeas corpus, like other writs, has its own requirements and terminology that can seem arcane to even experienced practitioners. To help navigate the maze, § 8.84 et seq., appendix A, “Requirements for Habeas Corpus Petitions in California State Courts,” provides a step-by-step guide to preparing a petition. § 8.122 et seq., appendix B, “California Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus,” provides flow charts showing the typical progression of a habeas corpus case through the California courts. § 8.123, part I, deals with “Typical proceedings to initial decision.” § 8.124, part II, deals with “Proceedings to review initial decision.” These materials may be useful in clarifying the procedural requirements and visualizing the various steps in the process.

A. **Where and When To File**  [§ 8.14]

Filing a habeas corpus petition when an appeal is pending requires a decision as to both as to *venue* – the appropriate court in which to file the petition – and *timing* – whether to file it during or after the appeal.

1. **Venue**  [§ 8.15]

All superior and appellate courts have statewide habeas corpus jurisdiction. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; *In re Roberts* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 582; *Griggs v. Superior Court* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 341, 346; *In re Van Heflin* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 131, 135.) However, practical and judicial policy considerations generally dictate that the court most closely

\(^{16}\)To show diligence when a petition collateral to an appeal is contemplated, counsel should indicate by footnote in the brief that a petition is anticipated, and when appropriate explain why the petition is not being filed contemporaneously.
associated with the case and most efficiently equipped to resolve the issues should decide the petition. Venue choice involves the “territorial” question of the area where the habeas corpus proceeding should take place and also the “vertical” question of which court – trial or appellate – within a given territory should hear the matter. The present discussion covers only challenges to the judgment or sentence; see § 8.53 et seq., post, for other uses of habeas corpus, such as remedying illegal prison conditions and parole denials.

a. “Territorial” question  [§ 8.16]

The appropriate venue for challenges to a conviction or sentence is normally the district or county where judgment was imposed. (In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 583; Griggs v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 341, 347.) If the petition is filed in the wrong appellate district, the Court of Appeal may deny it without prejudice and, if it does, must identify the appropriate court in its order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385(c).) If a petition is filed in the wrong superior court, the court may retain jurisdiction or transfer the case after making an initial determination of that the petition states a prima facie case.17 (Rule 4.552(b)(2); Roberts, at p. 583; Griggs, at p. 347.)

b. “Vertical” question  [§ 8.17]

Normally as a matter of orderly procedure a habeas corpus petition should be filed in the superior court in the first instance.18 (People v. Hillery (1962) 202 Cal. App.2d 293, 294 [an appellate court “has discretion to refuse to issue the writ as an exercise of original jurisdiction on the ground that application has not been made therefor in a lower court in the first instance”]; see also In re Ramirez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1312 [this policy not changed by trial court unification].) This is especially true when there are factual matters to be resolved (Hillery, at p. 294); an appellate court is not well equipped to conduct evidentiary hearings and make factual determinations (People v. Pena (1972) 25

17If the petition challenges a denial of parole or seeks relief on a Tenorio claim (People v Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89 [invalidating statute requiring consent of prosecutor to strike prior conviction]), the superior court normally should transfer the petition to the court that rendered the underlying judgment without making an initial determination of prima facie merit. (Rule 4.552(c); In re Roberts, supra, 36 Cal.4th 575, 593; In re Corte (1971) 6 Cal.3d 78, 88-89, fn. 9; see also Griggs v. Superior Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 347, fn. 5.)

18Counsel should understand that, after the petition is filed, compensation for services in the superior court generally must be sought in that court, rather than under the appellate appointment.
The cover should prominently state that the petition is collateral to a pending appeal. It must be red. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.44(b)(1).) A request to consolidate the appeal and the petition is usually a good idea. (See, e.g., rule 8.500(d) [separate petitions for review required if appeal and writ not consolidated and no order to show cause issued].) As with all motions, it should be filed as a separate document, not included in a brief or petition. (See rule 8.54.)

When the petition challenges the ruling of a superior court judge, usually another judge must hear the case. (Pen. Code, § 859c; Fuller v. Superior Court (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 623, 627.)
Occasionally a petitioner may find it difficult to state a cause without discovery. The Catch 22 is that in the absence of a pending cause a California trial court lacks jurisdiction to order post-judgment discovery. (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1256.) There is a statutory exception for special circumstances cases. (Pen. Code, § 1054.9, which superseded Gonzales; see In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 691; Curl v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 310.) Even after trial, however, the prosecution continues to have an ethical duty to disclose exculpatory information that casts doubt on conviction. (People v. Garcia (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1179; see also People v. Kasim (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1383-1384; see Thomas v. Goldsmith (9th Cir. 1992) 979 F.2d 746, 749-750 [state had “present duty to turn over exculpatory evidence” in federal habeas corpus proceeding].)
If the imprisonment is alleged to be illegal, the petition must . . . state in what the alleged illegality consists. The petition should both (i) state fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is sought, as well as (ii) include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or declarations. Conclusory allegations made without any explanation of the basis for the allegations do not warrant relief, let alone an evidentiary hearing.

(People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474, internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)

The petition should be factually and legally adequate as filed. As the California Supreme Court has warned:

The inclusion in a habeas corpus petition of a statement purporting to reserve the right to supplement or amend the petition at a later date has no effect. The court will determine the appropriate disposition of a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on the allegations of the petition as originally filed and any amended or supplemental petition for which leave to file has been granted.

(In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 781, fn. 16.)

2. Formal petition [§ 8.21]

Although the entire document filed with the court is usually called a “petition” for habeas corpus, it contains within it a formal pleading, also called a “petition,” that sets out the facts and law necessary to state a prima facie cause of action. The formal pleading is supplemented with points and authorities and evidentiary exhibits. The formal petition must include a prayer for relief and be verified.

a. Format [§ 8.22]

Rule 8.384 prescribes the requirements for a petition filed by an attorney. A formal petition can be drafted using the format from a reliable source book such as Fischer et al., Appeals and Writs in Criminal Cases (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 2000), with updates. Another option is to use Judicial Council form MC-275, a copy of which is
available from the California courts’ or ADI’s website. This form is required for proper petitions, unless the Court of Appeal has excused use of it. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.380(a).) A petition filed by an attorney need not be on the form, but it should include all of the information specified on the form. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.384(a)(1).)

b. **Facts and law**  

The key elements in the formal petition are supporting facts and supporting cases, rules, or other authority. Although the facts and law in the formal petition need not and generally should not be extremely detailed, they must be sufficiently specific to constitute a cause of action, i.e., a prima facie case for relief. Amplifying detail and legal analysis can be included in the accompanying points and authorities. Technically, however, the petition must stand on its own without reference to anything else. (E.g., *In re Gallego* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 825, 837, fn. 12; *In re Robbins* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 799, fn. 21.)

c. **Conclusion and prayer for relief**  

The petition should include a conclusion. It may summarize the main points made in the petition.

The prayer should specify the ultimate relief sought, such as an order to set aside the conviction, to vacate the sentence and return to court for resentencing, or to vacate the plea. It may also ask for such intermediate orders as issuance of an order to show cause or petition for writ of habeas corpus. (The Judicial Council form does not include a specific prayer for relief.)

d. **Verification**  

A petition must be verified under penalty of perjury. (See Pen. Code, § § 1474, subd. 3 & 1475; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5.) Counsel may apply for habeas

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23 In doing so it should recognize that habeas corpus relief is given by an *order*, not a *writ*. (*People v. Romero* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 743.) A common mistake is to pray for a “writ of habeas corpus granting [the ultimate] relief.”

24 Because of the verification requirement, a petition is not “properly filed” in state court until a verification is filed, for purposes of tolling the federal habeas corpus statute of limitations. (*Zepeda v. Walker* (2009) 581 F.3d 1013.)
Corpus relief on behalf of a client, and verification by counsel satisfies this requirement. 
(*In re Robbins* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 783, fn. 5.) Counsel should have sufficient personal knowledge of and confidence in the facts to sign under penalty of perjury.25 Otherwise, it is better practice to instruct the client to sign the verification.

3. **Points and authorities**  
[§ 8.26]

A memorandum of points and authorities should be attached to the formal petition to amplify the legal implications of the facts and address relevant authority. It must be in the proper format for the intended court, including a statement of case, statement of facts, argument, and conclusion. It must include references to the record, declaration, or exhibits. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)-(b), 8.384(a)(2).) Except in capital cases, the memorandum is subject to the length limit for civil briefs established in rule 8.204(c). (Rule 8.384(a)(2).)

4. **Declarations, exhibits, and other supporting documents**  
[§ 8.27]

Declarations and exhibits should be attached to the petition.26 Any reference to facts outside the record must be supported by adequate declarations or exhibits.27 If petitions in the same case have been filed previously, copies of the petitions (but no exhibits) must be included, unless the prior petition was filed in the same appellate court and the present petition so states and identifies the documents by case name and number. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.384(b)(1).) If the petition asserts a claim that was the subject

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25 A verification on counsel’s “belief” in the truth of the allegations is insufficient. (*People v. McCarthy* (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 593, 597.) Factual allegations on which the petition is based must be “in such form that perjury may be assigned upon the allegations if they are false.” (*Ex parte Walpole* (1890) 84 Cal. 584.)

26 For Court of Appeal habeas corpus cases, four copies of the petition itself must be filed, but unless the court orders otherwise only one copy of the supporting documents is required. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.44(b)(3) & (5).) Different rules apply to Supreme Court writ filings. (Rule 8.44(a)(2) & (3).)

27 Factual allegations on which the petition is based must be “in such form that perjury may be assigned upon the allegations if they are false.” (*Ex parte Walpole* (1890) 84 Cal. 584.) Hearsay statements in the petition or declarations thus may be insufficient. (See *People v. Madaris* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 234, 242; cf. *People v. Duvall* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 484-485 [handling of factual allegations difficult or impossible to establish at pleading stage].)
of an evidentiary hearing, a certified copy of the transcript must be included. (Rule 8.384(b)(2).)

For petitions filed by an attorney, any supporting documents accompanying the formal pleading must be bound, tabbed, and preceded by a table of contents. (Rules 8.384(b)(3), 8.486(c.).)

C. Initial Response by Court of Appeal to Petition [§ 8.28]

This section addresses procedures after a petition is filed in the Court of Appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385 et seq.) Superior court procedures are discussed in § 8.45 et seq., post. Counsel should consult the published Internal Operating Practices and Procedures of the Courts of Appeal, or call the appellate project or court clerk’s office for details about practices in a particular court. § 8.123, appendix B, “California Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus,” part I, “Typical proceedings to initial decision,” part II, may help in visualizing the process.

The Court of Appeal may respond to a petition in a number of ways – most commonly, (a) summary denial, (b) denial without prejudice to refiling in superior court, (c) request for an informal response, or (d) issuance of a writ of habeas corpus or an order to show cause. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385.) If the petition establishes a prima facie case warranting relief, the court must choose (d). (People v. Romero (1994) 8

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28 Court processes are described in the courts’ Internal Operating Practices and Procedures (IOP’s), which are published in conjunction with the California Rules of Court and also for some courts online at http://www.courts.ca.gov/courtsofappeal.htm. In the Fourth Appellate District, for example:

Division One oral argument is covered in section VII of its IOP’s: http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/IOP_District4_division1.pdf.

Division Two’s internal processes are described in section VII of its Internal Operating Practices and Procedures (IOP’s), which are published with the California Rules of Court but are not posted on the court’s website.


29 The court may occasionally dismiss a petition for mootness, inappropriate venue, or other procedural reason.
In mandate and other prerogative writ cases, in contrast, a peremptory writ in the first instance is possible.

In mandate and other prerogative writ cases, in contrast, issuance of an order to show cause or alternative writ is discretionary; the petition may be summarily denied.
determination the superior court is a more appropriate venue to hear the petition in the first instance. (E.g., In re Ramirez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1313; see In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 593-594; People v. Superior Court (Jiminez) (2002) 28 Cal.4th 798, 806, fn. 3.)

3. Request for informal response [§ 8.31]

Before determining the adequacy of the petition, the Court of Appeal often uses an “informal response” procedure, outlined in California Rules of Court, rule 8.385(b), which enables the court to assess the sufficiency of the petition without immediately issuing a writ or order to show cause. It streamlines the statutory procedures (Pen. Code, § 1473 et seq.), which were designed for the superior court and many of which date back to the 1800’s. It permits the Court of Appeal to deny a petition without oral argument or a written opinion. The procedure is roughly (and imperfectly) analogous to demurrer in a civil action. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 742, fn. 9.)

California Rules of Court, rule 8.385(b) provides:

(b) Informal response

(1) Before ruling on the petition, the court may request an informal written response from the respondent, the real party in interest, or an interested person. The court must send a copy of any request to the petitioner.

(2) The response must be served and filed within 15 days or as the court specifies.

(3) If a response is filed, the court must notify the petitioner that a reply may be served and filed within 15 days or as the court specifies. The court may not deny the petition until that time has expired. [32]

Upon considering the informal response and reply, the court may deny the petition, if it does not state a prima facie case for relief, or issue an order to show cause if it does. The informal procedure does not permit the Court of Appeal to order ultimate relief

32 This subdivision addresses the Supreme Court’s warning “due process may require that . . . habeas corpus petitioners be permitted to answer the response.” (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 283, fn. 2.)
without issuing an order to show cause or providing an opportunity for a formal return.\(^\text{33}\) (Pen. Code, § 1476; People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740-744.)

4. Issuance of writ of habeas corpus or order to show cause \([\S\ 8.32]\)

If the petition establishes a prima facie case warranting relief, the court must issue either a writ of habeas corpus requiring the presence of the petitioner or an order to show cause, which does not require the petitioner’s presence. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740; Pen. Code, § 1476, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385(d).) The issuance of the writ or order establishes a cause of action. (Romero, at p. 740.) It is a preliminary determination that the facts as alleged in the petition, if true, state a cause for relief. (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474-475; In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 875, fn. 4.) If the writ or order is issued only as to some of the claims alleged in the petition, it implicitly denies those not mentioned. (In re Bolden (2009) 46 Cal.4th 216, 218.) Neither the writ nor the order to show cause adjudicates the ultimate right to relief. (Romero, at p. 738.)

The writ of habeas corpus and order to show cause are functionally similar. A writ of habeas corpus is an order to produce “the body” – i.e., physically bring the petitioner before the court for proceedings on the petition. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 738, fn. 4.) The petition serves only a limited function: to institute formal proceedings and order the custodian to file a return. Appellate courts usually do not order the petitioner’s physical presence before them, because they are not equipped to handle prisoners, but instead issue an order to show cause, which requires the custodian to file a return. (Id. at p. 738; see also People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1073.)\(^\text{34}\)

Once the cause of action is established, several kinds of further proceedings are possible, depending on the issues and their relationship if any to an appeal. In its order to show cause, the Court of Appeal will direct which procedures will be followed. § 8.123 et seq., appendix B, “California Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus,” part I, “Typical proceedings to initial decision,” may help in visualizing the alternatives in this process.

\(^{33}\)The respondent may waive the requirement of an order to show cause by stipulating to the truth of the allegations and the right to relief. (Romero, at p. 740, fn. 7; cf. In re Olson (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 790, 801-802 [failure to object to granting of relief without order to show cause is not waiver of requirement].)

\(^{34}\)In recognition of this reality, California Rules of Court, rule 8.385(d) requires issuance of an order to show cause and does not mention the writ of habeas corpus alternative.
a. **Legal pleadings without fact-finding**  [§ 8.33]

If there appear to be no contested factual matters, the Court of Appeal may order further pleadings without fact-finding.

b. **Return before superior court**  [§ 8.34]

The Court of Appeal may make the order to show cause returnable in the superior court, thus transferring jurisdiction to that court. (Pen. Code, § 1508; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385(e); *People v. Romero* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740; *In re Hochberg* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 875, fn. 4.) It frequently chooses that option when the case involves issues of fact requiring an evidentiary hearing. (*Romero*, at p. 740.) The respondent must then file a return before that court, the petitioner must have an opportunity to file a traverse, and the court must decide the case formally. The superior court may not summarily deny the petition or decline to decide the facts on the grounds habeas corpus is not a proper remedy. (*Hochberg*, at pp. 875-876; *Rose v. Superior Court (People)* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 564, 574-576 [mandate issued when superior court failed to hold evidentiary hearing or state reasons in response to Court of Appeal order to show cause].)

c. **Reference to superior court**  [§ 8.35]

The appellate court, alternatively, may “refer” the matter to the superior court, i.e., retain jurisdiction but order a “referee” (usually a superior court judge) to serve as a fact-finder and report the findings back to the Court of Appeal. (E.g., *In re Sakarias* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 140, 144; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.386(f).)

As discussed further in § 8.41 et seq., “Decision on the Merits,” *post*, upon receipt of the factual findings, the appellate court will resolve the issues raised by the petition and determine whether any relief should be granted. It must first permit an opportunity for oral argument. (*Rosato v. Superior Court* (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 190, 230; see *Kowis v. Howard* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894-895; *People v. Medina* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 484, 489-490; cf. *Lewis v. Superior Court* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1237, 1256-1261 [no right to oral argument if a peremptory writ of mandate is issued in the first instance].)

d. **Court of Appeal as trier of fact**  [§ 8.36]

On very rare occasions, the Court of Appeal may sit as a fact-finding tribunal in the first instance and directly receive evidence.
D. Return [§ 8.37]

People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464 deals with the topic of habeas corpus returns in depth. Once the writ or order to show cause is issued, the return by the prosecution to the court’s order becomes the principal pleading, analogous to a complaint in a civil proceeding. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 738-739.) While this analogy is far from complete, it does underscore one of the basic functions of the return: to “sharpen[] the issues that must be decided.” (Duvall, at p. 480.)

The return must be responsive to allegations of the petition and may not simply assert “the existence of a judgment of conviction and sentence.” (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 476; see Pen. Code, § 1480.) A general denial is insufficient: the return must allege specific facts in support of the petitioner’s detention and recite the facts on which any denial of the petition’s allegations is based. (Duvall, at pp. 476, 479-480.) The return, “where appropriate, should provide such documentary evidence, affidavits, or other materials as will enable the court to determine which issues are truly disputed.” (In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 278, fn. 2.) The return is deemed to admit those material factual allegations it fails to dispute. (In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1251.)

Rule 8.386(b) and (c) governs the time, form, length, and content of the return.

E. Traverse [§ 8.38]

The petitioner’s response to the return is a traverse. It is analogous to the answer in a civil lawsuit, and through the return and traverse the issues are joined. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 739.) The factual allegations in the return will be deemed true unless the petitioner controverts them in the traverse. (In re Lawler (1979) 23 Cal.3d 190, 194.) Appellate counsel should keep these principles and analogies in mind and not be lulled into thinking a traverse is an “optional” pleading like a reply brief on appeal.

In the traverse the petitioner may reassert the allegations of the petition and may incorporate by reference material previously put forth in either the petition or the reply to an informal response. (In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 277.) The petitioner may also stipulate that the petition be treated as a traverse. (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 477; see In re Stafford (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 110, 113.) If the factual allegations in the return are so inadequate that the petitioner cannot answer them, “the petitioner may ‘except to the sufficiency’ (Pen. Code, § 1484) of the return in his . . . traverse, thus raising questions of law in a procedure analogous to demurrer.” (In re Saunders (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1033, 1048.)
The traverse may allege additional facts in support of the claim on which an order to show cause has issued, but it may not introduce additional claims or wholly different factual bases for those claims. It cannot “expand the scope of the proceeding which is limited to the claims which the court initially determined stated a prima facie case for relief.” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 781, fn. 16.) To bring additional claims before the court, petitioner must obtain leave to file a supplemental petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Board of Prison Terms v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1235; see also In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 974, 980-981; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 43, fn. 28, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3.)

California Rules of Court, rule 8.386(d) governs the time, form, length, and content of the traverse.

F. Evidentiary Hearing [§ 8.39]

If the return and traverse present no disputed material factual issue, the court may dispose of the petition without the necessity of an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 739, and cases cited therein.) If there are disputed facts and the petitioner’s right to relief may turn on the resolution of a factual matter, then a hearing is required.35 (Id. at pp. 739-740; see Pen. Code, § 1484; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.386(f)(1).)

Evidentiary hearings are normally conducted in the superior court before a judge of that court, even if the Court of Appeal has retained jurisdiction over the cause. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.386(f)(2).)

The petitioner bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts on which the claim depends. (In re Large (2008) 41 Cal.4th 538, 549.) However, a claim of newly discovered evidence or factual innocence must meet a higher standard and must “completely undermine the entire structure of the case upon which the prosecution was based.” (In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1239.)

G. Argument in the Court of Appeal [§ 8.40]

If the Court of Appeal has retained jurisdiction and has issued a prior writ of habeas corpus or order to show cause, the court must permit oral argument. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 3; Pen. Code, § 1254; see Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894-895;

35 The hearing is governed by the rules of evidence. Hearsay is not admissible unless an exception applies. (See In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1070.)

24
In contrast, issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance without an alternative writ or order to show cause creates a cause. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal. 3d 171, 178, fn. 6.)

If the proceeding is in the Court of Appeal, no written opinion is then required. (See Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1260, fn. 18.)

Factual findings by any referee the court may have appointed are not binding, but are entitled to great weight when supported by substantial evidence, especially findings that require resolution of testimonial conflicts and assessment of witnesses’ credibility.

36 In contrast, issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance without an alternative writ or order to show cause creates a cause. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal. 3d 171, 178, fn. 6.)

37 The respondent may waive the requirement of an order to show cause by stipulating to the truth of the allegations and the right to relief. (Romero, at p. 740, fn. 7; cf. In re Olson (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 790, 801-802 [failure to object to granting of relief without order to show cause is not waiver of requirement].)
because the referee has the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.38 (In re Sakarias (2005) 35 Cal.4th 140, 151; In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296-297; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 201; In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 603.)

3. Form of relief [§ 8.44]

If the court decides to grant relief, it issues an order (e.g., releasing the petitioner, altering the conditions of confinement, etc.), not a writ. The writ of habeas corpus has the limited function described in § 8.32, ante – to bring the petitioner brought before the court and require the respondent to file a return justifying the custody. This aspect of habeas corpus is in contrast to mandate, in which the relief is granted by issuance of a peremptory writ (either in the first instance or after issuance of an alternative writ or order to show cause). (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 743.)

The terms of the order are shaped to the individual situation, “as the justice of the case may require.” (Pen. Code, § 1484; In re Crow (1971) 4 Cal.3d 613, 619.) The nature of habeas corpus requires “the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriage of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.” (Harris v. Nelson (1969) 394 U.S. 286, 291.)

I. Proceedings in Superior Court After Habeas Corpus Petition Is Filed [§ 8.45]

Habeas corpus proceedings in the superior court are governed by California Rules of Court, rule 4.550 et seq.39 (See also Pen. Code, § 1473 et seq.) The requirements and sequence are, for the most part, similar to those for Court of Appeal habeas corpus cases. However, unlike Court of Appeal proceedings, the rules for superior court cases set forth procedural time lines. § 8.123, appendix B, “California Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus,” part I, “Typical proceedings to initial decision,” may help in visualizing the process.

38The same standard applies when the appellate court is considering a habeas corpus petition after denial of a petition in the superior court in the same case. (In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 249; In re Wright (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 788, 801-802.) See § 8.51 .post.

39Compensation for services in the superior court generally must be sought in that court, rather than under the appellate appointment. Counsel should contact the assigned ADI staff attorney about the particular situation.
1. Initial ruling on petition [§ 8.46]

The court must rule on the petition within 60 days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551(a)(3).) This means the court must make a preliminary determination whether the case is to go forward – that is, it must deny the petition, issue an order to show cause, or request an informal response. (Rule 4.551(a)(4).) In doing so, the court must assume the petitioner’s factual allegations are true and then decide whether they would, if proven, establish a right to relief. (Pen. Code, § 1476; rule 4.551(c)(1).) The court may deny the petition summarily if it fails to state a prima facie case for relief. It must issue an order to show cause if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. (Pen. Code, § 1476; rule 4.551(c)(1).)

2. Informal response [§ 8.47]

California Rules of Court, rule 4.551(b) provides for an informal response procedure to assist the superior court in assessing the sufficiency of the petition, similar to that in rule 8.385(b) for Court of Appeal proceedings. The informal response must be filed within 15 days after the court requests it. (Rule 4.551(b)(2).) The petitioner must be given an opportunity to file an informal reply (due 15 days after the response). (Rule 4.551(b)(2) & (3).) After allowing a time for a reply, the court must either deny the petition or issue an order to show cause within 45 days from the filing of the informal response. (Rule 4.551(a)(5).)

3. Later proceedings [§ 8.48]

If the court issues an order to show cause and the petitioner is indigent, it must appoint counsel. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.551(c)(2).) The respondent may file a return within 30 days, and the petitioner may file a denial (i.e., traverse) within 30 days after that. (Rule 4.551(d) & (e).) Within 30 days of the petitioner’s denial or expiration of the time for filing one, the court must either grant or deny the relief sought or, if needed, order an evidentiary hearing. (Rule 4.551(f).) An order denying the petition must include a statement of reasons. (Rule 4.551(g).) The court may reconsider an order granting relief within the 60 days the People have to appeal. (Jackson v. Superior Court (People) (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1051.)

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40 The procedures for responding to a failure to rule are rather Byzantine. (See rule 4.551(a)(3)(B).)
J. **Review of Habeas Corpus Decision**  

[§ 8.49]

1. **Filing in Court of Appeal after superior court decision**  

The denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus by the superior court is not appealable. (Pen. Code, § 1506; *In re Clark* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767, fn. 7; see *People v. Gallardo* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 986.) The remedy is to file a new petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal.

Unlike a denial, the *grant* of a writ of habeas corpus is appealable. (Pen. Code, § 1506.) The standard of review when the People appeal a grant is the same as that on appeal after a trial. The court applies the substantial evidence test to pure questions of fact and the abuse of discretion standard to decisions within the lower court’s discretion, and independently reviews questions of law. If there are mixed questions of law and fact, the Court of Appeal’s review uses a substantial evidence standard when the decision is predominantly factual and a de novo one when it is predominantly legal. (*People v. Waidla* (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 730.)

2. **Factual findings**  

When the Court of Appeal considers a habeas corpus petition filed after denial of a petition in the superior court in the same case, the court is exercising its original as opposed to appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal is thus acting as finder of fact and makes its own determination. Nevertheless, as when it considers the findings of a referee it has appointed, it gives the factual findings of the lower court “great weight,” particularly with respect to credibility determinations. (*In re Resendiz* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 249; *In re Wright* (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 788, 801-802; § 8.43, ante.)

3. **Supreme Court review**  

Although the Court of Appeal denies or grants the petition, relief may be sought from the California Supreme Court by a petition for review (Pen. Code, § 1506; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(a)(1)) or, if necessary, a new habeas corpus petition in the Supreme Court. Since the general rule is that writ relief will be denied if adequate appellate remedies are available, normally a petition for review should be sought. However, if it is necessary to present additional materials (for example, newly discovered information) or if time considerations make the appellate remedy (petition for review) inadequate, then a petition for habeas corpus would be appropriate.

A petition for review must be filed within 10 days after a decision denying habeas corpus relief becomes final as to the Court of Appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.500(e)(1). A denial is final in 30 days if (1) it is filed on the same day as a related appeal or (2) an order to show cause was issued (rule 8.387(b)(1) & (2)(B)). Thus a petition for review is due in the 30 to 40-day window after decision. Otherwise, a denial is final immediately, and the petition for review is due 10 days after the decision. (Rule 8.387(b)(2)(A).) The Court of Appeal may order earlier finality as to that court for good cause. (Rule 8.387(b)(3)(A).)

If the Court of Appeal decided the habeas corpus petition without issuing an order to show cause and without consolidating it with a related appeal, separate petitions for review must be filed for the habeas corpus and appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(d).)

§ 8.124, appendix B, part II, “Proceedings to review initial decision,” a flow chart, may help in visualizing the review process.

IV. OTHER APPLICATIONS OF STATE HABEAS CORPUS

Habeas corpus has applications in other circumstances than a post-conviction challenge to the judgment under which the petitioner is constrained. While detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter, examples encountered in appellate practice include:

A. Late or Defective Notice of Appeal

Although habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, it may be used to establish a constructive filing of a notice of appeal when the petitioner reasonably relied on counsel to file a timely notice of appeal and counsel failed to do so.41 (In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72; see also Rodriguez v. United States (1969) 395 U.S. 327.) Habeas corpus can also be used to establish constructive filing of a writ petition with a deadline. (In re Antilia (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 622; see § 8.83, post.)

Habeas corpus may also be used to validate a late-filed appeal on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, when trial counsel failed to consult with the client about an appeal and a reasonable defendant might have wanted to appeal. (Roe v. Flores-

41Practice note: Courts vary in their handling of requests for late filing of a notice of appeal. A motion is used in some courts, while others require a formal petition for writ of habeas corpus. (See People v. Zarazua (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1054.) Counsel should consult with the project if the situation arises.
Ortega (2000) 528 U.S. 470.) Another possible ineffective assistance of counsel issue would be based on failure to obtain timely a certificate of probable cause in a guilty plea appeal.

This subject is treated in § 2.115 et seq. of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started.”

B. Release Pending Appeal [§ 8.55]

Before trial, a writ of habeas corpus may be used to review either a denial of release or the imposition of excessive bail. After judgment, the superior court’s denial of release pending appeal may be challenged by a habeas corpus petition or, more simply, an application under California Rules of Court, rule 8.312.\(^{42}\) (In re Pipinos (1982) 33 Cal.3d 189, 196-197; In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921; People v. McGuire (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 687, 700, fn. 14, citing People v. Lowery (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 902, 904.) See § 3.37 et seq. of chapter 3, “Pre-Briefing Responsibilities: Record Completion, Extensions of Time, Release on Appeal,” for an extended discussion of release pending appeal.

C. In-Prison Conditions and Administrative Decisions, Parole, and Other Issues Arising After Judgment\(^{43}\) [§ 8.56]

Habeas corpus may be used to challenge in-prison conditions, administrative decisions such as credits and discipline, and similar matters. (E.g., In re Cabrera (2012) 55 Cal.4th 683; In re Arias (1986) 42 Cal.3d 667, 678; In re Fratus (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1339.) A petition seeking to remedy unlawful custodial conditions or administrative decisions should be filed in the district or division in which the petitioner is in custody. (In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 583-584; Griggs v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 341, 347.) If the proceeding becomes moot as to the petitioner personally during litigation because the individual matter is resolved, but the inmate’s complaint is a matter of broad public concern or is a recurring issue for other prisoners and the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the court may permit it to proceed

\(^{42}\)Before 2004, the provision for a bail application to the reviewing court was in rule 32 and before 2006, the provision for a bail application was in rule 30.2.

\(^{43}\)Counsel are cautioned that an appellate appointment does not cover such proceedings. Counsel may seek compensation elsewhere or refer the client to a prisoner assistance organization. The ADI website maintains a partial list of prisoner assistance resources. http://www.adi-sandiego.com/legal_prisoner_rights.html Counsel can also provide habeas corpus forms and instructions on filing them.
as a “class action” vehicle, figuratively speaking. (In re Carr (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 962, 964, fn. 1; In re Brindle (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 660, 670; see also In re Jackson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 501, 504, fn. 1; In re Davis (1979) 25 Cal.3d 384.)

A finding by the Board of Parole Hearings that a prisoner is not suitable for parole is subject to state habeas corpus review.\(^4\) (In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 584.) Similarly, habeas corpus may be used to contest the reasonableness of parole conditions. (In re David (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 675.) A petition attacking denial of parole is not a challenge to the conditions of confinement and should be filed in the county in which judgment was imposed, rather than the county in which petitioner is incarcerated. (Id. at p. 593.) The Board’s or Governor’s decision denying parole is subject to a limited judicial review by habeas corpus, to determine only whether the decision is supported by “some evidence.” (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 625; In re Scott (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 573; In re Smith (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 489.)

D. Contempt [§ 8.57]

Code of Civil Procedure section 1209 et seq. and Penal Code section 166 set forth the statutory provisions covering contempt.

Direct contempt is conduct in the immediate presence of the judge, such as disruptive or disrespectful courtroom behavior. It may be dealt with summarily by the judge against whom and in whose court the offense was committed. (E.g., In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 247, 256, 259 [in-court disparagement of trial judge]; In re Ciraolo (1969) 70 Cal.2d 389, 393 [false declaration about statements made by judge].) A finding of direct contempt requires an order reciting the facts constituting the contempt, adjudging the person guilty, and prescribing the punishment. The facts as recited must show on their face a legal contempt. (Id. at p. 394.)

\(^4\)Federal habeas corpus is available to review state parole decisions alleged to violate such provisions of the federal Constitution as due process or ex post facto. Federal review is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), at 28 United States Code section 2241 et seq. Section 2254 of AEDPA requires a deferential standard of review of these decisions. (Himes v. Thompson (9th Cir. 2003) 336 F.3d 848, 852-854.) Section 2244(d) applies a one-year statute of limitations to filing for federal relief. (Redd v. McGrath (9th Cir. 2003) 343 F.3d 1077; see also Shelby v. Bartlett (9th Cir. 2004) 391 F.3d 1061). See chapter 9, “The Courthouse Across the Street: Federal Habeas Corpus.”
Indirect contempt occurs outside the courtroom – for example, disobedience of a court order. (E.g., *Kreling v. Superior Court* (1941) 18 Cal.2d 884, 887 [violation of injunction].) The accused is entitled to notice of the accusations, in the form of a declaration setting forth the facts constituting the alleged contempt, and an order to show cause giving him an opportunity for a defense. (*Warner v. Superior Court* (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 821, 824; *In re Felthoven* (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 466, 468-469.) If punitive sanctions are imposed, the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. (*Hicks v. Feiock* (1988) 485 U.S. 624, 632, fn. 5; *Mitchell v. Superior Court* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1230, 1256.)

1. **Procedures for reviewing contempt order** [§ 8.58]

Habeas corpus is available to review an adjudication of contempt imposing punitive (as opposed to remedial) sanctions, involving incarceration of the accused. (*In re Buckley* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 247, 259 [in-court disparagement of trial judge]; *Kreling v. Superior Court* (1941) 18 Cal.2d 884, 887 [violation of injunction alleged to be void].)

Certiorari is another remedy. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1222; *Hawk v. Superior Court* (1972) 42 Cal.App.3d 108, 115; see also § 8.75, post.)

A criminal contempt conviction under Penal Code section 166 is appealable as a misdemeanor. (*In re Buckley* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 259.)

2. **Jurisdiction** [§ 8.59]

To make a finding of contempt, the trial court must have “jurisdiction,” in a specialized meaning of the term.

Jurisdiction to find a direct contempt committed in the immediate presence of the court requires an order reciting the facts, adjudging guilt, and prescribing the punishment. The facts recited must demonstrate on their face the commission of a legal contempt. (*In re Buckley* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 247.)

Jurisdiction to find an indirect contempt, disobedience of a court order outside the presence of the court, requires specific factual findings:

The facts essential to jurisdiction for a contempt proceeding are (1) the making of the order; (2) knowledge of the order; (3) ability of the respondent to render compliance; (4) willful disobedience of the order. The record of the court must affirmatively show upon its face the facts upon
which jurisdiction depends so that an appellate court can determine if a
contempt has been committed.

(Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1736, internal
 citations and quotation marks omitted [violation of consent decree].)

3. Standards of review [§ 8.60]

In reviewing an adjudication of contempt, the reviewing court’s sole responsibility
is to determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction to render the judgment. (In re
Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 247.) “Jurisdiction” has the specialized meaning
described in § 8.59, ante.

A contempt judgment is construed in favor of the accused – that is, the appellate
court does not presume it is justified unless shown otherwise, but instead requires that
each element of jurisdiction, in the specialized sense described in § 8.59, ante, be
demonstrated affirmatively on the face of the record. (Mitchell v. Superior Court (1989)
49 Cal.3d 1230, 1256; In re Liu (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 135, 146; see also In re Cassill
136.)

This principle does not mean, however, that the appellate court must take a view of
the evidence least favorable to upholding the order. (City of Vernon v. Superior Court
(1952) 38 Cal.2d 509, 517.) The standard is whether there was any substantial evidence
before the trial court to sustain its jurisdiction, and the power to weigh the evidence rests
with the trial court. (In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 247; City of Vernon, at p. 517;
Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1737.) If punitive
sanctions are imposed, the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt (Hicks v. Feiock
and therefore the appellate court must determine whether under the evidence the trial
court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the accused was guilty of contempt.

E. Civil Commitments [§ 8.61]

Because civil commitments involve custody of the person, habeas corpus may be
used to challenge the legality of the confinement when appellate remedies are unavailable
or inadequate. For example, in proceedings under the Sexually Violent Predator Act, the
appropriate remedy for challenging a probable cause finding is a habeas corpus petition,
not a motion to dismiss under Penal Code section 995. (People v. Talhelm (2000) 85
Cal.App.4th 400, 404-405.) Habeas corpus is also used for seeking dismissal of an SVP
petition when the underlying judgment has been reversed on appeal. (In re Smith (2008)
42 Cal.4th 1251; In re Franklin (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 386.) Habeas corpus is used in Lanterman-Petris-Short conservatorship proceedings to challenge short-term detentions. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § § 5275, 5353.) It is the appropriate procedure for testing the administrative placement of an mentally disordered offender and for raising a claim that the individual’s confinement in a prison facility violates his constitutional rights. (People v. Gram (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1125.)

F. Reinstatement of Appeal  [§ 8.62]

A petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in a reviewing court may be used after an appeal to challenge the appellate proceedings on such grounds as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. If the petition is successful, recall of the remittitur is an appropriate remedy. (People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 396-397; In re Smith (1970) 3 Cal.3d 192, 203-204; In re Grunau (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 997; People v. Valenzuela (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 381, 388, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 484, 490, fn. 12; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.272(c)(2), 8.366(a), 8.540(c)(2).) Alternatively, a motion to recall the remittitur may be used when the grounds do not depend on facts outside the record. (Mutch, at pp. 396-397 [fundamental change in law, altering elements of the offense, after original opinion]; People v. Lewis (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 874, 879.)

Habeas corpus may also be used to seek reinstatement of an appeal dismissed under California Rules of Court, rule 8.360(c)(5) for failure to file an opening brief. (In re Serrano (1995) 10 Cal.4th 447, 450.) A motion to reinstate is commonly used, as well.

G. Dependency and Family Law Applications  [§ 8.63]


Other family law applications include non-dependency child custody issues (In re Richard M. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 783, 789) and adoption-related proceedings (see generally Adoption of Alexander S. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 857, 866-868).
H. Other Applications  [§ 8.64]

Habeas corpus is occasionally used in other ways than those outlined above; this discussion does not purport to enumerate all such ways. Some of the most commonly encountered applications in criminal appellate practice might be seeking habeas corpus in lieu of appeal when because of extreme time pressures appellate remedies are inadequate (In re Quackenbush (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1305; In re Duran (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d. 632, 635), securing immediate release of an inmate who has already served all the time legally authorized, and challenging on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds the validity of a prior conviction used to enhance a sentence in a current proceeding (see Custis v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 485, 497; People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 424, 435; cf. Garcia v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 953, 964-966).45

V. OTHER EXTRAORDINARY WRITS IN CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE PRACTICE  [§ 8.65]

Criminal appellate practitioners seldom need to apply for writ relief other than habeas corpus, but occasionally may have to consider use of coram nobis or coram vobis, supersedeas, mandate or prohibition, certiorari, or other common law or statutory writs. The writs most likely to be encountered in appellate practice are mentioned here, with a brief description of their typical uses and requirements. Other resources offer more comprehensive treatment. (E.g., San Diego County Bar Association, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001) ch. 5; Fischer et al., Appeals and Writs in Criminal Cases (Cont.Ed.Bar 2000, rev. 2006) § 2.1 et seq., p. 347 et seq.)

A. Writs of Error Coram Nobis and Error Coram Vobis  [§ 8.66]

A petition for writ of error coram nobis in the criminal law context is filed in the superior court that rendered judgment and is the equivalent of a post-judgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea or a motion to vacate the judgment. If the judgment was previously appealed and affirmed, a petition for writ of error coram vobis is filed in the reviewing court.

45A challenge to a prior conviction enhancement grounded on failure to comply with Boykin-Tahl requirements may, in contrast, be done by a motion to strike in the current proceeding. (Allen, at pp. 426-427; see Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.)
1. **Coram nobis as motion to vacate judgment** [§ 8.67]

In its function as a motion to vacate the judgment, a writ of error *coram nobis* may be granted when three requirements are met:

(1) [T]he petitioner has shown that some fact existed which, without fault of his own, was not presented to the court at the trial on the merits, and which if presented would have prevented the rendition of the judgment; (2) the petitioner has shown that the newly discovered evidence does not go to the merits of the issues tried; and (3) the petitioner has shown that the facts upon which he relies were not known to him and could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ.


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46In *Ibanez*, the alleged error was the failure of the trial court to admonish the defendant of the possibility of consequences under the Sexually Violent Predators Act before accepting the defendant’s plea of guilty. On the People’s appeal from the grant of the defendant’s *coram nobis* petition, the appellate court concluded that there was no error in the failure to advise and in any event *coram nobis* was unavailable because the alleged error was legal not factual. In footnote 13, the court also noted that ineffective assistance of counsel could not be raised by *coram nobis*. (*People v. Ibanez* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 537, 546, fn. 13.)
2. *Coram nobis* as motion to withdraw guilty plea  

[§ 8.68]

Without statutory authorization, no right exists to seek relief by a post-judgment motion to vacate a guilty plea. (*People v. Shokur* (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1398; see also *People v. Picklesimer* (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 337-338 [unless authorized by specific statute, motion made after judgment becomes final cannot be considered].) *Coram nobis* may be available, however. In a *coram nobis* petition seeking withdrawal of a guilty plea,
the defendant must make a showing similar to the “good cause” showing required for withdrawal of a plea before judgment under Penal Code section 1018.

For example, *coram nobis* relief may be available when a defendant has entered a plea because of a misrepresentation by a responsible public official, duress, fraud, or other fact overreaching free will and judgment. In such situations, the defendant has improperly been deprived of the right to a trial on the merits. (*People v. Goodrum* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 397, 400-401; *Mendez v. Superior Court* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 791, 796 [*coram nobis* not available to challenge guilty plea induced by prospect that perjured testimony would be offered against defendant, if neither prosecuting authorities nor court had reason to know about the perjury at the time].)\(^47\)


3. **Appeal of *coram nobis* denial** [§ 8.69]

Unlike the denial of a habeas corpus petition in the trial court, the denial of a *coram nobis* petition may be appealable to the Court of Appeal. As explained in *People v. Gallardo* (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 982:

Denial of a defendant’s request for *coram nobis* relief is appealable (*People v. Allenthorp* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 679, 683) unless the petition failed to state a prima facie case for relief (*People v. Kraus* (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 568, 575, fn. 4) or the petition merely duplicated issues which had or could have been resolved in other proceedings (*People v. Vaitonis* (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 156, 159; see generally [Prickett, *The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in California* (1990) 30 Santa Clara L.Rev. 1, 48-66].)


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\(^47\)An exception to this general rule is when the court fails to advise a defendant of immigration consequences pursuant to Penal Code section 1016.5; rather than a common law writ, the correct remedy is a statutory motion. (*People v. Carty* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1521, 1524-1526, 1531.)
4. **Coram vobis** [§ 8.70]

*Coram vobis* is essentially the same as *coram nobis*, except that it is addressed to a higher court, while *coram nobis* is addressed to the court in which the petitioner was convicted. (People v. Welch (1964) 61 Cal.2d 786, 790; In re De La Roi (1946) 28 Cal.2d 264, 276.) It is necessary if the trial court has no jurisdiction to vacate the judgment. For example, when the judgment has been affirmed in a previous appeal, the appropriate remedy is a *coram vobis* petition filed in the court that affirmed the judgment – that is, the Court of Appeal (or Supreme Court, if review was granted). (Pen. Code, § 1265, subd. (a).) Similarly, if an appeal is pending when the error is discovered, *coram vobis* in the appellate court is necessary. (People v. Malveaux (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1435.)

B. **Mandate, Prohibition, and Certiorari** [§ 8.71]

Writs of mandate, prohibition, and certiorari are “prerogative” writs. The theory and requirements of these writs are explained in several leading cases of the California Supreme Court. (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232; Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171; see also People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, and People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 877, 883-884 [distinguishing between habeas corpus and prerogative writs].)

Writ proceedings in reviewing courts are governed by California Rules of Court, rule 8.485 et seq.48 Decisions in some writ proceedings filed in the superior court may be reviewed by appeal (see § 2.74, chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get An Appeal Started”) or by a writ proceeding filed in the reviewing court (see Kinder v. Superior Court (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 574, 578, citing Robinson v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 379, 383-384).

1. **Basic purpose** [§ 8.72]

   a. **Mandate** [§ 8.73]

   A writ of mandate (mandamus) is an order from a higher court to a lower one, or to some other entity or individual, commanding that some act be performed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1084-1097.) Many applications in criminal cases are pretrial. Probably the most common use of mandate in criminal appellate practice is ordering the issuance of a

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48Rule 8.486, petitions; 8.487, opposition; 8.488, certificate of interested parties; 8.489, notice to trial court; 8.490, decisions; 8.492, sanctions; 8.493, costs.
A writ of prohibition is an order prohibiting a threatened act in excess of the jurisdiction of the court or other entity, such as a trial of a defendant once in jeopardy. (Code Civ. Proc., § § 1102-1105; Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 509, fn. 1.)

For purposes of prohibition, the term “jurisdiction” is given a broad meaning, beyond the most fundamental sense – the presence or absence of power over the subject matter. Prohibition also applies to situations in which a court has authority to act only in a particular manner, or to give only certain kinds of relief, or to act only with the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288-289.)

c. Certiorari  [§ 8.75]

Certiorari, also known as a writ of review, is used when a tribunal has acted in excess of jurisdiction and an appeal is an unavailable or inadequate remedy – for example, review by the Supreme Court of a decision of the appellate division of the
superior court, or review of a contempt judgment.\(^{51}\) (Code Civ. Proc., § § 1067-1077; see *Mitchell v. Superior Court* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1230; *Dvorin v. Appellate Dep’t of Superior Court* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 648; *In re Buckley* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 240, fn. 1, citing *John Breuner Co. v. Bryant* (1951) 36 Cal. 2d 877, 878; *Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 454-455.) As with prohibition, for purposes of certiorari the term “jurisdiction” is construed to mean considerably more than fundamental power to act on the subject matter. (*Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal* (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288-289.)

\(^{51}\)Habeas corpus is also an appropriate remedy for reviewing a contempt adjudication if the contemnor is incarcerated. (*In re Buckley* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 240, fn. 1; see § 8.57 et seq., ante.)

2. **Petition and informal opposition, reply**  [§ 8.76]

A petition for a prerogative writ must comply with rule 8.486 of the California Rules of Court. (See also rules 8.204 as to form and length, 8.44(a) as to number of copies, and 8.25 as to service and filing.) It must explain any failure to seek relief in a lower court, must name the respondent and any real party in interest, must identify any related appeal, must be verified, and must include points and authorities. (Rule 8.486(a).) It must be accompanied by an adequate record and supporting documents. (Rule 8.486(b).)\(^{52}\) The form of supporting documents is governed by rule 8.486(c). Service is under rule 8.486(e.)

The respondent or real party in interest may file a preliminary opposition within 10 days stating legal and factual bases why the relief should not be granted. The petitioner may reply within 10 days. (Rule 8.487(a).)

3. **Court response and return or opposition, reply**  [§ 8.77]

When an appellate court considers a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition the court may: (1) deny the petition summarily; (2) issue an alternative writ or order to show cause; or (3) grant a peremptory writ\(^{53}\) in the first instance after giving the required notice

\(^{52}\)If the petitioner is a corporation or other entity, a certificate of interested parties under rule 8.208 is required. (Rule 8.488(b).)

\(^{53}\)A “peremptory” writ is an order for ultimate relief. It may be issued after an alternative writ or an order to show cause or “in the first instance,” without such a prior order. (E.g., *Albertson v. Superior Court* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 796 [alternative writ, followed by peremptory writ]; *Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International
and opportunity for opposition. *(Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1239; Code Civ. Proc., § § 1088, 1105; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.487(a)(4).)* It may also grant or deny a request for a temporary stay. *(Rule 8.487(a)(4).)*

a. **Summary denial**  
[§ 8.78]

The court may deny a petition summarily, before or after receiving preliminary opposition. *(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.487(a)(4).)* A “summary denial” is one without an order to show cause or alternative writ and without a written opinion or opportunity for oral argument. *(Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 898 [summary denial with a brief statement of reasons does not establish law of the case, even if a decision on the merits is the sole possible ground; declaring “firm rule that a denial without an alternative writ and written opinion does not establish law of the case”]; cf. Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024 [setting of case for oral argument and decision by full opinion is equivalent of order to show cause and means the decision is not “summary denial”; thus it becomes final 30 days after filing as to deciding court under current rule number 8.490(b)(2)]; Frisk v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 402, 413-417 [denial of writ after notice under Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, with full opinion, is law of the case and final as to deciding court in 30 days, in case where statute requires writ as the only available means of review]; see also People v. Medina (1972) 6 Cal.3d 484 [summary denial without opinion of pretrial writ challenging Penal Code section 1538.5 denial is not law of the case or res judicata on subsequent appeal].)*

Oral argument and a written opinion are not required when a writ is resolved by a summary denial. *(Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.)* The decision is final immediately. *(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.490(b)(1), 8.532(b)(2)(C).)* With a summary denial, the writ proceeding does not become a “cause,” and the denial does not establish law of the case. *(Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888.)*

b. **Alternative writ or order to show cause**  
[§ 8.79]

The court may issue an alternative writ or order to show cause, before or after receiving preliminary opposition. An alternative writ commands the respondent either to perform a specific act or to show cause why it has not done so. *(Code Civ. Proc., §*
An order to show cause invites further argument in support of the respondent’s position in a formal return, which may be by demurrer and/or a verified answer, filed within 30 days of the alternative writ or order to show cause. The petitioner may reply within 15 days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.487(b).)

If the respondent performs the act specified in an alternative writ, the matter does not become a “cause,” and the proceeding is moot. (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.) If the respondent files a return instead or an order to show cause is issued, the matter is a cause. In that case, an opportunity for oral argument and a written decision, which becomes law of the case, are required. (Ibid.; Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894-895; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178, fns. 5 & 6; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 2, 14.) The decision is final in 30 days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.490(b)(2), 8.532(b)(1).)

### c. Peremptory writ in the first instance

The court may grant a peremptory writ in the first instance – that is, order ultimate relief without first issuing an alternative writ or order to show cause. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088.) If the court is considering such a remedy, it must notify the parties and provide an opportunity for opposition. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178-180; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.487(a)(4) & (b)(1).) This accelerated procedure should be used only sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. (See Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1261; Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1222-1223; Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35.)


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d. **Disposition** [§ 8.81]

When the court has issued an alternative writ or order to show cause or is ordering peremptory relief in the first instance, the decision must be in the form of a written opinion with reasons stated. (*Lewis v. Superior Court* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.)

If the Court of Appeal grants ultimate relief, the opinion itself is not a peremptory writ. The writ cannot issue until the case is final as to the Supreme Court. (*Ng v. Superior Court* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 33-34; *Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc.* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 181; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.532(b.).)

C. **Supersedeas** [§ 8.82]

Supersedeas is an order staying a judgment or order pending appeal. It is seldom encountered in criminal practice, but can be used to stay potential harm such as a custodial condition of probation. (*In re Manuel P.* (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 48, 72-73; *In re Batey* (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 541, 542; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.112.)

D. **Statutory Writs** [§ 8.83]

Sometimes a statute specifically permits or requires review by writ – usually to avoid the delay entailed in an appeal. Such a procedure, called a “statutory writ,” may be the exclusive remedy for review or may be an alternative to appeal.55

Many such provisions involve interlocutory orders in ongoing trial proceedings. (E.g., Code Civ. Proc. § § 170.3, subd. (d), 170.6 [disqualification of trial judge]; Pen. Code, § § 871.6 [delay in preliminary hearing], 999a [denial of motion to set aside information or indictment], 1511 [trial date], 1512 [severance or discovery], 1538.5, subds. (i) & (o) [denial of search and seizure suppression motion], 4011.8 [denial of application for voluntary mental health services by person in custody]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707 and Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.772(j) [fitness for juvenile delinquency proceedings], construed in *People v. Chi Ko Wong* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, disapproved on another ground in *People v. Green* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 33-35.)

Other statutory writs involve final judgments potentially affecting the immediate public welfare. (E.g., Pen. Code, § 1238, subd. (d) [review sought by People of order

55See San Diego County Bar Association, California Appellate Practice Handbook (7th ed. 2001), chapter 5, sections 5.25 through 5.56, for a catalog of civil, criminal, and juvenile statutory writs.
granting probation]; Health & Saf. Code, § 11488.4, subd. (h) [challenge to order declaring seized property not subject to forfeiture].) An appellate practitioner might encounter such a case on occasion.

Usually statutory writs are mandate, prohibition, or certiorari in form. They may, however, entail a specially prescribed procedure created by statute and/or rule. (E.g., Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, subd. (l) & 366.28; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450, 8.452, 8.454, 8.456 [review of order for permanency plan hearing or order for placement of child after termination of parental rights].) Most statutory writs have short, jurisdictional time limits. However, the doctrine of constructive filing (see § 8.54, ante, and § 2.115 et seq. of chapter 2, “First Things First: What Can Be Appealed and How To Get an Appeal Started”) can be invoked to determine a writ petition was timely filed. (In re Antilia (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 622.)
Habeas corpus proceedings are governed generally by Penal Code section 1473 et. seq. California Rules of Court, rule 8.384 governs petitions by an attorney filed in the Court of Appeal or California Supreme Court. California Rules of Court, rule 8.380 deals with pro per petitions, and rule 4.550 et seq. governs petitions filed in the superior court. The following discussion applies to petitions filed by counsel in the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court.

I. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS  [§ 8.85]

Information about filing and service requirements is summarized in chart form in chapter 1, “The ABC’s of Panel Membership: Basic Information for Appointed Counsel,” § 1.154, appendix C.

A. Form  [§ 8.86]

A petition filed by attorney in a reviewing court may be on Judicial Council form MC-275. If it is not filed on the MC-275 form, the petition must include the information required by that form, and both the petition and any accompanying points and authorities must comply with rule 8.204(a) and (b) of the California Rules of Court. (Rule 8.384(a)(1) & (2).)

B. Cover  [§ 8.87]

A cover is required for a petition filed by an attorney, even if the petition is on form MC-275. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.384(a)(1).) The cover must be red. (Rule 8.40(b)(1).) It should identify the petitioner’s custodian and comply, to the extent applicable, with rule 8.204(b)(10).

56 The form is available from the California court website:

57 If the petitioner is in constructive rather than physical custody – for example, on probation, bail pending appeal, parole – the name of the custodian (such as the chief parole agent, chief probation officer, or superior court) should be used. (See generally 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Writs, § 14, pp. 533-535.)
C. Service  [§ 8.88]

Proof of service must be attached to the petition. (See Pen. Code, § 1475, ¶ 3.)

1. Persons to be served  [§ 8.89]

The rules do not specify service requirements, but counsel should err on the side of inclusiveness and serve those who reasonably may be affected or have an interest in the petition – for example, the Attorney General, district attorney, custodian of the petitioner, the superior court or Court of Appeal (unless filed there, of course), trial and/or appellate counsel, ADI, etc. – as dictated by the nature of the petition and issues.

Penal Code section 1475, third paragraph, specifically requires service on the district attorney “of the county wherein such person is held in custody or restraint” if the person is held under restraint by an officer of any court. That statute also has special service requirements when the person is in local custody for violation of an ordinance or when the petition is challenging a parole decision and an order to show cause has issued.

2. Method of service  [§ 8.90]

Practices may vary as to whether the court will permit service by mail on the respondent. If it is filed in the Court of Appeal, proof of service by mail is usually adequate. When immediate relief is requested, personal service is advisable. Counsel may check local rules, the appellate court clerk’s office, or the assigned ADI attorney for specific requirements.

D. Filing Copies  [§ 8.91]

The number of copies is governed by California Rules of Court, rule 8.44(b). (Rule 8.384(c).)

The Court of Appeal requires an original and four copies of a petition filed by counsel and one set of any supporting documents for original proceedings. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.44(b)(3) & (5).)
The Supreme Court requires an original and 10 copies of the petition and an original and two copies of supporting documents. (Rule 8.44(a)(2) & (3).)

Note: It is advisable to request a conformed copy. If a petition is being filed by mail, include an extra copy of the petition with a postage-paid, self-addressed return envelope.

E. Other Requirements  [§ 8.92]

Specific requirements for the formal petition, points and authorities, etc., are covered below.

Local rules: Local rules should additionally be consulted since there are variances in procedure. (See, e.g., Ct. App., Fourth Dist., Local Rules, rule 1, Request for an immediate stay or other immediate relief in writ proceedings, and rule 2, Covers on documents filed with the court.) Another source of information is the Internal Operating Practices and Procedures (IOPP’s) of the Courts of Appeal. Counsel may also consult the appellate project (e.g., ADI) or the court clerk’s office. 58

II. CONTENTS OF FORMAL PETITION  [§ 8.93]

If counsel does not use form MC-275, the petition must contain all information requested on the form including:

A. Current Confinement  [§ 8.94]

The petition must state the place of detention if the petitioner is in physical custody and the name of the prison warden or other custodian. 59

58 Caution: Some divisions may not have updated their rules, IOPP’s, or websites to reflect the most recent changes.

59 If the petitioner is in constructive rather than physical custody – for example, on probation, bail pending appeal, parole – the name of the custodian (such as the chief parole agent, chief probation officer, or superior court) should be used. (See generally 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Writs, § 14, pp. 533-535.)
B. Underlying Proceedings  

1. **Court**  

   The petition must state the name and location of the court under whose authority the person is confined (such as the superior court in which judgment was entered).

2. **Identity of case**  

   The petition must identify the kind of proceeding (such as criminal or juvenile delinquency) and the case number.

3. **Offense**  

   The petition must include a description of the offense, including the code section.

4. **Proceedings**  

   The petition must indicate the plea entered, the type of trial (such as jury, court, or submission on preliminary hearing transcript), and all relevant dates, including the dates of conviction and judgment.

5. **Sentence**  

   The petition must state the sentence, with the expected date of release, if applicable.

6. **Previous review**  

   The petition must describe the review previously sought – such as appeal, Supreme Court, or habeas corpus – including the courts, case numbers, issues raised, any hearings held, the results, and all relevant dates. Even if the answer is “none,” the petition should so

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60 Under Penal Code section 1475, information about previous writ applications, any related proceedings, and the results must be included. Copies of the previous petitions and a certified transcript of any evidentiary hearing must be included. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.384(b)(1) & (2).)
state. (See Pen. Code, § 1475, ¶ 2.) Copies of the petitions, excluding exhibits, must be attached; except that if the previous petition was in the Supreme Court or same Court of Appeal the current petition need only so state and identify the previous case by name and number. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.384(b)(1).)

7. Administrative decision [§ 8.102]

If from an administrative decision, the petition must include a description of that decision and what review of it was sought.

C. Counsel [§ 8.103]

The petition must provide the name and address of the current attorney, trial counsel, and appellate, habeas corpus or other counsel if applicable.

D. Possible Procedural Irregularities [§ 8.104]

Counsel have an affirmative duty to address why applicable procedural bars do not preclude consideration of their claims. Failure to do so may be considered an abuse of the writ, subject to sanctions and grounds for denying the claims without consideration of the merits. (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 453; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 798, fn. 35.)

1. Delay [§ 8.105]

The petition should explain any delay in filing it or in discovering the claimed ground for relief.

2. Failure to raise on appeal [§ 8.106]

The petition should explain why the current issue was not raised on appeal (for example: “The issue is based on facts outside of the appellate record”).

3. Failure to file in lower court [§ 8.107]

If it might have been filed in a lower court, the petition should explain why it was not.
4. **Failure to exhaust administrative remedies**  

If administrative remedies were arguably available but were not exhausted, the petition should explain why they were inadequate.

E. **Relief Sought**  

The petition must identify the nature of the relief sought – such as “new trial,” “recall of remittitur,” “order deeming notice of appeal timely filed,” “immediate release from custody,” etc.

F. **Grounds for Relief**  

The petition must include a summary of the grounds for relief, including all essential supporting facts and basic supporting law. These can be expanded in the points and authorities, but the formal petition should be self-contained, so as to state a cause of action on its face. References to matters in the supporting documents must include citations to the index tab and page. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.384(a)(3).)

G. **Verification**  

1. **Requirement for petition**  

Verification is required by Penal Code sections 1474, paragraph 3, and 1475, paragraph 2.  

2. **Verification by Counsel**  

Because counsel may apply for habeas corpus relief on behalf of a client, verification by counsel satisfies this requirement. (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 783, fn. 5; see Pen. Code, § 1474.) However, a verification based on information and belief may be found defective. (Star Motor Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 201, 204-205; Perlman v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 568, 574.)

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61 A defectively verified petition may result in denial of relief. (Krueger v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 934, 939.)
Sample Verification by Counsel

I am an attorney admitted to practice before the courts of the State of California and have my office in (name of) County.

I represent the petitioner and am authorized to file this petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner is unable to make this verification because he is incarcerated at (place), California. I am filing this petition under the authority of Penal Code section 1474. I drafted this petition and know its contents.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

(Date and place of signing, signature, name, State Bar number, address, and other contact information.)

III. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES [§ 8.114]

This section should expand on the legal points summarized in the formal petition. It resembles an appellate brief. In form it must comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)-(b). (Rule 8.384(a)(2).) References to matters in the supporting documents must include citations to the index tab and page. (Rule 8.384(a)(3).)

IV. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS [§ 8.115]

California Rules of Court, rule 8.384(b)(1)-(3) covers the requirements for attachments and other supporting documents.

A. Required Attachments [§ 8.116]

All relevant records, declarations, and other documents necessary to establish right to relief must be attached as exhibits or, if substantial (such
as transcripts), lodged with the court. A copy of any previous petition pertaining to the same judgment must accompany the petition, along with a certified copy of a transcript of any evidentiary hearing.

B. Form [§ 8.117]

California Rules of Court, rule 8.486(c) governs the form of supporting documents if the petition is filed by counsel in a reviewing court. (See rule 8.384(b)(3).) Specifically, it requires attachments to be bound together at the end of the petition or in separate volumes, to be index-tabbed by number or letter, and to be consecutively paginated.

C. Number of Filing Copies [§ 8.118]

The Court of Appeal requires one set of supporting documents if bound separately from the petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.44(b)(5).) The Supreme Court requires an original and two copies of separately bound supporting documents. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.44(a)(3).) This is different from the number of copies of the petition. (See § 8.91, ante.)

V. PETITION FILED IN CONJUNCTION WITH APPEAL [§ 8.119]

A. Cover [§ 8.120]

The cover should state “Related Appeal Pending” and the name and number of the appeal. The petition and opening brief in the appeal must each be independent documents; neither should attempt to incorporate parts of the other by reference. (In re Ronald E. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 315, 322, fn. 3.)

B. Record [§ 8.121]

References to a reporter’s or clerk’s transcript are often necessary in the petition and points and authorities. If the references are brief, it is best to attach the pertinent pages of the record to the petition, along with a declaration that they are true and correct copies. If the references are substantial, a request for judicial notice of the appellate transcripts would be

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appropriate. Such a request should be made by motion filed separately from a brief or petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.252(a)(1), 8.386(e).)
CALIFORNIA POST-CONVICTION HABEAS CORPUS

(FLOW CHARTS)

PART I. TYPICAL PROCEEDINGS TO INITIAL DECISION [§ 8.123]

PART II. PROCEEDINGS TO REVIEW INITIAL DECISION [§ 8.124]
APPENDIX B – CALIFORNIA POST-CONVICTION HABEAS CORPUS

Part I. TYPICAL PROCEEDINGS TO INITIAL DECISION  

PETITION

Filed in either Court of Appeal or superior court.

COURT RESPONSE

SUMMARY DENIAL

Even if facts alleged in petition are true, no right to relief.

REQUEST FOR INFORMAL RESPONSE

Possible that petition has merit. State asked to justify custody.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Petition states prima facie case. State must show legality of custody.

STATE’S INFORMAL RESPONSE

State presents reasons why petition should not be granted.

INFORMAL REPLY BY PETITIONER

Petitioner answers points made in informal response.

COURT RESPONSE

SUMMARY DENIAL

Informal pleadings establish lack of right to relief.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Petition states prima facie case. State must show legality of custody.

FORMAL RETURN BY STATE

State provides facts or law responding to specific allegations in petition.

TRaverse BY PETITIONER

Petitioner responds to return and formally adopts allegations of petition.

EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Ordered by court if there are issues of fact.

DECISION

Court of Appeal petition: Court may transfer case to superior court, appoint referee to report back, or conduct proceedings itself.

Referee, if appointed, reports to Court of Appeal; parties may respond to findings. Court must permit oral argument.
Part II. PROCEEDINGS TO REVIEW INITIAL DECISION  [§ 8.124]

- **INITIAL DECISION BY SUPERIOR COURT: DENIAL OF PETITION**
  - NEW HABEAS PETITION IN COURT OF APPEAL
    - No right to appeal; petitioner must file new habeas corpus petition in Court of Appeal.
  - WRIT PROCESS IN COURT OF APPEAL
    - Same proceedings as above: summary denial, or informal process and/or formal process
- **INITIAL DECISION BY SUPERIOR COURT: GRANT OF PETITION**
  - APPEAL BY STATE
    - If petition granted by trial court, state can appeal to Court of Appeal.
  - APPEAL PROCESS
    - Regular appellate proceedings
- **INITIAL DECISION BY COURT OF APPEAL, RATHER THAN SUPERIOR COURT**
  - PETITION FOR REVIEW IN CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
    - Either party may petition for review after decision in the Court of Appeal.*

*See text for discussion of habeas petition in lieu of petition for review.